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No. 81-185 ASY 
Simopoulos (doctor/criminal defendant) ~from Va S Ct 
~for the ct) 
v. 
Virginia State/Criminal Timely (w/ext) 
SUMMARY: Appt argues that (1) the Va abortion statutP.s 
shift to the defendant the burden of establishing a medical 
necessity for an abortion, (2) his conviction violated due 
process because the prosecution presented no evidence that appt's 
acts caused the destruction or expulsion of the fetus, (3) Va's 
mandatory hospitalization requirement for second trimester . . . 
abortions is unconstitutional, and (4) on the facts of this cose 
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the mandatory hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional 
because the only available hospital required minors seeking 
second trimester abortions to have parental consent. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Appt is a licensed gynecologist. 
P.M., who was 17 and five and one-half months pregnant, came to 
appt and requested an abortion . In his clinic, appt injected 
. -
saline solution into P.M.'s amniotic cavity. She went to a motel 
room and two days later expelled the fetus. 
Appt was indicted under Va. Code §18.2-71 for performing a 
second trimester abortion outside a hospital. He was convicted 
and appealed to the Va S Ct. The Va S Ct rejected each of the 
contentions appt places before this Court. 
Appt argued that the indictment was defective because the 
state did not assume the burden of proving lack of a medical 
necessity for the abortion. In appt's view, shifting the burden 
of proof to the defendant violated United States v. Vuitch, 402 
U.S. 62 (1971). The Va S Ct pointed out that §18.2-71 makes no 
mention of medical necessity when defining an illegal abortion. 
Medical necessity is established as a defense in a later section, 
§18.2-74.1. Unlike this case, in Vuitch medical necessity was 
part of the enacting clause. Here, once the defendant invokes 
the medical necessity defense, the state has the burden of 
negating medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, in this case the evidence clearly showed an absence 
of medical necessity. Appt testified that his patient was 
depressed and that he was concerned about suicide. But the 
... 
- 3 -
patient testified she was merely scared, and appt's own 
handwritten notes described her conditions as "normal." 
The Va S Ct also found that there was sufficient evidence 
that appt had destroyed the fetus. Appt acknowledged that he 
administered saline solution to terminate the pregnancy, and his 
patient testified that appt told her that the fetus was 
destroyed. A medical examiner reported that the fetus was born 
dead. The court concluded that, in the absence of evidence of 
any other causative factor, the evidence was sufficient to show 
that the saline solution injection destroyed the fetus. 
Appt's challenge to the hospital requirement, §18.2-73, was 
also unpersuasive, according to the Va S Ct. In Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized that the state's interest 
in the mother's health becomes compelling at approximately the 
end of the first trimester. The Court specifically stated: 
"Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are 
requirements ... as to the facility in which the procedure is to 
be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a 
clinic .... " Id. at 163. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179 (1973), 
the Court struck down the Georgia hospitalization requirement 
because it included the first trimester and the evidence was 
insufficient to show that the requirement was reasonably related 
to maternal health. 
Applying these principles, the Va S Ct found sufficient 
-----------
evidence to support the second trimester hospitalization 
requirement. Appt's expert witnesses testified that a second-
trimester out-patient saline injection was a reasonably safe 
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medical procedure and explained that abortion patients could 
suffer from the disdain of hospital staff members. One expert 
cited a study that 65 percent of saline injection patients 
required no hospitalization after expelling the fetus, and 
another testified that complication rates are about the same 
whether the injection is given inside or outside a hospital. 
At the same time, though, on cross-examination the experts 
conceded that complications could develop. One acknowledged that 
major problems could arise if the solution entered the 
bloodstream too fast and bleeding occurred. Another admitted 
that saline injections entail risks which may require observation 
of the patient, including headache, vomiting, and on rare 
occasions abrupt swelling of the uterus. The same expert agreed 
that saline injections can result in extensive hemorrhaging, 
although hemorrhaging occurs for the most part only during labor. 
Thus, from the time the solution is injected until the fetus 
is expelled, the patient is exposed to certain risks, "some 
minor, others major, none precisely predictable." J.S. App 18a. 
The hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to the 
state's interest in protecting the mother's health. 
~or is the hospitalization requirement unreasonable as 
applied to Virginia. This case is unlike Margaret S. v. Edwards, 
488 F. Supp. 181 (ED La 1980), in which no Louisiana hospital 
performed second-trimester abortions, and Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (WD Mo 1980), 
in which only one Missouri hospital did so. Two northern 
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Virginia hospitals and 24 hospitals in the rest of Virginia 
provided abortion services in 1977. 
Even if access to abortion services was inconvenient or 
conditioned on parental consent, those difficulties were not 
created by the state. Section 18.2-75 permits hospitals to place 
certain restrictions on abortion services or to refuse to perform 
abortions altogether, but it does not require them to do so. See 
Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2688 (1980) (state need not 
remove obstacles to abortions which it did not create). Statutes 
are presumptively constitutional, and appt failed to carry his 
burden to overcome that presumption. 
Appt's conviction was thus affirmed. 
CONTENTIONS: Appt takes issue with the VaS Ct's rulings 
(1) Burden of Proof for Medical Necessity. In Vuitch, 402 
u.s. at 71, the Court stated that "the burden is on the 
prosecution to plead and prove that an abortion was not 
'necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health.'" 
The result in this case should not be different simply because of 
the location of the maternal health exception in the statutory 
scheme. 
(2) Proof of Causation. The prosecution presented no proof 
of whether a saline injection caused the fetus' demise and failed 
to demonstrate that there were no intervening causes during the 
two days while the patient was in the motel. Medical experts 
testified that not all saline injections cause a fetus to be 
expelled. When the Va S Ct observed that there was no proof of 
another causative factor, it missed the point; the critical fact 
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is that there was no proof that the saline injection was the 
causative factor. 
{3) Mandatory Hospitalization. Appt's experts testified 
that a second-trimester out-patient saline injection is an 
acceptable medical practice. The prosecution produced no 
evidence and no witnesses to counter this testimony. Some lower 
co~rts have declareo a se~o-;d t"rim;;t;; h~l requirement 
unconstitutional. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, supra; Wolfe v. 
Stumbo, No. C80-0285 L{A) {WD Ky Dec. 3, 1980) {not yet reported). 
Gary-Northwest v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 {ND Ind 1980), 
aff'd mem., 451 u.s. {1981), is not controlling. In that __.... 
decision, the DC upheld a mandatory hospitalization requirement 
for second trimester abortions, and this Court affirmed. But 
Gary-Northwest was complicated by procedural issues; it was an 
attempt to reopen the denial of a preliminary injunction five 
years earlier. In addition, the statute in Gary-Northwest 
defined hospital to include ambulatory out-patient surgical 
centers, whereas the Virgnia statute is more restrictive. Nor 
did Gary-Northwest present the argument that mandatory 
hospitalization is an unconstitutional delegation of power to 
hospitals, which can decide whether or not to perform abortions 
and on what conditions. Gary-Northwest was only a decision that 
the DC did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary 
injunction. 
The v~ s c:_ erred when it relied upon a presumption of \~ 
constitutionality. Strict scrutiny is applicable to abortion } 
statutes. 
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{4) Mandatory Hospitalization in Virginia. Only twenty-six 
Virginia hospitals perform any abortions. Only two in northern 
Virginia permit any second trimester abortions. Both of those 
require minors to have parental consent. If the state 
conditioned abortions on parental consent, it would violate 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52 {1976). Here, the 
state is responsible for the parental consent requirement because 
it authorized hospitals to impose the requirement under the 
conscience clause, §18.2-75. In effect, the state has permitted 
the denial of abortions to all minors who are afraid to obtain 
parental consent. 
DISCUSSION: {1) Burden of Proof for Medical Necessity. 
This issue is ~ a substantial federal question. Vuitch is not 
directly controlling, because it dealt with the construction of 
the D.C. abortion statute. Moreover, the VaS Ct adequately 
distinguished Vuitch when it pointed out that lack of medical 
necessity is not part of the offense. Medical necessity is an 
exception to the abortion offense, set forth in a section 
subsequent to the definition of the crime. See Patterson v. New 
York, 432 u.s. 197 {1977). 
Furthermore, the Va S Ct did not hold that the defendant 
bears the burden of proof. It only held that the defendant bears 
the burden of production: the Va S Ct stated that the prosecution 
has the burden of negating the maternal health necessity 
exception beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant "invokes" 
the defense. J S App lOa. 
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In addition, in this case the prosecution proved lack of 
medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. The patient 
testified that she was only scared, and appt•s own notes 
characterized her condition a~rmal. 
{2} Proof of Causation. Nor is this issue a substantial 
federal question. The patient testified that she took no drugs 
during her stay in the motel other than an analgesic which appt 
had prescribed. It was undisputed that appt had injected saline 
solution into the amniotic cavity. This evidence was sufficient 
to establish a connection between the destruction of the fetus 
and the saline injection. 
Appt notes that his experts testified that saline injections 
do not always cause a fetus to be expelled. But appt was not 
indicted for causing the fetus to be expelled. He was indicted 
for causing the fetus to be destroyed. See J S App lla. 
{3} Mandatory Hospitalization. At the outset, it should be 
underscored that neither appt nor the VaS Ct give appt•s 
evidence its full due. In Simopoulos v. Virginia State Board of 
Medicine, 644 F.2d 321 {CA4 1981}, the CA4 rejected on abstention 
grounds appt•s attempt to prevent the Board from suspending his 
right to practice medicine. In the course of his opinion, 644 
F.2d at 332 {Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting}, Judge 
Butzner spelled out the evidence appt presented at trial: 
[Appt] presented as witnesses the chairman of the 
department of obstetrics and gynecology at the Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine, an associate clinical 
professor in obstetrics and gynecology at George 
Washington University, and a Virginia physician who 
specializes in obstetrics and gynecology. These 
witnesses testified that the procedure followed by the 
doctor is acceptable medical practice in an outpatient 
1 
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facility, and they stated that the doctor's clinic was 
well equipped for such practice. One of the witnesses 
added that even when treatments to induce a second 
trimester abortion are administered at a Virginia 
hospital, where he had served as chairman of the 
department of obstetrics and gynecology, the patients 
are frequently allowed to leave the hospital before 
they abort. The state presented no witness to 
contradict this testimony. 
/ . 
The lower courts have reached vary1ng results on the 
constitutionality of second trimester hospitalization 
,-
requirements. See Margaret S., 4BB F. Supp. at 194-96 
(hospitalization requirement unconstitutional because no 
Louisiana hospitals perform second trimester abortions and 
because D & E method is as safe as childbirth up to eighteenth 
week); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, 4B3 F. Supp. at 
6B6-B7 (D & E procedure safest second trimester abortion method 
and hospitalization requirement invalid because only one western 
Missouri hospital will perform it) ; Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1215 (ND 
Ohio 1979) (refusing on the basis of plaintiff's evidence to 
abandon Roe v. Wade language that state may regulate after first 
trimester); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1317-lB (ND Ill 
197B) (citing Roe v. Wade and upholding hospitalization 
requirement) • 
In a recent decision, the CAB vacated the DC holding in 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City. Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, Nos. B0-1130 & B0-1530 (CAB 
July 15, 19Bl) (slip op.). The CAB accepted the DC's premise that 
a second trimester hospitalization requirement could be rendered 
·' 
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invalid by improved abortion procedures. But the CAS remanded 
for further factual findings to determine whether the 
hospitalization requirement in fact discouraged D & E abortions 
and whether nonhospitalized D & E abortions are considrably more 
dangerous than hospital procedures. Slip op. at 8-14. 
In Gary-Northwest, the DC rejected a challenge to a 
hospitalization requirement as applied to the D & E procedure, 
and this Court affirmed. 49 U.S.L.W. 3806.~~stices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun would have noted probable jurisdiction. 
It is difficult to discern whether the Gary-Northwest affirmance 
governs this appeal. The DC rested its constitutional argument 
on the Roe v. Wade language that hospitalization during the 
second trimester is permissible. The DC upheld the 
hospitalization requirement by finding that it furthered maternal 
health. 496 F. Supp. at 901-02. But at the same time, the DC 
stated that even if the plaintiffs prevailed on their legal 
theory that a safer abortion procedure could require alteration 
of Roe v. Wade, they would still lose because they had presented 
insufficient proof of safety to justify a preliminary injunction. 
Id. at 902-03. 
If the Gary-Northwest affirmance amounted to a holding that 
second trimester hospitalization requirements are ~ se 
constitutional, this issue is not now a substantial federal 
question. But if the affirmance rested on the quantum of the 
Gary-Northwest appt's proof, the Court should at least call for a 
response. The state in this case presented no evidence other 
than what it elicited on cross-examination, and appt's evidence 
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tended to show that saline injections could be performed safely 
outside hospitals. 
It should be noted, however, that this case is not an ideal 
one to review the hospitalization requirement. As Gary-Northwest 
illustrates, most of the challenges to the hospitalization 
requirement have been based on the newly-developed D & E method. 
The saline injection method is not as safe as the D & E 
procedure, and the saline injection method existed when Roe v. 
Wade was decided. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, 
483 F. Supp. at 686 n. 13. 
(4) Mandatory Hospitalization in Virginia. The only two 
northern Virginia hospitals that perform second trimester 
abortions require minors to have parental consent. According to 
appt, the hospitalization requirement combined with the practice 
of the only two available hospitals amounts to an invasion of a 
minor's privacy in violation of Danforth. One DC has accepted a 
virtually identical argument. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas 
City, 483 F. Supp. at 687 (second trimester hospitalization 
requirement falls because no hospital in Missouri will admit 
minor without parental consent). But the DC was subsequently 
reversed by the CAS. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, 
slip op. at 5-8 (constitutionality depends upon health-based 
rationale for state's requirement, not on the actions of private 
entities). 
A variation on this argument was rejected by the DC in Gary-
Northwest. See 496 F. Supp. at 896-7 (only one Indiana hospital 
performed nontherapeutic second trimester abortions). The DC, 
.. 
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like the Va. S. Ct., cited language in Harris ,v. McRae that the 
government need not remove obstacles that it did not create. 
Again, if this Court meant to endorse all the reasoning of Gary-
Northwest when it affirmed, there is no need to give this aspect 
of this case close attention. 
However, the Court may have rested the Gary-Northwest 
affirmance on the DC's decision not to grant a preliminary 
injunction because of the plaintiffs' proof. If so, then it 
cannot be said that this issue is insubstantial. The Harris v. 
McRae language may govern. On the other hand, the state may not 
have responsibility for a poor woman's indigency and at the same 
time have responsibility for parental consent requirements when 
it mandates hospitalization and then permits hospitals to require 
parental consent. Also, this aspect of the appeal is not 
hindered by the problems of proof surrounding the safety of the 
saline injection method, as is appt's general challenge to the 
hospitalization requirement. 
Given the ambiguity of the Gary-Northwest affirmance, call 
for a response. . I 
Of course, there 1s no response. 
September 21, 1981 Holleman Opn in petn 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: ABORTION CASES 
Attached is my record of today's conference 
votes on the several issues in the three abortion cases. 
I~ 
·>' .. 
, / 1 ~ 
~ ··rc{ L 
W.J.B-:'Jr. 
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The issue of "Parental Notification" in the Akron case 
was considered on the merits with a vote of 4 - 4. Actually, 
the question is not before the Court. It was held valid be-
low and nobody sought review of that holding here. 
lfp/ss 12/17/82 
81-185 Simopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82 
CJ absent due to illness. 
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the 
three issues before us. My yellow notes give some - but by 
no means all - of the details. 
Issue No. 1 - Burden of Proof on "Necessity" 
Affirmed: 8-0. 
Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of Evidence and Causation 
Affirmed: 8-0. 
Issue No. 3 - Hospitalization 
Affirmed: 5-3 
Votes to affirm: WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP, WHR, 
and SO'C. 
Reverse and remand: TM, HAB and JPS 
Virginia's provision for clinics distinguishes 
this case from Akron and Ashcroft. 
lfp/ss 04/05/83 SIM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
81-185 Sirnopoulos 
TO: Jim and Mark DATE: April 5, 1983 
.FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr . 
This memo is being dictated Monday evening at 
horne as I reread our opinion. It is prompted by our 
discussion of revising our opinion with the view of 
forestalling a move by other Chambers to vacate and 
remand. The observations and comments below are made at 
random, with no attempt at cohesion. 
1. At page 11 we say that the issue: 
"Is whether Virginia's licensing requirements 
for outpatient surgical clinics performing 
second trimester abortions are reasonable means 
of furthering the state's compelling interest in 
the woman's health". (p. 11). 
This framing of the issue is not likely to be 
accepted by Justices who wish to vacate and remand. I 
will not try to anticipate how they might define the 
issue. We might reframe our draft roughly as follows: 
"The issue here is the validity of Virginia's 
requirement that second trimester abortions be 
performed in a licensed 'hospital' as the term 
hospital is defined by regulations to include 





2. We have talked about the possibility of 
describing the regulations in general terms without making 
judgments as to the validity of specific provisions. The 
holding would be that the Virginia requirements that 
second trimester abortions be performed in outpatient 
hospitals, and the regulations implementing these 
requirements, are facially valid. 
3. I am inclined to think we could leave Part 
II, including subpart C, substantially as now written. 
4. Part III would have to · be revised 
substantially. The first two paragraphs that begin on 
page 14, except for the last sentence thereof (commencing 
at the top of p. 15), probably could be retained with some 
editing. 
The entire remaining portion of Part III would 
be rewritten briefly and in general terms. I will not 
undertake this beyond suggesting some thoughts as to what 
we might say and not say. 
First, we would not discuss specifically any of 
the "categories" of regulations identified briefly in Part 
II-C. Rather, the opinion could move summarily to a 
conclusion of facial validity on the record before us. We 
would repeat that appellant for its own reasons has chosen 
. ' 
. . ·
to challenge Virginia's entire 
ofsecond trimester abortions. 
regulatory requirements 
The Virginia statutes 
require "hospital" facilities that may include "clinics". 
They authorize the State Board to adopt regulations, and 
these permit such abortions only in outpatient surgical 
hospitals. 
Appellant has not questioned the validity of any 
particular regulation applicable to second trimeter 
abortions. We therefore have no occasion to consider the 
validity of each of them as applied in this case. 
Appellant's attack is focused on and limited to 
Virginia's hospitalization requirements in total. He 
contends specifically, with respect to this case, that his 
conviction was unlawful because Virginia may not require 
second trimester abortions even after 20/22 week of 
pregnancy- to be performed in the facilities authorized 
by Virginia law. Appellant knew - at least by time of his 
trial (see, supra, at that the specific 
hospitalization requirement was a licensed outpatient 
facility. But he chose to question any "hospitalization" 
requirement for second trimester abortions and to attack 




This requires that we consider only the facial 
validity of the Virginia requirements. We have compared 
these with the recommendations of ACOG and APHA, to be set 
forth either in the footnotes or in an appendix. Although 
there are differences in detail, the Virginia regulations 
are carefully drawn to conform generally with the 
standards recommended by ACOG and APHA. It clearly 
appears that the Virginia regulations are compatible with 
generally accepted medical standards applicable to the 
performance of second trimester abortions. We therefore 
conclude, on the basis of the record before us, that 
Virginia's regulations further the state's controlling 
interest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. 
We could put a footnote here somewhat along the 
lines of what we now have in the text on page 19. A state 
cannot be expected to adopt regulations that serve every 
case with the same degree of relevance, as " [a] state 
necessarily must have some latitude in adopting 
regulations of general application in this sensitive area" 
(perhaps including the balance of the paragraph beginning 
on page 19) . 
5. I hardly need say that the foregoing is the 
roughest sort of summary of how Part III might be 
rewritten. I have made no attempt to frame precise 
language or to identify footnotes to be included and 
excluded. Perhaps we should consider seriously, as a 
means of reducing the footnotes and also preserving most 
of the relevant regulations of ACOG and APHA, including 
these in an appendix. 
5. In addition to changes along the foregoing 
lines, it would be necessary to confront specifically the 
inclination - if not conviction - of those who would 
vacate and remand. I have not thought this through with 
any care. Nor do I have Cory's memo before me. Tentative 
views as to what might be included at an appropriate place 
are as follows: 
For the first time in his reply brief filed with 
this Court, appellant focuses specifically on the 
hospitalization outpatient regulations. In addition to 
embracing them within his general challenge to Virginia's 
entire hospitalization requirements, appellant says that 
the state did not rely on the regulations at trial and 
therefore he had no opportunity to contest them. 
As noted (n. 2}, appellant was indicted for 
violating §§18.2-71 and 18.73 that make it a crime, so far 
as relevant - to perform an abortion within the second 
trimester except in a "licensed hospital". As stated in 
the text (p. 4) the term "hospital" is defined in §32.1-
123.1 to include "outpatient . . hospitals", and the 
regulations duly adopted by the Department Health include 
carefully drawn regulations and prescribe minimum 
standards for these hospitals. The regulations also make 
clear that second trimester abortions are to be performed 
in them. No question is raised as to the adequacy of the 
indictment. Nor has appellant denied that he failed to 
comply with the state requirements. From the outset, he 
simply has challenged them all. The state met the 
challenge on the terms in which it was made: 
The transcript of the trial records that on 
direct examination by his counsel, appellant acknowledged 
the existence of the outpatient regulations, stated that 
he was seeking a license, but denied that he knew of the 
regulations when the abortion was performed - even though 
they had been cons ide red at public hearings and adopted 
some two and a half years earlier (see n. 7). Despite 
full knowledge of the regulations at the time of trial, 
appellant elected to defend only by a sweeping attack on 
all of Virginia's hospitalization requirements. 
.. 
His belated claim of no opportunity to contest 
the regulations, made only in a few sentences in his reply 
brief here, comes too late. Whether a trial tactic or 
not, deferring until this Court to advance this claim in a 
procedural default. 
* * * 
Jim and Mark: 'rhe foregoing contains much of 
what we have in the opinion. Perhaps some or all of the 
new thoughts included above could be woven into the text 
of our present opinion. The alternative would be to make 
appropriate changes in the text and present footnotes and 
try to deal with all of this textually or in revised 
notes. 
I see that I have not mentioned the 
Brennan/Blackmun point that it is not clear whether the 
Virginia court considered the regulations - even facially. 
It certainly had the statutes that authorized the 
regulations before it, and it decided the case on the 
basis of appellant's challenge. We are not obligated to 
remand in light of this. 




Jim DATE: April 7, 1983 TO: 
.FROM: Lewis .F. Powell, Jr • 
81-185 Simopoulos 
Your suggested revisions of this date, marked on 
a copy of Chambers Draft No. II, are quite an improvement 
in organization. 
I still would like to try out on you and Mark 
the following thoughts as to what might be added at 
appropriate places, in the text or notes. 
1. Section 18.2-73 provided an "exception" 
i.e. a defense - to the felony for which appellant was 
indicted. The abortion would have been lawful if 
"performed in a licensed hospital". As appellant ha~ not 
applied for a license this defense was not available. He 
therefore broadly attacked Virginia's entire 
hospitalization requirements, equating them erroneously to 
the acute care hospitalization requirements before this 
Court in City of Akron and Askcroft. 
2. I agree, Jim with vour idea to put the 
details of appellant's reply brief arguments in a 
footnote. In addition to the general "brush off" that we 
give them at present, I am inclined to think, subject to 
what you and Mark think, that something more should be 
said, for example: 
We can be reasonably sure that the opinion we 
expect from Justice Blackmun will rely heavily on 
respondent's belated argument that the Virginia courts 
"had no opportunity to construe the '1 icens ing statutes 
and regulations'." I would answer by saying that 
appellant chose to attack the entire Virginia framework of 
regulation. As appellant neither the invalidity of the 
outpatient surgical clinic regulations adopted pursuant to 
the Virginia statutes, nor presented any evidence bearing 
on their validity, the Virginia court did not address the 
regulations apart from its specific approval of the entire 
Virginia regulatory provision. It is too late for 
appellant now to rely on grounds he had never advanced 
below, did not present as an issue in his jurisdictional 
statement, and did not mention here until his reply brief. 
3. In holding as it did that "second trimester 
abortions must be performed in hospitals as required by 
Vir inia law", the State Supreme Court necessarily 
sustained the validity of the duly adopted regulations 
pursuant ot the Virginia statutes. 
4. On p. 15, you have added a sentence to the 
ef feet that possibly certain individual regulations are 
unreasonable. We need not go this far. It is important 
to make entirely clear that even appellant's reply brief 
finds no fault with any specific regulation. It would be 
appropriate, perhaps, simplv to say in a footnote that as 
appellant has made only a facial challenge in the broadest 
language, we need not consider whether a particular 
requirement in the regulations may be invalid as applied. 
As Akron makes clear, in view of a state's compelling 
interest it may adopt regulations. Appellant has 
presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the entire 
Virginia scheme. 
5. We have speculated as to what would happen 
if this Court vacated and remanded. In the absence of 
evidence with respect to the regulations, the Virginia 
Supreme Court could simply do as we would: find them 
facially valid. It is unlikely, however, that Justice 
Blackmun would consider this satisfactory. My guess, 
therefore, is that he may well argue that the regulations 
never entered into this case at all: that the Commonwealth 
was as neglectful as Simopoulos, and that the conviction 
should be set aside and a new trial ordered. 
such a trial, the defendant would then 
regulations as applied. 
I suppose at 
attack the 
I am not suggesting that we 
Justice Blackmun may do in this respect. 
keep it in mind. 
anticipate what 






~hank you for your recent note. I a~ ma~ing some 
cl.arifytng changes in note 12, page 10 (notP 10, naqe 7 of 
the 1st draft) that I think will meet your suggestions. I 
have the documentation that assures the accuracy of th~se 
notes. 
Your letter gives me rm opportunity to hrinq you 
omm to clat,. on the s i. tuat ion with respect to the three. 
abortion cases as I understand it. 
~ 
Simoooulos 
First as to Simopoulos . You are the only member 
of the Court who has approved it even informally. Bill 
Brennan has suqoested in a letter to me that '~e ~houl rl va-
cate and remand the case for reconsideration by thP Suoreme 
Court of VirqiniR. "qarry and John have the sa.me view - at 
least tentatively. 
They make the point that the Virqinia court di~ not 
specificallY ad~ress the va1i~ity of thP regulations, and 
neither did the parties below. In my view, the reason that 
court wrote as if it were reviewing acute care, general hos-
pitalization requiiement wlthont: npE"'ci flcnlly afkJressing the 
regulations, iR that Sirnopoulos Plected to c~atlenge Virqin-
ia' s hospi tali zat ion requirement<:! a~ i. f thev rlere the same 
as those reviewed in City of Akron and A~~croft. He oid 
not distinguish between full service hospitals and the amhu-
latory surqical hospital.s (clinics) that Virginia law con-
templates. 
We are entitle~, T thin~, to ~eci~e the case on 
the record on "Yrhich SimooouloE chose to rest his defense . I 
therefore have no disposition to remand rather than affirm 
the conviction . 
I have spoken briefly to Randra who is writing in 





not expect to join in my analvsis, she would affirm the con-
viction. I believe Bill Rehnquist also i.s of this view, and 
svron voted at Conference to affirm. If the case were va-
cated and . remanded it would be back here i~ a year or two, 
and meanwhile we would have given no guidance as to the va-
lidity of perfo~~inq abortiona in outpatient clinics. 
I am considering making somP revisions in section 
III that now mav address the Virginia regulations in too 
much detail. 
*· * * 
Akron and Ashcroft 
It is also important that you 101n as m11ch of 
these two cases as you can. ~he "hospitalization" issue is 
the principal one. It also is the issue that haq caused the 
greatest confusion - a confuRion arising primarily aR to how . 
Roe would be construed. t have a hare Court for Akron, and 
presumably /wi 11 have a Court. on the ho~pi tali zat ion J.ssue in 
P Ashcroft that is identical to the hospitalization require-
ment in Akron. 
Nhen you reread Roe, I think you '>~ill agree that 
I have wr 1 tten the "los pita lT"Zat ion iss,le as narr,owl v ac; no~­
siblc consistently with t.hRt cac;P. 
* * * 
You noted when yo1.1 asked me to write these opin-
ions that you and I were in accord on most of th~ numerous 
issues. I know th~t you "'ave had ~tronq f~eling<:; a~ to pa-
rental notice, and yet - also as we mentioned - the combina-
tion of what 1 wrote in Rellott' IT (a p1ura1itv of four) 
and our combined opinions 1n Matheson have settler'l the rule 
with respect to parental notification. It iA not the rule 
for which HAB contendP.d in Bellotti II. 
Foraive this "long wirded" 1Ptter. ~hese are im-
portant cases, and the Court needs the authority of the 
Chief Justice in deci~tng them. · 
The Chief Justtce 
lfp/ss 
;; . 




April 12, 1983 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Bill and 
I enclose for your consideration a substantially· 
revised draft of an opinion. ~ 
The baste change is the elimination of th' discus-
sion of particular regulations. This draft also makes 
clearer th~t we would be decininq the case only on the 
record before us - a record containing no evidence as to 
unreasonableness of individual regulations. 
With full knowledge of the regulations, appellant 
elected to ignore them - apparently as a trial strategy -
and to analogize Virginia's overall regulation of abortions 
to those before us in City of Akron and Ashcroft. This 
is even clearer to me no\Ar than at the time of my fi.rst cir-
culation. 
As your rhamhers know, we have since obtained the 
entire available record including the hi~tory of the adop-
tion of the regulations almost two and a half years before 
the abortion at issue was performed. Appellant had a fu1l 
opportunity to &ttack the reasonableness of the regulations. 
~' guess is that since he had made no effort to obtain a 
license, he chose the strategy of arguing that the entire 
Virginia scheme is invalid. 
In these circumstances, T remain persu~oed that it 
is appropriate and desirable to affirm. Appellant should 
not benefit froll\ his own choice of (tefense straqegy. 'T'he 
opinion as now drafted clearlyholds only that on the basis 
of the recorn ht=~forP us the r~gulations cmpPar to be comPat-
ible wtth accepted mP.dica1 Atandards. 
t ~(td th~t our ~ler~s h~VP been collaboratinq -
constructively I think. Of course, T do not sugqest "poli-
ticking" of any kind: merely that they have been mutually 
helpful. 
I add one caveat. The Chief Justice has indicated 
that he approved my prior drafts. As the enclos~d is a 











MEMORANDUM TO ~HE CONFERENCE: 
' ,. 
Virginia 
HerA is another draft of my opinion in this 
Ther~ are a nu~ber of chanqes throuqhout. ·•"" .< J . .... ,., 
\<3··· 
ThA principal change is the elimination of specii: : 
ic consideration of each of the regulations ind:iviflnolly. 
The record contains no evidence as to the unreasonah1eness 
of individual rf.>guJ.ations. Rather, wi.th full knC'w1edge of 
the regulati.ons (see n. 19, P. 12), appPJ1Rnt elected - ap-
parently as a trial strateqv - to challenge Virginia's over- ~ 
all r~qulations of abortions, arquing that in effect thev .. · 
were comparabl~ to those in Citv of Akron. ' 
'I'' 
Since mv earJ.ier cirC"Illati.on, I have obtained the ~ 
entire availabl~ record includinq the history of the .. adop- "'"' 
tion of the regulations almost 2-1/2 years before the abor- ~ .. 
tion at issue was performeo. (See n. 6, p. 6-8). · ' 
~\.·, 
:': The opinion as now drafted would hold that, 
on the basis of the record before us, the requlations on 
their face appear to be compatible with accepted mecHcal 
standards. ,.. ." 
ss 




TO: Jim DATE: Feb. 2, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Simopoulos 
This memo relates only to the description of the 
requirements of the Virginia regulations, and particularly 
to the category of descriptions beginning on p. 14. 
I have dictated a separate rider covering the 
first category, my purpose being to de-emphasize the "corpo-
rate" requirements. 
I suggest that you consider doing substantially 
the same thing with respect to the second category. The 
construction standards for the physicial facilities will be 
used against us by dissenters. Although we can't ignore 
them, try your hand at a summary paragraph. If you can re-
duce it to a couple of sentences, it could be added to the 
same paragraph with the first grouping. For example, I see 
no reason to talk about parking and fire codes. It is well 
to emphasize to the extent is is true, that the requirements 
apply to all outpatient surgical clinics. 
As noted in the margin on page 15, if the provi-
sion authorizing "deviations" applies to all of the regula-
tions, this should be emphasized separately. 
As indicated in the margin of page 15, I would 
omit notes 13-15, but save a couple of copies of your first 
draft as we may need them when dissents come in. Possibly 
. '· 
2. 
to avoid being criticized for overlooking these sections, 
you could say - in a single note - that the regulations con-
tain customary provisions with respect to meeting building 






This memo relates only to the description of the 
requirements of the Virginia regulations, and particularly 
to the category of descriptions beginning on p. 14. o .. _, 
I have dictated a separate rider covering the 
first category, my purpose beinq to de-emohasize the "corpo-
rate" requirements. ~· ,. 
rr suqgest that you consider doing substantially 
the same thing with respect to the second category. The 
construction standards for the physicial facilities will be 
used against us by dissenters. :·Althouqh we can't ,ignore, 
,.t~ 
thern, try your hand at a summary paragraph. If you can re-~, 
'~t 
duce it to a couple of sentences, it could be added to the • 
same paragraph with the first grouping. For example, .I see 
no reason to talk about parking and fire codes. It is well 
to emphasize to the extent is is true, that the requirements 
•''1'~; 
apply to all outpatient surgical clinics. 
'' 
As noted in the marqin on page 15, i.f the provi- ~· 
sion authorizing "deviations" applies to all of the regula-
tions, this should be emphasized separately. 1 .1f 




omit notes 13-15, but save a couple of copies of your first ' .. 
draft as we may need them when dissents come in. Possibly 
/ 
2. 
to avoid being criticized for overlooking these sections, , 
you could say ~ in a single note - that the regulations con-
tain customary provisions with respect to meeting building 
codes, zoning ordinance and the like. 
f/. 
~~. 
'•.,.. .• -... ~· 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prtmt <!Jauri of t4"' ~b ~bdtg 
.. agfringhtn. ~. <IJ. 2!lgi,.~ 
March 11, 1983 
Re: No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
I am with you but will have a few small suggestions 
that will give you no trouble. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.. ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
_ju.p:rttttt <!f.rurl of Urt ~b ,jtattg ' 
._as£ringt!tn. ~. <!f. 2.U~'!;l 
PERSONAL 
April 4, 1983 
Re: No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lew is: 
I am not at rest on the two "Akron" cases yet. I am 
generally on the above. However I an "uncomfortable" with the 
declaratory statements in note 10, page 7. They are, of course, 
attributable to the source cited at the end of the statements. 
But would it not help if a "said to be" were inserted early in 
Note 10, with a similar qualifier in the second paragraph of note 
7? Quoted out of context it could appear the Court is making the 




.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt Qfttttrl ttf tqt 'Jnittb ,jtatts 
._asJringhm. ~. <!f. 2!lgt~~ 
March 7, 1983 
Re: No. 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
I will await Sandra's writing. 
Sincerely/ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,juvrtmt arltltrt ttf tqt .,uittb ,jtatt.tr 
JIU'Jriugtttu, ~. ar. 2!1~~~ 
March 7, 1983 
No. 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis, 
I will concur in the judgment in this case 
and will circulate something in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
..J USTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.i\nvuuu <l}O"m-t qf tlf~ ~nittb" ~tzd~g 
Jl¥lfittgron. ~. <If. 2.0~'!.$ 
March 7, 1983 
Re: 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
It seems doubtful to me that in 1979 either the 
Virginia Legislature or the medjcal profession 
understood that the Sfatut~y r~~ment that a 
second trimester abortion must be performed in a 
hospital could be satisfied by making use of an out-
patient surgical clinic. I shall therefore wait for 




Copies to the Conference 
C~AMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.h}trtlV <!}lttlrlttf tlt.t ~ttitt~ ~htt.tg 
._-Mftinghm. ~. <!}. 2llgt~' 
Re: No. 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
March 8, 1983 
After reading and reflecting upon your proposed op1n1on 
for this case, I have settled down at the alternative posi-
tion I took at conference. I now have concluded to vote to 
vacate the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration 
in the light of Akron. 
I am inclined to this conclusion because your opinion 
deals at length with the Virginia regulations. Yet those 
regulations were not really considered by the Supreme Court 
of Virginia. They are hardly mentioned in their opinion, 
and the regulations, of course, were issued long after the 
statute was enacted. I would be far happier to have the 
Virginia Supreme Court consider those regulations, their 
meaning, and their reach and application in the first in-
stance, and then let the case return here. 
Sincerely, 
Jutsice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.hprmu <lf!turlltf f!rt ~b ,itwg 
.. M~ ~. <If. 2!lgi'!' 
C HAMBER S O F 
J USTICE W t< . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~., 
March 9, 1983 
No. 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
As with your Akron op1n1on, I am impressed with the 
effort and thought you have so clearly devoted to this 
case. Your opinion makes a very strong case that Virgin-
ia's hospitalization requirement, as you interpret it, 
meets our constitutional standard, and it generally con-
forms to the view I expressed at conference. However, 
after giving the matter some thought, I am inclined to 
agree with Harry and John that we should not be the ones 
to interpret the Virginia statute in the first instance. 
Sorry though I would be to see your careful work go 
for nought, I ask you to consider whether it wouldn't be 
a good idea to dispose of this case with a brief per 
curiam vacating and remanding for reconsideration in 
light of Akron. I make this suggestion for two reasons. 
First, although there is no absolute bar to interpreting 
the Virginia statute for the first time in this Court, 
and although I think your interpretation is correct, 
surely if all other things were equal we would prefer to 
let the Virginia Supreme Court say what "hospital" means 
before we addressed the constitutionality of the statute. 
Second, given the likely outcome in Akron, Simopoulos 
will be a very important case, for it will tell the 
states what they can do by way of regulating abortions. 
If we can avoid it, I think we should not let such a cru-
cial opinion issue without a clear majority. 
At the same time, I believe (and I'm sure you agree) 
that the states should have some guidance. A per curiam 
opinion in Simopoulos might well serve that function. In 
vacating and remanding, we could focus attention on the 
possibility that Virginia's hospitalization requirement, 
if in fact it is what you say, would pass muster under 
the Akron standard. A remand would also permit full air-
ing of the issues involved in regulating outpatient 
second-trimester abortions. I am afraid that many pro-
- 2 -
fessional groups and other amici have overlooked the im-
portance of Simopoulos in this year's trilogy. 
Accordingly, I offer the following rough suggestion 
as something that might prove acceptable to a majority--
indeed, perhaps to all of us: 
The only substantial federal question presented by 
this appeal is similar to one addressed today in City 
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante, 
at 12-20: Is Virginia's statute requiring doctors to 
perform all second-trimester abortions in a hospital 
constitutional? we are informed, however, that the 
relevant statute, Va. Code §18.2-73, may incorporate by 
reference a definition of "hospital" in Va. Code §32.1-
123.1 and regulations promulgated thereunder, which 
include as "hospitals" certain facilities providing 
surgical services primarily on an outpatient basis. If 
so, the Virginia hospitalization requirement differs 
materially from the corresponding provision in Akron. 
The Virginia statute so interpreted may burden women 
and their doctors far less than a statute requiring 
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in an 
acute-care hospital. In the opinion under review, how-
ever, the Virginia Supreme Court did not adopt or even 
address the interpretation of §18.2-73 pressed in this 
Court by Virginia's Attorney General. Rather, it re-
lied on grounds much like those we reject today in Ak-
ron. See 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981). If~ 
were to consider the Attorney General's argument, we 
would have to interpret the statutory law of Virginia 
in the first instance. Prudence suggests that the 
highest court of the Commonwealth should have the op-
portunity to address the crucial question of what the 
word "hospital" in §18.2-73 means before we do. There-
fore, we vacate the judgment of the Virginia Supreme 
Court and remand for reconsideration in light of our 










lfp/ss 03/14/83 SIM SALLY-POW 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CON .FERENCE: 
This refers to Harry's letter of March 8 stating 
that he will vote to vacate the judgment and remand [this] 
case for reconsideration in the light of Akron. He 
suggests that the Virginia regulations were not "really 
considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia", and that 
they were issued "long after the statute was enacted". 
Bill Brennan has told me that he rather shares Harry's 
view, and John's letter of March 7 expresses a somewhat 
similar view, though he is awaiting "further writing". 
I recognized, of course, that vacating and 
remanding is an option available. I adhere to the view, 
however, that we should decide the case. In my view, the 
2. 
issue on which we granted the case is here, and it was 
argued in briefs and at oral argument, and there I think 
we should decide it. 
It is true that the primary focus in this case 
has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory 
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law". Appellant 
had good reason to refrain from making the distinction 
under Virginia law between full service, acute care 
"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where 
second trimester abortions also may be performed. 
Appellant did not wish to call our attention to the latter 
and their implementing regulations as he had made no 
effort to comply with them. Moreover, appellant has never 
denied that he knew about the regulations. As I have now 






my opinion, the regulations were adopted two years and 
five months prior to the abortion at issue. They were 
adopted only after public hearings at which several 
abortions clinics and representatives of the medical 
profession appeared and testified. 
It is entirely clear from the Virginia statutes 
that the term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics 
though they are characterized as "outpatient • 
hospitals". It also is clear that Part II of the 
regualtions was adopted expressly to accommodate second 
trimester abortions. See fn. and • As the -----
Attorney General of Virginia stated in his brief: 
"Under Virginia law, a second trimester abortion 
may be performed in an outpatient surgical 
clinic provided that the clinic has been 
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the 
state". Br., 19. 
4 . 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as 
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant 
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient 
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals. 
This is understandable as appellant's position has been a 
sweeping attack on all "mandatory hospitalization 
requirements". There certainly is no basis for reversing 
Simopoulos' conviction. As he elected, apparently as a 
tactic, not to challenge the outpatient regulations, it is 
too late for him now to advance this distinction. 
If we were to remand this case for 
reconsideration in light of Akron, it would be an 
unmerited victory for appellant's tactics. Moreover, it 
is not clear what the Virginia Supreme Court can do that 
we also cannot do properly. There is no factual evidence 
5. 
in this case with respect to the regulations as 
distinguished from appellant's general attack on the 
validity of all mandatory hospitalization requirements. 
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this defense, and its 
opinion can be read - in light of Virginia law - as 
sutaining facially both of the state's hospitalization 
requirements, including those for second trimester 
abortions as well as for those performed in acute care 
hospitals. Akron and Ashcroft settled the issue with 
respect to the latter type of hospitals. This leaves, as 
the issue before us whether the mandatory outpatient type 
hospitals requirements are valid on their face. We would 
have a different case if appellant had elected to 
challenge - as unduly costly or otherwise - specific 
provisions of these requirements. 
. 
. '[f~;~ ,i- / 
. .. , 
' 
6. 
It is well to bear in mind that this case 
involves an abortion performed some 20 to 22 weeks after 
gestation, on the edge of the period of potential 
viability. Under any view of our prior decisions, 
including Akron, the interest of the state at this point 
is compelling. All that my opinion does is to hold that 
the Virginia regulations "on the record before us" (see 
pp. 12 and 17} are not invalid. We certainly do not 
decide whether each of the specific regulations would be 
valid if, for example, they were applied to a D&E abortion 
quite early in the second trimester. 
At the prudential level, there also are rather 
compelling reasons to decide this case rather than remand 
it. The latter action would leave the law in Virginia -
and probably in a number of other states - unsettled as to 
7. 
the validity of requiring that second trimester abortions 
be performed in state licensed outpatient clinics that 
conform generally to accepted medical practice and 
requirements. 
My recollection is that there were seven or 
eight cases pending here that involved the validity of 
state regulation of abortions. After consideration at two 
or more of our Conferences, we selected for plenary 
consideration the three cases now before us. In the 
decade since Doe states have been endeavoring to adjust 
their laws and regulations to the new constitutional 
requirements. Decisions by us in all three of these cases 
should go far to resolve the existing uncertainties. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 03/15/83 SIM SALLY-POW 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks 
on my opinion in this case. I believe your concerns are 
similar to those expressed by Harry in his letter of March 
8 . 
I recognized, of course, that vacating and 
remanding on Akron is an option available. As you note, 
however, the case is properly before us on appeal. The 
issue has been briefed and argued. I remain of the 
opinion that we should decide it. 
It is true that the primary focus in this case 
has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory 
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law". Appellant 
, .• . 
2. 
had good reason to refrain from making the distinction 
under Virginia law between full service, acute care 
"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where 
second trimester abortions may be performed. Appellant 
had made no effort to comply with the implementing 
regulations. Moreover, appellant has not denied that he 
knew about the regulations. 
As footnotes and in the second draft of 
my opinion show, the regulations became effective two 
years and five months prior to the abortion at issue. 
They had been fully considered at public hearings. 
It is clear from the Virginia statutes that the 
term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics though they 
are characterized as "outpatient surgical hospitals", and 





abortions. See fn. and ___ • As the Attorney General 
of Virginia stated in his brief: 
"Under Virginia law, a second trimester abortion 
may be performed in an outpatient surgical 
clinic provided that the clinic has been 
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the 
state". Br., 19. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as 
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant 
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient 
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals. 
This is understandable in view of appellant's position 
that all "mandatory hospitalization requirements" for 
second trimester abortions are invalid. He elected, 
apparently as a tactic, not to challenge separately any of 
the applicable regulations. 
If we were to remand this case for 
reconsideration in light of Akron, it is not clear what 
4. 
the Virginia Supreme Court can do that we also cannot do 
properly. There is no factual evidence with respect to 
the regulations as distinguished from appellant's general 
challenge to all mandatory hospitalization requirements. 
No specific regulations were questioned. There certainly 
is no basis for a new trial. 
There are also prudential reasons to decide the 
case: Any remand would leave the law unsettled to some 
degree as to the validity of requiring that second-
trimester abortions be performed in state-licensed 
outpatient clinics that conform generally to accepted 
medical practice and requirements. A decision by us in 






cc: Justice Blackrnun 
.... 
··. 
~arC':h 1.5, 1.983 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Bil1: 
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks 
on my opinion in thi~ case. 
I believe your concerns are similar to those ex-
pressed by Harry in his letter of \larch 8. I recognize, of 
course, that vacating and remanding in liqht of Akron ~s an 
av:::tilable option. A~ you note, ho,1ever, the case is proper-
ly before us on aopeal. The issue has been hriefed and ar-
gued. T remain of the opinion that we shoula d~cide it. 
~he primary focus in this case has been, as appel-
lant describes it, on the "mandatory ho~pitalization re-
qni rement of Virginia 1aw". APPellant had goon n:••ason to 
refrain from making the rlistinction unoer Virginia law be-
tween general, acute care "hospitals" and "outPatient surgi-
cal hospitals" where second-trimester abortions may be oer-
formeo. Appellant ~ad made no effort to complv with the 
i.mnlement:ing regulations. r~oreover, appellant has not de-
nied that he knew about the regulations. 
As footnotes 6 and 7 in the second draft of my 
ooininn show, the regulations became effective two years and 
five months before the abortion at issue. They had bPen 
fullv considered at public hearings. Moreover, it is clear 
from the Virginia statutes that the term "hospit.a1s" in-
clu~es outpatient clinics though they are characterized as 
"outoAtient surqical hospitals", and that Part II of the 
regulations aoplies to second-trimester abortions. See nn. 
7 and 9. As the Attorney GPneral of Virqinia stated tn hiA 
brief: 
"{U]nner Virginia l~w, a second-trimester 
abortion may be pPrf"rmed in an outpatient 
surgical clinic provided that [the} clinic 
has been inspected and licensed as a hospital 
by the State". ~rief of ~ppPllee 19. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Vi~ginia, as 
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant Virginia 
statutes, did not address the outpatient hospitals separate-
ly from general, acute care hospitals. This is understan1-
ab1E" i.n view of appellant's position that all "mandatory 
hospitalization requirements" for s~cond-trimester abortions 
are invalid. He elected, apparently as A. tactic, not to 
challenge s~parately any of the applfcahl• requlations. 
If we were to remand this case for reconsideration 
i .n light of Akron, it is not clear what the Virqinta SuPreme 
Court can do that we properly cannot ~o as well. There is 
no factua1 evidence with respect to the regulations as dis-
tinguished from aPPellant's general challenge to all manda-
tory hospitalization requir~ments, because no specific regu-
lations were questioned. There certainlv is no hasis for a 
new t.r ial. 
There are also prudential reasons to decide the 
case: Any remand would leave the law un~ettled as to the 
validity of requiring that second-trimester abortions be 
performe~ in state-licensed outpati~nt clinics that conform 
generally to acceptefi medical Practice and requirements. A. 
decision by us in all three of these cas@s should qo far to 
resolve the existi.nq uncertainties. 
Sincerelv, 
Just ice Br(.!>nn;=m 
lfp/o;s 
cc: Justice Slackmun 
... 
t ... , ' 














From: Justice Stevens 
JJN 1 '8~ Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Prior to this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 
(1973), it was a felony to perform any abortion in Virginia ex-
cept in a hospital accredited by the Joint Committee on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals and licensed by the Department of 
Health, and with the approval of the hospital's Abortion Re-
view Board (a committee of three physicians).* In 1975, 
the Virginia Code was amended to authorize additional abor-
tions, including any second trimester abortion performed by 
a physician "in a hospital licensed by the State Department of 
Health or under the control of the State Board of Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation." Va. Code§ 18.2-73 (1982). 
The amended statute might be interpreted in either of two 
ways. It might be read to prohibit all second trimester abor-
tions except those performed in a full-service, acute-care hos-
pital facility. Or it might be read to permit any abortion per-
formed in a facility licensed as a "hospital" in accord with any 
regulations subsequently adopted by the Department of 
Health. The Court today chooses the latter interpretation. 
See ante, at ~. 
*An in-hospital abortion was also unlawful unless (a) it was necessary to 
protect the life or health of the mother, (b) the pregnancy was the product 
of rape or incest, or (c) there was a substantial medical likelihood that the 
child would be born with an irremediable and incapacitating mental or 
physical defect. 1970 Va. Acts, ch. 508. 
<, 
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There is reason to think the Court may be wrong. At the 
time the statute was enacted, there were no regulations iden-
tifying abortion clinics as "hospitals." The structure of the 
1975 amendment suggests that the Virginia General Assem-
bly did not want to make any greater change in its law than it 
believed necessary to comply with Roe v. Wade, and it may 
well have thought a full-service acute-care hospitalization re-
quirement constitutionally acceptable. Moreover, the opin-
ion below does not suggest that the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia believed the term "hospital" to incorporate licensed 
abortion clinics. It only discussed testimony pertaining to 
full-service, acute-care hospitals like Fairfax Hospital. See 
Juris. Statement 16a. And it stated that "two hospitals in 
Northern Virginia and 24 hospitals located elsewhere in the 
State were providing abortion services in 1977," Juris. State-
ment 19a, again referring to acute-care facilities. The opin-
ion refers to "clinics" only once, as part of a general state-
ment concerning the variety of medical care facilities the 
state licenses and regulates; even there, the term is included 
in the list as a category that is distinct from "hospitals." Ju-
ris. Statement 18a. 
On the other hand, the Court may well be correct in its in-
terpretation of the Virginia statute. The word "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 could incorporate by reference any institution li-
censed in accord with Va. Code § 32.1-123.1 and its imple-
menting regulations. See ante, at fH>. It is not this 
Court's role, however, to interpret state law. We should not 
rest our decision on an interpretation of state law that was 
not endorsed by the court whose judgment we are reviewing. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion was written on the as-
sumption that the Commonwealth could constitutionally re-
quire all second trimester abortions to be performed in a full-
service, acute-care hospital. Our decision today in City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, 
p. --, proves that assumption to have been incorrect. The 
proper disposition of this appeal is therefore to vacate the 
-
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judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and to remand 
the case to that court to reconsider its holding in the light of 
our opinion in Akron. 




TO: Jim DATE: June 3, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Ashcroft 
After a rereading of the opinions below on the 
"second physician" issue (that I had not reread since 
preargument), and again reading HAB' s dissent, I do not 
believe proposed Rider A - as you and I have draft it - is 
quite fair. As a means of focusing my own thinking (and 
so you can check it), I dictate this memo. 
The DC invalidated the second physician 
requirement as overbroad, devoting only a paragraph to it 
(A 26). Its findings included: "D&E may be the procedure 
of choice, even after viability, in cases in which there 
are positive contraindications to the use of saline or 
prostaglandins installation": "no chance of fetus 
survival" when D&E is used: and, the concluding sentence: 
"the attendance of a second physician during an abortion 
procedure which holds no possibility of fetal survival 
does not further [the state's] interest." 
The finding relied on by HAB is that D&E "may be 
the procedure of choice even after viability", but 
'l 
2. 
apparently only in cases in which the woman's health 
requires this because it might be endangered by the "use 
of saline or prostaglandins installation". We would 
agree, if the woman's life is endangered by methods other 
than D&E. Thus, the question seems to be whether there is 
substantial evidence that during the third trimester D&E 
may be required in the interest of the mother's health? 
A footnote cites, without quoting, the testimony 
of "Doctors Robert Crist for plaintiffs and Richard 
Schmidt for defendants". It seems to me that HAB's 
opinion correctly states the DC' s holding (p. 6) ' 
concluding that "in some cases maternal health 
considerations will preclude the use of procedures that 
might result in a live birth [the second doctor in 
such circumstances] "is superfluous". 
CA 8 quoted Dr. Crist as testifying that "D&E 
may be the best medical procedure at 28 weeks" because 
there were "contraindications" to the use of other 
methods. (A 80) CAS does state that "Missouri points to 
testimony by other physicians that do not or would not use 
D&E at this stage, and therefore the evidence indicates 




If I am reading the foregoing correctly, it 
seems to me that our rider A needs substantial revision. 
Sadly, I don't think we can hang HAB directly with Dr. 
Crist's testimony, as he does not mention him at all. He 
simply latches on to the findings of the two courts below, 
and relies on the "two court" rule. 
You are far more familiar with all of this, Jim, 
than I am. Unless I am mistaken or have overlooked 
something important, it seems to me we must refocus our 
response on this aspect of the two physician issue. CAS 
concedes that medical opinions differ. At best, this is 
the ultimate finding of fact below. This entitles us to 
do two things: (i) show, as you have devastatingly 
(subject to a comment below) that on the plaintiff's side 
the only "differing view" is that of Dr. Crist, whereas 
the other view is that few if any physicians ever use a 
D&E during third trimester~ and ( i i) given this 
contradictory evidence, with the great weigh of it 
contrary to Dr. Crist's views, the state's interest in 
protecting a viable fetus justifies the second physician 
requirement even though there may be the rare case where a 










My one qualification about Dr. Crist's testimony 
is the possible ambiguity in his long answer to the 
question in the middle of the page {A 130}. I believe, 
however, that your reading of this testimony {at least 
that reprinted in the appendix} is correct. The final 




Q. And do you believe that as a general 
principle • where there is an abortion there 
should never be a live fetus? 
A. That is correct." 
We should discuss this. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
~0~ :he Chie:f Justice 






. uat1ce Stevens 
J'rom :J J'ustice O'Connor 
CircUlated: 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rE~ted : _ _ __ _ 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[June 15, 1983] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JusTICE WHITE and Jus-~ 
TICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
I agree with the Court's treatment of the appellant's argu-
ments based on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971) 
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). Accord-
ingly, I join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it affirms 
the conviction. For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 
81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and 
in No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ak-
ron, I do not agree that the constitutional validity of the Vir-
ginia mandatory hospitalization requirement is contingent in 
any way on the trimester in which it is imposed. Rather, I 
believe that the requirement in this case is not an undue bur-
den on the decision to undergo an abortion. 
lfp/ss 06/14/B'3 81-185 Simopulous v. 1rginia 
This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. The appellant is an obstetrician-gynecologist. At 
his unlicensed clinic, he performed an abortion - by injec-
tion of saline solution - on a 17-year-old woman who was 
approximately 22 weeks pregnant. 
Appellant was convicted of violating the Virginia 
statut,frequiring that second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in a licensed hospital. The Supreme Court of Virgin~~ 
._ affirmed the conviction. 
Under Virginia law, the term "hospital" is defined 
to include outpatient hospitals. Regulations of the Virgin-
ia Department of Healt~rovide that second-trimester abor-
tions may be performed in outpatienyfsurgical hospitals li-
censed by the state. Unlike the City of Akron ordinance~and 
the State of Missouri statute / virginia does ~t require 
that second-trimester abortions be performed in acute-care, 
full-service hospitals. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to 
be generally compatible with accepted medical sta~ 
I\ 
erniRg outpatient second-trimester abortions. 
2. 
We have not considered/ whether the regulations are 
constitutional in every particular ;ffor appellant declined 
to challenge them specifically. 
We have no reason to doubt, however, that an ade-
quately equipped clinic/ - upon proper application ;L could be 
licensed to perform second-trimester abo~~n~~~~~~~ 
We conclude, therefore, that~vi {ginia's require-
ment~that second-trimester abortions be performed in li-
censed clinic,;is not an unreasonable means of furthering 
the state's compelling interest in protecting the woman's 
health. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
affirmed. 
Justice O'Connor / joined by Justices White and 
(' 
Rehnquist1'has filed an opinion concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment in part~Justice Stevens has filed 
a dissenting opinion. 
81-185# Simopou1os v. Virginia (Jim) 
LFP for the Court 
1st draft 3/3/83 
2nd draft 3/16/83 
3rd draft 4/28/83 
4th draft 5/23/83 
5th draft 6/9/83 
Joined by CJ, WJB, TM, HAB 
SOC concurring in part and in judgment 
1st draft 5/5/83 
2nd draft 6/13/83 
Joined by BRW, WHR 
JPS dissent 
1st draft 6/1/83 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tlttt <!Jouri ~f tlrt 'Jttttitt~ ~htttg 
Jlag!rtttgtlttt. ~. <!J. 2llbi~$ 
Re: No. 81-185, Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
May 4, 1983 
As you know, my original and preferred vote in this case 
was to vacate and remand. In my letter of March 8, I noted my 
discomfort with the Court's reaching out to consider the consti-
tutionality of the Virginia regulations when they had not been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. I do think, how-
ever, that it is important that we have an opinion for the Court 
in this case, or at least an opinion that commands a substantial 
plurality. Thus, although I would still prefer to vacate and 
remand, I could 'oin a narrowly-written o inion affirming the 
judgment. Your th1r ra comes a long way towar assuaging my 
concerns -- a fact I deeply appreciate -- but I am still some-
what troubled by it. 
J, My m~jor concern is that you still come out to uphold the 
regulations, a1though now only on the basis of the record before 
l 
us. I am reluctant t~ affirm on thiJt groqQd. I do not mean to 
suggest that I think 'E"Fie"regulations are unconstitutional, or 
that I would not vote to uphold them in an appropriate case, but 
I do not regard this case as an appropriate one. Because nei- } ~ 
ther the parties nor the courts below have addressed the consti- ~ 
tutionali ty of the particular regulations adopted by Virginia, a...t.. 9 we have no really firm basis on which to determine whether these · 
regulations are justified by the State's interest in protecting ~ 
maternal health. Ordinarily, we would not make such a decision ~/ . 
without the benefit of a record, briefing, and argument. If the 
record is inadequate, we would remand for further proceedings. 
It is not our practice to decide constitutional questions on the 
basis of an insufficient record, while noting that a better rec-
ord might lead to a different result. 
2 My second concern is with the way in which you uphold the 
regulations. You conclude that the regulations appear to be 
medically reasonable, and you then rely on the fact that appel-
lant has failed to introduce evidence to the contrary. The 
problem I have with this approach is that I am not sure aEpel-~~ 
lant has the burden of proof on this point. Ordinarily, the d~~ 
State must bear the burden of demonstrating that its regulattDns --,~ 
on--rne-practl.ce ot aoorfion are sufficiently related to its 
interest in protecting maternal health. See City of Akron, at 
12; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973). In this case, 
Page 2. 
'7 
because the constitutionality of the regulations was not liti- . 
gated below, the State has introduced no evidence whatsoever to r~­
show that the regulations promote maternal health. As you ~ 
pointed out in your letter of April 12, this is "a record con- l'.L~ 
taining no evidence as to the unreasonableness of individual + 
regulations." I would only add that the record is equally de- C... Ia 
void of any evidence as to the regulations' reasonableness. It~
is not enough for me just to place the regulations side-by-side  
with the ACOG standards; I think our adversary system demands ~1.-t~ 
that the parties be permitted to put in evidence and litigate ' · 
the issue. - ~ -l ... ?-.1-,r ~~ ~ ~ 
I would prefer to take a slightly different approach. You ~ ~ 
say that appellant failed to introduce evidence regarding the ~
constitutionality of the regulations, and that we therefore 
should uphold them. I would say, rather, that appellant failed 
to raise the issue, and Enat we therefore need not reach it. As 
you pointed out in your April l2 letber, appellant was aware of 
the regulations by the time of trial but chose not to challenge 
them. In fact, it appears to me that appellant has expressly / 
declined to contest the constitutionality of a clinic-licensing ~ 
scheme like Virginia's. He challenged Virginia's abortion statute 
on the sole ground that a restriction to full-service general 
hospitals was unconstitutional, and he repeatedly asserted that 
I 
the proper course would be for Virginia to permit second-
trimester abortions in appropriately licensed outpatient clin-
ics. This, of course, is just what Virginia has done. It 
seems to me that we justifiably could l}_old a~pellant to this 
choice of litigation strategy, anaconclude £at the constitu-
tiona 1 y o e u 1 s is not at issue. This would make 
it unnecessary for the regulations to be addressed at all, 
other than to note that they permit second-trimester abortions 
to be performed in outpatient clinics as well as in full-
service general hospitals. 
Your opinion appears to be inconsistent with this approach 
at only a few points. I do not know whether you feel inclined 
to make any further changes, but if what I have outlined above 
would be acceptable to you, and in an effort to be helpful, I 
offer on the following pages suggestions for your consideration. 
This is a large and difficult task. I am grateful for your 
efforts. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell ~~ 
'-'--.. 
P.S. I enclose a copy of your opinion with the suggested changes 
marked up. They are not so bad as the two pages of "sug-
gestions" seem to indicate • 
... 
"Given the plain lang age of the Virginia regula-
tions and the history of t eir adoption, see notes , 
supra, we have no reason o doubt that an adequately 
equipped clinic could obta n, upon proper application, 
an outpatient hospital li nse permitting the perform-
ance of second-trimester a ortions. Appellant has thus 
challenged a statutory sc erne that does not exist in 
Virginia: a requirement th second-trimester abortions 
be erformed in full-serv ce hospitals. Since appel-
lan aae QecliAed to chal enge the constitutionality of 
the regulation have no occasion to pass ~ __ 1 
~~~~~
(6) Page 13, footnote 20. I would prefer to eliminate the 
first two sentences (through "and thus also invalid") and the 
last three sentences (beginning "And certainly appellant 
cannot") • At the end of fourth from last sentence (beginning 
"Some of these arguments"), I would add "and none have been 
raised below." 
(7) Pages 13-14. I would prefer the first (run-over) 
sentence of this paragraph to read as follows: "We conclude 
that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be 
performed in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of 
furthering the State's compelling interest in 'protecting the 
woman's own health and safety.'" 
(8) Page 14, footnote 21. I would prefer the last sen-
tence to read: "The only issue before us, however, relates to 
second-trimester abortions." 
(9) Page 14. I would rewrite the last sentence of Part IV 
to read: "Rather, the State's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in licensed clinics appears to comport 
with accepted medical practice, and leaves the method and timing 
of the abortion precisely where they belong -- with the physi-
cian and the patient." 
(10) Finally, I would simply eliminate the first sentence 
of Part v. 
Suggestions 
(1) Page 5, footnote 3. The last sentence of this foot-
note states that "the validity of these requirements" is at 
issue. I would prefer the sentence to read: "Thus, it is irrel-
evant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his 
procedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations." 
(2) Pages 9-10, footnotes 9-17. These footnotes spell out 
the details of the Virginia regulations, in contrast to the 
textual description of the areas covered. If the validity of 
the regulations is reached, I would prefer to see these foot-
notes eliminated. 
(3) Page 11. I would prefer to eliminate the first sen-
tence of the second paragraph and the first sentence of the 
third (run-over) paragraph, as well as footnote 18. 
(4) Pages 12-13. I would re-write the run-over paragraph 
to read as follows: 
"We need not consider whether Virginia's regula-
tions are constitutional in every particular. Despite 
personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the 
time of his trial, appellant has not attacked them as 
being insufficiently relate~9 to the State's interest in protecting maternal health. His challenge throughout 
this litigation has been limited to an assertion that 
the State cannot require all second-trimester abortions 
to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
Indeed, appellant has taken the position, both before 
the lower courts and before this Court, that a state 
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facili-
ties would be constitutional. See 9 Record 196a, 214a; 
Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S .Ct.) , p. 35; 
Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43, n. 75, 
46. In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's 
hospitalization requirements are no different in sub-
stance from thoi~ reviewed in the City of Akron and 
Ashcroft cases. Not until his reply brief in this 
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart 
from Virginia's statutory hospitalization requirement." ~ 
~~: 
(5) Page 13. I would add the following paragraph prior to u~- ~ 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: ~Jfll 5 ~~ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1255 v. 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
MISSOURI, ET AL. 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1623 v. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment 
and dissenting in part. 
For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 81-746, Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health and in No. 81-1172, 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I believe 
that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement im-
posed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the 
limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming arguendo 
t1iat the requirement was an undue burden, it would never-
theless "reasonably relate[] to the preservation and protec-
tion of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 163 
81-1255 & 81-1623--0 
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(1973). I therefore~sent rom the Court's judgment tha 
the requirement is unconstitutional. 
I agree that second-phy:sician equirement contained in 
§ 188.030.2 is con~cause the State possesses a 
compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, 
but I believe that this st~_interest i~ extant thro~h9ut 
pregnancy. I therefore concur in t 'Flejudgment of the Court. 
-I agree tha~ pathology-rep_2rt reqmreme 1m pose by 
§ 188.047 is constitutionar'6ecause it imposes no undue bur-
den on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I 
do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contin-
gent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is 
imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court. 
Assuming arguendo that the State cannot impose a paren-
tal veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I 
agree that the parental consent provision contained in 
§ 188.028.2 is constitution al. However, I believe that the 
provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any 
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I con-
cur in the judgment of the Court on this issue. 
I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand 
on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v. 
Eckerhart,- U. S. - (1983). 
I I 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
I agree with the Court's treatment of the appellant's argu-
ments based on United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971) 
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). Accord-
ingly, I join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it affirms 
the conviction. For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 
81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and 
in No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ak-
ron, I do not agree that the constitutional validity of the Vir-
ginia mandatory hospitalization requirement is contingent in 
any way on the trimester in which it is imposed. Rather, I 
believe that the requirement in this case is not an undue bur-
den on the decision to undergo an abortion. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iUFtnlt Qf!tllrl of tlft ~tb .itaU• 
._-ufrington. ~. <If. 2ll~Jt.~· 
May 5, 1983 
Re: 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Sandra: 




cc: The . Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.:§u:prnnt C!faurt cf tltt ~tb ~taie.s' 
~lyittghtn, ~. "f. 2!l~~~ 
Re: 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Sandra: 
Please add my name to your opinion in this case. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
May 6, 1983 
Sincerely, 
CHANCERY 
Mr. Harry Blackmun 
THE DIOCESE OF FARGO 
1310 BROADWAY 
BOX 1750 
FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA 58107 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
c/o President Thomas Clifford 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks, ND 58202 
Dear Mr. Blackmun, 
May 11, 1983 
This letter is written in response to the news item of 
Fargo Forum (5/8/83) that you will be the speaker at the 
graduation exercises of the Law School of the University of 
North Dakota, May 15, 1983. 
Commencement exercises are happy occasions, and I 
join the people of this state in wishing the graduates good 
fortune, indeed, God's blessings in their years of study , 
interpretation, and practice of law. 
I am certain your presence as an Associate Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the graduation-speaker will 
have meaning and significance not only to the graduates , but 
likewise to the entire University Family at Grand Forks. 
This is as it should be, I feel. 
Yet, your presence at the University of North Dakota, 
and more especially your address to the graduates , both 
fill me with anguish and travail. 
I realize as I reflect with deep sadness , Mr. Justice 
Blackmun, that a decade has passed since you master-
minded the Roe vs Wade and Doe vs Bolton decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court: the decision that denied and deprived 
legal protection to the Unborn Child. You are aware , I am 
confident what that decision has meant to this Nation in 
terms of human life, in terms of approximately 15 million 
young Americans who never will be given the opportunity to 
live, to study law, or to be numbered among school children 
of this great nation. 
On various occasions , I have read news items in which 
you were quoted about the abortion decision, about the hidden 
rights you found lodged in the U.S. Constitution, to deny the 
Unborn Child the gift of life, the privilege to be born. 
Somehow I have always sensed, in your statements , a great 
... . . 
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uncertainty, a lack of conviction or inner peace with the 
abortion decision. It is wrong, and I am convinced you are 
fully aware of that fact. That is why I am writing this 
letter. As the U.S. Catholic Bishops recently stated in 
their Pastoral Letter on Peace, "No society can live in 
peace with itself, or with the world, without a full awareness 
of the worth and dignity of every human person, and the 
sacredness of human life" (Jas. 4: 1-2). 
Your presence at the graduation of the Law School of 
the University of North Dakota on May 15th, then, gives me 
and, I am certain, numerous people of North Dakota the 
opportunity to reflect anew on the value of the sacredness 
of human life, and on the tragedy and devastation of the 
Abortion Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, January 22, 1973. 
I am asking the Catholic people of this Diocese, and 
people of all Religious Faiths to join me, especially on 
May 15th, in thanking God for His gift of human life and to 
beg His pardon and mercy for the wanton destruction of 
human life, caused by the Abortion Decision of the Supr eme 
Court and by all forms of Violence, oppression, and exploi-
tation in our day. 
Sincerely, I regret your coming to the University of 
North Dakota as the graduation speaker on May 15th, and 
openly I express that deep lament. 





cc: President Thomas Clifford 
. ·~· .. 
l : 
' ' ' ,'1;. 
The purpose of this letter is to review ·the situa-, 
tion i.n these three "headache" cases that you asked ·me to 
write. 
Akron 
' I have a bare Court (~l.JB, TM, HAB, ,JPS and LFP) , ' 
anrl Sandra - for her all-out dissent - has three votes (B~W, 
WHR and SOC). 
... 
As I point out in n. 1, P. 2, of my Akron opinion, 
Sandra's position simplv e't\C'!.sculates Roe ann the several 
cases that have accepted its basic principles. You have not 
voted, though I consider your joining as essential. 
Ashcroft 
I have no votes for my opinion. John has indicat-
ed by letter that he expects to join all but Part V of my , 
opini.on. My understanding is that Harry is writing a long 
ooinion (presumably for ~~JB and TM). He wi.ll join Part II 
of my opi.nion that invalidates Missouri •s requirement of an 
acute-care general hospital. There are, as you know, sever-
al other issues in 1\shcroft, and Harry is rHssenting as to 
parental consent (5-4) (NJB, TM, !JAB, JPS), the pathology 
report (8-1) (HAB) {W.JB, TM were tentative), and the second-
doctor requirement (6-3) (WJB, TM, HAB) . 
The O'Connor trio agrees with my result as to all 
issues except hospitalization . 
Simopoulos 
Thi's case , in many ways the most important of the 
three, is at a critical stage and I need your help. 
I had hoped that the Justices sharing Sandra's 
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affirm the judgment, but on entirely different reasoning: 
namely, that a state may impose virtually any limitation it ·~ 
w !shes. . '~· ', ,~,~· ~":"" 
, · I{;Th~ only hope of a Court aff irmi~g al~ng th~ 1 ines 
of your vote and mine lies essentially with what Harry and 
Bill ,., Brennan (who a~ .. e cooperating) are wil \ ing to join. ,. '' 
.~; _./ r have had a considerable private exchange with '· 
Harrt and Bill. Until recently, they were adamant in their 
unwillingness to affirm. Their position has been that we 
should vacate. and remand to allow the Virginia court to con-
strue and pass upon the validity of the regulations. In 
view of the curious way - if not negli.gent way - in which 
Simopoulos was tried by both parties, the regulations never 
were expressly addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
I relJlain .. firm ln my view,. however, that this is the result 
of a strategy, choice by Simopoulos. "As he challenged the , 
entire Virqinia · regulatory schemP, it is appropriate to re-
ject his~phallenge and affirm. 
~ 
Harry has now given me a list of specific cha~nges 
in my third draft of the opinion tha.t, if 1 accept, will 
enable him to join. I ~eliver to you hPrewith a proposed 
' fourth draft (not yet circulated) in which I have gone much 
- but not all of tbe way ~ ~ith Harry, but not as far as he 
woul<i like. 
If you can find the time (perhaps today or tomor-
row) to take a look at the changes I have made, I will be 
grateful. If these meet with your approval, I will go back 
to Harry and see if he will accept them as a compromise be-
tween us. Although I have .eliminated a good deal of lan-
guage I would have preferred to keep in the opinion, I think 
the proposed fourth draft would fairly well set-tle the va-
lidity of regulations like those of Virginia. This is our 
basic objective. 
I will be happy to discuss this with you at any 
time. We should try to get this off of "dead center" before 
next week's hectic schedule. A.lso, HA.B is expecting some 
reply from me. 
Sincerely, 








THE CHIEF JuSTICE 
May 16, 1983 
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MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1623 v. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that 
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the 
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opin-
ion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the 
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy 
• "A 
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the 
Court's prior decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per- f. / I .I . J- ~--. ~-- ; t 
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi- ~~
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement a2£lies t~~t ~itp_ester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 8. 
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health ob · ectives. Although pathology 
examma wns may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante,~:) ~S" 9 .~ 
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in 
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The 
routine and a~d medical practice 1s for the attending 
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tis-
sue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and } 
Gynecologists (AGOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination .... " ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice 
' See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion .. .. An ~ception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Mis-
souri's requirement that this examination be performed by a 
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was 
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as 
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a 
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of con-
cern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 ~st 
may be better ~ to perform a microscopic examination, 
Missour"'ilaw does not require a microscopic examination un-
less "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the 
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the ini-
tial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of 
the attending physician and which will often make the pathol-
ogist's services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pa-
thologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8, 
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is un-
disputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a 
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10, 
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase 
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspec-
tive, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every 
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or 
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put 
2 The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F . Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
. . ,
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll 
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to 
appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. I)anfort~, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri nas not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate mediCal care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
3 A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion) . 
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on 
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in 
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I 
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving 
th~il~ f®Js horn.. alive, this type of aid is possible only 
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a 
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physi-
cian performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction 
does not apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
~ DistricgCourt found that the dilatation and evacuation 
~) 2;£th? of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival, 
and that 1t w1 nevertheless be the method of choice for some 
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in j ...,-_ 
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the I~ 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
'The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865. 
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in 
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second- h sician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a urden on women in cases where 
thebllrden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866. 
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving 
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physi-
cian at every third-trimester abortion" because "[ w ]e ... 
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7, 
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of 
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot jus-
tify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at 
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of 
metiiOd"pre sumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need 
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health 
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not 
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would 
hold it invalid. 6 
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 
507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
• In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
6 The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B 
In addition, I would hold that the stat~e'~lure to Qro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it un-
co s 1tu wna. As t e ou recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an 
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to 
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not 
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute ap-
pears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a 
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when 
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take 
control of'' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it 
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this sec-
tion to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (em-
phasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second phy-
sician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the 
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails 
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always 
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that 
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to 
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an 
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be 
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions with-
out a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause 
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physi-
cians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way 
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with. 
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judg-
ment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license 
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the phy-
sician's right to practice." 
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not 
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an 
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any 
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissi-
bly vague; it fails to inform the physician whetner he may 
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or 
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the wom-
an's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. 
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the 
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability 
abortion. In C olautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute 
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to 
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional 
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The 
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with 
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible 
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that 
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician require-
ment invalid on this ground as well. 9 
7 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
8 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
9 Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor abs t arental con a court 
order. o. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). A minor who has __... 
not obtained parental consent may petition the juvenile court 
for court consent or the right to self-consent. The statute 
then provides that 
"the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion . . . ; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied .... " § 188.028.2(4). 
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... au-
thorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alterna-
tives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omit-
ted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that 
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the 
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."' 
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) per-
mits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the gen-
eral standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483 
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear 
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny 
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a 
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not 
competent to make a decision regarding abortion indepen-
dently." Ibid. 
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain lan-
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
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guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set 
forth by the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
643-644, 647-648 (1979) (Bellotti II), and applied by the 
Court today. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the stat-
ute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[ w ]here fairly possi-
ble, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of un-
constitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves I 
the construction adopted by the Court-oTAppeals, conclllaing 
that a Missouri juvem e court may no eny a [minor's] peti-
tion 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor 
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at 
14. 
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise 
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of 
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state 
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of 
Missouri law is a matter for the cou of Missouri, and "[t]he 
majority's constructiOn of state law is, of course, not bind-
ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of 
WHITE, J .). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition 
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite 
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missou-
ri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the 
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10 
10 This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979 
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti 
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or 
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II , 443 U. S., 
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this lan-
guage to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where 
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be 
served by an abortion, ' " even if the minor " 'is capable of making, and has 
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.'" !d., at 
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General , 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d 
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It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will 
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court 
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state 
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court held that 
the District Court should have abstained where "an uncon-
strued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the 
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the ne-
cessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least ma-
terially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147, 
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see 
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I 
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as 
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification pro-
cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules 
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of 
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02, 
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to 
intimate that abstention would be improper ... were certi-
fication not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where 
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri 
courts to reach a different result. 
11 The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the 
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on 
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge 
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section 
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would 
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483 
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of 
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to ne-
cessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976). 
12 While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains im-
portant, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement 
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. 
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in ex-
ercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See 
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). 
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constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we 
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri 
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by 
other means. 13 
13 Because I believe abstention is appropriate, I do not reach the ques-
tion whether Missouri's parental-judicial consent statute as construed by 
the Court is constitutional. 
' .y 
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81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
.> •• 
' nea ' Barry: 
~, Here are two copies of a proposed fourth draft of 
an opinion in this case. The margins are marked to indicate 
f, changes. 
J\11 of these changes are ma~e to accommodate the 
suggestions in your letter and accompanying memorandum of 
~ay 4. Jim Browning, my clerk, has indicate~ in the mar- ~ 
gins of your memorandum the extent to which I have adopted 
your suggestions. '" , ,. '· 
In summary, T have retained the footnotes on pp. 9 
and 10 that describe the Virginia regulations. On page 11, 
I retained the first sentence in the third (run-over) para-
graph. And I 'Tiade modest revisions in your suggested lan- ' .. 
·n f 
guaqe for page~ 12 and 13. '"'· \~~ 
' In all other respects (unless inadvertently I have: 
\ 
~:f. I· 
overlooked something), I have accepted your s~ggestions. 
·' As the. Chief ioined an earlier draft, I felt I -.. ~' 
owed hlm the duty to show him these changes. You have seen 
his -join note of yf'>sterday. App;uently, he thought I han 
circulated this fourth draft to the Conference. I had dis-
cussed the general nature of th~ chanqes with him previous-
ly. In any event, although he said to me that he would pre-
fer my first circulation, he recognizes the importance of 
putting together a solid Court. • 
I would very much prefer to retain the first sen-
tence in the thir~ paragraph on page 11. It is not a hold-
ing sentence. It metely states that on their face the Vir-
ginia regulations appear generally to be "comp~tible with 
accepted medical standards". In view of the qualifying lan-
guage, I do not think there can be any doubt as to the accu-





I am happy to discuss any of this with you. Our • 
exchange of views has been constructive. On the basis of 
talks with him, I believe we can persuade the Chief also to 
join Akron. With six of us agreeing on Akron and Simopoulos 
(by far the two most important issues), each of which reaf-
fir:'lls P.oe, I think we will have gone a long way to lay to 
rest the controv~rsy of the last decade as to the faithful-
. ' .
of thi s Court to your historic decision. Guidance also 
be given legislatures and courts. 




, . .. 
·. 
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20,2.14 Special Hospital - Institutions, as defined by Section 32-
298(2), Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, which provide 
care for a specialized group of patients and/or limits in-
patient admission to provide diagnosis and treatment for 
patients who have specified conditions (e.g., tuberculosis, 
orthopedic, pediatric). 
Section 30.0 Procedures for Licensure or License Renewal 
30.1 General 
No person shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this State 
any outpatient hospital as defined in and included within provisions 
of these regulations without having obtained a license. Any person 
establishing, conducting, maintaining, or operating an outpatient 
hospital without a license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five 
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or by confinement in jail 
for not more than twelve months, or both, and each day of such violation 
before any conviction shall constitute a separate first offense. 
30.2 Classification 
Hospitals to be licensed shall be classified and designated pursuant 
to Sections 20.2.8, 20.2.11, and 20.2.14 of these regulation.s. 
30.3 Separate License 
Separate license shall be required by outpatient hospitals maintained 
on separate premises even though they are operated under the same 
management. Separate license shall be required for separate buildings 
on the same grounds . 
30.4 Special Facilities 
Hospitals which have separate organized sections, units, or buildings 
to provide services of a classification covered by provisions of other 
state statutes or regulations may be required to have an additional 
applicable license for that type of service (e.g., maternity, psychiatric, 
nursing home) . 
30.5 Request for Issuance 
Hospital licenses are issued by the Commissioner , but all requests for 
licensing shall be submitted initially to the Bureau of Medical and 
Nursing Facilities Services. The procedure for obtaining the license 
shall include the follO\ting steps 1 
30.5.1 
30.5.2 
Request for application forms shall be made in writing to 
the Bureau. 
Application for license or license renewal to establ1sh or 





Appl•cation for original license, change 111 license , or 
license renewal shall be accompanied by a check or money 
order for the service charge, payable to the licensing 
agency, when requested. 
Appli..:ation or original lieense of a facility or fo r 
additions or major alterations to existing licensed facilities 
must be accompanied by a letter of approval indicating that 
the building meets the requirements of the Virginia Fire 
Safety Laws . 
.\('. 6 Service Charge 
The service charge shall be $10.00. 
\
1 1. 7 License Expiration 
A license shall expire as specified or at midnight December 31 
following date of issue, whichever is first, and shall be renewable 
annually, upon filing of application and payment of the service charge, 
unless cause apl'ears to the contrary. 
30.8 Name 
Every outpatient hospital shall be designated by a permanent and 
appropriate name which shall appear on the application for license. 
The name shall not be changed without first notifying the licensing 
agency. 
30.9 Posting of License 
30.10 
The outpatient hospital license issued by the Commissioner shall be 
framed and posted conspicuously on the premises, either in the main 
entrance or in a place clearly visable from the main entrance. 
Return of License 
The licensing agency shall be notified in writing within thirty (30) 
working days concerning any proposed change in location, ownership, 
or name of the facility. A license shall not be transferred from 
one owner to another or from one location to another. 
The license issued by the Commissioner shall be returned to the Bureau 
when any of the following changes occur during the licensing year or if 
the facility is closed: 
30.10.1 Revocation. 
30.10.2 Change of location. 
30.10.3 Change of ownership. 
30.10.4 Change of name. 




Revocation or Suspension of License 
A license to operate an outpatient hospital shall be revoked or 
suspended by the licensing agency upon the findings of one or more 
of the following• 
30.11.1 Continuing violation of the proyisions of the licensing 
act or the rules and regulations of the Board adopted 
thereunder. 
30.11.2 Permitting, aiding, or abetting the commission of any 
illegal act in the facility. 
30.11.3 Conduct or practice detrimental to the welfare or safety 
of any patient in the facility. 
Before a revocation of a license is effective, the provisions of 
the Administrative Process Act shall be observed. 
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RULES AND REGULATIONS 
FOR THE LICENSURE OF 
OUTPATIENT SURGICAL HOSPITALS 
PART II 
ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS FOR 




AND OPERATION OF EXISTING AND NEW HOSPITALS 







Each outpatient surgical hospital shal l have a governing body or 
other legal authority responsible for the management and control of 
the operation of the facilities. 
There shal l be disclosure of hospital ownership. OWnership interest 
shall be made known to the licensing agency and in the case of corpora-
tions, all individuals or entities holding 10\ or more of total owner-
ship shall be identified by name and address . The licensing agency 
shall be notified of any changes in ownership . 
The governing body shall provide facilities , personnel and other 
resources necessary to meet patient and program needs. 
The governing body shall have a formal organizational plan with 
written by-laws, rules and regulations or their equivalent. These 
shall clearly set forth organization, duties, responsibilities, 
accountability, and relationships of professional staff and other 
personnel. The person or organizational body responsible for formu-
lating policies shall be identified. 
The by-laws, rules and regulations , or their equivalent , shall include 






A statement of purpose; 
Description of the functions and duties of the governi ng 
body, or other legal authority; 
A statement of authority and responsibility delegated to 
the chief administrative officer and to the medical staff; 
Provision for selection and appointment of medical staff and 
granting of clinical privileges; 
Provision of guidelines for relationRhip among the governing 
body, the chief administrative officer , and the medical staff. 
40.6 Administrative Officer 
40.6.1 The responsibility for administration and management of the 
outpatient surgical hospital shall be vested in an individual 
whose qualifications, authority and duties shall be defined in 












Section 41.0 Policies and Procedures 
41.1 General Statement 
Policies and procedures may vary depending on scope and type of 
service, personnel, equipment and location of the facility. It 
is recognized that no two facilities will be identical because 
of variations in the scope and objective of the outpatient ser-
vice. Even though each facility may be different, certain stan-
dards and procedures shall be applicable to all in assuring the 
delivery of a high quality of care. 
41.2 Policy and Procedures Manual 
Each outpatient surgical hospital shall develop written policies 







The types of emergency and elective procedures which 
may be performed in the facility; 
Types of anesthesia which may be used; 
Admissions and discharges, including criteria for 
evaluating the patient before admission and before 
discharge; 
Written informed consent of patient prior to the 
initiation of any procedure; 
Procedures for hous ekeeping and infection control. 
41.3 A copy of approved policies and procedures and revisions thereto, 
shall be made available to the Bureau upon request. 
Section 42.0 Staffing 
42.1 Medical Staff 
The size and organizational structure of the medical staff will vary 
de pe nding on the scope of service. 
~·' · ' 
~42 . 1 . 2 
42.1.3 
Pro f e s sional and clini cal s ervices s ha ll be supervised by 
a physician licens ed t o practice medicine or surgery in 
Virginia. 
Surgical procedures shall be performed by a physician 
licensed to perform such procedures in Virginia. 
Clini cal privileges of phys ician and non-physician 
practitioners shall be clearly defin~d. 
10 
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Credentials including education and experience shall be 
reviewed and privileges identified, established, and 
approved for each person allowed to diagnose, treat 
patients, or perform surgical procedures in accordance 
with guidelines, policies or by-laws adopted by the 
governing body and approved by the medical staff. 
Nursing Staff 
The total number of nursing personnel will vary depending upon t.he 
number and types of patients to be admitted and the types of cper~tivr· 





A registered nurse qualified on the basis of education, 
experience, and clinical ability shall be responsible 
for the direction o f nursing care provided the patient;. 
The number and type of nursing personnel, including 
registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and 
supplementary staff, shall be based upon the needs of 
the patients and the types of services performed. 
At least one registered nurse shall be on duty at all 
times while the faci lity is in use. 
Job descriptions shall be developed for each level of 
nursing personnel and include functions, re spons ibilities, 
and qualifications. 
Evidence of current Virginia registration required by state 
statute shall be on file in the facility. 
Section 4 3. 0 Patient Care Services 




The anesthesia service sha ll be directed by and under 
the supervision of a physician licensed to practice 
medicine or surgery in Virginia. 
The physician responsible for the anesthesia service shall 
be presen t for the administrat i on of anesthetics and re-
covery o~ patients when any general or major regional 
anesthetic is used. 
There shall be written procedures to assure safety in 










Unless the hospital program and official written action 
by the governing body prohibit use of flammable anesthetics 
the requirements of "Rul es and Regulations for the Licensure 
of General and Special Hospitals," Depa rtment of Health shall 
be met. 
StPrile Supply SC'rvice s 
4 3. 2.1 
4 3 . 2 . 2 
Adeq uate provisions s hall be maintained for the processing, 
ste rilizing, storing, and dispensing o f clean and sterile 
supplies and equipment . 
Written procedures sha ll be establ ished for the appropriate 
disposal of patho l ogica l and other potential ly infectious 
waste and contaminated supplies . 
Dietary Service 
43.3.1 If the program calls for the serving of snacks or other 
foods, adequate space, equipment, and supplies shal l be 
provided. Applicable state and local codes pertaining to 
receiving , storage, refrigera tion, preparation , and serving 




43 . 4.3 
Each outpatient surgical hospital shall deve lop a written 
evacuation plan to assure reasonable precautions are taken 
to protect patients, employees, and visitors from hazards 
of fire and other disaster. 
A program to acquaint all personnel with evacuation procedures 
shall be maintained. 
A copy of the plan and procedures shall be made available 




43. 5. 3 
Each outpatient surgical hospital shall maintain on the 
premises adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and 
control of hemorrhage and other complications. 
A written agreement which ensures emergency transportation 
to a licensed general hospital shall be executed with an 
ambulance service. 
A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital 
to ensure that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital 
shall receive needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall 
be with a licensed general hospital capable of providing full 
surgical , anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic 
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which has 
a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service 




4 3 .6 Lahora tory a nd Patho l ogy Se rv i ces 
4 3 . 6 .1 
43.6.2 
4 3.6 . 3 
Each p at i ent admitted to the outpatie nt s urgi ca l hospital 
shall r eceive appropriate r o utine laboratory t es ting. 
Outpa t i e nt surgi c al hospitals whi ch p rovide abo rtion ser-
vice s s hall provi d e l abo r atory se rvices which meet the 
minimum r equi reme nts of Sec tio ns 64 . 1.3 and 64.1.4 of 
Part III o f these r e gul a tions. 
All tissue r emoved shall be submitte d for histological 
examinati on by a p a thologist and a wri t ten r e port of 
h is exami na t i on p r ovided to the a ttend i ng physi c ian. 
The repor t of find i ngs shall be filed in the pa tient's 
clinica l r ecord . P a tho l ogy servi c e s f o r abortion patients 
shal l mee t t h e min imum r e qui rement s of Sect i o n 64. 2. 4 
of Part III o f t hes e r e gulat i ons. 
43.7 Me di c a l Re cords 
43 .7 . 1 
43.7, 2 
43.7.3 
An accurate and compl e te c l i nical reco rd or chart shall 
be maintained on each patient. The reco r d or cha r t shall 
contain sufficient i n f ormati o n to sati s fy t he diagnosis o r 
need for the medica l or surgical se r vice . It sha ll include , 
whe n app l icable , but no t be l imited t o the fol l owi ng : , 
(a) Patie n t identification; 
(b) Admitting information, i n cluding patien t his tory 
and physical examination; 
( c ) Signed consen t ; 
(d) Confirmation of pregnancy, if applicable ; 
(e ) Phy s ician orders; 
( f ) Labo r atory te s ts, p a tho l ogist ' s report of ti s sue , 
and radiologist ' s report of X- rays; 
(g ) Anesthesia record ; 
(h ) Operative reco rd ; 
(i ) Surgical medication and medica l treatmen ts; 
(j ) Recovery roo m notes; 
(k) Phy s ician and nur s es' progre s s notes: 
(1) Condition at time of di s charge; 
(m ) Patient instruc t i on s , preoperative and postoperative; 
(n) Nam e s of referral physi c ian s an d/or ;,qe nc ies. 
Pro vis i o n s shall be made f or the safe sto r a qP o f me di ca l 
r ecor ds o r accurate and l e gi b le r epr oduct 1o ns the r e of . 
All med i ca l records , ei the r o r i q in al o r occurat P reprod uc tl o ns, 
s hall be prese rve d f o r a minimum of f i ve ( 5 ) years foll o w1ng 
disch arge of the pati e nt. 
(a) Records o f minors s hall b e k e pt for at lea s t five (5) 





(b) Birth and death information shall be retained for 
ten (10) years in accordance with Section 32-353.29, 
Code of Virginia (1950) , as amended. 
(c) Record of abortions and proper information for the 
issuance of a fetal death certificate shall be fur-
nished the Bureau of Vital Records, Virginia Depart-




43 .8 .3 
43.8.4 
43 . 8.5 
Prior to the initiation of any procedure, a medical history 
and physica l examination shall bt comfleted for each patient. 
Where medical evaluation, ex~ination, and referrals are made 
from a private physician 's ot'fice, another hospital, clinic , 
or medical service, pertinent available records thereof shall 
be mace and included as a part of the patient ' s medical record 
at the time the patient is admitted to the outpatient surgical 
hospital. 
Sufficient time shall be allowed between initial examination 
and initiation of any procedure to permit the reforting and 
review of laboratory tests by the responsible physician . 
In outpatient surgical hospi tals which provide abortion s er-
vices, the diagnosis of pregnancy shall be th e responsibility 
of the physician performing the abortion procedure. 
Outpatient surgical hospitals whi ch provide abortion services 
shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instructi or. 





Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications 
under the direct supervision of a licensed nurse . Nurses who 
supervise the recovery area shall have specialized training in 
resuscitation techniques and other emergency procedures. 
The recovery period will vary according to the procedure per-
formed but patients shall be observed for post-operative 
complications for a minimum of sixty (60) minutes • ... 
A physician licensed in Virginia shall be present on the 
premises at all times during the operative and post-operative 
period until discharge of the patient. 
Patients shall be discharged from the recovery only on written 










Rh0 (D) anti-immune globulin (human) shall be administered 
to Rh-negative patients who receive abortion services in 
accordance with requirements of Section 64.3.5 of Part III 
of these regulations. 
Environment and Maintenance 
43.10.1 All parts of the outpatient surgical hospital and its premises 
shall be kept clean, neat, and free of litter and rubbish. 
43.10.2 Hazardous cleaning solutions , compounds, and substances shall 
be labeled, stored in a safe place, and kept in an enclosed 
section separate from other materials. 
Laundry Service 
43.11.1 Each outpatient surgical hospital shall make provisions for 
the cleaning of all linens. 
43.11.2 There shall be distinct areas for the separate storage and 
handling of clean and soiled linens. 
43.11.3 All soiled linen shall be placed in closed containers prior 
to transportation. 
Physical Plant 
43.12.1 Fire and Safety. 
Each outpatient hospital shall establish a monitoring program 
for the internal e nforcement of all applicable fire and safety 
laws and regulations. 
43.12.2 Lighting and Electrical. 
(a) Policies and procedures shall be established to rrQn~m~ze 
the hazards in the use and operation of all electrical 
equipment. 
(b) All electrical appliances used by the outpatient surgical 
hospital shall have the Underwriter Laboratories label or 
be approved by the local electrical inspection authority. 
43.12.3 Plumbing. 
(a) All plumbing material and plumbing systems or parts thereof 
shall meet the minimum requirements of the State Uniform 
Building Code. 
(b) All plumbing shall be installed in such a manner as to 
prevent back siphonage or cross connections between potable 




43.12.4 Sewage Disposal Systems. 
Existing and new facilities shall be connected to an approved 
sewage system. 
43.12.5 Waste Disposal. 
Pathological and bacteriological wastes, dressings, and 
other contaminated wastes shall be incinerated in an approved 
incinerator or by other methods of disposal as approved by the 
licensing agency. 
43 . 12.6 Water Supply. 
(a) Water shall be obtained from an approved water supply 
system. 
(b) The water shall be distributed to conveniently l0cated 
taps and fixtures throughout the faci lity and shall be 
adequate in volumn and pressure for all hospital purposes, 
including fire fighting . 
CONSTRUCTION ST11NDARDS FOR NEW HOSPITALS 1\ND ADDITIONS 1\ND ALTERATIONS 
TO EXISTING HOSPITALS 










The owner or his representative shall provide a brief narrative 
which describes the functional space requirements, staffing 
patterns, departmental relationship, and other basic information 
relating to the fulfillment of the in=titution's objective. 
The narrative shall indicate the manner in which the se rvices are 
to be made available to the outpatients. When se rvices are to 
be shared or purchased, appropriate modifications or deletions 
in space and equipment requirements sha ll be considered to avoid 
duplication . In many instances , minimum requirements will need 
to be exceeded for the institution to function as programmed. 
These minimum requirements are not intended in any way to 
restrict innovations and improvements in design or construction 
techniques. Plans and specifications which contain deviations 
from the requirements prescnbed herein may be approved if it 
is determined that the purposes of the minimum requirements 
have been fulfilled . Request to waive any specific requirem~nt 
shall be submitted as early as possible in the planning process. 
The extent (number and type) of the diagnostic, clinical, a nd 
administrative facilities to be proVided shall be determined by 
the se rvices contemplated and the estimated patient load as 









50 .4 . 1 
50.5.1 
If t h e outpatient surgical hospital is a physical p a r t of 
a n inpatient hospital and is intended t o serve inpatients 
as well as outpatients , the applicable requiremen ts of the 
" Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Ge neral and 
Special Hospitals , " Department of Hea l t h, shall apply. 
In the absence of a formal parking study, vehicle parking 
for outpatient surgical hospitals shall be provided at t he 
ratio o f two parking spaces for each treatment room a nd 
each examining room plus sufficient parking spaces to accom-
mo d ate the maximum number of staff on duty at one time. 
Exceptions may be made with approval of the Bureau f or 
outpatient surgica l hospitals located in areas with high 
population dens ity if adequate public parking is available 
or if the hospital is accessible to a public transportation 
system. 
Codes, Fire Safety, Zoning 
50.6.1 All construction of new buildings and additions, altera-
tions or repairs to existing buildings for occupancy as a 
"free-standing" outpatient hospital shall conform to state 
and local codes, zoning and building ordinances, and the 
State Uniform Building Code requirements applicable to 
type of occupancy. In case of a conflict, codes with the 
most strict standards shall apply. All codes applicable 
to the outpatient surgical hospi tal shall be noted on the 
preliminary and working drawings. 
Conversions 
50.7.1 Conversions of existing buildings to outpatient surgical 
hospital occupancy will be conside red only in those buildings 
which meet or can be remodeled to meet the requirements of 
the State Uniform Building Code. When the licensing agency 
finds the enforcement of one or more of the requ1rements in the 
following sections would clearly be impractical, the Commissioner 
shall have the auLhorlty to wa1ve, either temporar1ly or 
permanently , the enforcement of one or more of these require-
ments , prov1dcd patient care and safety to life from fire are 
not adversely affected. Life safety dur1ng construction of 
alterat1ons , conversions, or addit1ons shall be ma1ntained. 
Additions shall conform to new cons tructi on requirements. 
Site Requirements and Location 










Facilities not located on the ground floor of a building 
shall be served by an elevator(s) capable of accommodating 
a standard stretcher. 
Facilities shall be located in buildings providing emergency 
electrical service. The emergency electrical service may 
be provided by an .auxiliary generator, or, if available from 
the power company, two separate lines, each supplied from a 
separate generating source. The emergency electrical service 
shall h ave the capability to cover at least the operating, 
procedure, and r ecove ry room(s) lighting and electrical equip-
ment. 
The sanitation, water supply, sewage, and disposal facilities 
shall comply with the applicable state and local codes and 
ordinances. 
Adequate fire protection facilities or fire department ser-
vices shall be available. 
Architectural Plan Review 
During the early phase of architectural planning, prime considera-
tion shall be given to patient traffic from the patient parking 
area to admissions and through the service areas to discharge 
offices and to areas for patient pick up. Also, personne l traffic 
patterns from other areas to the service area, as well as those 
related to internal operations, shal l be considered. Traffic 
patterns for supply distribution are sometimes difficult to 
coordinate with personnel and patient Lraffic but are just as 
essential to the operations of the facility and therefore, 
shall be included in the planning. 
51.2 Drawings and Specifications 
51.2 .1 
51.2 . 2 
51.2.3 
When construction is contemplated for new buildings, additions, 
or substantial alterations, preliminary drawings and outline 
specifications shall be submitted to the Bureau, with a program 
narrative description, for review and approval prior to starting 
final working draw1ngs and specifications. 
The final working drowings and specifications shall be submitted 
to the Bureau for review and approval prior to release of con-
tract documents for bidding. Change orders which affect scope 
and/or function shall be submitted for approval prior to execution. 
The Bureau shall be notified of the award of contracts, of 
the date when construction has been completed, and of the 








Minor altl!rations and rl!lllodt!.linq - Minor altl!rations or 
remodeling changl!s which do not affect the structural 
integrity of the buildinq, or change functional operation, 
or which do not affect safety, need not be submitted for 
approval. 
The preparation and submission of drawings and specifications 
shall be executed by or under the immediate supervis ion of 
an architect rl!gistered in th" State of Virginia. 
Section 52.0 Construction Requirements 
52 . 1 Administration and Public Areas 
52 .1.1 Entrance to the building shall be located at grade level, 
sheltered from the weathl!r and abll! to accommodate wheel-
chairs, if applicabll! . 
52.1.2 While the same room may serve more than one function, the 
planning process shall assure that adequate sp~c" is available 
for all administrative services. 
52.1.3 Reception area- Reception may be considered a part of 
administrative services. Howevl!r, adequate space near the 
entrancl! shall be provided for rl!ceiving and registering 
patients. Work space shall provide privacy for obtaining 
confidential information and discussing financial arrangements. 
52.1.4 Lobby and waiting art!& - Adequatl! waiting space designed for 
comfort s hall be provided for at least one family member/friend 
per patient. Facilities shall include public toilets, public 
telephone(s), drinking fountains(s), and wheelchair storage. 
52.1.5 Preoperative preparation and holding - Adequate space to assure 
privacy for both males and females shall be provided in dressinn 
rooms and patient lockers, toilet and bathing fac1lities, pre-
operative preparation, medication administration, anrt pat1ent 
holding areas. 
52.1.6 Counsl!ling services - If the program calls for servi · ~s re-
quiring special patient counseling , private spacl! sh be 
provided for this servicl! . 
52 .1. 7 Nourishment rooms - Facili til!s and space may be pro\' .. ..j for 
preparation of light nourishml!nt, and refrigeration • t juices. 
An ice machine is desirabll!. Handwashing facilities shall be 
provided in the room. 
52 .1. 8 Space for general storage for office supplies, sterile supplies, 
pharmacy and housekeeping supplies shall be provided. 
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Adequate janitor's closet(s) with floor receptor or 







52.2 . 6 
52.2.7 
Size and design - The size and design of units shall be 
in accordance with individual programs, but the following 
basic eiements shall be incorporated in all facilities, 
wh ere applicab le. 
Surgical suite -The plumbing, heating, and electrical 
systems for this service shall meet all codes applicable 
to the general hospital operating room as specified in 
the "Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General 
and Special Hospitals," Department of Health. 
Operating rooms. 
(a) Number - The architectura l design of the facilities 
shall provide a sufficient number of rooms for the 
projected case load and types of procedures to be 
perfonned. 
(b) Size of rooms - Operating rooms shall have .minimum 
dimensions of 16' X 18'. One sma ller room may be 
reserved for very minor local excisions but that 
room shall be no less than 160 square feet. 
Scrub-up facilities.- Regular scrub sinks shall be pro-
vided. Scrub facilities shall be arranged to minimize 
any incidenta l splatter on nearby personnel or supply 
carts. 
Personnel dressing - The personne l l ocker and dressing 
areas shall be so located that personnel enter from un-
controlled areas and exit directly into the surgical 
suite. Locker space shall be provided for each employee , 
and a toilet, shower , and dressing area shall be provided 
in each personnel dressing room. 
Recovery roo m. 
(a) This r oom shall have handwashing facilities, medi-
cation storaoe space, clerical work space , storage 
for clerical supplies, linens, and patient care 
supplies and equipme nt; and an adjoining toilet 
which shall have a water closet and handwashing 
facilities. 
General purpose examination rooms - The prP.operative 
preparation area may be designed and equipped for examina-
tion. Each room shall have handwashing facilities and be 





52.2.8 Work and storage space - Separate rooms shall be provided 
for clean and sterile holding and for instrument or equip-
ment clean-up functions. 
52.2.9 · Anesthesia storage - Unless the narrative program and 
governing body action prohibits in writing the use of 
flammable anesthetics, a separate room shall be provided 
for storage of flammable gases. 
52.2.10 Anesthesia workroom- Anesthesia workroom and equipment 
storage facilities with adequate ventilation, work counter 
and sink shall be provided. 
52.2.11 Nurses, clerical or control station- S~fficient clerical 
control station(s) shall be appropriately des.igned and 
located. Suitable space shall be provided for the following 
activities: traffic control of the area; clerical functions 
related to room or case scheduling and record maintenance; 
personnel functions, and nursing activities related to 
medication administration and treatments. 
52.2.12 Doctors' dictation - Space shall be private and adequate 
in size for the total number of doctors who may be dic-
tating at the same time. It may be located adjacent tQ 
but not inside the nurses' station, lounge, or doctors' 
dressing area. 
52.2.13 Housekeeping- A janitor's closet shall be conveniently 
located and designated to serve only the sur gical suite. 
It shall have suitable storage facilities and receptacles 
for special equipment and supplies used in cleaning the 
operating rooms. 
Laboratory and Radiology Services 
52. 3.1 Space and equipment requirements shal l be determined by 
the workload described in the narrative program. These 
services may be provided within the outpatient surgical 
hospital or through an effective contractural arrange-
ment with nearby facilit1es. If laboratory and/or 
radiology services are not provided by contractural 
agreement all applicable requirements of the "Rules 
and Regulat1ons for the Licensure of General and Special 




Minimum pubhc corridor width shall be 5 '0". 
Each building shall have at least two exists remote from 
each other. Other details as to exists and fire safety 








Items such as drinking fountains, telephone booths, 
vending machines and portable equipment shall be 
located so as not to restri ct corridor traffic or 
reduce the corridor width below the required width. 
Toilet rooms which may be used by patients shall be 
equipped with doors and hardware which will permit 
access from the outside in any emergency. 
The minimum width of doors for patient access to 
examination and treatment rooms shall be 3'0". 
No door shall swing into a corridor in a manner 
that might obstruct traffic flow or reduce the re-
quired corridor width, except doors to space such 
as small closets which arc not subjec t to occupancy. 
Rooms containing ceiling mounted equipment and those 
have ceiling mounted surgical li9ht fixtures shall 
have height required to accommodate the equipmen t or 
fixture. All other rooms shall have not less than 
8'0" ceilings except that corridors , storage rooms , 
toilet rooms and other minor rooms shall not be less 
than 7'8". 
52.4.8 Cubicle curtains and draperies shall be non-combustible 
or rendered flame retardent. 
52.4.9 Floor materials shall be easily cleanab l e and have 
wear resistance appropriate for the location involved. 
52.4.10 Wall finishes shall be washable and, in t~e immediate 





RULES AND REGULATIONS 
PART III 
ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND PHYSICAL FACILITY STANDARDS 

















Each outpatient abortion hospital shall have a governi~~ body or 
other legal authority responsible for the manage;ent a n C3ttrol 
of the operation of the facilities. 
There shall be disclosure of ownership. Ownership interest shall 
be made known to the licensing agency and in the case of corpora-
tions, all individuals or entities holding 10\ or more of total 
ownership shall be identified by name and address. The licensing 
agency shall be notified of any changes in ownership. 
The governing body shall provide facilities, personnel and other 
resources necessary to meet patient and program needs. 
The governing body shall have an organizational plan. The organi-
zational plan shall clearly set forth duties, responsibilities, 
accountability, and relationships of professional staff and other 
personnel. The person or organizational body responsible for 
formulating policies shall be identified. 
The organizational plan shall include at least the following: 
60.5.1 
60.5.2 
A statement of purpose; 
A statement of authority and responsibility delegated 
to the chief administrative officer and to the medical 
staff; 
60.5.3 Provision for selection and appointment of medical staff 
~ and granting of c~cal privileges. 
Administrative Officer ~ 
60.6.1 The responsibility for administration and management of 
the outpatient abortion hospital shall be vested in an 
individual whose qualifications, authority and duties 
shall be defined in a written statement adopted by the 
governing body. 
Section 61.0 Policies and Procedures 
61.1 General Statement 
Policies and procedures may vary depending on types of termination 
of pregnancy technique, personnel and equipment required, and loca-
tion of the facility. It is recognized that no two facilities will 
be identical. Even though each facility may be different, certain 
standards and requirements shall be applicable to all in assuring 





Policy and Procedures Manual 
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall develop written policies 
and procedures which shall include provisions covering the foll owi ng 
itemsr 
61. 2 .1 Patient Eligibility 
61.2. 2 Personnel 
61. 2. 3 Clinical Services 
61.2. 4 Medical Records 
61.2. 5 Physical Facilities 
A copy of approved policies and procedures and revisions thereto, 
s hall be made available to the Bureau upon request. 
Section 62.0 Patient Eligibility 
62.1 The outpatient abortion h ospital is maintained and operateo for the 
primary purpose of terminating a confirmed pregnancy of a p~tient 
who is medically eligible for an abortion performed on an o•ttpatient 
basis. 
62. 1. 1 
62 .1. 2 
62 .1. 3 
Medical eligibility shnll be determined by the atte1ding 
physician b ased on thP medical history and the findings 
of the physical examination . 
Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall 
be performed prior to the end of the !ir~t trimester 
(12th week amenorrhea ). 
Concomitant female ste rilization or any other procedure 
requiring entry into the pelvic or abdominal cavity shall 
be prohibited. 
Section 63.0 Personnel 
63.1 Medtc~l Staff 
The size and organizational st ructure of the medical staff will 
vary depending on the scope of service. 
63.1.1 Each outpatient abortion hospital shall have a Medical 
Director. 
(a) The Medical Director shall be a physician licensed 
to practice medicine or surgery ! n V1rg inia; and 
(b) Shall be c~d by the American ~d of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology and have training and exper1ence in 













(c) Shall supervise all medical aspects of the professional 
and clinical services in the facility; and 
(d) Shall review credentials of all professional staff 
including education, experience and hospital privileges 
and identify, establish, and approve privileges for 
each person allowed to diagnose, treat patients, or 
perform pregnancy termi nation procedures in accordance 
with guidelines or policies approved by the governing 
body. 
All pregnancy termination procedures shall be performed by 
a physician licensed to practice medicine or surge ry in 
Virginia. 
Nursing Staff 
The total number of nursing personnel will vary depending upon the 





A registered nur~e qualified on the basis of education, 
experience, and clinical ability sha~l be responsible for 
the direction of nursing care provided the patients. 
The number and type of nursing personnel, including registered 
nurses, licensed practical nurses, and supplementary staff, 
shall be based upon the needs of the patients and the types 
of services performed. 
At least one registered nurse shall be on duty at all times 
while the facf!!tyi; i n use for termination of pregnancy 
procedures. 
Job descriptions shal l be developed for each level of nursing 
personnel and shall include functions, responsibilities, and 
qualifications. 
Evidence of current Virginia registration required by state 
statute shall be on file in the facility. 
Counseling Staff 
63.3.1 Each outpatient abortion hospital shall offer each patient 
~rpgj;jA)Oe. ~ounseli.w~ ar. J instruction in the prec;nancy 
termination procedure and in birth control methods. 
63.3.2 An individual qualified on the basis of education, training 
and experience shall be responsible for the supervision of 
the interviewing and counseling .services provided the patients. 
63.3.3 The counseling supervisor shall be available fa~ consultation 





Individual inte rview and counseling shall be given prior 
to the termination of pregnancy procedure. 
Information obtained at admission counseling shall be 
recorded in the medical record and brought to the 
a tten tion of the physician prior to the termination 
of pregnancy procedure. 
Laboratory Staff 
63.4.1 
63.4 . 2 
63.4.3 
Each outpatient abortion hospital s hall have the capabilit 
to perform rout i ne pre-operative laboratory examination on 
the premises. 
An individual qualified on the basis of education , trainina 
and experience shal l be responsible for the supervision of 
laboratory services provided the patients. 
The l aboratory supervisor should be a graduate of an accre •i-
ted school of medical technology o r a laboratory technicia .• 
certified by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. 
Section 64.0 Clinical Services 
64.1 Pre-Operative Admission 
64.1.1 
64 .1. 2 
64 . 1. 3 
Prior to the initiation of any pregnancy termination pro-
cedure , a medical history and physical examination , incluc: in•l 
complete vaginal and bi-ma11ua l pelvic examination shall b<' 
c omp leted for each patient. 
Where medical evaluation, examinatior. , 3nd referrals are 
made from a private physician's office , anothe r hospital, 
clinic, or medical service , pertinent available records 
thereof shall be included as a part of the patient's 
medical record at the time the pat.ient is admitted to 
the outpatient abortion hospital. 
The following laboratory procedures shall be conducted on 
each patient and results of (a), (b), (c) , and (e) shall 
be available prior to the performance of the pregnancy 
termination procedure: 
(a) Pregnancy test; 
(b) Hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations; 
(c) Blood and Rh typing; 
(d) In the case of Rh-negative patients, a Coomb's test; 
(e) Urinalysis for sugar and albumin; and 
(f) Culture for gonorrheal infection. 
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When medically indicated, serologic test for syphilis and 
Papanicolaou smear shall be conducted. 
Appropriate written informed consent of the patient shall 
be obtained prior to the initiation of any procedure. 






The anesthesia service shall be directed by and under the 
supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine or 
surgery in Virginia. 
There shall be written procedures to assure safety in 
storage and use of inhalation anesthetics and medical gases. 
Only non-combustible agents shall be used for anesthesia 
or for pre-operative preparation. 
Tissue removed shall be submitted for histological exami-
nation by a patho logist in all cases where gross examination 
by the attending physician does not confirm presence of 
fetal parts. The attending physician shall document in 
the patient's medical record the presence or absence of 
fetal parts. 
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall maintain on the 
premises suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items 
necessary for resuscitation or control of hemorrhage 
and other complications . 
Such items shall include but not be limited to the following: 
(a) Blood pressure cuff; 
(b) Oxygen; 
(c) Suction machine; 
(d) Oral airway; 
(e) Resuscitation bag; 
(f) Endotracheal tube; 
(g) Laryr.goscope; 
(h) Tracheotomy set; 
(i) Cut-down set; 
(j) Plasma expanders; 
(k) I-V sets; 
















Each patient shall be observed for post-operative 
complications under the direct supervision of a 
Registered Nurse. Nurses who supervise the recovery 
area shall have specialized training in resuscitation 
techniques and other emergency procedures. 
The recovery period will vary but patients shall be 
observed for post-operative complications for a minimum 
of forty-five (45) minutes. 
A physician licensed in Virginia shall be present on 
the premises at all times during the operative and 
post-operative period. 
Patients shal l be discharged from the recovery area 
only on written order of the attending physician . 
Rh
0 
(d) anti-immune globulin (human) shali be adminis-
tered to all Rh-negative patients who receive abortion 
services, where medically indicated, unless refused. 
The patient's decision to reject or accept must be in 
writing and made a permanent part of the medical record. 
Prior to discharge, each patient shall receive written 
instructions and counseling regnrding post-abortion 
complications and self-care. 
Prior to discharge, arrangements shall be made for post-
operative examination, either in the same facility or 
elsewhere, within two (2) to four (4) weeks after dis-
charge. Instructions for emergency care in the interim 
shall be given. 
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall provide treat-
ment on the premises or by referral of any abnormal 





Each outpatient abortion hospita! shall have a written 
plan for identifying medical emergencies and procedures. 
Supplies and equipment reserved for emergency use shall 
be checked at least weekly to assure adequate supply 







An agreement which ensures transportation of medical 
emergency cases to a licensed general hospital shall 
be executed with an ambulance service. 
To ensure that patients of the outpati~nt abortion 
hospital shall receive needed emergency treatment 
there shall be: 
(1) A written agreement with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, 
anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic 
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice 
and which has a physician in the hospital and 
available for emergency service at all times; or 
(2) Evidence that two or more staff physicians have 
unsupervised obstetrical, gynecological, or 
general surgical privileges in an accessible 
licensed general hospital which meets the re-
quirement of (1) above; or 
(3) A written agreement with two or more physicians 
who have unsupervised obstetrical , gynecological, 
or general surgical privileges in an accessible 
licensed general hospital which meets the require-
ments of {1) above. 
Nedical Records 
64.5.1 An accurate and complete clinical record or chart 
shall be maintained on each patient. The record or 
chart shall contain sufficient information to satisfy 
the diagnosis or need for the service. It shall in-
clude where applicable, but not be limited to the 
following: 
(a) Patient identification; 
(b) Admitting information, including patient history 
and physical exam1nation; 
(c) Pre-operative counseling notes; 
(d) Signed consent; 
(e) Confirmation of pregnancy; 
(f) Physician orders; 
(g) Laboratory tests, pathologist 's report of tissue, 
and radiologist's report of X-rays; 





(i) Operative record, including results of gross 
examination to determine presence or absence 
of fetal parts1 
(j) Surgical medication and medical treatments1 
(k) Recovery room notes; 
(1) Physician and nurses ' progress notes1 
(m) Condition at time of discharge, 
(n) Patient instructions, 
(o) Post-operative counseling notes1 
(p) Names of referral physicians and/or agencies. 
Provisions shall be made for the safe storage of medical 
records or accurate and legible reproductions thereof. 
All medical records, either origina l or accurate reproduc-
tions, shall be preserved for a minimum of five (5) years 
following discharge of the patient. 
(a) Records of minors shall be kept f o r at least five 
(5) years after such minor ha s reached the age of 
18 years . 
(b) Record of abortions and proper information for 
the issuance of a fetal death certificate shall 
be furnished the Bureau of Vita l Records, Virginia 
Department of Health, within ten (10) days after 
the abortion . 
Section 65 .0 Physical Facilities 
65.1 
65 . 2 
Codes and Zoning 
65 .1.1 All construction of new buildings and additions, 
alterations or repairs to existing buildings shall 
conform to all applicable state and local codes, 
zoning and building ordinances. 
Fire and Safety 
65.2.1 
65 . 2.2 
Each ou~patient abortion hospital shall establish a 
monitoring program for the internal enforcement of all 
applicable fire and safety laws and regulations. 
Each outpatient abortion hospital shall develop a 
written evacuation plan to assure reasonable pre-
cautions are taken to protect patients , employees , 






(a) A program to acquaint all personnel with evacuation 
p rocedures shall be maintained. 
(b) A co py of the plan and procedures shall be made 
a vai lable to the Bureau upon request. 
Site Requ iremen ts a nd Loca t ion 
6 5 .3 . 1 
65.3.2 
65.3 . 3 
65.3.4 
The si t e shal l mee t local zon i ng r equirements. 
Adequate fire protection faci liti es or fire department 
services shall be availab le. 
Facilities not located o n t h e ground floor of a building 
shall be served by an elevator capable of accommodating 
a standard stretcher. 
Facilities should be located in buildings provi ding 
emergency electrical service. 
Conversion of Existing Buildings 
65.4.1 Conversions of existing buildings to outpa t ient abortio n 
hospita l occupancy wi l l be considered on ly i n t hose 
buildings which meet or can be remodel e d to mee t the 
r equirements of the State Uni f o rm Bui l ding Code . When 
the licensing agency finds the enforcement of one or 
more of the requirements in the regulations wou ld 
clearly be impractical, the Commissioner shall have 
the authority to waive, either temporarily o r perma-
nently , t he enforcement of one or more of these 
requirements , provided patient care and safety t o 
life from fire are not adversely affected. Life 
safety during construction of alterations, conver-
zions , or additions shal l be maintai ned. 
Building and Se rvice Requirements 
65 . 5 .1 Administration and Public Areas 
(a) While the s ame r oom may serve mo re than one function, 
the pl a nning proc e s s s hall a ss ure that adequate space 
is available for all administrative services . 
(b) Reception area - Reception may be considered a part 
of administrative services . However, adequate space 
near the entrance shall be provided for receiving 
and regis t ering patients. Work space shall provide 
privacy for obtaining confidential information, 
discussing financial arrangements and counseling. 
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65.5.2 
(c) Lobby and waiting area - Adequate wa1:ing space 
desi9ned for comfort shall be prov, ded for at 
leas t <'ne family mcmbt•r/friend per p ;,ti ent. 
Fa c ilities shall include public toilets, public 
telephone• (s), drinking fountain (s I. 
(d) Pre-op~ r.ative preparation and holding - Adequate 
space t0 assure privacy shall be provided in 
dressin9 rooms and patient lockers , toilet, 
preoperat1ve preparation, medi 2a tion adminis-
tratior. and patient holding are~s . 
(e) If the program calls for the se rv : ng of s11acks o r 
other foods, adequate space, equipment, and supp lies 
shall be provided. App li cable s:ate and local codes 
pertain1ng to receiving, storage , refr~ge~ation, 
preparation, and serving of food shall be followed. 
(f) Space for general storage for office supplies 
pharmacy and housekeeping supplies •hall be pro-
vided. !lazardous -leaning solutions, compounds , 
and sub~•. anccs shall be label en, stored and kept 
in an enclosed section separate irom other supplies. 
Clinica 1 Are.1s 
(a) ~ i ze and design - The size and design of uni ts shal l 
]o, in accordance with individual programs, bu t the 
followinq basic elements sha ll be incorporuted in 
all facilities: 
(b) Procedures and Examining Rooms - The design of 
facilities shall provide a sufficient nwnber of 
rooms for the projected case load and the types 
of pro.::edurcs to be performed. 
(l) Size of rooms - Rooms in which pregnancy 
termination procedures ure performed shal l 
h>ve a minimum clear fl oor area of 100 square 
fe~t and have adequate lighting for surqical 
proc>=>dures. 
(2) C0nv.•ntional gynecological exannnution or 
o~er~ting tables with Jccessories, drapes, 
and/or linen shall be used in all procenurcs. 
(c) Scrub-·"p facil1t1es - Regular scrub sinks shall be 
provided. 
(d) Pert ·mnel dressing - The personnel locker and dressing 
areus s h~ll be so located that personnel enter from 















(e) Recovery room - A separate recovery room shall be pro-
vided and shall have handwashing facilities, medica-
tion storage space, clerical work space, storage for 
clerical supplies, linens, and patient care supplies 
and equipment; and an adjoining toilet with hand-
washing facilities. 
(f) Sterile Supply Services - Adequate provisions shall be 
maintained for the processing, sterilizing, storing, 
and dispensing of clean and sterile supplies and equip-
ment, Written procedures shall be established for the 
appropriate disposal of pathological and other poten-
tially infectious waste and contaminated supplies 
(g) Anesthesia workroom - Anesthesia work areas and storage 
facilities with adequate ventilation shall be provided. 
(h) Emergency equipment storage - Space out of the direct 
line of traffic shall be provided for a "crash cart," 
stretcher and similar emergency equipment . 
(i) Laboratory facilities - Space and equipment shall be 
provided within the outpatient abortion hospital for 
conducting pregnancy tests , hematocrit or hemoglobin 
determination, urinalysis, blood grouping and Rh typing. 
The space shall be adequate to provide at least the 
following: 
(1) Laboratory work counter; 
(2) Lavatory or counter sink equipped for handwashing; 
( 3) ·storage cabinet or closet. 
(j) Laundry and linen facilities - Provisions shall be made 
for cleaning, storage, and handling of all linen. There 
shall be distinct areas for the separate storage and 
handling of clean and soiled linen. All soiled linen 
shall be placed in closed containers prior to trans-
portation. 
General Requirements 
(a) Environment and Maintenance - All parts of the outpatient 
abortion hospital and its premises shall be kept clean, 
neat, and free of litter and rubbish. 
(l) Floors shall be easily cleanable and shall have 
wear resistance appropriate to the area involved. 
(2) Wall finishes shall be washable and in the inunediate 
area of plumbing fixtures, shall be smooth, moisture 
resistant and easily cleanable. 
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(b) Doors - Doors sha ll be not less than 3 ' 0" in width 
in areas subject to patient occupancy. All doors 
to toilets which may be used by patients shall be 
equipped with hardware which will permit access in 
any eme rgency. No door shall swing into a corridor 
in a manner that might obs truct traffic flow or re-
duce the r equired co~ridor width, except doors to 
s pace such as small closets 'which are not subject 
to occupancy. 
(c ) Corridor s - Corridor width in areas of publi c us e 
s ha ll be 5 • 0". 
(d ) Lighti ng and Ele ctri cal - Po l icies and procedure s 
s ha ll be establi s hed to mi ni mi ze t he hazards in the 
use and operation o f a ll e l ectri ca l equipment . All 
electrica l app liances s ha l l have the Underwriter 
Laboratories l abe l or be approved by t he l oca l 
electrica l inspection authority . 
(e ) Plumbing - Al l p l umbi ng mate r ial and plumbi ng systems 
or parts tPereof sha l l meet the minimum requirements 
of applicable state and l oca l codes . All plumbing 
sha ll be install ed i n s uc h a manner as t o prevent 
back siphonage or cross connections between potable 
and non-potable wate r s upplies . 
(f ) Sewage Disposal Systems - Existing and new facilitie s 
shall be connected to an approved sewage system . 
(g) Waste Disposa l - Pathological and bacteriological 
wastes , dressings , and othe r contaminated wastes 
sha l l be incinerated in an approved incinerator 
or by othe r methods of disposal as approved by t he 
licensing agency. 
(h) Water Supply - Water shall be obtained from an 
approved water supply system. The water shall be 
distributed to conveniently located taps and fix-
tures throughout the facility and shall be adequate 
in volume and pressure for all outpatient abortion 
hospital purposes, includinq fire fighting. 
Architectural Plan Review 
During the early phase of architectural planning, prime 
consideration shall be given to patient traffic from the 
patient parking area to admissions and through the service 
areas to discharge offices and to areas for patient pick up. 
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Also, personnel traffic patterns from other areas to 
the service area, as well as those related to internal 
operations, shall be considered. Traffic patterns for 
supply distribution are sometimes difficult to coordinate 
with personnel and patient traffic but are just as essen-
tial to the operations of the facility and therefore, 
shall be included in the planning. · 






When construction is contemplated for new buildings, 
additions, or substantial alterations, preliminary 
drawings and outline specifications shall be submitted 
to the Bureau with a program narrative description for 
review and approval prior to starting final working 
drawings and specifications. All codes applicable to 
the building shall be noted on the preliminary and 
working drawings. 
The final working drawings and specifications shall be 
submitted to the Bureau for review and approval prior to 
release of contract documents for bidding. Change orders 
which affect scope and/or function shall be submitted for 
approval prior to execution . 
The Bureau shal l be notified in writing of the award of 
contracts, of the date when construction has been com-
pleted, and of the estimated date of occupancy . 
Minor alterations and remodeling - Minor alterations 
or remodeling changes which do not affect the structural 
integrity of the building, or change functional operation, 
or which do not affect safety, need not be submitted for 
approval. 
The preparation and submission of drawings and specifi-
cations shall be executed by or under the immediate 




Quality obstetric-gynecologic care requires efficient organization of the medical 
staff and other personnel, whether the care is provided within an ambulatory 
or a hospital setting. 
AMBULATORY CARE 
Ambulatory obst;,>ric-gynecologic cars-:is outpatient care that is provided in a 
/ physician's office, outpatient clinic, or free-standing or hospital-based surgical 
facility. The organization of the ambulatory care facility will vary depending 
on the kind of facility or type of practice and on the patient volume. However, 
certain standards are applicable to all types of settings, whether it be a solo 
physician's office, group practice, or outpatient clinic. 
Personnel directly involved in the welfare of the obstetric and gynecologic 
patient should be organized into a health care team under the direction of an 
obstetrician-gynecologist. Staff should be sufficient in number and training to 
prevent undue delays and provide optimal care. Job descriptions and written 
policies should be prepared and reviewed periodically where appropriate. 
These policies should indicate specific responsibilities, as well as a plan for 
continuing education of personnel. While it may not be feasible to provide 
in-service education in all offices, it is desirable that personnel have access to 
such programs. 
A free-standin ambulator sur ical facilit should have a governing body, 
similar to a hospital board o trustees, that as final authority and responsibil-
ity for patient care, facilities, services, appointment of the medical staff, and 
establishment of clinical privileges. A mechanism similar to that used in the 
hospital for granting privileges should be established in an ambulatory surgical 
facility. Privileges granted to a physician should not exceed those held (by that 
physician) in at least one accredited hospital within the geographical area. A 
hospital-based facility usually function~ under the hospital's governing body, and 
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Details on how either a free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory facility 
should be organized, and the relation of the hospital staff to the facility are 
available from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and the 
Accreditation for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. 
Incr sing medical knowledge and improved equipment d facilities have 
great! increased the range and quality of care that c 
hospita. However, information, equipment, facilities, a even skilled person-
nel cann be used efficiently without effective o anization of each de-
partment i the hospital. 
Ultimate responsi 'lity for patient care, staff and facilities and services resides 
in the governing 1:) dy, usually a board f trustees. The board customarily 
delegates administra Ye responsibility an administrator and medical re-
sponsibility to the me al staff. Altho gh it may be impossible to draw sharp 
lines of distinction betw n medical d administrative functions, the hospital 
should establish guideline ensuri g cooperation between these areas. 
The responsibility of dep tm ts or sections of the medical staff should be 
established by the staff and a roved by the hospital's governing body. As a 
major and well-defined speci f medicine, obstetrics and gynecology should 
be organized as an indepe ent artment. The lines of authority within the 
department should be de ly delin ted and understood and must apply to all 
individuals to whom P, vileges are anted. 
Organization of 
The organizatio of a department of obstet · cs and gynecology is determined 
by the size a type of hospital in accordanc with the bylaws of the medical 
staff. A hos tal with full time attending staff mbers who also teach and do 
research 1 have different organizational needs an a hospital devoted exclu-
sively to atient care. There are, however, principl and objectives common to 
all ho ital departments. The following general gui lines should be adapted 
to lo al need and custom. 
Department Head. The staff of the department of obstetrics nd gynecology 
should be headed by a director or chairman, who may be ei er elected or 
appointed. The choice of director or chairman should be based on rofessional 
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ily, drug, and environmental factors. Inquiries should be made abou 
outco of previous pregnancies, mental retardation, or other known sus-
pected in rited or metabolic disease. Whenever possible, disorders auld be 
diagnosed p · r to pregnancy. When a genetic disorder is suspect , the gyne-
cologist may, "thin limits of training or experience, counsel e patient on 
how the genetic · order might affect her health and repr ctive capabilities 
or the development f her offspring. When counseling couple with a sus-
pected genetic abnorm "ty, the gynecologist should p vide information nec-
essary for the patient to ide whether to proceed ith further investigation 
liased on the potential socia emotional, and ec omic consequences. When 
this decision is made, many g ecologists w· refer patients with potential 
genetic disorders to qualified gene · counse · g and evaluation centers. It is the 
obligation of the gynecologist to b fa 1liar with the availability of these 
services. 
Health Education 
Patients are now better i armed about their bo ·es and health issues, and 
physicians and membe of the health care team shou accept the responsibil-
ity to integrate educ on into every aspect of their care. he physician should 
er members of the health care team nd use whatever 
resources are a ilable. 
Patient e cation should begin with the professional's first co act with the 
patient a continue for the length of their association. Content include 
and physiology of the reproductive organs, procedures an 
tre ent, as well as means of promoting and maintaining health. Thos ro-
. ·ng the education should be aware of the patient's level of understand1 
physical and emotional status, and readiness for learning. 
SURGICAL SERVICES 
Certain surgical procedures may be performed on an ambulatory outpatient 
basis to conserve time and expense for the patient and assist in efficient use of 
hospital facilities. A physician's office, an outpatient clinic, or a free-standing 
or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facility may be used. Procedures should 
be limited to those that can be performed safely with available medications and 
equipment and for which the participating personnel are trained. Only pa-
tients without major complicating medical disease should be selected. If a major 
medical disorder is present, appropriate consultation should be obtained before 
proceeding with a surgical procedure in an ambulatory facility. 
Informed consent should be obtained before any surgical procedure is per-
formed. On discharge, the patient should be given __adE;,guate ~ostogerative 
instructions, preferably written, and arrangements should be mr e for routine 
., < z:w;v 
'· 
I 
52 • STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC.SERVICES 
and emergency follow-up care. The importance of a follow-up evaluation 
should be stressed during both the preoperative and postoperative interviews. 
Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination. The 
patient should be informed of the operative findings, including tissue diag-
nosis. In the situation of elective termination of pregn~ncy, the attending 
physician should record a Clescnptron of the gross products. Unless definite 
embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions 
of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic 
examination. 
sician's Office and Outpatient Clinic 
Proce res commonly performed in a physician's offic 
clinic inc de, but are not limited to: 
• Abortion, uncomplicated, up to 14 weeks fro 
• Aspiration a breast cyst 
• Biopsy, aspira n, or washing of thee 
• Biopsy of the vu , the vagina, or 
• Cervical polypectom 
• Colposcopy 
• Cryosurgery or fulguratio 
• Culdocentesis 
• Cystoscopy 
• Dilatation and cur age 
• Hysterosalpingo aphy 
• Incision and ainage of vulvar or perin 
• Incomplet abortions, spontaneous and unc 
• Insertio of intrauterine contraceptive device 
• Proc sigmoidoscopy 
• R oval of skin lesions 
ubal insufflation · 
• Urethroscopy 
• Uterin~ sounding 
Free-Standing and Hospital-Based Facilities 
Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be li-
censed to conform to requirements of state or federal legislation. Such facilities 
should maintain the same sur ical, anesthetic, and ersonnel standards as rec-
ommended for hospitals. Surg'ica procedures may e performed in t ese facil-
ities under general or regional block anesthesia when it is expected that the 
postoperative recovery will permit discharge on the same day. There should be 
a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide for prompt emergency 
treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unanticipated complication. 
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Prior to any surgical procedure, informed consent should be obtained in 
writing, signed by the patient, and included in the patient's chart. 
en indicated, for patient safety or because of special circumstance , any 
proce e that can be performed in the physician's office or the tpatient 
clinic may erformed in a free-standing or hospital-based ulatory sur-
gical facility. A · ional procedures commonly performed · a free-standing or 
hospital-based ambu ory surgical facility include b are not limited to: 
• Extensive biopsies or extensive 
• Hysteroscopy 
• Laparoscopy, includin agnostic, 
procedures if lapar my is not anticipated 
· • Marsupializaf of a Bartholin duct abscess or cys . 
• Minilapa omy for st~rilization 
• Sim perineoplasty 
Anesthesia 
Only surgical procedures that can be performed without anesthesia or with 
local anesthesia may be performed in the physician's office or in an outpatient 
clinic. When local anesthesia is used in these settings, equipment and trained 
personnel should be available for emergency resuscitation. 
Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or spinal anes-
thesia should do s6 under the direction of an anesthesiologist. These anesthet-
ics should be administered by a qualified anesthesiologist, another qualified 
physician, or a certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an anesthe-
siologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained personnel and proper 
equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation must be available. 
· Only a patient at low anesthetic risk should be considered for ambulatory 
surgery. The patient should be provided with preoperative instructions, espe-
cially regarding the restriction of food and fluids, and advised that noncompli-
ance can result in cancellation of the procedure. 
A recovery area is necesearr. During the recovery period, the patient should 
be under continuous observation by a qualified member of the health' care 
team. This person should maintain a complete record of the patient's general 
condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence of complications. 
The patient should remain in the area until recovery is sufficient to permit safe 
discharge ·in the company of a responsible adult. 
The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical facility 
until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician should oversee 
the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the surgeon respon-
sibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the back-up hospital. 
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Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services should meet the same 
standards of care as those recommended £or other surgical procedures per-
formed in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and 
hospital-based ambulatory setting. Physicians performing abortions in their 
offices should provide for P.!'.omr_t emergency treatmeJlt or hospitalization in 
the event of an unanticipatedcompfication. Clinics and free-standtlg ambu-
latory care facilities should have written agreements with nearby hospitals for 
the transfer of patients requiring treatment for emergency complications of 
abortion procedures. 
Generall abortions in the h sician1s office or out atient clinic shoul 
limited to 14 weeks from the 'rst da of the last menstrual eriod. In a 
os 1tal- ase or in a free-stan m am u ator sur ical facility, or in an out-
patient clinic meeting the criteria required for a free-standing surgica acility, 
abortions should be limited generally to 18 weeks from the last menstrual 
~Prior to abortion, the woman should have access to special counseiing 
that explores options for the management of an unwanted pregnancy, exam-
ines the risks, and allows sufficient time for reflection prior to making an 
informed decision. If counseling has been provided elsewhere, the physician 
performing the abortion should verify that the counseling has taken place. 
In addition to the usual and customary history, physical examination, and 
indicated laboratory procedures, an Rh factor determination should be made. 
Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure the presence of villi or fetal parts 
prior to the patient's release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be sent for further patho-
logic examination, and the patient must be alerted to the possibility of an ec-
topic pregnancy. 
Rh immune globulin must be administered to every unsensitized Rh(D) 
negative woman who has an abortion except when it is definitely known that 
the father is Rh negative. 
ADMINISTRATION OF PHYSICIAN'S OFFICE AND 
OUTPATIENT CLINIC 
Medical Records 
Physician's offices and outpatient clinics should maintain accurate medical 
records for each patient. The record should be legible, concise, cogent, and 
complete. Further, the record should allow easy assessment of the care provided 
to determine if the patient's health needs have been diagnosed and effectively 
managed. Because modern medical practice frequently involves several physi-
cians and professionals, the record must serve as a vehicle for communication 
among all members of the health care team. 
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All pertinent medical information should be secure, confidential and readily 
accessible. All records should be retained by the physician's offices and outpa-
tient facilities for the period of time prescribed by law or by good medical 
practice or state statute of limitations for personal injury. 
At the initial visit a comprehensive data base should be established to include 
the following: 
• Reason for visit 
• Menstrual history 
• Obstetric history 
• Gynecologic history 
• Contraceptive method 
• Sexual history 
• Past medical and surgical history 
• Current medications 
• Allergies 
• Social history 
• Family history 
• Review of systems 
If this information is supplied by the patient on a printed form prior to the 
initial consultation, it should be reviewed by the physician before examining 
the patient. 
An appropriate physical examination should be recorded on the initial visit. 
The extent of the examination will vary with the patient's health needs. A min-
imum record should include height, weight, nutritional state, blood pressure, 
head and neck, heart, lungs, breasts, abdominal, pelvic, and rectal exam-
inations. Other data should be recorded as obtained. All correspondence, oper-
ative notes, and laboratory data should be reviewed and filed chronologically 
in the patient's medical record. 
When the patient returns for continuation of her health care, it will be 
necessary to update the original data base, as well as maintain concise progress 
notes. Any pertinent dqta regarding changes in health status or inpatient care 
should be recorded and may take the form of a diagnostic summary. 
When a patient is seen in consultation, sufficient historical and physical data 
should be obtained and recorded to support the diagnosis. The consultant's 
findings should be reported promptly and a written report included in both the 
consultant's and referring physician's files. 
Quality Assurance 
Each physician's office and outpatient clinic should assess whether effective 
and efficient management of health care has been accomplished. 
In the outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the com-
pleteness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use 
. ' 
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of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care. It should include the 
identification of potential problems in the care of patients, the objective assess-
ment of their cause, and designation of mechanisms to eliminate them. Efficient 
use of medical resources can be documented by evaluating use of personnel, 
finances, equipment, and facilities. 
Patient care evaluation is difficult in the physician's office because few mod-
els of evaluation can be applied in this·context. However, gynecologists should 
periodically review and compare their own experiences with standards of 
patient care and office practices suggested by the scientific literature and contin-
uing medical education programs. 
Personnel 
Administrative and professional personnel· requirements will vary consider-
ably in each physician's office and outpatient clil).iC depending on the patient 
load, pattern of practice, and type of facility. Whether the health care team has 
one member or many individuals, the members of the team should participate 
in the specific areas of care according to their training and within written defi-
nitions of their responsibilities. Policies and responsibilities should be reviewed 
and revised periodically. Regular meetings of personnel should be encouraged, 
and there should be an ongoing program for in-service training. 
Facilities and Equipment 
The physical facilities and equipment described in the following sections 
should be reasonably available for the care of patients either within the office 
or clinic setting. Additional facilities and equipment beyond those recom-
mended below will vary depending on the type of practice and patient volume. 
PATIENT RECEPTION AREA 
The reception area should provide comfortable seating, patient educational 
materials, and conveniently located restroom facilities. Provision should be 
made for privacy in discussing financial arrangements and other confidential 
information with the patient. Sufficient space should be provided to permit 
medical and financial records to be handled and stored with security and 
confidentiality. 
CONSULTATION ROOM 
A comfortable and private area should be provided for interviews and for 
counseling with the patient or her family. The physician's office could serve as 
a consultation room. Separate rooms, other than the physician's office, should 
be available for use by nurses, social workers, health educators, and other 
.. 
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of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care. It should include the 
identification of potential problems in the care of patients, the objective assess-
ment of their cause, and designation of mechanisms to eliminate them. Efficient 
use of medical resources can be documented by evaluating use of personnel, 
finances, equipment, and facilities. 
Patient care evaluation is difficult in the physician's office because few mod-
els of evaluation can be applied in this·context. However, gynecologists should 
periodically review and compare their own experiences with standards of 
patient care and office practices suggested by the scientific literature and contin-
uing medical education programs. 
Personnel 
Administrative and professional personnel· requirements will vary consider-
ably in each physician's office and outpatient clii}iC depending on the patient 
load, pattern of practice, and type of facility. Whether the health care team has 
one member or many individuals, the members of the team should participate 
in the specific areas of care according to their training and within written defi-
nitions of their responsibilities. Policies and responsibilities should be reviewed 
and revised periodically. Regular meetings of personnel should be encouraged, 
and there should be an ongoing' program for in-service training. 
Facilities and Equipment 
The physical facilities and equipment described in the following sections 
should be reasonably available for the care of patients either within the office 
or clinic setting. Additional facilities and equipment beyond those recom-
mended below will vary depending on the type of practice and patient volume. 
PATIENT RECEPTION AREA 
The reception area should provide comfortable seating, patient educational 
materials, and conveniently located restroom facilities. Provision should be 
made for privacy in discussing financial arrangements and other confidential 
information with the patient. Sufficient space should be provided to permit 
medical and financial records to be handled and stored with security and 
confidentiality. 
CONSULTATION ROOM 
A comfortable and private area should be provided for interviews and for 
counseling with the patient or her family. The physician's office could serve as 
a consultation room. Separate rooms, other than the physician's office, should 
be available for use by nurses, social workers, health educators, and other 
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Quality obstetric-gynecologic care requires efficient organization of the medical 
staff and other personnel, whether the care is provided within an ambulatory 
or a hospital setting. 
AMBULATORY CARE 
Ambulatory obst;>ric-gynecologic car~is outpatient care that is provided in a 
/ physician's office, outpatient clinic, or free-standing or hospital-based surgical 
facility. The organization of the ambulatory care facility will vary depending 
on the kind of facility or type of practice and on the patient volume. However, 
certain standards are applicable to all types of settings, whether it be a solo 
physician's office, group practice, or outpatient clinic. 
Personnel directly involved in the welfare of the obstetric and gynecologic 
patient should be organized into a health care team under the direction of an 
obstetrician-gynecologist. Staff should be sufficient in number and training to 
prevent undue delays and provide optimal care. Job descriptions and written 
policies should be prepared and reviewed periodically where appropriate. 
These policies should indicate specific responsibilities, as well as a plan for 
continuing education of personnel. While it may not be feasible to provide 
in-service education in all offices, it is desirable that personnel have access to 
such programs. . 
A fr;_e-standing ambulatory surgical facili!Y should have a governing body, 
similarto a hospital board of trustees, that has final authority and responsibil-
ity for patient care, facilities, services, appointment of the medical staff, and 
establishment of clinical privileges. A mechanism similar to that used in the 
hospital for granting privileges should be established in an ambulatory surgical 
facility. Privileges granted to a physician should not exceed those held (by that 
physician) in at least one accredited hospital within the geographical area. A 
hospital-based facility usually function~ under the hospital's governing body, and 
staff privileges will be established by hospital regulations. 
1 
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members of the health care team, if such are being employed. Minimal equip-
ment for each room should include a desk or table with two chairs. 
EXAMINING ROOM AREA 
The following equipment should be accessible to, although not necessarily in, 
each room: 
• Biopsy instruments 




• Reflex hammer 
• Ophthalmoscope 
• Scale 
• Supplies for obtaining: 
Spe<i,mens and cultures , 
Wet slide preparation and bacterial smears 
Stool examinations 
Cytologic studies 
• Equipment necessary for diagnostic studies and operative procedures per-
formed in the facility. 
When local anesthesia is used, the following equipment should be available 
for possible emergency resuscitation: 
• Positive pressure oxygen 
• Intravenous equipment and fluids 
• Suction 
• Cardiac monitor 
• Laryngoscope with assorted airways. 
EXAMINING ROOMS 
The exact number of examining rooms required will depend on the patient load 
and type of practice; however, at least two examination rooms are preferable 
even for a solo physician's office. 
Equipment available for each examining room should include: 
• Screening to permit patient privacy 
• Handwashing facilities and paper towels 
• Examination table with suitable disposable cover and a stool 
• Examination light 
• Gynecologic examination equipment and supplies 
• Work counter or table 
58 • STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 
• Small desk, table, or shelf for writing 
• Storage cabinet 
UTILITY ROOM AND STORAGE 
. The utility room area should contain: 
• Work counter 
• Handwashing facilities and paper towels 
• Deep sink 
• Closed cabinets for storage 
• Locked medicine cabinets 
• Refrigerator for biologicals and specimens 
• Facilities for sterilization unless central sterilization is available 
• Waste receptacle 
CONFERENCE ROOM 
For larger practices or clinics, a conference and patient education room may 
contain: 
• Comfortable chairs 
• Conference table 
• Educational materials and pamphlets 
• Chalk board 
• Bulletin board 
• Models and demonstrating equipment 
• Screen 
• Slide projector 
• Movie projector 
• Videotape equipment 
SAFETY STANDARDS 
Specific plans and procedures for the health and safety of patients and person-
nel should meet all applicable local and state safety, building, and fire codes and 
should include: 
• Methods for controlling electrical hazards and preventing explosion and 
fire 
• Procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife 
blades, and contaminated waste supplies 
• Methods for storing, preparing, and administering drugs, when applicable 
• Plans for handling reasonably foreseeable emergencies, including methods 
for transferring a patient to a nearby hospital 
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• Plans for emergency patient evacuation and the proper use of safety, 
emergency, and fire extinguishing equipment 
• Plans for training of personnel in cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
• Plans for adequately maintaining and cleaning facilities. 
ADMINISTRATION OF FREE-STANDING AND HOSPITAL-BASED 
AMBULATORY SURGICAL FACILITIES 
Medical Records 
All ambulatory facilities should maintain accurate medical records for each 
patient. An efficient record system should be established that conforms to a 
standard record used in that community or back-up hospital. All pertinent 
medical information should be secure, confidential, and readily accessible. The 
record should be legible, concise, cogent, and complete. Further, the record 
should allow easy assessment of the care provided to determine if the patient's 
health needs have been identified, diagnosed, and effectively managed. The 
patient's record should include the pertinent details of any anesthetic used, the 
procedure performed, any difficulties encountered, and the patient's subse-
quent condition. Because modern medical practice frequently involves several 
physicians and professionals, the record must serve as a vehicle for communica-
tion among all members of the health care team. 
This record should contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative 
diagnosis and the operative procedure and to document the postoperative 
course. All diagnoses and operative procedures should be listed to facilitate data 
retrieval. 
The record should contain: 
• Patient identification data 
• History and physical examination 
• Provisional diagnosis 
• Diagnostic and therapeutic orders 
• Surgeon's and nurses' notes 
• Laboratory data 
• Operative consent 
• Operative report 
• Anesthesia report 
• Tissue report 
• Medications record 
• Discharge summary and instructions 
The appropriate records should be completed and laboratory data recorded 
prior to surgery. The laboratory data shou~clude hemoglobin or hematocrit, 
urinalysis, and, in certain selected patient~, ot}te~tudies such as a chest x-ray, 
electrocardiogram, and electrolytes. 
'. 
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A preoperative history and physical examination should be completed and 
recorded no more than two weeks prior to the surgical procedure. The physi-
cian should strive to identify pre-existing or concurrent illness, medications, 
and adverse drug reactions that may have a bearing on the operative procedure 
or anesthesia. All records should be reviewed before any surgery is performed. 
On the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval 
history, medical record review, and heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record. 
The record should be completed promptly and signed by the attending 
physician. A discharge summary should be written or dictated; every effort 
must be made to forward information necessary for continuity of treatment to 
physicians who will subsequently care for the patient. 
The ambulatory care facility should keep registries of admissions and dis-
charges, operations, and controlled substances. Records should be kept confi-
dential and should be protected against fire, theft, and other damage for the 
duration of time prescribed by law, or by good medical practice or state statute 
of limitations for personal injury. 
Quality Assurance 
The effectiveness of patient care and the appropriate use of the ambulatory 
surgical facility should be continually evaluated. Evaluation of patient care 
should be performed by a team of ·professionals qualified to assess all aspects 
of patient care, including the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of 
diagnoses, and outcome of care. The evaluation should include the 
identification of potential problems in the care of patients, the objective assess-
ment of their cause, and designation of mechanisms to eliminate them. Partic-
ular care should be taken to identify ambulatory treatments that might have 
been undertaken more appropriately on an inpatient basis. 
Personnel 
The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility requires ad~uc;te 
staffing with administrative and rofessional personnel. The assignment of 
pers'on·~n~eli"'s...,...o~u..,· ,..,..,..e~-a~se-.,.. ... o'""nlll:t~e-n..._um_.,""'e-r-o"-7'""p~a ,..J-en-t:-s-, -patient profiles, type of 
procedures, and facility design. 
Written policies describing specific responsibilities of each member of the 
team are desirable, and should be reviewed and revised periodically. There 
should be an ongoing program for in-service training of personnel. 
A governing_b~ of the ambulatory surgical facility has the final authority 
and responsibility .for the appointment of the medical staff. Privileges should 
be granted only to those who are properly trained, licensed, and who have 
demonstrated competence. These privileges should not exceed those granted to 
the same individual in at least one accredited hospital within a geographic area. 
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Facilities and Equipment 
GENERAL DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT 
The general physical design for a free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory 
surgical facility will depend on the number and types of surgical procedures to 
be performed. The facility should provide a comfortable, safe environment 
with minimal architectural barriers. Standards for both the construction and 
operation of ambulatory surgical facilities should be equivalent to those applied 
to an accredited hospital handling similar surgical procedures. . 
Attention should be given to a convenient and efficient traffic flow. In a 
multilevel facility, elevators that can accommodate stretchers should be avail-
able for immediate use. 
The facility should include adequate space for: 
• Reception and waiting 
• Administrative activities, such as patient . admission, record storage, and 
business affairs. 
• Patient dressing and lockers 
• Preoperative evaluation including physical examination, laboratory test-
ing, and preparation for anesthesia 
• Performance of surgical procedures 
• Preparation and sterilization of instruments 
• Storage of equipment 
• Storage of drugs and fluids 
• Postanesthetic recovery 
• Staff activities 
• Janitorial and utility support 
~ 
Instruments, equipment, and supplies used in the ambulatory surgical facil-
ity should be equivalent to those used ·for similar procedures in an accredited 
hospital and should provide for: 
• Control of sources and transmission of infection 
• Infection surveillance 
• Functional oxygen and suction 
• Resuscitation and defibrillation 
• Emergency lighting 
• Sterilization 
• Emergency intercommunication 
SAFETY STANDARDS 
Specific plans and procedures should be established for the health and safety 
of patients and personnel. Such plans and procedures should meet all state and 
local building, safety, and fire codes and should include: 
I·; 
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• Methods of control against the hazards o( electrical or mechanical failure, 
explosion, and fire 
• Comprehensive emergency plans, including but not limited to patient 
evacuation and the proper use of safety, emergency and fire extinguishing 
equipment 
• Equipment and personnel for handling reasonably foreseeable medical 
emergencies arising from services rendered 
• Provision for transferring unanticipated emergency cases to a nearby back-
up hospital 
• Training of personnel in cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
• Control and disposition of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and con-
. taminated waste supplies 
• Proper storage, preparation, and administration of drugs 
• Facilities that are accessible, barrier free, and safe for all, including the 
handicapped 
• Adequately maintained and clean facilities 
.,. 
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and retention of records. He also agreed with the ma-
jority that§ 6 (1) was unconstitutionally overbroad. He 
dissented from the majority opinion upholding the con-
stitutionality of§§ 3 (3), 3 (4), 7, and 9, relating, respec-
tively, to spousal consent, parental consent, the termina-
tion of parental rights, and the proscription of saline 
amniocentesis. 
In No. 74-1151, the plaintiffs appeal from that part 
of the District Court's judgment upholding sections of 
the Act as constitutional and denying injunctive relief 
against their application and enforcement. In No. 74-
1419, the defendant Attorney General cross-appeals from 
that part of the judgment holding § 6 (1) unconstitu-
tional and enjoining enforcement thereof. We granted 
the plaintiffs' application for stay of enforcement of the 
Act pending appeal. 420 U. S. 918 (1975). Probable 
jurisdiction of both appeals thereafter was noted. 423 
U.S. 819 (1975). 
For convenience, we shall usually refer to the plaintiffs 
as "appellants" and to both named defendants as 
"appellees." 
III 
In Roe v. Wade the Court concluded that the "right 
of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of 
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." 410 U. S., at 153. It emphatically rejected, 
however, the proffered argument "that the woman's 
right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate 
her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and 
for whatever reason she alone chooses." Ibid. Instead, 
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this right "must be considered against important state 
interests in regulation." Id., at 154. , 
The Court went on to say that the "pregnant woman 
cannot be isolated in her privacy," for she "carries an em-
bryo and, later, a fetus." I d., at 159. It was therefore 
"reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at 
some point in time another interest, that of health of 
the mother or that of potential human life, becomes sig-
nificantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer 
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be 
measured accordingly." Ibid. The Court stressed the 
measure of the State's interest in "the light of present 
medical knowledge." Id., at 163. It concluded that the 
permissibility of state regulation was to be viewed in 
three stages: "For the stage prior to approximately the 
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its 
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of 
the pregnant woman's a~ndin~ian," without in-
terference from the State. --:ra.;at 164~ The participa-~ 
tion by the attending physician in the abortion decision, 
and his responsibility in that decision, thus, were empha-
sized. Af!.~ ~ first_~age, as so described, t~tate 
l!:ay, if it chooses, r~Jilir.....t~~~t~ ~ortion pro-
cedure to preserve and protect maternal liearth."" Ibid. 
FTnally, for the stage subsequent to viability, a point ·\ 
purp~sefully _left flexible for professional determination, r 
a~<!_ df2J_~~~~~~.EQ!l_ g_eyeloping_ medical skill an~ tech: 1 
. m_!:l~l __ ablhcy.~ ... t..he . State may regulate an abortiOn to \ 
protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abor- : 
~ion-except where it is nec~ssary, in a~propriate medical j 
JUdgment, for the preservatiOn of the hfe or health of the l 
_Ir}ot~er.: _ Jd., at 163-165. 
1 "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) 
but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., 
at 160 . 
• : ... -c, 
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IV 
With the exception specified in n. 2, infra, we agree 
with the District Court that the physician-appellants 
clearly have standing. This was established in Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188. Like the Georgia statutes 
challenged in that case, "[t]he physician is the one 
against whom [the Missouri Act] directly operate[s] 
in the event he procures an abortion that does not meet 
the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physician-
appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of 
personal detriment. They should not be required to 
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole 
means of seeking relief." 2 Ibid. 
Our primary task, then, is to consider each of the 
2 This is not so, however, with respect to § 7 of the Act pertain-
ing to state wardship of a live-born infant. Section 7 applies 
"where a live born infant results from an attempted abortion which 
was not performed to save the life or health of the mother." It 
then provides that the infant "shall be an abandoned ward of the 
state" and that the mother-and the father, too, if he consented 
to the abortion-"shall have no parental rights or obligations what-
soever relating to such infant." 
The physician-appellants do not contend that this section of the 
Act imposes any obligation on them or that its operation otherwise 
injures them in fact . They do not claim any interest in the ques-
tion of who receives custody that is "sufficiently concrete" to satisfy 
the "case or controversy" requirement of a federal court's Art . III 
jurisdiction. Singleton v. Wulff, post , at 112. Accordingly, the 
physician-appellants do not have standing to challenge § 7 of 
the Act. 
The District Court did not decide whether Planned Parenthood 
has standing to challenge the Act, or any portion of it, because of 
its view that the physician-appellants have standing to challenge 
the entire Act. 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1366-1367 (1975). We decline to 
consider here the standing of Planned Parenthood to attack § 7. 
That question appropriately may be left to the District Court 
for reconsideration on remand. As a consequence, we do not 
decide the issue of § 7's constitutionality. 
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this right "must be considered against important state 
interests in regulation." /d., at 154. 
The Court went on to say that the "pregnant woman 
cannot be isolated in her privacy," for she "carries an em-
bryo and, later, a fetus." I d., at 159. It was therefore 
"reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at 
some point in time another interest, that of health of 
the mother or that of potential human life. becomes siiZ-
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challenged provisions of the new Missouri abortion stat-
ute in the particular light of the opinions and decisions 
in Roe and in Doe. To this we now turn, with the assist-
ance of helpful briefs from both sides and from some of 
the amici. 
A 
The definition of viability. Section 2 (2) of the Act 
defines "viability" as "that stage of fetal development 
when the life of the unborn child may be continued in-
definitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems." Appellants claim that this defi-
nition violates and conflicts with the discussion of 
viability in our opinion in Roe. 410 U. S., at 160, 163. 
In particular, appellants object to the failure of the defi-
nition to contain any reference to a gestational time pe-
riod, to its failure to incorporate and reflect the three 
stages of pregnancy, to the presence of the word "indefi-
nitely," and to the extra burden of regulation imposed. 
It is suggested that the definition expands the Court's 
definition of viability, as expressed in Roe, and amounts 
to a legislative determination of what is properly a mat-
ter for medical judgment. It is said that the "mere 
possibility of momentary survival is not the medical 
standard of viability." Brief for Appellants 67. 
In Roe, we used the term "viable," properly we 
thought, to signify the point at which the fetus is "po-
tentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit 
with artificial aid," and presumably capable of "mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb," 410 U. S., at 160, 
163. We noted that this point "is usually placed" at 
about s~s or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier. 
!d., at 160. 
We agree with the District Court and conclude that the 
definition of viability in the Act does not conflict with 
what was said and held in Roe. In fact, we believe that 
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§ 2 (2), even when read in conjunction with § 5 (proscrib-
ing an abortion "not necessary to preserve the life or 
health of the mother ... unless the attending physician 
first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the 
fetus is not viable"), the constitutionality of which is 
not explicitly challenged here, reflects an attempt on the 
part of the Missouri General Assembly to comply with 
our observations and discussion in Roe relating to via-
bility. Appellant Hall, in his deposition, had no par-
ticular difficulty with the statutory definition.3 As noted 
above, we recognized in Roe that viability was a matter 
of medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we 
preserved the flexibility of the term. Section 2 (2) does 
the same. Indeed, one might argue, as the appellees do, 
that the presence of the statute's words "continued in-
definitely" favor, rather than disfavor, the appellants, for, 
arguably, the· point when life can be "continued indefi-
nitely outside the womb" may well occur later in preg-
nancy than the point where the fetus is "potentially able 
to live outside the mother's womb." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S., at 160. 
In any event, we agree with the District Court that 
\.J.-/ it is no~ ~f ~h,e !eg;islatu!e or the 
t-<' ~ourts ~' which essentially is a medical 
t#p.. concept, ~oint in the gestation perio<;l. The 
, .J.~:.. time when viability IS achieved may vary with each 
) pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particu-
lar fetus is viable is, and must be, a m~tter_for __!he .b:!_dg-
ment of the responsible attending ~p~y~i_£i~. The defi-
nition of viabil~elyreRects this fact. 
The appellees do not contend otherwise, for they insist 
3 "[A]lthough I agree with the definition of 'viability,' I think 
that it must be understood that viability is a very difficult state 
to assess." Tr. 369. 
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that the determination of viability rests with the physi-
cian in the exercise of his professional judgment.~ 
We thus do not accept appellants' contention that a 
specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by 
statute as the voint of viability. See Wolfe v. Schroer-
ing, 388 F. Supp. 631, 637 (WD Ky. 1974); Hodgson v. 
Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (Minn. 1974), dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. 
Hodgson, 420 U. S. 903 (1975)." 
We conclude that the definition in § 2 (2) of the Act 
does not circumvent the limitations on state regulation 
outlined in Roe. We therefore hold that the Act's defi-
nition of "viability" comports with Roe and withstands 
the constitutional attack made upon it in this litigation. 
B ~J-
The woman's consent. Under § 3 (2) of the Act;:~-.-----:r , 
woman, prior to submitting to an abortion during the -~ 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy, must certify in writing her 
consent to the procedure and "that her consent is in-
formed and freely given and is not the resultof coercion." --Appellants argue that this requirement is violative of 
4 "The determination of when the fetus is viable rests, as it should, 
with the physician, in the exercise of his medical judgment, on a 
case-by-case basis." Brief for Appellee Danforth 26. "Because 
viability may vary from patient to patient and with advancements 
in medical technology, it is essential that physicians make the 
determination in the exercise of their medical judgment." !d., at 
28. "Defendant agrees that 'viability' will vary, that it is a difficult 
state to assess . . . and that it must be left to the physician's 
judgment." !d., at 29. 
5 The Minnesota statute under attack in Hodgson provided that 
a fetus "shall be considered potentially 'viable' " during the second 
half of its gestation period. Noting that the defendants had pre-
sented no evidence of viability at 20 weeks, the three-judge District 
Court held that that definition of viability was "unreasonable and 
cannot stand." 378 F. Supp., at 1016. 
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 164-165, by imposing an 
extra layer and burden of regulation on the abortion 
decision. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 195-200. 
Appellants also claim that the provision is overbroad 
and vague. 
The District Court's majority relied on the proposi-
tions that the decision to terminate a pregnancy, of 
course, "is often a stressful one," and that the consent 
requirement of § 3 (2) "insures that the pregnant woman 
retains control over the discretions of her consulting 
physician." 392 F. Supp., at 1368, 1369. The majority 
also felt that the consent requirement "does not single 
out the abortion procedure, but merely includes it within 
the category of medical operations for which consent is 
required." 6 !d., at 1369. The third judge joined the 
majority in upholding § 3 (2), but added that the writ-
ten consent requirement was "not burdensome or chill-
ing" and manifested "a legitimate interest of the state 
that this important decision has in fact been made by 
the person constitutionally empowered to do so." 392 
F. Supp., at 1374. He went on to observe that the 
requirement "in no way interposes the state or third 
parties in the decision-making process." !d., at 1375. 
We do not disagree with the result reached by the 
District Court as to § 3 (2). It is true that Doe and 
Roe clearly establish that the State may not restrict the 
decision of the patient and her physician regarding abor-
tion during the first stage of pregnancy. Despite the 
1 fact that apparently no other Missouri statute, with the exceptions referred to in n. 6, supra, requires a 
6 Apparently, however, the only other Missouri statutes concerned 
with consent for general medical or surgical care relate to persons 
committed to the Missouri State chest hospital, Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 199.240 (Supp. 1975), or to mental or correctional institutions, 
§ 105.700 (1969). 
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p~n co2~n~ to~ ~~c~ procedure/ 
the imposition by § 3(2) orsucn a requiremeritror ter-
mination of pregnancy even durin~r the first stage, in our 
----~~~--view, is not in itself an unconstitutwna1 requirement. 
The decTsT;;~~r;~;rc,-indeed";TSa~ 'important, an.d often 
a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that 
it be made with full knowledge of its nature and conse-
quences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, 
and her awareness of the decision and its significance 
may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the 
extent of requiring her prior written consent. 
We could not say that a requirement imposed by 
the State that a prior written consent for any surgery 
would be unconstitutional. As a. consequence, we see 
no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some 
types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac proce-
dure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a speci-
fied mortality level, or, for thatmatter, for abortions.8 
c 
The spouse's consent. Section 3 (3) requires the prior 
written con;Iit of tbe spouse of the woman seeking an 
abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless 
7 There is some testimony in the record to the effect that taking from 
the patient a prior written consent to surgery is the custom. That 
may be so in some areas of Missouri, but we definitely refrain from 
characterizing it extremely as "the universal practice of the medical 
profession," as the appellees do . Brief for Appellee Danforth 32. 
8 The appellants' vagueness argument centers on the word "in-
formed." One might well wonder, offhand, just what "informed 
consent" of a patient is. The three Missouri federal judges who 
composed the three-judge District Court, however, were not con-
cerned, and we are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of 
information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to 
its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well 
confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable 
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· additional challenges to § 3 (3) based on vagueness and 
~ y..;.. 
overbreadth. ., r"' "1 ,, 
D ~ Vtj~. { ·~\ . J . ----=-- A~t· \ Y.vP~ 
Parental Consent. Section 3 ( 4) requires, with re-..-----
spect to the first' 12 weeks of pregnancy, where the 
·---.......--·-- ~ ··---woman is unmarried and under the age of 18 years, the 
written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis 
unless, again, "the abortion is certified by a licensed 
physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of 
' the mother." It is to be observed that only one parent 
need consent. 
The appellees defend the statute in several ways. 
They point out that the law properly m_ay subject 
minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible 
with respect to adults, and they cite, among other cases, 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and _Mc-
Keiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Missouri 
law, it is said, 11is replete with provisions reflecting the in-
terest of the state in assuring the welfare of minors," cit-
ing statutes relating to a guardian ad litem for a court 
proceeding, to the care of delinquent and neglected chil-
dren, to child labor, and to compulsory education. Brief 
for Appellee Danforth 42. Certain decisions are consid-
ered by the State to be outside the scope of a minor's 
ability to act in his own best interest or in the interest of 
the public, citing statutes proscribing the sale of firearms 
and deadly weapons to minors without parental consent, 
and other statutes relating to minors' exposure to certain 
types of literature, the purchase by pawnbrokers of prop-
erty from minors, a.1d the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages to minors. It is pointed out that the record 
contains testimony to the effect that children of tender 
years (even ages 10 and 11) have sought abortions. 
Thus, a State's permitting a child to obtain an abor-
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bility or concern for the child would constitute an irre-
sponsible abdication of the State's duty to protect the 
welfare of minors." !d., at 44. Parental discretion, too, 
has been protected from unwarranted or unreasonable 
interference from the State, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 
( 1972). Finally, it is said that § 3 ( 4) imposes no addi-
tional burden on the physician because even prior to the 
passage of the Act the physician would require parental 
consent before performing an abortion on a minor. 
The appellants, in their turn, emphasize that no other 
Missouri statute specifically requires the additional con-
sent of a minor's parent for medical or surgical treat-
ment, and that in Missouri a minor legally may consent 
to medical services for pregnancy (excluding abortion), 
venereal disease, and drug abuse. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 431.061-431.063 (Supp. 1975). The result of§ 3 (4), 
it is said, "is· the ultimate supremacy of the parents' de-
sires over those of the minor child, the pregnant patient." 
Brief for Appellants 93. It is noted that in Missouri a 
woman under the age of 18 who marries with parental 
consent does not require parental consent to abort, and 
yet her contemporary who has chosen not to marry must 
obtain pa.rental approval. 
The District Court majority recognized that, in con-
trast to § 3 (3), the State's interest in protecting the 
mutuality of a marriage relationship is not present with 
respect to§ 3 (4). It found "a compelling basis," how-
ever, in the State's interest "in safeguarding the authority 
of the family relationship." 392 F. Supp., at 1370. The 
dissenting judge observed that one could not seriously 
argue that a minor must submit to an abortion if her 
parents insist, and he <;ould not see "why she would not 
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explicitly accorded to adult women, provided she is suf-
ficiently mature to understand the procedure and to 
make an intelligent assessment of her circumstances with 
the advice of her physician." Id., at 1376. 
Of course, much of what has been said above, with 
respect to § 3 (3), applies with equal force to § 3 ( 4). 
Other courts that hav_e considered the parental-consent 
issue in the light of Roe and Doe, have concluded that 
a statute like § 3 ( 4) does not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. See, e. g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F. 2d, at 792; 
Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp:, at 636-637; Doe v. 
Rampton, 366 F. Supp., at 193, 199; State v. Koome, 84 
Wash. 2d 901, 530 P. 2d 260 (1975). 
We agree with appellants and with the courts whose 
decisions have just been cited that the State may not 
im_£~~-~_Ela~~£~<!_vi.§!QJ1 , such as § 3( 4), ~~i~i_the 
co~_pj _ _0'_~~Plmmt or person in loco parentis as a condi-
tion for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 
12 weeks of her pregnancy. Just as with the require-
ment of consent from the spouse, so here, the State does 
not have the constitutional authority to give a third 
party an absolute, and possibly arbitra!y, veto over the 
decision of the -physician and his patient to terminate the 
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for with-
holding the consent. 
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into 
being magically only when one attains the state-defined 
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected 
by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. 
See, e. g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975); Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines 
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 
U. S. 1 (1967). The Court indeed, however, long has 
recognized that the State has somewhat broader author-
ity to regulate the activities of children than of adults. 
f. 
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Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S., at 170; Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). It remains, then, to ,, 
examine whether there is ~ificant st~te inter!st 
in conditioning an abortion on tli~ consent or a parent 
or person in loco parentis that is not present in the case 
of an adult. 
One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family 
unit and of parental authority. 392 F. Supp., at 1370. 
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a 
parent with absolute power to overrule a determination, 
made by the physician and his minor patient, to termi-
nate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the 
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power 
will enhance parental authority or control where the 
minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamen-
tally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy 
already has fractured the family structure. Any inde-
pendent interest the parent may have in the termination 
of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty 
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature 
enough to have become pregnant. 
We emphasize that our holding that § 3 ( 4) is invalid I 
does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or 
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of 
her pregnancy. See Bellotti v. Baird, post, p. 132. The 
fault with § 3 ( 4) is that it imposes a special-consent 
provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman 
and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termi-
nation of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient 
justification for the restriction. It violates the strictures · 
of Roe and Doe. 
E 
Saline amniocentesis. Section 9 of the statute pro-
hibits the use of saline amniocentesis, as a method or 
technique of abortion, after the first 12 weeks of preg-
I 
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Re: No. 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
May 18, 1983 
I very much appreciate what you have done with the 
uncirculated fourth draft of your opinion in this case. You 
certainly and most graciously have accommodated most of the 
concerns expressed in my letter of May 4. I am deeply grate-
ful for all this. 
I could, and if necessary would, join your fourth 
draft in its present form. I must confess, however, that I 
remain very uncomfortable w'th the combination of the pres-
ence of both footnotes L 9-J. 7 and the sentence on page 11 to 
the effect that the regulations appear to be generally com-
patible with accepted medical standards. Under your analysis 
in Akron, this phrase does have constitutional significance; 
regulations that accord with accepted medical standards carry 
a presumption of constitutionality. Although the Virginia 
regulations may well turn out to be constitutional upon clos-
er examination, I do not want to create the impression that 
we have prejudged the question. 
Footnotes 13 and 15 provide an example of the prob-
lem. There is nothing wrong with any of the tests mentioned 
in footnote 13, but it is not at all clear to me that each 
and every one of those tests is necessary prior to every 
abortion. Moreover, when coupled with footnote 15's require-
ment that test results be received before an abortion is 
performed, the result may be a mandatory waiting period of 
sever~l d_gys prior to the abortion. {I am always d1sturbed 
wruen people in Washington tell me about how long they must 
wait for laboratory results. I was spoiled by the Mayo sys-
tem where results are available either immediately through 
frozen sections or, in almost all cases, within 24 hours.) I 
think it is at least open to question whether such a result 
would be consistent with good medical practice, yet this is 
what the footnotes and the sentence on page 11 imply. 
Would you be willing to compromise by omitting the 
footnotes and have the sentence on page 11 remain? I could 
then join with enthusiasm and contentment. 
I say again that I am grateful for your sympathetic 
consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell J~ 
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[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that 
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the 
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opin-
ion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the 
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy 
.. 
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the 
Court's prior decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per-
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi-
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 8. 
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health objectives. Although pathology 
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, 
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in 
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The 
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending 
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tis-
sue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination .... " ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice 
1 See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion . . . . An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
_ ..... 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
4 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Mis-
souri's requirement that this examination be performed by a 
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was 
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as 
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a 
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of con-
cern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist 
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, 
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination un-
less "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the 
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the ini-
tial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of 
the attending physician and which will often make the pathol-
ogist's services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pa-
thologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8, 
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is un-
disputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a 
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10, 
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase 
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspec-
tive, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every 
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or 
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put 
' The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
' ... 
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll 
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to 
appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
3 A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 11>-19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion). 
'r• 
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on 
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in 
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I 
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving 
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only 
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a 
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physi-
cian performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction 
does not apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation 
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival, 
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some 
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in 
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
'The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865. 
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in 
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where 
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866. 
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving 
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physi-
cian at every third-trimester abortion" because "[ w ]e ... 
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7, 
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of 
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot jus-
tify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at 
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of 
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need 
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health 
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not 
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would 
hold it invalid. 6 
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 
507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
5 In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
6 The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B 
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to pro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it un-
constitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an 
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to 
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not 
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute ap-
pears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a 
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when 
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take 
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it 
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this sec-
tion to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (em-
phasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second phy-
sician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the 
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails 
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always 
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that 
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to 
"take all reasonable steps ... to preserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an 
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be 
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions with-
out a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause 
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physi-
cians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way 
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with. 
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judg-
ment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license 
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the phy-
sician's right to practice." 
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not 
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an 
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any 
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissi-
bly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may 
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or 
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the wom-
an's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. 
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the 
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability 
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute 
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to 
make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and additional 
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The 
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with 
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible 
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that 
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician require-
ment invalid on this ground as well. 9 
7 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
8 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
• Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
10 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court 
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). 
A 
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of 
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S., at 7 4, the Court invalidated a parental consent re-
quirement on the ground that "the State does not have the 
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the con-
sent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979 Bellotti II 
eight Justices agreed that a statute permitting a judicial veto 
of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion was uncon-
stitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., 
at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Althou h four Justices 
stated in Bellotti II that ap ropna e y structured judicial 
consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648 
(opinion of POWELL, J.), this statement was not necessary to 
the result of the case and did not command a majority. Four 
other Justices concluded that any judicial-consent statute 
would suffer from the same flaw the Court identified in Dan-
forth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the 
decision of the physician and his patient. I d., at 65fr656 
(opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE 
STEVENS in Bellotti II: 
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
/ 
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"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision 
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny 
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign 
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would 
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings 
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden 
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that im-
posed on the minor child by the need to obtain the con-
sent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, 
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the 
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little 
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must neces-
sarily reflect personal and societal values and mores 
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly whe~·<i' '1 
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision-
is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underly-
ing the constitutional protection afforded to her deci-
sion." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted). 
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judi-
cial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would 
hold it unconstitutional. 
B 
Even if I believed that a State could require parental or ju-
dicial consent, I could not accept the Court's conclusion that 
the Missouri consent statute should be upheld. Under Mis-
souri law, a minor who has not obtained parental consent may 
petition the juvenile court for court consent or the right to 
self-consent. Section 188.028. 2( 4) then provides that: 
"the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion ... ; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
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which the petition is denied. . . . " ' 
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... au-
thorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alterna-
tives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omit-
ted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that 
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the 
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."' 
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) per-
mits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the gen-
eral standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483 
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear 
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny 
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a 
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not 
competent to make a decision regarding abortion indepen-
dently." Ibid. 
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain lan-
guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set 
forth in either the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL or the opinion 
of JUSTICE STEVENS in Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 643-644, 
647-648, 652-656. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the 
statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[ w ]here fairly 
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of 
unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves 
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding 
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] peti-
tion 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor 
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at 
14. 
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise 
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of 
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state 
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of 
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he 
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not bind-
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ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. 8., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition 
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite 
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missou-
ri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the 
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10 
It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will 
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court 
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state 
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1), the Court held that 
the District Court should have abstained where "an uncon-
strued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the 
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the ne-
cessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least ma-
terially change the nature of the problem."' ld., at 147, 
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see 
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I 
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as 
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification pro-
10 This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979 
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti 
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or 
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., 
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this lan-
guage to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where 
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be 
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor "'is capable of making, and has 
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.'" !d., at 
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d 
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri 
courts to reach a different result. 
11 The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the 
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on 
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules 
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of 
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02, 
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to 
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certi-
fication not possible." 428 U. 8., at 151. 12 In cases where 
constitutional ·rights of this magnitude are at stake, we 
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri! 
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by 
other means. 
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section 
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would 
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483 
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of 
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to ne-
cessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976). 
'
2 While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains im-
portant, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement 
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. 
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in ex-
ercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See 
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Harry: 
I am pleased by your letter of the 18th because, 
at long last, we should be able to get a Court together that 
will adequately protect all of the relevant interests, and 
also afford guidance that is now lacking. 
You are generous to express vour willingness to 
join my fourth draft in its presP.nt form. Your strong pref-
erence, ho~"'ever, would be to omit footnotes 9-17 that in-
clude a more detailed statement of the regulations than the 
general summary in the text. Altho,Jgh t reallv do not share 
your concern, I understand it. Also, I think it is impor-
tant for both of us to he stronglv supportive of a fourth 
draft. After all, we need three more votes. 
Accordinqly, if we can ohtatn the concurrence of 
Bill Brennan nnd Thurgood in the ooinion, T wiJl remove the 
eight footnotes. 
It will be necessary, of course, for me to per-
suade the Chief. J think this can be done to assure a 
Court, though I have not spoken to him. 
Would you be willing to talk to Bill Brennan, ei-
ther alone or with me as vou think best? 
When John called me on the 18th to say that he 
will join your Ashcroft dissent, we discussed the status of 
Simopoulos. He recognizes the importance of trying to have 
a solid six Court majority, and ha~ agreed to await my 
fourth draft. In the discussion with John, I summarized 







81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Chief: 
This is the 4th draft I am circulating this morn-
ing. ~he copy marked "4th draft" that you saw - and ap-
proved - last week had not then been circulated. 
I wanted your approval before I showed it to 
Harry. He has now agreed to "go along". He wanted one 
change: the deletion of the footnotes that described the 
Virginia regulations in netail. 
I have agreed. The requlations are summarized in 
the text, with specific reference to the section number of 
each regulation. The deletion of the Jtll1re detailed descrip-
tion in the footnotes therefore is really immaterial. 
I believe we now can get a Court to affirm - rath-
er than remand as RAB and WJB have insisted until now. My 
thanks for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 




j;u.puutt <!Jttu.d ttf tlft 'Jnittb j;tatts 
'llasfrhtghtn. ~. Qt. 2D.;t'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 23, 1983 
Re: No. 81-185-Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
... 
Sincerely, 
d /1A · 
r /.~. 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
May 23, 1983 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Chief: 
This is the 4th draft I am circulating this morn-
ing. The copy marked "4th draft" that you saw - and ap-
proved - last week had not then been circulated. 
I wanted your approval before I showed it to 
Harry. He has now agreed to "go along". He wanted one 
change: the deletion of the footnotes that described the 
Virginia regulations in detail. 
I have agreed. The regulations are summarized in 
the text, with specific reference to the section number of 
each regulation. The deletion of the more detailed descrip-
tion in the footnotes therefore is really immaterial. 
I believe we now can get a Court to affirm - rath-
er than remand as HAB and WJB have insisted until now. My 
thanks for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 






_juprtntt afltu:ri llf t£rt ~b ,jhdt.s 
~as!pngLtn, ~. <q. 2!1&1'!;1 
JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
May 23 , 1983 
Re : No. 81-185 
Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis , 
I deeply appreciate the way you ' ve 
accommodated my problems. I am 
delighted to join your circulation of 
May 23rd . 
Justice Powell 




JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hpuuu <qcuri ttf tlp~ ~nittb ~hdts 
-ltlllthtgtlttt. ~. <q. 2ll,;t~.;l 
Re: No. 81-185 - Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
~83 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Dear Lewis: 
.:invutttt <!fourl ttf t4~ ~b ~httts 
._-asfrittgtcn. ~. <!f. 2llgt~~ 
May 23, 1983 
Herewith, for your information, is a copy of the 
letter I received from the Catholic Bishop at Fargo. 
This was hand delivered to me when I was at the 




No. 81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your recent letter and kind remarks on my opinion 
in this case. I understood your concerns to be similar to those 
expressed by Harry in his letter of March 8 and by John on March 7. 
I recognize that vacating and remanding in light of Akron is an 
option, but am inclined to believe that we shouln decide the case. 
There may be some prudential reasons why the issue in this case 
should be avoided, but, as you note, the case is properly before us 
on appeal, and the hospitalization issue was argued in briefs and at 
oral argument. There are also prudential reasons to decide the 
case: Any remand would leave the law unsettled to some ae§r~as to 
the validity of requiring that second-trimester abortions be 
performed in state-licensed outpatient clinics that conform 
generally to accepted medical practice and requirements. A decision 
by us in all three of these cases should go far to resolve the 
existing uncertainties. 
I am today circulating a second draft. I have added two 
footnotes and substantially rewritten another specifically with your 
concerns in mind. See nn. 5, 6, 7. See also n. 9. I hope these 
changes will be helpful. 
I look forward to hearing whether my work has addressed the 
problems that you raise. 
Sincerely, 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services 
Richmond, Virginia 
June 30, 1977 
~~·· .. 
2 
Promulgated under Title 32, Chapter 16, Section 32.297 et seq., of 
the Code of Virginia, 1950 as amended and in conformity with the 
General Administrative Process Act, Title 9, Chapter 1.1:1, Section 
9-6.14:1 et seq. 
These are new regulations: 
Preliminary Approval by State Board of Health - December 1, 1976. 
Public Hearing Held January 26, 1977. 
Final Approval by State Board of Health - May 11, 1977. 
Effective Date: June 30, 1977 
Copies may be obtained from• State Department of Health, Bureau of 
Medical and Nursing Facilities Services, James Madison Building, 
109 Governor Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219. 
3 
The following rules and regulations are presented in three parts: Part I, 
general information and procedures for licensure of outpatient hospitals: 
Part II, requirements for licensure of outpatient surgical hospitals: ·and 
Part III, requirements for licensure of outpatient hospitals performing 
abortions only. 
Part II of these rules and regulations specify minimum organization, operation 
and construction standards for o~tlent surgical hosp~s. These facilities 
are sometimes referred to as "day surgery,~-and-out surgery" or "surgi-
centers." The scope of service and types of operative procedures performed 
in these facilities are usually multidisciplinary. Operational standards 
and clinical requirements are at a level similar to inpatient surgical 
facilities. 
Part III of these rules and regulations set forth the minimum standards for 
the organization, operation and physical facility requirements for outpatient 
abortion hospitals. These facilities are usually referred to as "outpatient 
abortion clinics." These facilities limit the operative procedures to termi-
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RULES 1\NL> REGULATI-·NS 
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PART I 
GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCFDURES 





PARI' I: GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROCEDURES 
Section 10.0 General Information 
10.1 Authority 
Title 32, Chapter 16, of the Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, 
authorizes the Board of Health (hereinafter referred to as Board) 
to issue licenses to establish, conduct, maintain, and operate 
hospitals. In order to discharge that duty, the Board is empowered 
to adopt rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards to 
promote the safety and ensure proper attention and service to and 
care of patients of hospitals within the State. 
10.2 Purpose 
These regulations have been promulgated by the Board for the purpose 
of defining the minimum standards of operation and construction which 
shall be permitted in or by licensed outpatient hospitals, and to: 
1 (a) Guide the Board in its determination of compliance with licensure 
standards as set forth herein; and 
(b) Assist the owner or his authorized agent in the preparation of 
an application, architectural drawings and specifications, and 
other reports. 
10.3 Administration 




State Board of Health 
The Board of Health has responsibility for promulgating, 
amending, and repealing regulations pertaining to the 
licensing of hospitals. 
State Health Commissioner 
The State Health Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as 
Commissioner) is the executive officer of the State Board 
of Health with the authority of the Board when it is not 
in session and subject to such rules and regulations as 
may be prescribed by the Board. 
Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services 
The Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services 
(hereinafter referred to as Bureau) of the Department of 
Health of the Commonwealth of Virginia is designated as 
the primary reviewing agent of the Board for the purpose 
of admi~istering these regulations. 
2 
9 
10.3.4 Bureau Offices 
The Bureau maintains a central office in the City of 
Richmond with a mailing address of James Madison Building, 
109 Governor Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219. 
10.4 Effective Date 
These regulations shall be effective on June 30, 1977. 
10.5 Extreme Emergency Regulations 
If the establishment of an extreme emergency r egulation is necessary 
for the preservation of public health, safety or welfare, the Commissioner 
may immediately promulgate and adopt the necessary regulation. 
10.6 Compliance and Prohibition 
These regulations sha ll apply to '"free standing"' outpatient hospitals. 
Such facilities which are operated by and physically attached to a 
hospital licensed unde r "'Rules a nd Regulations for the Licensu re of 
General and Special Hospitals,"' Department o f Health, shall be subject 
to provisions of those regulations. 
10.7 Allowable Variance 
Upon the finding that the enforcement of one or more of these regula-
tions would be clearly impractical, the Commissioner shall have the 
authority to waive, either temporarily or permanently the enforcement 
of one or more of these regulations, provided safety and patient care 
and se rvi ce are not adversely affected. 
10.8 Severability 
If any provision of these r egulations or the application thereof to 
any facility or circumstances shall be held invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect the provisions or application of the regulations which 
can be given effect, and to this end the provisions of the regulations 
are declared to be severable. 
Section 20.0 Definitions 
20.1 Genera l 
As used in these regulations, the words and terms hereinafter set forth, 
shall have meanings re spective ly set forth unless the context clearly 
requires a different meaning. 
20.2 Definitions 












lfp/ss 12/16/82 ABORl SALLY-POW 
81-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (Missouri) 
Conference 12/16/82 
CJ absent due to illness. 
f 
This memorandum ~ summarize the votes on the 
issues before us. M')J- yellm1 net::ES qi..rE S<5illE bat bV' 110 r 
meaRs all of the det~ 
Issue No. 1 - Abstention. 
Affirm: 8-0. 
Issue No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent 
Divided vote - 4-4. 
Voting to reverse: WJB, TM, HAB and JPS 
Voting to affirm: BRW, LFP, WHR, SO'C 
'., ·'"' 
Note: CAS construed the Missouri statute to 
require an independent decision-maker, expressly relying 
on my opinion~n Bellotti I~ 
* * * 
Sl-1623 Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Issue No. 1 - Hospitalization in JCAH Hospitals 
Affirmed 5-3 (-s.J abaeflt:1 
( 
A vote to affirm in this case sustains CAS 
holding of invalidity. 
Voting to affirm: WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS. 
Voting to reverse: BRW, WHR and SO'C 
Issue No. 2 -Pathologist's Report 
CAS held this requirement invalid. 
2. 




to reverse: WJB (tentative), , BRW, TM 
(~ tentative), WHR, and SO'C. 
Voting to affirm: i.e., invalidate the 
-;5 ~ ( requirement. HAB and JPS 
Note: I would not be surprised to see WJB and 
TM change their votes on this issue. I also was 
tentative. 
3 0 
Issue No. 3 -Second Physician's Opinion Invalidated by 
CAS 
Reversed 5-3. 
Voting to reverse (to sustain the requirement) 
BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS and SO'C. 
4 . 
Voting to affirm: WJB, TM and HAB. 
Note: HAB feels strongly about this issue. He 
thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is 
"flatly contrary to Bolton". But Bolton involved only 
first trimesters. Here the requirement exists only when 
the fetus is viable and the state's interest is at its 
strongest. 
* * * 
Issue No. 4 -Attorney's Fee 
All vote to Hold for my opinion in Hensley. 
lfp/ss 12/16/82 ABORTION SALLY-POW 
81-185 Simopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82 
CJ absent due to illf ness. 
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the 
three issues before us. My yellow notes give some - but 
~ iW no means all - of the details. 
Issue No. 1 - Burden of Proof on "Necessity" 
Affirmed: 8-0. 
Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of Evidence and Causation 
Affirmed: 8-0. 





Votes to affirm: WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP, 
WHR, and SO'C. 
Reverse and remand: TM, HAB and JPS 
lfp/ss 12/17/82 ABOR2 SALLY-POW 
81-746 Akron v. Akron Center (Conference 12/16/82 
CJ absent due to illness. 
( 
This memorandum will 
three issues before us. 
summarize the votes on the 
(?,r-~~ 
Issue No. 1 ... J~ou;i&ot;lictiOD- (Ste:ndil"tg?) 
~)s~ 
A - Most of the Justices had not focused on the 
issue. WJB saw no standing problem. I rather think that 
a... ~~ 
there is ftO standing, but the only vote we took was on the 
1\ 1\ 
merits. 10n and 
1nance. 
+ •sllli N<l??:-?:- ParliR'sill QePtee R& • 
G)~~~~ 
CA affirmed the DC decision of invalidity. 
s-~ 
We affirmed~ (with some questions) 
Voting &e~in4tel¥ to affirm were WJB, TM, HAB, 
~ 
/\ LFP (if issue is here), ~Ad SO'-e! (-r be1h:vm. 
/p~ ~· /j/lwJ Wfl-f<J s'o'c. 
l.. 
Issue No. J - Parental Notification 
r 
The DC invalidated, but CA6 reversed - relying 
on Matheson. 
In my view, the issue is not here ('~~ 
~ M~ dk- /k..4.~c:L~). 
~#'A 
~ 3 
Issue No. to Assure Consent is "Informed" 
2. 
3 • 
CA6 invalidated all provisions, and we affirmed 
6-2. 
Voting to affirm: WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and 
SO'C 
4 
Issue No. 1- 24 Hour Waiting Period 
f 
CA6 held it invalid. 
We affirmed 5-3. 
Voting to affirm :~ TM, HAB, LFP, and 
JPS. 
To reverse: BRW, WHR and so•c 
> 
Issue No. ~- Disposal of Fetal Remains , 
CA6 held invalid. 
We affirmed 6-2. 
4 . 
Voting to affirm: WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and 
SO'C 
To reverse: BRW and WHR 
* * * 
81-1172 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron 
The only issue is the requirement for 
hospitalization in all second trimester cases. 
CA6 sustained validity reluctantly, relying on 
our summary affirmance of the Indiana statute. 
We reversed 5-3. 
Voting to reverse: WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS 
To affirm: BRW, WHR and SO'C 
Note: The hospitalization provision in the 
Akron ordinance is substantially identical with that in 
5 • 
Missouri. Second trimester abortions may not be performed 
in clinics, even the licensed type like those in Virginia. 
: Justices, in Fervent Debate, · 
:Tackle Abortion Issue Again 
By Fred Barbash 
Wuhln~~AJn ~t swr Writer 
. Supreme Court Justice Harry A. 
· Blackmun, author .of the 1973 deci-
. lion legaliziog abo~on, leaned for-
ward, glared down · al the solicitor 
general of the United States and 
waved the Reagan administration's 
legal bri~f asking the court to ap-
prove new and stringent restricUQns 
on abortions. . 
"Mr. Solicitor ·General, 'are you 
asking us to overrule" the abortion 
decision, he snapped at Solicitor . 
General Rex E. Lee. "It seems to me 
· that you are · asking that or you're 
asking that we overrule Marbury w. 
Madison: be said sarcastically, re-
ferring to ~e 1803 case that estab-
lished the court's right to review leg-
islation and declare it unconstitu-
tional. 
"Did you personally write this 
brief?" he said finally, in a tone of 
disgust. 
"Substantial portions,• Lee re-
sponded tersely. · · . 
It was the dramatic high point of 
three hours of fervent debate yester-
day as the Supreme Court began its 1 most comprehensive review of abor-
tion law since its 1973 decision. The 
justices questioned the lawyers in-
tensely about new medical proce- . 
dures, counseling, and safety in tlie 
thousands of abortion clinics estab-
lished acr088 the country since ~ 
original ruling. 
They focused as well on the Con- · JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
See ABORTION, A8, CoL 1 ••• touP QUII&Iaul ud ali&&le ...-cum 
" 
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Justices, Re~~wing Abortion Law~ 
' . . 
: , ABORTION, From At 
ititution and the relationship be-
tween bra+ of government. 
At iaa~e were laM in Virginia, 
Miaaouri'.lnd Akron, Ohio, that reg-
ulate a~: Virjinia BUcceasfully proaecuua a doctor for performing 
ln abortiOn ' ' his clinic, instead of 
in a bolp:.f'• required by state 
Ia '"' .. ~ . . . w. .. ... 
Miaaouft.'eDa,:ted a law requiring, 
1mong other things, that women be 
.hospitalized (or abortions after the 
1eeond three months of pregnancy 
and obtain parental or court consent 
if they are under 18. 
Akron, in the in01t far-reaching 
legislation, ~posed · among other · 
things a parental consent require-
ment for women uDder 15, a 24-hour 
•cooling-off period" before ari abor-
tion at any stage of pregnancy, and 
an Mjnformed consent" provision 
forcing doctors to describe in anat-
omical detail the appearance of the 
fetus and to tell patients that it ia a 
"human life from the moment of 
conception.~ 
None of the justices who asked 
questions yesterday indicated any 
inclination to revise subataptially the 
1973 ruling, Roe us. Wack· as anti- · ~~~~~:- •111.~ abortion forces bad hoped_;:~ ··--- -- -- --• -· 
In fact, the arguments before the 




.. ~· .. ' . 
whether the new laM were consis- Lawyer Alan G. ~ cleleada Akron law reqalriDI doctors to delcribe the fetut to wor 
tent with Roe vs. Wade, which held 
that m01t abortions-the ones in the 
early stages of pregnancy-were a 
matter of choice between a woman 
and her doctor. 
Akron's lawyer, AJan G. Segedy, · 
said the municipal law, appealed to 
the Supreme Court after being 
struck down by a federal ·appeals 
court in Ohio, did not rob women of 
choice. 
, · "The right II DOt a right to have 
an · abortion," he told the co\lft, "but 
the right to make a deciaion: abo!-/ 
... 
tion or chiidbirth." The Akron law 
helps women make that choice by 
giving them the information about 
the fetus, he said. 
"The state has an int.eres't in pro-
tecting the woman's freedom of 
choice whether or. not to have an 
abortion .... This ia nOt a burden-
some law. This is a choice-enhancing 
law.• 
The doctor-patient relationship is 
oot disrupted by the Akron ordi-
nance, Segedy added. Rather, the 
law creates a doetor•patient relation-
lhip in abortion dinics where he 
..WUtained . that none would exist 
otherwise. . 
Segedy urged the court to give 
ltates and cities more flexibility to 
. impoee restrictions on abortions in 
the ftrat three months of pregnancy. 
States should not have to ahow a 
•compelling" reuon for restrictions, 
be said. 
Stephen Landsman, representing 
Akron abortion clinics challenging _____ ,______ ·u 
( 
-; .. , ..... '.' .. . 
Asl{ed to Approve Restrictions 
. .. : ~ ~· .' ~ . 
'•. 
" · ·-: ~ .7' • .• . 
; · , ' I 
' . ...... 
By Vl•ctor luhau tor t.he Wuhtncton Poet · 
oateD NekJDI abortloas: "The right is ••• the right to mak:e a cleeisioa," ht tells court. · 
the law, pointed out that the ordi· 
nance impoees more reculationa on 
women eeeking abortions than are 
Imposed on mental patients eeeking · 
medical treatment. •Jt treats women 
as if they are not to be trusted to 
know their own minds and to make 
rational decisions. • 
-rhe real purpoee of all these stat-
utes,• uid Frank Susman, repreeent· 
ing PJanned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, "is to thwart" abor-
. tiona. 
Lawyers defending the hospital-
ilation requirements in all three ju-
rU!dictions argued that Roe vs. Wade 
permitted the hospitalization re-
quirements by uying that in the 
fmt three months of pregnancy, the 
atate may regulate abortions in order 
to protect the health of the woman. 
Hoepitala, rather than abortion clin-
ics, are belt able to IChieve that, 
they aaid. 
-But there's no law preventing a 
doctor from doing brain IUrpry out· 
side a hospital, is there," said Justice 
John Paul Stevens. "A doctor could 
do that at home, couldn't he," he 
told Deputy Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral William G. Broaddus. 
Missouri Attorney General John 
Ashcroft said there was a "medical 
debate" about whether abortions 
were safer in a hospital or in a clinic 
in the early period of the second tri-
mester. "When a medical debate 
rages, I think the state ought to have 
the ability to err on the side of safe-
ty." 
The Reagan administration en· 
tered the eases as a "friend of the 
court." Lee told Blackmun that the 
1ovemment was not asking now for a 
reversal of 'the 1973 abortion ruling. 
"That issue must await another day," 
he aaid. But he said that in review-
ing abortion regulations, the courts 
should more often defer to legisla-
tures, which are better equipped 
than eourta to make such sensitive 
policy choices. 
"At Che end _of the day, the deci-
sions must be made by the _courts," 
he acknowledged. "But the courts 
must be mindful of the choices al-
ready JWtde" by those elected by the 
voters. "Balancing" of competing in-
terest. is involved in abortion reg-
ulation, Lee said. And legislatures 
"do it (the balancing) better." 
Frank Susman, the lawyer chaJ. 
lenging the Missouri law, called 
Lee's argument a "terrifying 
thought" that attacks the "very foun-
dations of liberty." It would result in 
the "bargaining away" of fundamen-
tal rights, Susaman said. "A hundred 
and seventy-nine years of constitu-
tional history would appear to fly 
out the door." 
The cases heard yesterday were 
Simopoulos vs. Virginia, City of 
Akron vs. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health , and Planned Par-
tnthood Association of Kansas City 
111. Ashcroft, Attorney General of 
Missouri Et AI . 
' _tj 
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MEMO TO FILE 
81-746 Akron 7.:~ 
~: ,,'l J' 
)."ji, 
There are two sections that tend to be confused: 
Section 1870.05(A) requires with respect to women 
unrler 18, the giving of 24 hours prior notice to a parent or 
guardi an "unless the abortion is ordered by a court having 
jurisdiction". (the "notice provision") 
· Section 1870.05(B) provides, with respect to mi-
nors under 15, that written consent must be obtaineo both 
from the minor and a parent or qu~rdian unless approval has 
been obtained fr.om a cour.t having jurisdiction. (the "con-
sent" provision) 





... ·l".'t'he DC invalidated both the not i.ce ~nd consent 
provisions. The original defendants (the city, etc.) did 
not appeal; but intervenors did appeal. ' Relying on 
Matheson, and part i.cularly on my concurr lng opinion, C~6 
reversed. Matheson sustained the notice provision because 
the minor. in that case made no claim either. that she was 
mature or that her best interests would not be ser.ved by 
parental notification. 
tn this case, CA6 noted that the intervenors - the 
only appealing parties - ·a,re "parents of unmarried minor 
daughters".' Neither the maturity nor condition with respect 
to emancipation of. these minors was shown. CA6 accordingly 







missible reogulation insofar. as it a.pplies to immature minors 
who live with their parents, are dependent upon them and are 
., 
not emancipated by marriage or ptherwise". This leaves open 
situations where the minor is mature or emancipated or where 
.. 
"notice would not be in her best i.nterest". ,-,~.:.;, ~\ ::.;/ . ~~ ,; 
Accordinqly, CA6 reversed the DC. · It thus he]d ' '" 
that ~1870.05 (A) i.s facially va irl.~ Apparently no appeal 
was taken from this decision. · Even the brief on behalf of 
the original plaintiffs (the clinics and the phvsicians) 
states in footnote 79, p. 48 (red brief) that §1870.05(A) is 
"not before this Court". · 
ill' '.'!.,1 
Consent Provision May Be Here [Sl870.05(B)] 
CJ\.6 affirmed the ded.sion of the District Court 
invalidating the consent provision. Again, it ~11as held that 
no independent decision-maker was provided because juvenile 
courts - even when they have 1urisdiction - are required to 
'A· 
notify parents. CA6 relied on Danforth. 
\1 . 
On the merits, 1 would affirm on the basis of my 








81-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft 
Conference 12/16/82 




This memorandum summarizes the votes on the issues 
before us. 
Issue No . 1 - Abstention. 
Affirm: 8-0 . 
rssu~ No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent 
Divided VOtP - 4-4. 
Voting to reverse: WJB , TM, HAB and JPS 
Voting to affir.m: BRN, T.FP, NHR, SO ' C 
, ., 
.,. ' 
NotP: c~s ~on~trueo the Missouri statute to re-
quire an in~eoenoent deciRion- maker, expressly relying on my 




* * * 
Ashcroft v . PJanned Parenthood 
Issue No. 1 - Hospi ta 1 t zat ton in ,"J'CAH Hosr;>i ta ls 
. -~~- Affirrn~n 5-3 . ' 
A vote to affirm in this case SUStRins 





Votinq to affirm: W,'JB , TM , HA'A , r .. FP and .lPS. 
Voting to reverse: BRlA1, WHR and SO ' C 
'•!>I 
,, 
' ,. ~~\. 'i:' 
' . 
, .. . . . 
"•· 
. \ 
CJ!' •:, ~c' ~, 
l 
' ~· )·;: 
,,,~I j 
t· .. 
Issue No. 2 - Pathologist's Report 
CAS held this requirement invalid. 
t, ,, 
'f.! !"; Reversed: 6-2 (several tentative). 
''I';• 2. 
Voting to reverse: WJB (tentative), BRW, TM (ten-
tative), LFP (tentative), WHR, and SO'C. ~· 
Vottnq to affirm: 
ment. HAP ano JPS 
i.e., invalidate the require-
. " 
Note: I would not be surprised to see w~lB and TH 
change their votes on this issue. I also was tentative. 
Issue Mo. 3 - Second Phy~ician's Opinion _ Invalidated 
CAS 
R~versed 5-3. 
'\ '1 Voting to reverse (to suf:;tain the .. requirement) 
,i 
BRW, I,FP, WHl:t, JPS and SO' C. , .. ""' •' 
Voti.ng to affirm: r7JB, ,.,M anr1 'RAB. 
• lj 
Note: ltAR feels strongly about this issue. He ,.,.'' 
thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is 
"flatly contrary to Bolton". But Bolton involved only first 
trimesters. Here the requirement exists only when the fetus 
is viable and , the state's interest is at its strongest. 
' .. * * ·'· .:ti 
to Halo for 
··tl> 




81-746 Akron v. Akron Center (Conference 12/16/82 
CJ absent due to illness. 
~his memorandum will summarize the votes on the 
three issues before us. 
Issue No. 1 - Parental Consent 
·' 
(i) Standing: Most of the Justices had not fo-
cused on the issue. WJB saw no standing problem. I rather 
thlnk that there is a standing problem, but the onlv vote we 
took was on the merits. 
(ii) Merits of Parental Consent: 
CA affirmed the DC decision of invalidity. · 
We affirmed 5-3 (with some questions) 
Voting to affirm were tiJB, , .™' HAB, and LFP (if 
issue i. s here) . ~-
To reverse: BRW, W'HR, SO'C 
Issue No. 2 Parental Notification I, "j~l 
The DC invalidated, but CA6 reversei.i - r_elyinq on 
I•' Matheson. 
··~· 
>}~;.! ~·· In my view, the issue is not here. 
on notice and consent). 
On merits we affirmed 5-3. '·;'." 
Voting to affirm: 
To reverse: WJB, TM, HAB 
(See my memo 
:I 
Issue No. 3 - Provisions to Assure Consent is "tnformed" 
CA6 invalidAted all provisions, anii \-Te affirmed 
6-2. 














" '1'0 BR~~, WHR 
'f'''' 
~iii-
t: J' reverse: 
~.1 
.. ~ 'l' '1' 
Issue No. 4 24 Hour r,.;ra it inq ·perior! 
CA6 held it invalid. 
~Je affirmed '5-3. '"'" 
Voting to affirm: WJB, T~, HAB, LFP ann ,lPS. 
··;(;·,., 
~--
l'f'o reverse: BRW, WRR and SO'C 
.. ~ 
' -~~~ 
,; .. ·) 
l,'lil; 
Issue No. 5 Dispo~al of Fetal Remains '' 
CA6 held invalid. 
'' .,, We affirmed 6-2. 
Vot5nq to Affirm: 
To reverse: BRW and 
* * 
81-1172 Akron Center for Reoroductive Health v. Akron 
'rhe only issue is the requireme"lt for hospltaliza'~ \ 
tion in all secono trimester cases. , ··· \~ 
CA6 sustained validity reluctantly~ . relying on our 
aummary affirmanct=- of the Indiana statute. ';, 
~· 11' f •,; 
;), 
We 1reversed S-3. 
Voting to reverse: 
To affirm: 
·.{'' 
BR~'J, , T'JHR and SO' c., , 
Note: The hospitalization provision 
ordinance is substantially identical with that in 
Second trimester abortions may not be Performed in 









Bl-185 Sirnopoulous v. Virginia - Conference 12/16/82 
(':, rJ absent due to illness. 
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the 
three issues before us. My yellow notes give some - but by 
no means all - of the details. 
Issue No. l - Rurden of Proof on "Nece~sity" 
Affirmed: 8-0. 
Issue No. 2 - Sufficiency of F.vidence and Causation 
Affirmed: B-0. 
Issue No. 3 - Pospitalization 
Votes to affirm: WJB (tentative), BRW, LFP, WHR, 
and so•c. 
Reverse and remand: TI-t, HAB and JPS 
li. 
Virginia's provision for clinics distinguishes 
this case from Akron and Ashcroft. 
..,. 





, Abortion Cases 
< 
Dear Chief: 
!n accordance with your. request, I now send out to 
your residence a me~orandum that summarizes the voting in 
these three cases. 
I also enclose a memorandum that deals particular: 
ly with the confusing auestions in the Akron case of 
"notice" and ~consent ... 
. ;;·, ':''1·: 
~here were so many issues that recording the votes 
became somewhat speculative. There may be a few mistakes in 
my notes. o';~,'' 
RPcause of the multiplicity of issues, and also 
because we were following your form chart primarily, my ex-
planatory notes arP too haphazrd to be of much assistance. 
Often we would take a vote with no discussion. In my view, 
the hospitalization issue is the most important one. We 
have a Court - including Bill Brennan - to affirm ''\ 
Simopoulos. Unlike the Virginia qt~tute, both Akron and 
Missouri require all second semester abortions in hospitals, . 
without exception for clinics however adequate. 
On questions relating to notice of parents and 
parental consent, I adhered to views expressed by me in 
Bellotti II and Matheson. These also are important and 
recurring issues. 
If~I can be of any assistance, do not hesitate to 
call on 
"-~? 
my. ~: .. ~ 
'~rdo hope you are proqressinq satisfactorily, 









-~ .. ··; ..... 
A-~ ·- ..•. ~·· 
~~ ~. ltjj.; 
,~1~~; ~ 1~ ;; 
'li:_ 
December 17, 1982 
Abor t ion Cases 
·' 
MEMO TO THB CONFFRENCB: 
I found the consent ana notice provisions of the 
Akron ordinance confusinq, and still do to some extent . 
With respect to the consent provision 
§1870 . 05(B) - I voted to affirm on the merits . There may 
still be a standing problem for me . 
I ··;:-
t~ , As to the notice provision, I was uncertain as to 
whether it is before UR at all. I am now satisfie~ that it 
is not. See the brief on behalf of the original plaintiffs 
(respondents and cross petitioners brief) at p. 48, footnote 
79 . 
If the Court 
the basis of Matheson. 
holaing of invalidity, 
p. 12a, 13a. 
reaches the merits , I would affirm on 
CA6 reversed the District Court's 
relying on Matheson . See appendix , 
• .. "" 
t . li' . P . , .Tr • 
'. ~. ;~ 
I , ~-,"f 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, MONDAY, JANUARY 17, 1983 
10 Years After the Abortion Decision 
'\J"-
By TBUY EAS11.AND 
Ten years ago this week the Supreme 
Court ruled that a woman has an almost 
unrestrictable rtgbt to seek an abortion. 
Roe v. Wade began a decade of con trover· 
sies, the most recent of wbkh arise from 
conrressional attempts to reverse or mod· 
lfy the decision. Wbatever one may think 
of tbese recent efforts-and I am yet to be 
persuaded by any of them-and whatever 
one may think of the morality of abortion, 
the court's decision 10 years ago was mls· 
taken. 'l1lat was clear then, and time has 
ooly served to empbaslze the mistake and 
to Indicate Its gravity. 
Roe v. Wade bolls down to this: A 
woman has a constltuHonally protected 
rtgbt to seek an abortion. It ts an absolute 
rtgbt durtnr the first three months of preg· 
nancy. After that, and up to the point of 
"viabUity"-which the court defined as the 
fetus' "capabUity of meaningful life" -the 
rtgbt may be llmlted only by the state's In· 
terest In protecting the health of the 
mother. After vlabWty, wbkh the court 
reckoned to occur at the seven·mooth 
mart of a pregnancy, the rtgbt may be 
llmlted and even proscribed by the state's 
Interest In "the potentiality of human life," 
unless abortloo Is necessary to preserve 
the life or bealth ol the woman. 
Note the word "health." Inasmuch u 
the court. In a companion case to Roe, rec· 
op1Jed a vey broad deftD1tloo ol"bealth," 
lncludtnr the prepant woman's "emo-
tlooal weU·belnr.'' the rtPt to an aborUoo 
could euOy be exerdled In the tblrd trt· 
mester ot prepancy. Thus the abortioD 
rtPt &IIDOWlCed by the court Ill Jan. 22. 
1J73, wu vlrtually unl1mlted. 
Numerous Problems 
A wide fiDit! of scbolars boldlnf both 
pro- and antl·abortloo beliefs quickly 
pointed out the nwnerous problems with 
Roe v . . Wade. These Included mtstalces In 
blstory, lldence and law. But the essential 
difftculty wu, U It remalDI today, that 
Roe v. Wade lmpoled m the Dation a view 
ot the abortiCil lillie llcklDI COIIItltutloaal 
warrant. 
A riPt to abortion obvloully can't be 
found In the Coostltutloo. Neither can It 
reallll\lbly be concluded trom a prtnclpjed 
interpretation of the Constitution. The 
court thought the right might Inhere In the 
14th Ameildment, but It can lie there only 
on a reading of Individual liberty and the 
famlly that has only the slightest legal pre-
cedellt and Dies In the face of AmericaD le-
pl and social history. 
To be sure, the court did recognize that 
If the unborn were a person, It would de-
serve 14th Amendment protection, and the 
abortion liberty would be significantly clr· 
cumscrtbed. But the court combed through 
the Constitution to conclude that the word 
"person" In that docwnent nowhere hu 
"pre-natal appUcatlon." Turnln&' to the ex· 
perts In medicine, philosophy and tbeol· 
OCY, the court said that because they could 
DOt reach a consensus as to wben life be-
ethical considerations than social embar· 
rassment, dislike of children, lost wages, 
career planning and the "wronr" sex of 
the unborn child. 
Since 1973, the nature of the court's de-
cision has become even clearer. Its essen· 
tially legislative character II Indicated by 
the stream of litigants who have gone to 
the court In 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981 and now 
again this year aslt1ng for clartflcatlon and 
testin&' the decision's limits. ADd the fact 
that It violates the view many people still 
have of abortion ethics Is Indicated by the 
several efforts to hedge the lmpUcatlons ol 
Roe v. Wade (such as the Hyde amend-
ment problbltin&' federal fundlnc of abor-
tion), aome ot wblcll bave been succesl· 
ful. 
Whatever one thinks of the morality of abortion, the 
Supreme Court's decision 10 years ago was mistaken, and 
time has only emphasized the gravity of the mistake. 
(ins, then neither could It, and, thus, nel· 
ther could the citizens of any state actin&' 
tbrou(b their legislature. 
Thts act of "raw judicial power,'' as 
Justice White called It In hts vigorous dis· 
sent, prevented the states from balancing 
concern for the mother and concern for the 
unborn In the many other ways that are 
clearly possible and wblch the citizens ot 
tbe various states then clearly preferred. 
In 1J73, a small nwnber of states pennlt· 
ted abortions of pregnancies lnvolvinl 
rape, Incest or fetal defonnlty, and a very 
few allowed abortions for no reason. All of 
these states, however, set limits on late-
tenn abortions. No state pennltted a rlcht 
to abortion so expansive u the one pro-
tected by the court. · 
Without clearly advertlnr to what It 
surely must have known It was doln&, the 
court pve the green llibt to abortion for 
almost any reason, lncludlni none at all. 
Roe v. Wade thus was an affront not 
merely to those wbo bold that the unborn 
deserve the fullest protection. It was also 
an affrlllt to those many Americans who 
do not consider themselves part of the 
"pro-life" movement but wbo deeply be-
Ueve that abortion Involves more serious 
With the fetus' status as a human beln( 
In limbo, the court said It could not be a 
constitutionally protected person. The most 
It would say was that fetuses beyond the 
28th week have "potential life" -a curious 
pbrase, inasmuch as some fetuses of even 
lesser are have bad actual life. They have 
survived outside the womb; miraculously, 
some have survived desptte eftortl to abort 
them. 
A case for tncludln&' the unborn amonr 
those covered by tbe 14th Amendment Is at 
least as plausible u the court's arcument 
that the rtpt to abortion Is secured by tbe 
Coostltutlon. Protection of the unborn bu 
a more dlst1ngulsbed blstorlcal and lepl 
pedigree In this nation than does the Ub-
erty to abort. Interestinely, during the tat· 
ter half of the 19th century, wben most 
states moved to problblt abortion except 
when the mother's life was endangered, 
there was no serious orpnized opposttloo 
argulnf for the constitutional ri&'bt to abor-
tion that tbe court discovered In 1J73. In· 
deed, women's &'fOUJlS did DOt oppo1e tbe 
antl·abortlon movement. · 
Even so, the safest conclusion of law 
and blstory Is that neither the abortion Ub-
erty nor the ript to life of the unborn Is 
secured beyond doubt by the Constitution. 
Faced with this, the court should have de-
ferred to the states and thus to the Jud&'· 
ments of citizens as expressed through 
their legislatures. As .ouver Wendell 
Holmes once said, wisely, the 14th Amend· 
ment does not etve ~ jiiiUces "carte 
blanche to embody (their) ecooomk or 
moral beUefs In ltl problbltlool." In Roe v. 
Wade, however, the court read ltl on 
moral bellefs Into tbe Coostltutloo to ere. 
ate the abortion Uberty and tbeD proceeded · 
to act lllte a legislature In settlDC Jortll tM 
CODdltions ol lts exercise. 
A Fallible lastltudoD 
ODe of the most serious consequences 
of the court's decision touches tbe deepest 
foundations of our society. Our system of 
law depends oo respect for Individual life, 
a value rooted In the Judeo-<lu1stlan ethic. 
The court's decision In Roe v. Wade cannot 
ftslly be recoocUed with that value. In-
deed, It points the way toward a future In 
which' respect for human life becomes, lllte 
beauty, merely relative. Tbe court teaches 
through Its dectslons, and there Is some ev· 
ldence-one thinks of the "Infant Doe" 
case In Bloomington last year-to suuest' 
that the people are now more disposed to · 
place relative values on human life. · 
Today It ls fuiUonable for some to crltl· • 
clz.e those wbo say the Supreme Court ll•: 
wroac. All too frequently defeuse of a ; 
court decision seems to become a ~~ 
ment ot tbe court'slnfalllbUlty, and too of. 
ten It Is u1d that tbe Ccllltltutlon II what' 
the court says It Is. But, u Llncoln ooce 
remarked, a declllon by the court II DOt a 
"thus sayetb tbe Lord"; tbe judklary, lllte 
tbe other two brancbes or our penunent.·' 
II a falUble lnltltutloo. 
To be sure, It may not be clear wbat the : 
next step beyond criticism of the court~ 
should be-whether leelslatloo, a COIIIUtu· =·-
tlooal amendment, a packlnr ot tbe court," 
a withdrawal of jurlldlctllll-and IOIIle" 
steps are wtaer than otben. But It II cer-
tain that whatever step II takell C&DDOt be· · 
taken unl• t1ae wbo belleve tbe court '· 
wu wroq In a liven lnltaDce speak up ' 
wben tbey bafe tM chaDce. ADd 10 yean I 
qo, In Roe v. Wade, tbe court wu:: 
wron&'-&er1ously WfOIII. l' 
Mr. Eatliuld is editor tl Ute Virgillia···· 
AwL ~ 
C HAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE H ARRY A . BLA CKMU N 
Dear Lewis: 
~utttt <!fouri ltf tfr~ ~mu~ ~httts 
'JI'Mfritt:ghnt. ~. Qf. 2.Ll.;;.l!~ 
Re: Abortion Cases 
March 8, 1983 
My writing this letter is presumptuous, but I dare to do so 
because of experience I have had with the Clerk and the Reporter 
in the past. 
I am in hearty agreement with your treating the Akron case 5 
as the primary one. Your three opinions all indicate that the 
order in which they are to be reported is Akron first, Missouri 
second, and Simopoulos third. 
Numerical order, however, seems to be a routine fact of 
life here in the Court, and, unless specific and positive in-
structions are given to Mr. Lind and Mr. Stevas, the case with 
the lowest number always will be first. This is why Simopoulos 
was argued first (a mistake in my opinion) at the December ses-
sion. If you indicate and stress your preference to Henry Lind 
he will, I am sure, follow it. But, if not, Simopoulos will be 
reported first and your "post" and "ante" references will be 
changed. 








~his fq to thank you for your note of March 8 sug-
., qesting that ~essrs. Lind and Stevas be requestPd to report 
• ,these cases i.n the fo 11o~'ing order: Akron 1 Missouri and 
'• Simoooulos. 
I may well have overlooked the desirability of 
this. 





~upum.t Qflluri gf tlf.t ~it.tb ~bd.t~ 
Jl'RS'.lfin:gton. ~. <lJ. 2llc?~~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 9, 1983 
Re: 81-746 & 81-1172 - City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Repro. Health 
Dear Lewis: 
Your new footnote responding to the dissent is 
effective. You need not change a word to keep me 
happy, but I have two thoughts to suggest for your 
consideration: 
First, in the third sentence of the second 
paragraph, would it not be more accurate to say 
that the dissent's reasoning "would accomplish 
precisely that result." 
Second, in the next to the last sentence in 
the footnote, I wonder if you might consider a 
revision along these lines: "In sum, it appears 
that the dissent would uphold virtually any 
abortion-inhibiting regulation because every 
such regulation is rationally related to the 
State's interest in preserving potential human 
life. This analysis is wholly incompatible 
" 





81-746 City of Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, Inc. 
This Term we have considered three cases that 
present challenges to laws regulating abortions. In Roe 
v. Wade this Court recognized a woman's constitutional 
right to choose abortion - subject to the state interests 
also recognized by the Court. Roe was decided a decade 
ago. None of our subsequent cases has questioned Roe's 
authority as a constitutional precedent. We respect the 
doctrine of stare decisis, and today we reaffirm Roe. 
The first of the three cases is here from the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This case 
involves a comprehensive city regulatory ordinance. Its 
validity was questioned by several abortion clinics and 
physicians. Five of the ordinance's provisions are at 
issue here. 
The first and most important requires that all 
second-trimester abortions be performed in an acute care, 
full service hospital. If valid, it would prevent this 
surgical procedure from being performed in an outpatient 
clinic - however well staffed and equipped. 
2. 
The Court of Appeals held that this hospital 
requirement is constitutional. 
In Roe v. Wade we held that, beginning at 
approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, 
a state "~ enact abortion regulations that reasonably 
relate to the preservation and protection of maternal 
health. It was made clear, however, that a state is not 
free to adopt regulations that depart from accepted 
medical practice, and that impose unnecessary burdens on a 
woman's access to an abortion. 
There is convincing evidence - accepted by the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and 
other medical authorities that abortions - at least 
during the first few weeks of the second trimester - can 
be performed safely in appropriate non-hospital facilities 
at substantially less cost than in a full hospital. 
In light of the record in this case, we think 
the Akron hospital requirement unnecessarily and 
unreasonably burdens the woman's right. We therefore 
reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
There are four other provisions of the~ordinance 
before this Court. They relate to {i} parental consent, 





(iv) disposal of fetal remains. For the reasons stated in 
our opinion, we agree with the Court of Appeals that each 
of these provisions also is invalid. 
Justice O'Connor has filed a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. 
lfp/ss 06/14/83 81-1255 Planned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft 
SPEECH2 SALLY-POW 
The second of these cases comes to us on 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
It involves four provisions of a Missouri statute that 
comprehensively regulates the performance of abortions. 
The first of these is a hospital requirement 
substantially similar to that in Akron. For the reasons 
stated in that case, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals that the Missouri requirement is invalid. 
A second provision requires minors to secure 
parental or judicial consent before obtaining an abortion. 
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of this 
requirement. We agree and affirm its judgment. 
A third provision requires a pajtholgy report 
for each abortion performed. The Court of Appeals 
invalidated this requirement. We disagree and reverse. 
Finally, a fourth provision requires the 
presence of a second physician during abortions performed 
after the fetus has become viable. The Court of Appeals 







As was made clear in Roe, after viability the 
state has a compelling interest in preserving the life of 
a viable fetus. We think the Court of Appeals erred in 
invalidating the second-physician requirement, and we 
reverse its judgment. 
The views of the Justices, however, have 
diverged considerably O n the issues in this case. 
With respect to the several opinions, Parts III, 
IV, and V of my opinion were joined only by the Chief 
Justice. 
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring 
with respect to the hospital requirement, but dissenting 
on the other three issues. His opinion is joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting 
from the judgment on the hospitalization issue, but 
concurring in the judgment on the other three issues. She 
is joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. 
lfp/ss 06/14/83 81-185 Simopulous v. Virginia 
SPEECH3 SALLY-POW 
This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of 
Virginia. The appellant is an obstetrician-gynecologist. 
At his unlicensed clinic, he performed an abortion - by 
injection of saline solution - on a 17-year-old woman who 
was approximately 22 weeks pregnant. 
Appellant was convicted of violating the 
Virginia statute requiring that second-trimester abortions 
be performed in a licensed hospital. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia affirmed the conviction. 
Under Virginia law, the term "hospital" is 
defined to include outpatient hospitals. Regulations of 
the Virginia Department of Health provide that second-
trimester abortions may be performed in outpatient 
surgical hospitals licensed by the state. Unlike the City 
of Akron ordinance and the State of Missouri statute, 
Virginia does not require that second-trimester abortions 
be performed in acute-care, full-service hospitals. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear 
to be generally compatible with accepted medical standards 




We have not considered whether the regulations 
are constitutional in every particular, for appellant 
declined to challenge them specifically. 
We have no reason to doubt, however, that an 
adequately equipped clinic upon proper application -
could be licensed to perform second-trimester abortions. 
We conclude, therefore, that Virginia's 
requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed 
in licensed clinics is not an unreasonable means of . 
furthe~e state's compelling interest in protecting the 
woman's health. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
affirmed. 
Justice 0' Connor, joined by Justices White and 
Rehnquist, has filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part. Justice Stevens has 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
lfp/ss 06/14/83 
SPEECH2 SALLY-POW 
81-1255 Planned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft 
The second of these cases comes us on certiorari 
to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It 
involves four provisions of a Missouri statute that 
comprehensively regulates the performance of abortions. 
The first of these is a hospital requirement 
substantially similar to that of Akron. For the reasons 
stated in that case, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals that the Missouri requirement is invalid. 
A second provision requires a pathology report 
for each abortion performed. A third provision requires 
minors to secure prental or judicial consent before 
obtaining an abortion. The Court of Appeals sustained the 
validity of both of these requirements. We agree and 
affirm its judgment. 
Finally, a fourth provision requires the 
presence of a second physician during abortions performed 
after the fetus has become viable. The Court of Appeals 
invalidated this provision. 
As was made clear in Roe, the state's interest 
in the woman's health is compelling, but after viability 
2. 
the state also has a compelling interest in preserving the 
life of a viable fetus. We think the Court of Appeals 
erred in invalidating the second-physician requirement, 
and we reverse its judgment. 
The views of the Justices, however, have 
diverged considerably of the issues in this case. To this 
point I have announced only the judgment of the Court. 
With respect to the several opinions, Parts III, 
IV and V of my opinion were joined by the Chief Justice. 
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring 
with respect to the hospital requirement, but dissenting 
on the other three issues. His opinion is joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. 
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting 
from the judgment on the hospitalization issue, but 
concurring in the judgment on the other three issues. She 
is joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. 
CASE 
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Rider A, p. 14 (Simopoulos) 
The regulations applicable to "outpatient 
abortion clinics" include some provisions explicitly 
addressed to abortion. In most respects, they are 
identical to those applicable to "other outpatient 
surgical hospitals" as defined. See supra, at p. 
n. and --- The regulations may be grouped for 
purposes of discussion into three main categories. 
The first grouping relates mainly to 
organization, management, policies and staffing - matters 
not presently relevant. These do require personnel and 
facilities "necessary to meet patient and program needs." 
§§40.1, 40.3. They require a policy and procedures 
manual, §43.2, 12 an administrative officer, §40.6, and a 
lfp/ss 02/02/83 Rider A, p. 2 (Simopoulos) 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic witt 
her boy friend. The abortion was performed by means of an 
injection of a saline solution. P.M. told appellant that 
she planned to deliver the fetus in a motel, and she 
understood that appellant agreed this was all right. 
Appeellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analegsic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions". The sheet also advised that 
she call the doctor if "heavy bleeding began". Although 
P.M. does not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was specified in the instruct ion 
sheet. 
* * * 
Jim: I have elaborated on the facts a bit, as these are 
important background to this case. My facts came from 
theopinion of Virginia Supreme Court. They are not 
questioned by petitioner's briefs. 
lfp/ss 02/02/83 Rider A, p. 2 (Simopoulos) 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with 
her boy friend. The abortion was performed by means of an 
injection of a saline solution. P.M. told petitioner that 
she planned to deliver the fetus in a motel, and petitioner 
agreed that this was all right. Petitioner gave P.M. a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet and a perscription for an 
analgesic that her advised her she had undergone "a surgical 
procedure" and warned of a "wide range of normal reactions". 
The sheet also advised her to call the doctor if "heavy 
bleeding began". Although P.M. does not recall being 
advised to go to a hospital when labor began, this was 
specified in the instruction sheet. 
Jim: I have elaborated on the facts a bit, as these are 
important background to this case. My facts came from the 
opinion of Virginia Supreme Court. They are not questioned 
by petitioner's briefs. 
lfp/ss 02/02/83 
SIMOP17 SALLY-POW 
Rider A, p. 17 (Simopoulos) 
III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations as 
such either in his jurisdictional statement or principal 
brief. In these, he emphasizes that Virginia requires 
hospitalization for second trimester abortions without 
alluding to the fact that the statutory term "hospital" is 
defined to include outpatient surgical clinics and 
specifically those that may be licensed for abortions. As 
appellant had not sought a license for his clinic, perhaps 
he deemed it necessary broadly to equate the Virginia 
provisions with the hospitalization requirements we have 
considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Appellant's 
reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations on 
various grounds. He argues that even if he had applied 
for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted: that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to 
construe the 11 1 icens ing statutes and regulations 11 : that 
Part II of the regulations (see, supra, at ) do not 
"cover a surgical facility where second trimester 
abortions [are] performed": and that medical evidence 
rebuts the view that it is "safer to perform trimester 
-. 
2. 
abortions in hospitals". Appellant's reply brief, pp. 9-
13. None of these contentions finds support in the prioer 
decisions of this Court, and the Virginia requirements are 
strikingly different from those we invalidated in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft. Indeed, it is evident that Virginia 
has made a thoughtful effort to adopt statutes and 
regulations compatibel with our decisions. We are 
convinced that the Virginia provisions are reasonably 
related to and further the state's compelling interest in 
protecting the health of the mother during the second 
trimester, and that they do not unduly burden the right of 
a woman to an abortion. 
The requirements of the first and second 
categories of regulations discussed in Part II-C above 
have little relevancy in this case. They have not been 
challenged by appellant beyond his general condemnation of 
any requirement that second trimester abortions - even 
those during the 22nd week of pregnancy - be performed in 
hospitals however defined and whether outpatient or not. 
In any event, as appears from the recommendations of the 
ACOG set forth in the margin below, Virginia requirements 
with respect to the type of facilities, equipment and 
3 0 
personnel are compatible with generally accepted medical 
standards, and further the state's legitimate interest. 
Appellant's argument centers essentially on the 
patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations. 
He contends that they do not further the state's interest 
in the health of the mother. We think they clearly do. 
The sanitation29 and record keeping 
typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
standards 30 are 
The labor a tory 
services support - and often are essential to - the direct 
medical services performed by the physician and nurse. 31 
The post operative recovery standards also comport with 
accepted medical practice. 32 The equipment requirements 
for emergency services are minima1 33 , and are further 
prefaced with the "adequate".34 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia 
requirements are necessary for every second trimester 
abortion. A state simply cannot adopt regulations that 
serve every case with the same degree of relevance. 
Following as we must -- Doe and subsequent precedents, 
we adhere to the trimester periods as providing general 
guidance for the purpose of state regulation in accordance 
with medical knowledge and generally accepted standards. 
The trimester periods are approximations. As we noted in 
.. 
4. 
City of Akron, in light of current medical knowledge and 
experience and particularly the use of the saline 
injection method -- abortions may be performed safely in 
most cases during the early weeks of the second trimester. 
But a state's general regulations must be drawn to 
accommodate reasonable periods of time. Thus, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply 
because it does not perfectly correspond to the asserted 
state interest". City of Akron, U.S., at __ 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record 
before us in this case, that Virginia's regulation of 
second trimester abortions is reasonably related to and 
furthers the state's legitimate interest in the health of 
the mother. We note that Virginia does not require the 
patient to be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the 
abortion be performed in a full service general hospital. 
The Virginia requirements - the statutes and regulations -
accommodate medical advances, are in accord generally with 
accepted medical requirements, and leave the type and 
timing of the abortion precisely where it belongs 
between the physician and his patient. 
, 
5. 
Note to Jim and Mark: The foregoing rider, as you will 
have observed, is a condensed revision of Jim's draft 
pages 17-23. I would put this discussion in a separate 
Part III. 
The foregoing is by no means a draft to be 
accepted by you or 
general guide for 
finished form. 
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he Supreme Court of 
§18.2-73 {t~e sa~ s 
Virginia interprets the word 
"hospital" in it is defined in §32.1-123.1 1is 
(. 75" 
made clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to ~1tle 
L-£/X.~ 
32.1 of the Virginia Code, >-.w!a.it is -tiili-a "He-alHt": M v~s 
The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, ~~~ 
clinics, home health agencies, and other medical care ~! 
facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 of the Code, and to 
fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided 
that medical procedures employed in second-trimester 
abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the 
evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that the 
hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's 
compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal 
health. 
221 Va., at 1075, 277 S.E.2d, at 204. Th~re){hus is no basis for 
I f'... 
assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in §18.2-73 any 
differently than it is interpreted in title 32.1, and specifically 
in §32.1-123.1. See n. 6, infra. 
w-~~~r~t~~ 
1-D /f1.~~ ~ :B I ~-~y 




5. The Supreme Court of Virginia interprets the word 
"hospital" in §18.2-73 as it is defined in §32.1-123.1. This is 
made clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 
32.1 of the Virginia Code, the Title of the Code that contains many 
of Virginia's health laws: 
The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, 
clinics, home health agencies, and other medical care 
facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 of the Code, and to 
fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided 
that medical procedures employed in second-trimester 
abortions must be performed in hospitals. Based upon the 
evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that the 
hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's 
compelling interest in preserving and protecting maternal 
health. 
221 Va., at 1075, 277 S.E.2d, at 204. Thus there is no basis for 
assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in §18.2-73 any 
differently than it is interpreted in title 32.1, and specifically 
in §32.1-123.1. See n. 6, infra. 
Note to Jim: Would it not be better to have Rider B, defining 
hospitals, precede this note? 
I .. 
RIDER B 
6. Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"Hospital" means any facility in which the primary 
function is the provision of diagnosis, of treatment, and 
of medical and nursing services, surgical or nonsurgical, 
for two or more nonrelated individuals, including 
hospitals known by varying nomenclature or designation 
such as sanatoriums, sanitoriums and general acute, short-
term, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals. 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when §18.2-73 was 
enacted is similar, see 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, §1514-a2, repealed by 
Jr , 
1979 Acts, c. 711~ specifically includi~ at that time "out-patient 
A ~ 
surgical hospitals (which term shall not include the office or 
office of one or more physicians or surgeons unless such office or 
offices are used principally for performing surgery)." See Va. Code 
§32.298(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978). 
RIDER C 
7. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, 
c. 15, §1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Ttie State Board of 
Health gave preliminary approval on December 1, 1976, and a public 
hearing was held January 26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. 
Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and staff present from the 
Department included two doctors and the Director of the Bureau of 
Medical and Nursing Facilites Services. Witnesses included the 
Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association: a 
representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State: 
representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics: a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and 
the Tidewater OBGYN Society: the Medical Director of the Ambulatory 
Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, a Division of Medical 
Center Hospitals, in Norfolk: the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital: a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life: 
and a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See 
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: 
Proposed Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient 
Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Board apparently made 
changes in the regulations before giving its final approval on May~ 
11, 1977. The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977.~~ 
~/X&> ~~•~L-h:J ~~ 
Although n,i:)..t;_paui-el:rl:-arl-;t~emm-t bQE-e, we note that new but 
similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when 
'· 
. d " 
~ •.. ;·· •' 
J, 
~ 
appellant performed the abortion for which he hae been prosecuted. 
2. 
See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982}. These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, ~
enacted in 1979. 
lfp/ss 03/09/82 DRAFT SALLY-POW 
)~~-------- The abortion for which petitioner was prosecuted 
was performed on November 10, 1979, some two years and 
five months after these regulations became effective on 
June 30, 1977. In view of the public hearing on January 
26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of 
various organizations specifically concerned with 
abortions, it cannot be said - and 
not argue - that he was not fully aware of the regulations 
and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed. 
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we 
note that new but similar regulations 
' . 
lfp/ss 03/09/82 Rider Y, p. 5 (Simopoulos) 
YP5 SALLY-POW 
Appellant does not argue that his clinic would meet the 
requirements of the Virginia statute and regulations; 
.rather, he broadly attacks ' their validity as applied to 
second-trimester abortions. Thus, the issue before us is 
the validity of the Virginia requirements; not whether 






It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester 
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas 
City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, we rec-
ognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early weeks of 
the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be performed as safely in 
an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." City of Akron, 
ante, at 19. The requirements at issue, however, mandated that "all 
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, acute-care 
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia stat-
utes and regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions 
be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under 
Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions 
in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
RIDER B 
We need not consider each of the regulations separately. De-
spite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the time of 
his trial,l9 appellant introduced no medical evidence questioning 
the reasonableness of any of them. This is to be contrasted with 
the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, where the plaintiffs 
sought at great length to show that particular requirements as to 
equipment and services were unreasonable restraints on women seeking 
second-trimester abortions. Appellant persisted in arguing broadly 
that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in 
substance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft 
cases.20 Indeed, not until his reply brief in this Court did appel-
lant criticize the regulations apart from Virginia's statutory hos-
pitalization requirement. 
;, ' '* .. .. 
lfp/ss 03/14/83 Rider A, Simopoulos 
SIMOR SALLY-POW 
The most important difference was that the requirements 
now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all 
outpatient clinics, in which abortions could be performed, 
w 
regardless of the trimester. Thus, no distinctionf ~as 
L. 
made between first and second trimester abortions with I 
respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
~~ 
regulation. As....-a restrl.--t- e4i tlH~--fre.a.r:iA'3S, Part III of the 
(\ 
present regulations - relating only to first trimester 
abortions - was added. It therefore is clear that 
Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and 






The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association stated 
that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and have our 
support." Id., at 4. The existing abortion clinics were concerned, 
however, about the imposition of the regulations on existing 
outpatient abortion clinics doing first-trimester abortions. The 
clinics acknowledged that during the second trimester "the State may 
regulate the procedure in the interest of maternal health. This is 
the law of the land." Id., at 7. But the clinics specifically 
"propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules 
and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in 
Virginia." Id., at 26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director 
of the Ambulatory Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, 
concerned about the need to regulate outpatient surgical clinics in 
the State, agreed that such a change was necessary, saying "it would 
be an irrevocable mistake to allow compromise of the standards for 
outpatient surgical units to accommodate abortion clinics if they 
are both to be considered under the same Regulations." Id., at 30. 
G~ommants) it 's not surprisinq that the Board created 
Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing 
first-trimester abortions. The Board gave its final approval to the 
' 
regulations before us on M~y 11, 1977. 
RIDER A 
The first draft of the regulations was considerably different 
from the regulations that the Board finally approved. See 
Department of Health, Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the 
Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (October 27, 1976). 
~~~ The most important difference was that the requirements Row in Partj 
~h .. ~~ ~~~ 
~~ ~an~II of the regulations were applicable to all a~r~iGn~ clinics 
~ regardless of the trimester in which the procedure was performed. 
~ ~ There was no segarate set of regulations for o~tpatient abortion 
Y i.,-J {AA.. ~ ~-.(.._ ~~ ~ I 'I~ ~ ~ ¢ I ~ t. ~ 1 ', , r 6.- )! 1 -r~ 
~ / clinics~ only, such as existed in Part III in the final regulations. 
~vr . 
r Seen. 9, 1nfra. 
a-z__ e:L ,~~-~- .!Pf ~~ 4'....e.~ s / 
~~-t- ,Y R1' ~ ~ 1.-r.}-~ 







lfp/ss 03/14/83 SIM SALLY-POW 
81-185 Simopoulos v. Virginia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This refers to Harry's letter of March 8 stating 
that he will vote to vacate the judgment and remand [this] 
case for reconsideration in the light of Akron. He 
suggests that the Virginia regulations were not "really 
considered by the Supreme Court of Virginia". Bill 
\Brennan has told me that he rather shares Harry's view, 
and John's letter of March 7 expresses a somewhat similar 
I 
view, though he is awaiting "further writing". 
I recognized, of course, that vacating and 
remanding is an option available. I adhere s~gly to 
the view, however, that we should decide the case. In my 
2 0 
view, the issue on which we granted the case is here, and 
it was argued in briefs and at oral argument. 
~ I~ i~ l~~e ~hat ~he primary focus in this case 
has been, as appellant describes it, on the "mandatory 
hospitalization requirement of Virginia law". Appellant 
had good reason to refrain from making the distinction 
under Virginia law betwee~ etviee , acute care 
"hospitals" and "out-patient surgical hospitals" where 
second~rimester abortions also may be performed. 
Appellant did not wish to call our attention to the latter 
and the implementing regulations as he had made no effort 
to comply with them. Moreover, appellant has never denied 
that he knew about the regulations. As I have now made 
~ 7 
clear in footnotes S and in the second draft of my 






months abortion at issue. They were adopted 
only after public hearings at which several abortions 
clinics and representatives of the medical profession 
appeared and testified. The hearings resulted in 
significant changes being made in the regulations. See n. 
It is entirely clear from the Virginia statutes 
that the term "hospitals" includes outpatient clinics 
though they are characterized as "outpatient . . . 
hospitals". It also is clear that Part l.liof the 
I~ f~-
vt regu5~tions was adopted expressly to accommodate ~ 
OJt<1. ~ t>~ 1I:. WOA ~ ~ ~e~~ ~cr.J..-~ 
trimester abortion{ Se~. 7 and '1 ·LAs t~~ «lood:>O..a. 
Attorney General of Virginia stated in his brief: 
/ "~der Virginia law, a second trimester abortion 
may be performed in an outpatient surgical 
clinic provided that Gh~ clinic has been 
inspected and licensed as a hospital by the 
j ~tate". 'Si;....,( ~ \~  
4. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia, as 
Harry notes, apart from a reference to the relevant 
Virginia statutes, did not address the outpatient 
hospitals separately from general, acute care hospitals. 
~ This is understandablel.\as appellant's position has been a 
j 
sweeping attack on all "mandatory hospitalization 
requirements". There certainly is no basis for reversing 
Simopoulos' conviction. He elected, apparently as a 
tactic, not to challenge the outpatient regulations on all 
of Virginia's hospital requirements. 
If we were to remand this case for 
reconsideration in light of Akron, it would be an 






is not clear what the Virginia Supreme Court can do that 
l~o\o~ ~£~ 
we also cannot do properly. ~eEe is Ro f factual evidence 
~ .. -Ut () ... 
in this case with respect to the regulat1ons~~ ~~~ 
k ~ C.. Y,\ 
~-s.t..ingni shQ4:fFe:m appellanb' s general challenge to the 
validity of all mandatory hospitalization requirements. 
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this challenge, and 
./ 
its opinion can be read - in light of Virginia law - as 
. ~ ~~~~{l~~.,~ 
s-sutaining facially 8etR
6 
o{ ~ taeel~ Hespitali•atioR 
( requirementt i .ncl~d.in¥os~nd trimester 
{ 
. ~ ~~~A,..,.,\b_d~J 
well as ~ thos~r:m~n acute care 
hospitals. Akron and Ashcroft settled the issue with 
respect to the latter type of hospitals. This leaves, as 
the issue before us, whether t~ mandatory outpatient 
hospitals requirements are valid on their face. We would 
have a different case if appellant had elected to 
6 • 
challenge - as constitutionally burdensome or otherwise -
specific provisions of these requirements. 
It is well to bear in mind that this case 
involves an abortion performed some 20 to 22 weeks after 
gestation, on the edge of the period of potential 
viability. Under any view of our prior decisions, 
including Akron, the interest of the state at this point 
is compelling. All that my opinion does is to hold that 
the Virginia regulations "on the record before us" (see 
I~ 20 
pp. ~ and~) are not invalid. We certainly do not 
decide whether each of the specific regulations would be 
valid if, for example, they were applied to a D&E abortion 
quite early in the second trimester. 
At the prudential level, there also are rather 






it. The latter action would leave the law in Virginia 
and probably in a number of other states - unsettled as to 
~ the validity of requiring that second~rimester abortions 
~ be performed in state~licensed outpatient clinics that 
conform generally to accepted medical practice and 
requirements. 
My recollection is that there were seven or 
eight cases pending here that involved the validity of 
state regulation of abortions. After consideration at two 
or more of our Conferences, we selected for plenary 
consideration the three cases now hefore us. In the 
~ decade since ~tates have been endeavoring to adjust 
I 
their laws and regulations to the new constitutional 
requirements. Decisions by us in all three of these cases 
should go far to resolve the existing uncertainties. 
8. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
ss 
. ~ 
lfp/ss 05/07/83 Simo 
SIMll SALLY-POW 
We need not consider whether Virginia's 
regulations are constitutional in every particular. 
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by 
the time of his trial, ~llant has not attacked them as 
being insufficiently related to the State's interest in 
protecting maternal health. 19 His challenge throughout 
this litigation has been limited to an assertion that the 
State cannot require all second-trimester abortions to be 
performed in full-service general hospitals. In essence, 
appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization 
requirements are no different in substance from those 
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 20 At 
the same time, however, appellant took the position - both 
before the Virginia courts and this Court - that a state 
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities 
would be constitutional. See 9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief 
for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.S.Ct.), p. 35; Juris. 
Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46. The 
.. ~~/ 
clear implication of appellant's defense in this case is 
.... 
that the Virginia requirements for outpatient facilities 
in which second-trimester abortions may be performed are 
2. 
unconstit~ional. Yet, not until his reply brief in this 
Court did he elect to criticize the regulations apart from 
his broadside attack on the entire Virginia 
hospitalization requirements. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia 
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes 
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an 
3. 
adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application, 
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the 
performance of second-trimester abortions. 
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SIMll SALLY-POW 
We need not consider whether Virginia's 
regulations are constitutional in every particular. 
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by 
the time of his trial, "appellant has not attacked them as 
being insufficiently related to the State's interest in 
protecting maternal health. 19 His challenge throughout 
this litigation has been limited to an assertion that the 
State cannot require all second-trimester abortions to be 
performed in full-service general hospitals. In essence, 
appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitalization 
requirements are no different in substance from those 
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 20 At 
the same time, however, appellant took the position - both 
' ' 
2. 
before the Virginia courts and this Court - that a state 
licensing requirement for outpatient abortion facilities 
would be constitutional. See 9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief 
for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.s.ct.), p. 35; Juris. 
Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46. The 
clear implication of appellant's defense in this case is 
that the Virginia requirements for outpatient facilities 
in which second-trimester abortions may be performed are 
unconstittuional. Yet, not until his reply brief in this 
Court did he elect to criticize the regulations apart from 
his broadside attack on the entire Virginia 
hospitalization requirements. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia 
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes 
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an 
•. 
3. 
adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application, 
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the 
performance of second-trimester abortions. 
.., 
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SIMll SALLY-POW 
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's 
hospitalization requirements are no different in substance 
~ 
from those review~ in the City of Akron and Ashcroft 
cases. 20 At the same time, however, appellant took the 
position - both before the Virginia courts and this Court 
- that a state licensing requirement for outpatient 
abortion facilities would be constitutional. See 9 Record 
196a, 214a: Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va.s.ct.}, 
p. 35: Juris. Statement 16: Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 
75, 46. The clear implication of appellant's defense in 
this case is that the Virginia requirements for outpatient 
facilities in which second-trimester abortions may be 
performed are unconstittuional. Yet, not until his reply 
. . 
2. 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the 
regulations apart from his broadside attack on the entire 
Virginia hospitalization requirements. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia 
regulations and the history of their adoption, see notes 
______ , supra, we see no reason to doubt that an 
adequately equipped clinic could, upon proper application, 
obtain an outpatient hospital license permitting the 
performance of second-trimester abortions. 
• r 
lfp/ss 04/11/83 Rider A, p. 13 (Simopoulos) 
SIM13 SALLY-POW 
We need not consider each of the regulations 
separately. Despite personal knowledge of the regulations 
at least by the time of his tria1, 14 appellant introduced 
no medical evidence questioning the reasonableness of any 
of the regulations. This is to be contrasted with the 
evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, where the 
plaintiffs sought at great length to show that particular 
requirements as to equipment and services were 
unreasonable restraints on women seeking second-trimester 
abortions. Rather, appellant persisted in arguing broadly 
that Virginia's hospitalization requirements are no 
different in substance from those we reviewed in the Akron 
and Ashcroft cases. Indeed, not until his reply brief in 
... '. 
2. 
this Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart 
from Virginia's overall requirements. 
lfp/ss 03/03/83 Rider A, p. 12 (Simopoulos) 
SIMOP12 SALLY-POW 
Only the last of these arguments is relevant to the 
validity of these statutes and regulations, and appellant 
points to no;/ evidence that supports his sweeping claim of 
"safety". We have noted above that the Virginia 
requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance 
with the state's requirements will entail costs, but this 
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to 
protect the health and safety of people. Moreover, 
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7. The regulations were promulgated pursuant t~[l9~7 Va. Act~zr-
c. 1 , ~4~repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. The State Board ~ -
~ gave preliminary approval on December 1, 1976, and a public 
hearing was held January 26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. 
Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and staff present from the 
Department included two doctors and the Director of the Bureau of 
Medical and Nursing Facilites Services. Witnesses included the 
Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association; a 
representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State; 
representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and 
the Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory 
Surgical Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, a Division of Medical 
Center Hospitals, in Norfolk; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; 
and a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See 
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: 
Proposed Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient 
Hospitals in Virginia (January 26, 1977). The Board apparently made 
changes in the regulations before giving its final approval on May 
11, 1977. The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The 
abortion for which petitioner was prosecuted was performed on 
November 10, 1979, some two years and five months afte~ hese , 
2. 
regulatiens becarne-e~e~. In view of the public hearing on 
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above bv representatives of 
various organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it 
cannot be said -- and indeed appellant does not argue -- that he was 
not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement 
that his clinic be licensed. 
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new 
but similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when 
appellant performed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See 
Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 




MEMO TO FILE 
Abortion Cases 
As more Amici briefs have been filed than one 
could read, and as they also inevitably are repetitive, I 
have focused on several. This memo will identify their 
positions. 
SG's Brief 
The SG's brief is filed only in the Akron and 
Missouri cases, and it does not address the various issues. 
Rather, it is a brief articulating principles with 
particular emphasis on the deference due legislative 
decisions on a subject of social and political controversy. 
The brief is well written, and uses our decisions 
skillfully. 
The Proper Standard 
CA6 (Akron) held that any regulation having a 
"legally significant impact ••. on a first trimester 
abortion decision ••• is invalid". The SG asserts this is 
a new standard not found in our decisions, and would 
significantly expand the "abortion right". 
Our decisions make clear that the "right of 
personal privacy", held in Roe v. Wade to include the 
abortion decision, is not an unqualified [right] and must be 
considered against important state interests in regulation". 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. The correct standard, as 
repeatedly articulated in our cases, is whether the 





regulation is "unduly burdensome". Maherv. Roe, 432 u.s. 
464, 473-474 (unduly burdensome interference with [the 
woman's right] to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy): Bellotti I, 428 u.s. 132, 147 (regulation of 
first trimester abortions "is not unconstitutional unless it 
unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion"): and repeated 
in Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 314; Beal v. Doe, 432 u.s. 
438' 446. 
The SG quoted from my opinion in Maher: 
"The right in Roe v. Wade can be understood 
only by considering both the woman's interest 
and the nature of the state's interference 
with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified 
constitutional right to an abortion." 
Informed Consent Approved 
As an illustration of a regulation held valid by 
this Court, the SG cites Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67, where 
we upheld "informed consent" and record keeping 
requirements. The consent provision in Danforth required a 
woman to "certify in writing her consent to the procedure 
and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not 
the result of coercion, 428 u.s., at 65 (emphasis added). 
The SG observes that Danforth noted the strength of the 
state interest furthered by the informed consent regulation, 
weighed it against its intrusion upon a woman's unfettered 
discretion, and concluded that it did not unduly burden the 
abortion decision. 
f.' ·o:- i 
Substantial Deference Due Legislative Judgment 
The greater portion of the SG's brief is a plea 
for judicial restraint and deference to legislative 
judgments. He makes the valid argument that the abortion 
issue has been, and will continue to be, the "focus of great 
national debate". The sub-issues in the debate are numerous 
and complex. American citizens are deeply and passionately 
divided. In a democracy the legislature is the "primary 
authority" with "responsibility to resolve competing policy 
views". 
As an illustration, the SG notes that "parental 
entitlement to notification of or participation in an 
immature daughter's decision that could profoundly affect 
her life presents competing considerations whose resolution 
lie at the very core of what legislators are elected to do. 
See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s., at 408-410. 
The SG notes the basic differences between the 
legislative and judicial branches: first, the superior 
capacity of a legislature to hold hearings and find facts. 
Second, legislators - elected by the people - must account 
periodically to the people for the way they legislate, and 
this is the heart of our democratic process that assumes a 
"full and uninhibited discussion of public issues". 
Finally, legislative decisions can be changed and 






The SG quotes from my opinion in u.s. v. 
Richardson, 418 u.s., at 188. In footnote 8, p. 13 of his 
brief, the SG quotes the usual statements with respect to 
judicial restraint. He relies, for example, on Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch, p. 15. 
Time for the Judiciary to Allow the Legisative Process to 
Function 
It is pointed out that "ten years ago", in Roe, 
the Court adopted a three-part set of rules with respect to 
the stages of pregnancy. We left many questions unanswered, 
and over the intervening decade, litigation has multiplied 
with the result that the" rules [have] become increasingly 
intricate and substantially more complicated" Here, the SG 
cites Matheson, Harris, Bellotti I and II, Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, Maher, Beal and Danforth. 
The final plea is that in applying the "undue 
burden standard", we should accord "substantial deference" 





Abortion Cases - Professors' Brief 
Eighty-five professors have joined in a brief by 
Paul Brest and Susan Appleton that is a well written, but 
repetitive, argument that - at least for adult women - is 
strongly pro-abortion. The analytical approach of the brief 
is straight-forward, and may be consistent with Roe - though 
possibly inconsistent with some of our subsequent decisions 
{e.g., Maher and Danforth). 
Two-Step Analysis 
This is emphasized throughout the brief, and 
summarized on p. 32 as follows: 
"First, a court must examine whether or not 
the regulation is state action imposing any 
burden at all on the right to obtain an 
abortion. The question here is not one of 
degree but simply whether the regulation 
affirmatively imposes any legally cognizable 
burden. If it does not, then the analytical 
framework developed in Roe does not govern. 
See Danforth~ Maher~ McRae. If, however, the 
regulation imposes any burden on the right 
recognized in Roe, then as a second step, 
strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to 
determine whether that burden is undue--that 
is, whether it is properly justified by a 
compelling state interest and sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to further that goal. See 
McRae, 468 u.s. at 314~ Maher, 432 u.s. a-t--
473-74." p. 32 
With respect to the second step, only two state 
interests have been identified: {i) the compelling 
character of a state's interest in protecting maternal 







. ,. . 
character of a state's interest in preserving potential life 
only after fetal viability", Roe, 410 u.s., at 163-164. 
The reason the state's interest in protecting 
maternal health is said to be compelling only after the 
first trimester, is that medical testimony establishes that 
the risk to maternal health during the first trimester is 
less than at childbirth. 
Void All Regulation before the Court 
This brief asserts that "all of the regulations 
now before this Court interfere directly with the right 
recognized in Roe should be held void". According to the 
records, they significantly burden the abortion decision and 
its effectuation by making termination of a pregnancy more 
onerous, more costly, more time consuming, and - sometimes 
more hazardous". Brief, p. 33, 34. 
Then, the brief delivers the "knockout", by 
asserting that "all of the measures applicable to abortions 
sought by adult women during the first trimester must fall 
because neither state interests identified in Roe is 
sufficiently compelling during that stage to support such 
restrictions". p. 34, 35. Accordingly, all of the first 
trimester regulations here are "unduly burdensome". Citing 
McRae, 448 U.S., at 314, Maher, 432 U.S., at 473. 
2. 
Resort to "Balancing Test" Impermissible 
In a subsection commencing at p. 41, the state 
argues against "resorting to a balancing test or a sliding 
scale analysis". 
Its position is summarized as follows: 
"Only the 'compelling state interest' 
test--applied here and in all fundamental--
rights cases--promises adequate protection of 
fundamental constitutional rights, 
consistency with this Court's precedents, and 
elimination of the uncertainly that a 
variable standard of review resting on ad hoc 
assessment of burdens generates." 41 
Unique Status of Children 
In a brief concluding section, the professors 
concede that children have a unique status. It also 
emphasizes that children have constitutional rights and 
quotes at length from Carey, 431 U.S., at 693 (a favorite of 
the professors, though not an abortion case). 
The brief "explicitly refutes" Judge Kennedy's 
dissenting opinion in Akron in which she argues for a 
"sliding scale standard of review for all abortion 
regulations, whether applicable to minors or adults". 
The brief identifes (p. 60) the three concerns 
"uniquely relevant to minors": (i) the vulnerability of 
children~ (ii) their inability to make informed decisions~ 
and (iii) the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing. Citing my Bellotti opinion, 441 u.s., at 634. 
3. 
' 
'h · . 
. 
'. 
After noting that these special conerns for 
children do not support a state-granted parental veto 
(Danforth), "a majority of the Justices would approve a more 
narrowly drafted statute allowing minors judicially 
determined to be mature to make their own abortion 
decisions, while requiring immature minors to obtain a 
consent substitute, parental permission or judicial 
authorization" predicated on the minor's best interests. 
Citing Bellotti, at p. 643-644. 
It noted that Matheson approved a parental 
notification requirement except with respect to mature or 
emancipated minors or where best interests to the contrary 
can be shown. 
The brief states that a "special standard of 
review" is appropriate with respect to regulation of minors, 
but does not define the standard. 
* * * 
I would like for my clerk to make an independent 
judgment as to the professors' characterizations of our 
decisions, particularly with respect to the absolutism of 
all restrictions - however slight or inherently reasonable -
on adult women without meeting the compelling interest 
standard. My recollection is that there is language in 
Maher to the contrary, but perhaps I am wrong. 
The professors' brief does not address some of the 
issues that I believe are raised in one of more of these 
cases. It talks about first trimester abortions by adult 
4. 
women, and I do not recall that it addresses requirements -
such as hospitalization - with respect to second trimester 
abortions. Although the brief refers to "approximately the 
end of the first trimester" it does not discuss the position 
of the American College that physicians should be allowed 
flexibility to make a judgment as to when a fetus is viable 
without regard to the number of weeks. 
Nor, as I recall, does the brief consider whether 
appropriately trained persons other than physicians might be 
allowed to perform abortions during the first trimester, or 
whether these may be performed in free standing clinics 
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MEMO TO FILE 
dr Abortion rases 
' more Amici briefs have been filed than one 
~~ f 
could read, and ~s they also inevitably are repetitive, I 
have focused on several. This memo will identify their 
positions. ',1! •• ·.·~ 
SG' s Brief '; ,. 
!;:."'!':' 
The SG's brief is filed only in the Akron and 
Missouri cases, and it does not address the various issues. 
Rather, it is a brief articulating principle,e; ,with,.~ 
particular emphasis on the rleference due legislative 
J~ 
decisions on a subject of social and political controversy. ~. 
,,:~<#• The brief is well written, and uses 
skillfully. 
• ~ CAfi (Akron) held that any 
"legally significant impact •• >· . on a first trimester 
abortion decision •• .'•I is invalid". 
.~ 
The SG asserts this is 
a new standard not found in ou~ decisions, and would ~-
significantly expand the "abortion right". 
Our decisions make clear that the 
personal privacy", held in Roe v. Wade to include the ,. 
abortion decision, is not an unqualified [right] and must be 
considered against important state interests in requlation". 
Roe v. Wade, 410 TJ.~. at 154. '1'1-te correct standard, as 
repeatedly articulated in our cases, is whether the 
.. 
2. 
regulation is "unduly burdensome". Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 
464, 473-474 (unduly burdensome interference with [the 
woman's right] to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy) J Bellotti !, 428 u.s. 132, 147 (regulation of .,j• <;.. 
'· 
first trimester abortions "is not unconstitutional unless it 
unduly bur0ens the ri~ht to seek an abortion"): and repeated 
in Parris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 3141 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S~ 
The s~ quoted from my opinion i.n MahE>r: 
"The ri.ght in Roe v. waoe can be understood 
'·, only by considering both the woman's intere.st 
and the nnture of the state's interference 
with i.t. 'Roe did not decJ.are ··an unqu"llified 
constitutional ri qht to an abort ion." 
Informed Consent Approved 
v ;_~ !:. ·~;··~·7 1\s an illustration of a regulation helcl valid by 
~. ~· ~,, 
this Court, the SG cites Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 66-67,'' where 1 
k ~: '):' 
we upheld "informed consent" and record keepinq '.l' '' •,, ;, 
requirements. The consent provision in Danforth required a'~. 
woman to "certify in writinq her consent to the procedure~ 
and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not 
' the result of coercion, 428 u.s., at 65 (emphasi!? added). 
The SG observes"i that Danforth noted the strength of the ,.,• 
state interest fuLthered by the informe~ consent regulation, 
weighed f~ against its intrusion upon a woman~s unfet~ered 
discretion, and concluned that it did not unduly burden the 








Substantial Oeference Due t.egi.slative ,Judgment 
The greater portion of the SG's brief is a plea 
for judicial restraint and ~efer.ence to legislative 
judgments. qe makes the valid argument thBt the abortion 
issue has been, and will continue to be, the "focus of great 
national debate". · The sub-issues in the debate are numerous 
and comPlex~ American citizens are deeply and passionately 
- f_.'(i.~: ~·~ 
,- ;#: ~ 
divided. ' In a democracy the legislature is the "primary ~ 
t,l'J 
~" authority" t~ith "responsibility to resolve competing policy 
views". 
:nr:·~ 
· As: an illustration, the SG notes that 
· entitlement to notification of or participation in an 
immature daughter's decision that could profoundly affect 
her life presents competi.ng considerations whose resolution 
,, 
lie at the very core of what lP.gislators ·':1.are electe'd to do. 
"\ 
legislative '~.··a'nd judicial branchesi•;,,;·fi.rst, the superior 
'II .f~ ~~ { 
"{~·r, 
capacity of a legislature to hold hearings and 
' . I Second, legislators ,.!; 'eolected by the people- must account 
periodically to the people for the wav they legislate; and 
this . rs the heart of our democrat i.e process 
ifr,.<.~ 
"full and uninhibited discussion of public issues".=· 
-~:···,,;"" 
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The SG quotes from my opinion i.n u.s. v. 
Richardson, 418 u.s., at 188. In foo-tnote 8, p. 13 of his ,, ~'J.¥ I 
·c:· 
brief, the SG quotes the usual statements with respect to 
judicial restraint. He reJ ies, for example, on Bickel, The •>',, 
r.i f\J 
'/1• il 
Least Dangerous Branch, p. 15. 
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';M,, ~- . 
.fl \ ': 
.,.r~ '~'' .t' ~t. 
Time for the Judiciary to Allow the Legisative Process to 
Functio"l'l 
It is pointed out that "ten years ago~, in Roe, 
the Court adopted a ·,. three-part set of rules wi.th respect to 
the stages of pregnancy. 'We left many questions unanswered· 
and over the intervening decade, litigation has multiplied ' 
with the result that the"' rules [have] become increasingly 
""f-.. 
intr i.cat'e .. and substantially more complicated" Her~ :,// the SG 
~· -~ <f .<!:.'\. 
cites Matheson, Harris, Bellotti I and II, Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 u.s. 379, Maher, Beal and Danforth. ~ 
}he fina:l plea · is that in applying ~~h~ "undue 
"i £,'' '"':;:~'t 
burden standard~, we should accord ~sub~tantial 
~ '' ·~- ~· 
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to legislative J> judgment: ' 
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MEMO TO FILE 
81-746 and 81-1172 Akron Abortion Cases 
The purpose of this memo is to outli.ne the 
provisions of the sections of the Akron ordinance at issue, 
together with the holding of CA6. 
Section 1.870.05(B): "rhe Consent Provision 
As to women under 15 years of age, it i.s a 
criminal offense for a physician to perform an abortion 
without first obtaining the "informed wri.tten consent 11 of 
one of her parents or her legal guardian 11 in accordance with 
§1870.06, or having obtained an order from a court having 
jurisdiction. 
The h~i~f~ state that the juvenile court is the 
only nne havinq iurisdiction, and that Ohio law requires all 
complaints filed in such courts to be ~erved on the minor's 
parents. Thus, the effect of ~1870.05(B) is at least to 
require notification of parents. For reasons I stated in 
Bellotti It - and possibly in H.IJ. v. Matheson, I Probably 
would not approve of t.h is. 
~herP also is a standing question with respect to 
considering thl.s section of the ordinance. Respondent's 
brief (p. 45) argued that this section is not properly 
before the Court because no party with Article III standing 
appealed to CA6. The only parti.es who appealed were parents 
(not the city or city officials) whose interest was 
unrelated to any specific case. 
2. 
Section 1870.06(B): Specific Advice Required. 
"In order to ensure that the consent" is 
"informed", physicians are forbidden to perform any abortion 
until the woman (and one of her parents i.n the abRence of a 
court order) is advised by her phy~i.cian on a number of 
specific matters. See the full provision pp. 6 and 7, 
petitioner's brief. Included in the required advice is the 
"unborn child is a human li~e from the moment of 
conception"' that the "unborn child may b~ viable if more 
than 22 weeks have elapsed: that an abortion is a "major 
surgical procedure that can result in ••• hPrnorrhaqes, 
pefor8ted uterus, infection, menstrual. disturbances, 
sterility, etc., etc.". 
mhe o-p:l.nions belm-1, ana brief':; on the "abortion" 
side of this caqe leap on this provision with special fury. 
So do the briefs on behalf of medical societies. See 
parti.cu1arJy briPf of the American College of Ohst~tricians 
and ~yn~cologtsts (hereafter the "College"), a well written 
WilMer, Cutler brief, at p. 8, et seq. This brief 
emphasizes the uniqueness of ~ach patient, and the necessity 
that "a physician must be able to exercise discretion in 
determining the amount, nature and mode of pr~seontati.on of 
the information" for the oarticular patient and her 
circumstances. 
I am inclined to agree with the foregoing, but 
construe it to recoqnize that a physician's advice is 
3. 
required. This is absent in so many clinics. See 
Simopoulos. 
It is to be noted, in this case, that the District 
Court found that: 
"A patient's contact with the physician who 
is to perform the abortion procedure usually 
occurs when she is taken into the operating 
room. At that time, the physician reviews 
the patient's medical chart and asks if she 
has any questions. The doctor then performs 
a pelvic examination. If (this is negative] 
••• the abortion usually will then be 
performed." App. 46a-47a1 also quoted in 
petitioner's brief p. 8. 
Unless CA6 rejected this finding, it appears that 
one or more of these clinics (there are three of them in 
this case that together performed 5280 aobrtions in 1977) 
provide no real consultative information and advice. See 
also what happened in Simopoulos. 
I would affirm CA6's holding with respect to the 
invalidity of this section, but make clear - in accordance 
with the College's brief - that the physician must provide 
advice in accord with generally accepted practice by 
qualified physicians. 
Section 1870.06(C): Information as to "Particular" Risks. 
This section, expanding on the advice required by 
1870.06(B) requi.res that the woman, and one of her parents 
or guardian be informed of "the particular risks associated 




employed, providing a general description of the medical 
instructions to be followed subsequent to the abortion. ~ .• 
This also was invalidated by CA6, though the DC 
.,,. 
~. sustained its constitutionality. Apparently the debate was 
over whether the advice should be given by a physician 
rather than some other person in the clinic. Apart from 
this, I would think requiring information on the "risks 
associated" with the abortion need not be included in a 
statute, althouqh a responsible physician would identy them. 
The brief of the College indicates that the risks are not as 
serious as a tonsilectomy or anywhere near as serious >as" an 
. ~~ r~ 
. ~~-: zi, 
appendectomy. 
Secttion 1870.07: 24 Hours Delay. 
Except in the event of an emergency need for an 
abortion, this section prohibits thls action 11 Until 24 hour 
have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of 
her parents or legal guardian, have signed the consent form 
required by Sl870.06.".• The physici.an must 
accordingly. · 
~he DC sustained the 24-hour provision, but CA6 
held it unconstitutional for the uninformative reason that 
it "causes a legally significant impact or consequence on 
the abortion decision, it therefore cannot be applied to 
first trimester abortions". CA6 seems to be a bit carried 
away by inquiring whether a regulation causes 
4. 
5. 
significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision". 
This is not a self-evident analysis. 
'll<'( 
Section 1870.16: ~umane Disposal. , 
Requires that the "remains of the unborn child be ~ 
ll 
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner". Held 
unconstitutional by both courts, by the DC on vaguenss. 
.. ~ * * * 
Respondent's Brief - Second Trimester Abortions. 
' ,!," , .. ·Respondents in this case y. are the three clinics in ,. 
' Akron, and a Dr. 'Bliss.: They have filed cross petitions (I 
,, 
i'i., 
am not clear at the mom.ent as to the i.ssues thereof) , with a 
supporting brief prepared by a professor at the Cleveland-
;'' ~. 
Mar shal,l Law School, and lawyers from the ACLU. ;;:. 11' ... 'J'_. ,' ,it •t:\ 
fl ~ ~1:. O(l 
,. Th.e·' first section of thts brief ;;_ . and apparently 
'.'j 
the primary interest of respondents ,- is the limitation on 
second trimester'"' abortions • .. 
··· ... 
Section 1870.03, according to respondent's brief 
(I should ;ead the siction) requires that every abortion 
performed subsequent to the end of the firs~ trimester be 
performed in a hospital. This is defined to mean "a general~. 
hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or 
obstetrics which is accredited by the the joint commission 
on the accredit'ation of hospitals, or by the American 
Osteopathic Association. Respondent's brief "relies on 
statistics and ~(idence to the effect that no arbitrary line 
can be drawn between the trimesters, and contends that 
I v ·~: ~ 
6 • .. , 
j, 
"early second trimester abortions are safely performed in 
c• ·~\. 
outpatient clinics~. It is stated that only 17% of the 
public hospitals, and 34% of the private hospitals, do 
abortions at all. And at the time of trial "second 
trimester abortions were not available in hospitals in 
il,t. 
:j·, ~.: ll 
Akron", with the result that "ambulatory facili~ies" have .~~~ 
been developed to meet , this special need, and that over 70% 
of all abortions were performed in free standing clinics~ ., 
ii 
The College's brief, somewhat more restrained, 
argued that the limitation on all secondary trimester 
'" f" ··•·• ., 
abortions is unconsti .. \~utionally "overbroad,~"- ~:; Apparently 
recognizing that t.her;~ is language in Roe v. Wade that '·" 
supports "ila holding of validity, the Col lege brief. emphasizes 
~·~~ .:·i< 
language.~,:in Wade ·,. t ,hat talk's of "present medical knowledge", .. , 
and reads our ~dases . as having "declined~t9 permit the states 
:!l:,JV.~ 
.. , 
to establish a ,?_specific point of presumptive viability", 
.~ 
,,,,t.'l> ;· . :1 
rathef >'t t ~- is i:said that this 
"'"' -~ ... ~, '~; (cornpelting] poirit flexible 
.[~0 ' ' lc .\•.· U 
Court,.: has deliberately "left the 
... & 
for anticipated advancements 
medical ' skill". Citing Colauti v. Franklin, 439 u.s., ' at 
387, with a see also to~, 410 u.s., 
Danforth, 428 U.S., ae1' 61, · 64 • .. 
The College brief argues that since Roe 
progressed oramat ically". ~~~In '~ th''i' s connect i.on, . . ~ ~~~~~ 
b~r" ief states that the increased~~::~~fety of 
\ 
abortions after the first ·trimester result's 'from the 
•' . 
'~!'. 
'_. ~ ~ 
"wigespread ~· adoption of dialation ano evacuation {D&E) ", now 
l.'t 
,. 
r ~· ",r t 
~~' .. ~~ 




an accepted technique for second trimester abortions". Br. 
21. ···' 
i' 
. It is argued also that "most second trimester ~" 
abortions are as safe as or safer than childbirth has led to 
a change in the views of many physicians regarding the 
advisability of hospitalization for all second trimester 
abortions". 0 Br. 23. The College refers to its "Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecological Servides", as stating: 
"{In] a hospital based or in a free standing 
ambulatory surgical facility, or in an 
outpatient clinic meeting criteria required 
for a free standing surgical facility, 
abortions should be limited generally to 18 
weeks from the last menstral period" 
23, 24. 
Vf'! ,c~·~ 
,, . ..-"· 
i ~ 
·~ ·c,;.f' 
' ' .. ·~ 
In footnote 65, p. 24, the College's standards are 
set forth for "free standing surgical facilities" .: 
"ACOG, Standara for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) ("ACOG 
Standards"). ACOG's standards for 'free- " 
standing surgical facilities' recommended :: 1 
that they 'be licensed to conform to 
requirements of state or federal legislation' 
and 'maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, ,, 
and personal standards a~ recommended for 
hospitals.' Id. at 52. 'Surgical procedures 
may be performed in those facilities under 
general or regional block anesthesia when it 
is expected that the postoperative recovery 
will permit discharge on the same day. There 
should be a written policy requiring the 
medical staff to provide for prompt emergency 
treatment or hospitalization in the event of 






seen briefed thoroughly, whether the physician must 
determine that viability has not commenced before any 
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MEMO TO FIT .. E 
S1-1255 and 81-1623 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft 
Planned Parenthood, a clinic (Reproduction Health 
Services), and a couple of doctors, sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the Missouri abortion statute as , 
revised following Danforth. It is not easy to identify the 
"~inner", although this state prevailed on what appear to be 
most of the major issues. This memo, dictated only to aid 
my memory will review - summarily - the opinion of CAS by 
Chief Judge Lay. In doing so, I folJo\"~ by subject matter 
CAS's disposition of the issues.* l• 
.1* f ~; 
I. Second Trimester Hospitalization Requirement. 
Section 1S8.025 requires that seconn, and third trimester 
":J4}''J ·-:~,::'.If 
abortions be pe.rformed in a hospital. 'T'he DC had ~~ 
invalidated this: requirement. It had noted that the D&E • 
~-! 'J--3~ 
.' 
*At the beginning, CAS summarizes its disposition of the 






~· ~ I 
method was available in Missouri in only one hospital. • 
M.oreover, the DC noted that no hospital would admit a woman 
under 18 wlthout parental consent, and therefore parents 
were given the power to veto minor women's decisions with 
respect to second and third trimester abortions. 
Parental Consent for Hospitalization -.:-;.!:~ iJ.. ~~ 
~·. ~" " ;: 
1'· CAS noted that, unlike the statute in Danforth, ~ 
' the new statute noes not r~quire parental consent (is this 
true even for immature minors?). In rejecting the DC's 
position, CAB noted that the unavailability of hbspitals was 
not state action, but was the action of "private entities". 
Morf"over, CA.8 thought that the DC's position woulrt '.,' "force 
i 
.:, "'T ~'0/t'f 
reevaluation of every health-based second trimester ·: 
': rPguJation", and that the state iinterest was both concern 
I 
for the mother's health _.:mo viability of the fetus. ~.!:,;. 
'Because of inadequate .~findings by the District 
Court, CA.8 remanded on the hospi.tallzation requirement. It 
,, 
noted that "the centr~l issue is the relative safety 
nonhospitali.zed D&E ~ and hospitaliz~d methods"~- In 
concluding thls portion of its opi.nion, CAB said: 
~In sum, we find that the district court 
ailed to properly analyze the 
hospitalization requirement. On remand, it 
should .first determine if the regulation 
creates substantial interference with and 
imposes a direct burden on the woman's 
decision to have an abortion. If it does, 
the district court should evaluate whether 
the hosP.italization requirement is ;ustified 
by a compelling state interest7 i.e., whether 
it is reasonably related to the woman's 
health. Missouri bears the burden of 
justi.fying the restriction." A-66 
3. 
II. Parental or Court Consent for Mi.nors. , · 
This section makes it a crime to perform an 
abortion on a minor (under age 18) unless (i) the physician 
has obtained written consent of the minor and one parent or ' 
guardian; or (ii) the minor is emancipated and the physician 
has informed consent1 or (iii) the minor has been. granted 
the right to self-consent to the abortion by a court order, " 
obtained by procedure prescribed in the statute; or (iv) the • 
minor has be~n granted consent by court order. 
respondents cross petit loners, p. 5. ·~ 
CAB began its discussion of this issue by quotinq 
the paragraph from my Bellotti II opinion that outlined 
requirements with respect to consent. 
The DC had invalidated this provision because it 
was viewed as allowinq a state court unbridled discretion. 
Also the statute had not dealt with emancipation properly. 
CAB construed S188.028 differently. ,r' It ruled that a court 
·-
could not deny the minor's petition unless it found that 
"the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to 
make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her 
best interests". These are my Bellotti II requirements. 
CAS buttressed its holding in this respect by reli.ance on 
H.L. v. Matheson. See A68-69. 
. In discussing Matheson ~AS noted that it had gone ·~ 
off on a "standing" issue. But here the plaintiff was not a 
young woman seeking abortion. Rather, 
corporations and physicians seeking to 





services, and that these plaintiffs had shown that some of 
their . r~spective patients included mature minors. 
{t !•. 1'1 
~¥ ~ 
i Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this case (the 
primary petitioners who lost on major points below) argue . ' 
,. 
that CAS harl no authority to interpret the statute as it 
~~ 
'If 1,, 1 ',~,., __ fi 
did, contending that the plain language was otherwise. 
'l,,~ 
CAB then noted that this case presented "the 
r-
,.:y ! 
left open;,_in Matheson: whether · ~t;.", is consti.tuti.onally 
permissible to require mature or 'best~· interest' minors 
notify their parent~ prior to a co~rt hearing in which th~y;~ 
seck , judicial consent". A70 Aqain relying on my Be1lottl 
IT opini.on, .CAB states that it "advances persuasive .reasons 
for conlcuding that parental notice ·is unduly burdensome in 
cases involving mature or ; 'best interest ' minors . " ·443 
u.s ., at . ' ; if'~"''f:~: ~· ! 
~-··. " ~ • , - ~ r r:·· ; •y. :.•- , ... !! 
Planned Parenthood chatl.enged 
'" -~ ·~ 
severaJ other 
t; 
provisi?r:s of §188 . 028 . ThesP do not appear substantial to 
~\lff~-1• ~: M 
me -; ,a't;~~iieast at. present. ~.The usual vagueness 
-~~:_ ... :'.i!i .. '. . 
i':·.t·~ _'; 
madet ... ~ It a'iso is said that the procedure do~s not 
anonym! ty:~.~- Oespi te these arquments, C'A8 concluded that 
judicial consent provisionw is constitutional . But CAB 
agreed with Planned Parenthood that "the notice provisions 
found in subsection 188.028 . 2(2 ) are ' impermissible and 
be set aside."~ 
In sum, the judicial consent , construed, was 
sustained, but - ln accord with Bellotti II, the requirement. ~"· 












'· "' 0 
!1 • 
II!. Restricti.ons on Abortion A.fter Viabi.l'itv (A73) 
CAB first reversed the ocs holding that all of 
these restrictions were void for vagueness • . ~ do not think 
'! '.~i"l,: i 
•. '<'' 
we granted cert on the vagueness issue. · ·' ' ··· 
Second Doctor Requirement 
fl.~ 
,; CAS affirmed the DC's decision that this unduly 
burdened the woman's riqht. The state agreed that there was 
a financial burden, but arqued that under Harris and Maher 
that · this was a private rather than public matter. I aqree 
with CAS that these casP.s were misconstrued by Missouri. 
Thus, there certainly was a state imposed burden that could · "'''", 
be iustified onlv by a sho\'rinq of comPelling state interest.~··· 
··:;; The interest relied upon by the state was the 
importance of mr\ki.nq sure, where a second ,,, trimester: abortion 
is performeo, that the fetus will not survive. CAS affirmed 
the DC in conlcudinq that the state ~failed to 
second i.ioctor 's opinion was necessary. ·, .. " 
~·. :n •I' 
CAS oiscussed .· the O&E procedure, ..,.. .. ::((' ,, the conflict 
of Dr. Crist' 's testimony with that of all other doctors.* ~ 
·t·r ., .. 
*My recollection is that Dr. Crist was a party in the Akron 
case. He testified that he used n&E successfully on women 
pregnant as much as 2S weeks. His testimony was 
contradicted by every other phvsictan, the prevailing view 
being that a fetus could not survive D&E abortion. I'd like 
' t.o fino some wav to check up on Or. Crist. M.y quess is that 








IV. Informed Consent 
~anforth hel~ that a state may require "informed 
consent" even in the first tr\rnester. Danforth, 428 u.s. 
at 64-67. But Danforth limited this as follow~: 
1',; f< ... ~~-: 
T r.: *· 
f•' 
,,ill 
"The giving of information to the patient as 
to just what would be done as to its . 
consequences {may be required]. To ascribe 
more meaning than this might well confine the 
attending physician in an unoesired and 
uncomfortable straightjacket in the practice 
of his profession." At 67. 
·, a~·'~ '\:t.if'· '' 
,~, ,,· ~l"l 
' OJ.:. ;;, 1 
Section 188.039.2(3) goes well beyond Danforth. 
6 • 
It requires that the woman be informed of the "probable . ,,r 
anatomical and psychological characteristics of the unborn 
child", ' and subsection (4) provides that she must be ;••,,,~,, 
~r~ 
informed of "the : immediate and long range physicial dangers 
of abortion and ~Rycholoqical trauma"• =· ·- .. ~ 
affirmed. 
The DC held this 
I •. 
In so doinq, CAB said that the DC properly 





woman and her physician",i and that the s~lfe•s i~terest is 
b· ' adequately served when the woman's ''• decision is maite with 
"full knowledge of its nature and consequences". Danforth, 
Section 188.039.1 requries that the "attending 
t·:v~-~., 
physicia"n.~.J~J nform the woman of the information ~pecified in 
the statute. Both the DC and CAB sustainen this 
requirement, despite the argument of Planned Parenthood that 
f ~· 
~::"if ' ' 
nonphysicians are capable of informing the patient, and that 
requiring the physician to do it creates scheduling problems 
and increased costs. My tentative vi.ew is that a qualified 
7. 
•; ;.::.. 
person other than a physician could give this information. , ;( 
I think a state could require the licensing of such persons, ~ , 
such as practical nurses are licensed.* 
,( f, 
v. Pathological Reports 
Sect. ion 188.047 requires that sample of the tissue 
removed must be submitted to a certified pathologist, who 
must file a report with the state divison of health. 
,,,, ·~ CAS invalidated this provision, holding that the 
decision whether to obtain pathological reports should be 
left to the physician. CAS noted that ~issouri "does not 
require submission of tissue to a pathologist following 
other medical procedures". A94 
:. '.t. )' .~ '~ 
{;i 
*In the sub~ection discussinq advice by the physician (p. 
A91), CAS refers to the 48 hours waiting period prescribed. 
It appears to sustain this as valid, although the discussion 







·~~ In invalirlating this requiremen~, CAS reiterated 
that "Missouri law requries that all abortions be peformed 
by physicians". 
CAS's opinion is lonq and ramblinq, and not 
(.~ .. .,., 
altogether clear. I hope we can find some way to prevent 
courts from havinq to make the multiplicity of judqments 
such as those addressed by the oc and CAS i.n 
ss 
*cAS's opinion is so long I may have missed it , but I find 
no full discussion of the requirement th~t only physicians 
may perform first trimester abortions. My guess is that the 
Court will hold specially trained p~r~ons other than 

















~,: ·~- ··:it~· 
l'. 
Abortion Cases ~rofessors' Brief 
Eiqhtv-five professors have joined in a brief. by 
Paul Brest and Susan Appleton that is a well written, but 
repetitive, arqum~nt that - at least for adult women - is 
strongly pro-abortion. ~he analytical approach of the brief 
is straight-forward, and may be consistent with Roe - though 
possibly inconsist~nt with some of our subsequent decisions 
(e.q., Maher and Danforth). 
Two-Step Analysis 
'T'his is emphas.ized throughout the brief, and 
summarized on p. 32 as follows: 
t~ 
' " 
First, a court must examine whether or not 'f~ ., 
the regulation is state action i.mposinq anv 
burr.en at all on the riqht to obtain an 
abortion. 'T'he question here is not one of 
degree hut simply whether the regulation 
affirmatively imPoses anv Jeqallv coqnizable 
burden. If it does not, then the analytical 
framework nevelooeo in Roe does not govern. 




requlation imposes any huroen on the riqht "· ·~· 
recognized i.n Roe, then as a second step, . ~, · 
,strict iudici.al scrutiny must be appl i.ed to \. ..... v 
determine whether that burden is undue--that 
is, whether it is properly justified by a 
compelling state interest and sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to further that qoal. See•·' 
M.c Rae , 4 6 8 U.S • at 314 7 Maher , 4 3 2 U.S • a-t-
473-74." 32 '•'' 
'I; ~-
respect to the second step, only two 
intere'sts· have been identified: (i) the compelling i_., .... 
character of a' state's interest in protecting maternal ,, 
. 







~h~racter of a state's interest in pr~serving potential life 
only after, fetal viabU.ity", ~, 410 u.s., at 163-164. 
~.~The reason the state's interest in Protecting 
mat~rnal health :is said to be comPellinq only aft~r the 
first trimester, is that medical t~stimony establishes that 
' ' ' 1!;1 ' ' ,. 
the rtsk to maternal health durinq the first ,r. tr'imester , is 
Voi~ All Regulation before the Court 
This brief asserts that "all of the requlations 
now before this Court interfere directlv with the riqht 
recognized in Roe shoul(h be held voicl". According to t'tle 
2. 
records, ,.-~hev significantly burde··n ~'the abortion decision and .. ~. 
;I>,• ~.i11· 1: "' •:.~~ 
i. ts ~ .(fe~t_.riation bv making termi ~af i.on of ¥~ ::';1p·~~gnancy 
onerous, more :~ co'stly · , more' time consuminq, anrl .J' sometimes 
,,,,,,. ··•('i 1. 1 
~~~-., ,. 
more hazardous ,,Br i;~f, p. 33, 34. ·· · .. ~~~·~'i~,i·~t 
t:r L~. ·~~·}ft ·~-~~~:. 
Then
1
, "th'e brief delivers.; ~Hel' 11 ~:knockout", by 
1 ~- :,;··.f,- - ir~fSt"~;.)'; . . ~~ ~ 
:\. ~~ 'rf) M.,, ' ·, 
the :measu:res ,. applicr.tble to aborti..ons 
~t:~~./ "<! :'1-! !/!; "':··:·:i:i ~- ·-.·-\ ·, \' 
sought'-; by ui'iriq the first tr imestP.r must fall 
' ~ )> ~qj~~ > 'il ·~t-\:' ' . ~- ~ ·.· 
becauE;~J:te i theE ,,.;_stf!.te.1 inte~~sts io:.; t if. ieq i!l":,Roe is 
sufficiently compelling dur.inq that staae to support 
""-·'; • Jl: 
,-.,.-...~ 
asserting that "all 
·restric.tions". p. 34,:%F3 ~ Accordinqly, a l\ of the 
t 
~ ', _ ~f·· _ _Y:.Y~ . •. 
tr if!1ester .~i requ lations here 'iue "unduly burdensome". 
l . -~ 




,. . ~· 
' 
Resort to "Balancing Test" ImPermissible . 
In a subsection commencing at p. 41, the state 
argues against ""resorting to a balancing test or a sliding . . 
scale analysis". 
~·, Its position is summarized as follows: 
"Only the 'compelling state interest' 
test--applied here end in all fundamental--
rights cases--promises adequate protection of 
fundamental constitutional rights, 
consistency with this Court's precedents, and 
elimination of the uncertainly that a 
variable standard of review resting on ad hoc 
assessment of burdens generates . " 41 
.,, 
~: 
UniquP Status of Children 
In a brief concluding section, the professors . 
."'ll 
~~~:&.:,, ~w 
concede that children have a unique status: It also . 
:~ .,: 
emphas'izes '' that children have constitutional rights and 
quotes at .length f-rom Carey, 431 u.s., at 693 (a favorite of 
the professors, though not an abortion case) . 
' 





nion in 'Akron in which she argues for ~ ,; ::' , 
"sliding scale standard of review for all abortion 
"";,..JI 
regulations, ~ whether applicable to minors or adults " . ' 
.. !. ··::.-'" ~~r 
3. 
; . ::1'!'he, bf i.ef ··.· identifes (p . 60) the t ,hree concerns 
~'~~: ~.·':~·~;'''· ~:;:'~(:·~'' ~~~j;l1'~~~t. 1;~· / 
"uniquely relevant to minors" : ( i) the vulner abi 1 i ty of '' " 
children; (ii) their ~. inability to make informed decisions : 
1 and (iii ) the importance of the parental role in child 
~~: Y. ,,, < 






~· 4; .. ,, 
' ~ 
•' . ~ . 
.. 
,, 
~ After noting that these special conerns for 
children do not support a state-granted parental veto 
(Danforth) , 1'a ,; majority of the Just ices '.would approve a more 
narrowly drafted statute allowing minors jurlicially 
,, determined to be mature to make their own abortion 
decisions, while requiring immature minors 
'l' 
consent substitute; parental permission or 
~ 'J 
authorization" Predicated on the minor's best interests . , 
~-~ s 
~:''fy.t: , ..... , ... 
Citing Bellotti, at p. 6.43-644. ' •·· '~*'"' ., 
,'' ,,, ·. ·. ~ 
It . noted that. Matheson al;)proved ··~ a pare~_tal ~'i 
notification requirement except with respect to mature or 




can be shown. ' .. 12 ;')J 
~~fi~ brief states that 
"'-""' 1~:?"' 
review\ . is appropriate with respect 
but does not define the standard . 
~ t._, _.!}~; ~-"' 
.I y 
" woultiJn ike for my clerk to make 
judgment f\ S:!f?~l~~ professors'' character·,izations of our 
decisions, particularly· with \· respect 
,-.-. ' - II< 
all r'~'str ict ions .. ?- however s ;l:·ight or 
on aoult women vlithout meeting the comoel ~ ing interest' 
d-'".,1 
standard.~ l.~y recoll,e'ction is that .:there - i 's language ~.in 
t:· ,: ' ~~ 
.... J 
Maher to the contrary, but perhaps I am wrong . 
>T.~ The professors' brief does not address some of 
!:, 
issue~ that ~! believe ~;j ,raised in one of more of these 
~( 





' '.1 ;.'1''1,.,, ,, ,,-
~; 
t-





vmmen, ana T do not recall that it addresses requirements 
j'; "' li 
such as hospitalization- with reqoect to secon~ trimester ;.· 
abortions." Although the brief refers to "approximately the 
end of the first trlmP-ster" it does not discuss the position 
of the American C"olleqe that physicians should be allowed , ·:, 
' 
flexibility to make a is viable 
without regard to the number of weeks. 
,. ' 
Nor, as I recall, aoes the brief ' consi~er \'.rhet.her 
' '':W, 
appropriately tralned persons other than physicjans miqht be 
• . • J· 
allowed to perform abortions duri~g the first trimester, or 
whether these may be performed in free · standing clinics 








"i\· .. ~~·~ ·~ ·t 
lfp/ss 11/23/82 
MEMORANDUM " " _f."" -~ I 
TO: DATE: Nov. 22, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. ,~ ~., 
Abortion Cases 
··-•-
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to 
select for me, including also the brief by the American ., 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. ' As I am sure 
you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit 
overwhelming. , I have not tried to sort out which ones we ~ 
granted, or whether we took them across the board. ~ 
·A primary objective of the Court at this tlme, 1as 
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would 
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the 
flow of litigation into the Courts. The professors' brief 
with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive 
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of "balancing". 
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions 
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally 
"at will" In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia 
\' 
case), there always will be licensed physicians who will 
make enormous profits out of what have been described as 
"abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief 
fairly states some of our holdings. Perhaps the SG goes too 
far the other way. 
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several 





Informed Consent Requirement 
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue 
burden per se. The Akron provision is unduly burdensome 
because it imposes extensive requirements a.s to exactly what 
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her 
"informed" consent. 
As to the consent requirement with respect to 
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined 
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one 
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is 
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds 
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of , 
the minor. ,. In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the 
juvenile court to notify the parents. Under my opinions in 
Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid. 
,_-z 
24 Hours Oelay(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri) 
~ Although I do not recall (without checking} a 
.~ court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary • 
·-·~: 
'•' •. :.! ··~ 
.. 
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our 
standards. This normally can be left to the physician, 
provided there is some assurance that the physician wil~ ~ 
adequately inform the woman. With respect to immature 
minors, there should be time to assure informed consent. We 
have never considered the extent of a doctor' s :f", 
r 
responsibility in determining whether a minor l s mature. I 
suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors 
. · .. 
•. 
'· . .. 
~ 
' 1 
\ ; ' 
3. 
of tender age (under 15) that an independent decision maker 
determine maturity and best interest issues. Such a 
requirement inevitably would produce some delay. ·~ 
Second Trimester Abortions 
"· .,, My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line, 
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a 
fetus. ~~ In Akron, respondents argue that "early second 
trimester abortions are safely performed [even in] 
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any 
' ·.~ 
"arbitrary line between trimesters"~ 
~r.:.(, ·.:~ 
zy;. ,!"; ·~ The American College seems to agree, relying on 
the argument that "medical knowledge {since Doe] has · 
progressed dramatically", particularly in the use of 
procedures~ Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case" 
persuaded CAS (and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure 
invariably destroys the fetus. Thus, in view of the 
compelling state interest once viability exists a state 
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be 
made by a physician. t:.,. , ~ 
,..,1 As the College brief relies on "current 
knowledge", it would appear that it 
physician is the only person likely to possess such 
knowledge'· and therefore the viability decision 







Free Standing Clinics 
.A major issue, in view of the extensive use of 
ctincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing 
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would 
be lawful. . . 
·'!,< j., 
' ~~, T. am favorably inclined toward the views in the ~· 
amicus brief of the College. See pages 23, 24. I \ 
( # 
particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the . 
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities~ 
{,1 as requiring them to "maintain the same surgical, · 
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as 
recommended for hospitals." Clearly, I would think, clincis 
should be regulated and approved by state law, 
periodically inspected. [.':& 'fl.'·',' 
.,;·• It is not clear whether the College would require 
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions. The 
record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of 
the College's standard as to abortions. Take a look, and 
identify (or xerox) anything helpful • 
• • • ,,;; 
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of 
tentative views. When we go into Conference on three cases, 
involving three different sets of regulations, it will be 
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you, ~k 
identifying the issue a~d the case. ; Where we differ, we can 





TO: Jim DATE: Nov. 22, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Abortion Cases 
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to 
select for me, including also the brief by the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. As I am sure 
you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit 
overwhelming. I have not tried to sort out which ones we 
granted, or whether we took them across the board. 
A primary objective of the Court at this time, as 
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would 
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the 
flow of litigation into the Courts. The professors' brief 
with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive 
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of "balancing". 
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions 
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally 
•at will". In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia 
case), there always will be licensed physicians who will 
make enormous profits out of what have been described as 
"abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief 
fairly states some of our holdings. Perhaps the SG goes too 
far the other way. 
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several 
of the major issues in these cases: 
·~ . 
Informed Consent Requirement 
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue 
burden per se. The Akron provision is unduly burdensome 
because it imposes extensive requirements as to exactly what 
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her 
•informed• consent. 
As to the consent requirement with respect to 
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined 
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one 
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is 
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds 
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of 
the minor. In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the 
juvenile court to notify the parents. Under my opinions in 
Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid. 
24 Hours Delai(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri) 
Although I do not recall (without checking) a 
court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary 
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our 
standards. This normally can be left to the physician, 
provided there is some assurance that the physician will 
adequately inform the woman. With respect to immature 
minors, there should be time to assure informed consent. We 
have never considered the extent of a doctor's 
responsibility in determining whether a minor is mature. I 
suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors 
3. 
of tender age (under 15) that an independent decision maker 
determine maturity and best interest issues. Such a 
requirement inevitably would produce some delay. 
Second Trimester Abortions 
My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line, 
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a 
fetus. In Akron, respondents argue that "early second 
trimester abortions are safely performed [even in] 
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any 
"arbitrary line between trimesters". 
The American College seems to agree, relying on 
the argument that "medical knowledge [since Doe] has 
progressed dramatically", particularly in the use of D&E 
procedures. Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case 
persuaded CAB (and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure 
invariably destroys the fetus. Thus, in view of the 
compelling state interest once viability exists a state 
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be 
made by a physician. 
As the College brief relies on "current medical 
knowledge", it would appear that it agrees a qualified 
physician is the only person likely to possess such 
knowledge, and therefore the viability decision cannot be 
delegated to a less qualified person. 
4. 
Free Standing Clinics 
A major issue, in view of the extensive use of 
clincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing 
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would 
be lawful. 
I am favorably inclined toward the views in the 
amicus brief of the College. See pages 23, 24. I 
particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the 
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities" 
as requiring them to •maintain the same surgical, 
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as 
recommended for hospitals.• Clearly, I would think, clincis 
should be regulated and approved by state law, and 
periodically inspected. 
It is not clear whether the College would require 
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions. The 
record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of 
the College's standard as to abortions. Take a look, and 
identify (or xerox) anything helpful. 
* * * 
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of 
tentative views. When we go into Conference on three cases, 
involving three different sets of regulations, it will be 
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you, 
identifying the issue and the case. Where we differ, we can 




FIRST DRAFT: Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The principal issue here is whether Virginia's 
mandatory hospitalization requirement for second-trimester 
abortions is constitutional. 
I 
~~s a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist. 
His practice in November, 1979 consisted of office 1 
practice in Woodbridge, Virginia, hospital practice at 
four local hospitals or surgery centers, and ~ 
practice at his clinic in Falls Church, known as the 
American Women's Clinic. The clinic has an operating 
room, operating-room lighting, and facilities for 1 
resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. 
CA-uL~~ S' 
Petitioner ~ pekform~ first-
~ )=> /' 
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time 
relevant to this case, the clinic was not certified or 2 
1 . d . fo-1 Jl h d . . h 1cense 1n any way, nor a pet1t1oner soug t any 
\..' 
~~~~ J?~~--~~ ~~ 





petitioner's clinic on 
she .~~ same 
~~~~ 
~er-~ , 1979. She /\told 
petitioner that she was about 22 
h~~~~ ~~~,_,_~ 
Petitioner testified that he encouraged her to confide 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
~ 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did ..g..o. horne, but 
-1 
never advised her parents. 
o days later, P.M. returned for a saline injection, 
·~hf' . . d. . d . / 1. . t'  pet1t1oner a rn1n1stere 1n ~ue c 1n1c opera 10n 
7 ~ ~~~-
facility. Although P.M. w~~ 1l~able to recall being 
"\ 
~ >4 7ts> ,4D 
instructed to meet petitioner at any hospital when the 
1\ 
labor began, here was testimony that petitioner provided ~ 
post-injection instructions as to when to report 
~.M. then went to a motel a~ aborted her fetus in 
~ 1\ motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline 
injection. Alone, she left the fetus, follow-up 
instructions, and pain medication at the motel. Her 
boyfriend took her horne. Police found the fetus later 
that day and opened an investigation. 1 




Petitioner was indicted2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside 
of a licensed hospital and was convicted by a Judge of the 4 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County sitting without a jury. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed his case and, in a 
unanimous decision, affirmed his conviction. Simopoulos 
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981). 
This appeal followed. We now affirm. 
II 
1Except as permitted by statute, persons performing 
an abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and 
subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.2-
71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). See Simopoulos 
v. Virginia State Board of Medicine, 644 F.2d 321, 322-323 
(CA4 1981) . 
2The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code 
§18.2-71, which provides: 
Except as provided in other sections of 
t hi s a r t i c 1 e , i f any per son a dm in i s t e r to , or 
cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other 
thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her 
unborn child, or to produce abort ion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or 
produce such abortion or miscarriage, he shall 
be guilty of a Class 4 felony. 
In the four following sections the ·virginia Code sets 
forth exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal 
liability (i) if the abortion is performed within the 
first trimester, §18.2-72~ (ii) if the abortion is 
performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§18.2-73~ (iii) if necessary to save the woman's life, 
§18.2-74.1~ and (iv) during the third trimester under 
certain circumstances, §18. 2-74.1. The indictment here 
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any 
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any first-
trimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not, 





Petitioner contends that -th-e- Virginia statutory y 
f"'\ 
hospital requirement sharply restricts the availability of 
abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-
trimester abortions. 3 He also argues that the Virginia 
3Petitioner raises two issues on his appeal that do 
not ~.QQSQ.rve extended treatment. H:i& first conten~ ~ 
that Va. Code §18.2-71 was unconstitutionally applied to 
him, because lack of medical necessity for the abort ion 
was not alleged in the indi ... st_~nt, fto-t addressed in the 
prosecution's case, ~t7'mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Petitioner contends that this failure creates two 
constitutional issues: (i) whether the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, 
as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62 
(1971); and (ii) whether the prosecution failed to meet 
its burden of persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New 
York, 432 u.s. 197 (1977). ---
The authoritative construct ion of §18. 2-71 by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least 
with regard to the defense of medical necessity, the 
prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical 
necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until petitioner 
invoked medical necessity as a defense. See 221 Va., at 
1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Petitioner's reliance on Vuitch 
thus is misplaced, ~ecause the Virginia statute, as 
construed by the state court, does not require that the 
State allege lack of medical necessity; the District of 
Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, 
did require the prosecut1on to so allege. See 403 U.S., 
at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going 
forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is 
normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 s.ct. 1558, 
1567-1568 & n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u.s. 
684, 701-703 nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). ri'hus, we agree wi 
~me state court that the prosecution did not bear the 
burden of alleging or proving lack of medical necessity in 
t is case because petitioner failed to invoke the defense. 
Petitioner also contends that e·he Sl:ip£-Sme Cottrt . of 
V~ja~n=ocl3:Pkeld=i~ his .g~i:OA-- beee:ttse t;.be 
prosecutio · rove that his acts in fact caused 
the de se of the fetus. e S a e cas , ere 
e ~ ence that (i) P.M. wen to petitioner specifically for 
abortion and that she advised him that she was twenty-
o weeks pregnant, App. 264, 268; (ii) two days later 
ti tioner injected P.M. with a saline solution without 
mplication, id., at 271; (iii) after the procedure was 
rformed he tOTO P.M. that the fetus would be destroyed, 
(iv) she then went to a motel and stayed two 
otnote continued on next page. 
' 5. 
~h-~ 
requirement c£eates negative health consequences and, as 
applied to him and the abortions that he performs in his 
well-equipped does not "measurably 
contribut[e] to the purposes which the State advances 6 
as justification for the restriction." Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 u.s. 678, 702 
(1977) (WHITE, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the result). 
We need not pause long here to consider the standard 6 
of review, for we have set it out at length today in City 
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 
u.s . Although the Court found in Roe v. Wade, 410 
.., 
~ ~1~), the woman's right to ~decide to abort to 
~... . • IJC a fundamental right, we rejected the notion that a 
~~~~woman has an absolute right to an abortion without any 
~~interference from the State. We consistently have 
~ recognized, and we reaffirm today, that, "since a State 
{0' 
days, id., at 273-277; (v) that she did not 
medication but the pain pills that petit· r 
prescribed, id., at 286; (vi) P.M. abor at the 
motel, id., ~276-277; and (vii was born dead 
and was of the approximat ational age of five and one-
half months, id., 232-233, 236. We believe this 
evidence is su cient to support a finding that 




has a legitimate concern with the health of women who 
undergo abortions, 'a State may properly assert important 7 
interests in safeguarding health [and] in maintaining 
medical standards.'" City of Akron, u.s. ' at 
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S., at 154). As JUSTICE BLACKMUM 
stated for the Court in Roe: 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical 
procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient. This 
interest obviously extends at least to the 
performing physician and his staff, to the 
facilities involved, to the availability of 
after-care, and to adequate provision for any 
complication or emergency that might arise. 
410 U.S., at 150. The issue here is whether the Virginia 
hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to the 
promotion of the Commonwealth's compelling interest in 
maternal health and safety. 4 
A 
Before examining the medical basis for Virginia's 
hospitalization requirement, it is ~to understand 
4Peti tioner also argu.es that the State has no 
compelling interest in impos1ng criminal penalties on the 
performance of safe non-hospital abortions in the second 
trimester and that criminal penalties to enforce total 
hospitalization is not a narrowly drawn requirement. 





c-r= first the nature of that requirement. As a general 
proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
Virginia law. 5 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 10 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery 
to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a 
hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. 
~ 
Code §18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute does 
"" ~Att~ .. .: J Hc.b ~ .-( H.-.. ~ 
notAdefiAe11 hospital ,~§32.i~23.i defines "hospital" to 
include "outpatient hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of 
5A physician's .office is explicitly excluded from 
the hospital 1 icens~ statutes and regulations, unless 
the off ice is used pr' incipally for performing surgery. 
10 
See Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. 
Petitioner contends that whether his facility principally 
performs surgery is a question of fact that has not be£s..t-) v 
~ resolved and that it is 1\Unu• fa.L frgm ol.e-.r whether 'his 
clinic may be 1 icensed as a "hospital." He notes that, 
after he went to trial, he requested a certificate of 
neea~ but was informed by the Off ice of the Attorney 
General that his "office-clinic cannot be licensed as a 
hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this type of 
procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Petitioner 3a, 4a. 
Petitioner did not seek any license before his indictment p 
~ thus tfie ....f-4u::t.ual iem:te whether his partic~::~le:-r 
facility would qualify , as ~ Aos~ital is irrelevant ~to ou F-
d~ ..... ~ t,/...., L.tlfU.4r .-
Petitioner also notes that the Commonwealth does not 
that he should have procured a hospital 1 icense 
under Part III of the Rules and Re9ulations for the 
Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in V1rginia to perform 
first-trimester abortions and that, until now, the 
Commonwealth has cons ide red the Falls Church facility to 
be a physician's office beyond the reach of the hospital 
licensure regulations. The legality of petitioner's 
actions in performing other abortions at the clinic, and 
the constitutionality of Virginia's first-trimester 
abortion clinic regulations, is not before us, however. 
8. 
the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the 
Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977} 
(hereinafter Rules} defines outpatient hospital in 
pertinent part as "[i)nstitutions which primarily 
provide facilities for the performance of surgical 
procedures on outpatients" 6 and expressly includes 
"outpatient abortion clinics."7 Thus, under Virginia law, 
a second-trimester abortion may be performed in an 1: 
outpatient surgical clinic provided that clinic has been 
licensed as a hospital by the Commonwealth. 
u 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-
6section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person 
shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this 
Commonwealth any hospital ... unless such hospital ... is 
licensed as provided in this article." See also Rules 
§30.1 (similar provision specifically for outpatient 
hospitals}. 
7 "outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part 
III of the Rules, see Rules, at i, §62.1.2 of which 
provides that "[a) ny procedure performed to terminate a 
pregnancy shall be performed prior to the end of the first 
trimester (12th week amenorrhea}." Petitioner argues from 
this that outpatient hospitals that provide abortion 
services cannot provide second-trimester abortions. A 
more plausible reading, however, is that Part III sets 
minimum standards for first-trimester abortion clinics, 
with part II setting m1n1mum standards for outpatient 
surgical hospitals that may perform second-trimester 
abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several 
sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 43.7.3(c}, 
43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion 
services. Moreover, the Commonwealth's counsel at oral 
argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to 
~ Part I I leg ally COI:il-d ~r form second-trimester abort ions. 
~ fr/ A.: Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. y~ 
.. -... 
~·r S' .. w~ ~~' 1-<A-~ w..u.. 
~ (/~ ~~~.,~~ .. .,_IIIJel!!~~ 
~ ,,4 ~ -1-y~ bj La si;ai p-w-f-~~ 
~!YV ~. ~~ ''ar ~&A-~ t' ~~v}l-tV~ 
9. 
trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly 
different from those that we invalidated today in City of 1~ 
Akron and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 
u.s. In those cases, the laws at issue "require[d] 
all second-trimester abortions to be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities." Id., at We found that such 
a requirement, by preventing the performance of D&E 1~ 
abortions '~h. ·l. 1n non osp1ta sett1ngs, "imposed a heavy, and 
1\ 
~ unnecessary, burden on women's access to a 
relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe 
abortion procedure." City of Akron, u.s., at 
The Court therefore held invalid the laws there as ~ 
no~ states' interest in 
"' 
maternal health. 
_....._....--.,--,i:"' ..~~':"'-.--1!-l ~ ~w.,. ~~ 
most important factors in our analysis in ---- ---
City of Akron was the medical fact ;~"D&E abor l ions may 
be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a 
hospital." u.s. ' at 
not require 
that second-trimester abortions be performed 




Virginia's ~es, outpatient clinics may qualify for 1· 
licens~ as hospitals in which second trimester abortions 
~
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our aetermiRat:i-ons in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here~ aRd 
B 
We do not dispute petitioner's contention that 
Virginia hospital regulations impose 
right to privacy. No doubt there are some costs encur d 
in complying with the challenged regulations and 
will be some fewer qualified facilities available 
second-trimester abortions. 8 We nonetheless conclude 
Virginia's hospital requirement for 
8Petitioner suggests that the hospitalizatio 
requirement is not reasonably related to the 
Commonwealth's health interest because it effectively 
leaves the Commonwealth's pregnant women at the mercy of 
local hospital governing boards that may prohibit the 
procedure altogether or require parental consent in the 
case of minors. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57 (finding n 
evidence that an outpatient surgical facility in Virgini 
has ever performed a second-trimester abortion). 
Petitioner points to no evidence in the record, however, 
that a qualified outpatient surgical center has been 
denied a hospital license, and without such evidence, we 
do not think his argument is relevant to the issue 
presented here--whether the state licensing regulations 




F~rst:, -w.e  ow: p.U,Qr heldiAg..s. that the State 1~ 
interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling 
at approximately the beginning of the second-trimester. 
See City of Akron, __ u.s., at __ ; Roe, 410 u.s., at 
3 1 '"ft&#k:n ~ s '-r .J·. 6 H C di"EOl'l;; ·=~~) 
16!~ Second-trimester abortion~may give rise to serious 
complications, 9 and in the later weeks of pregnancy 11 
. ~~. . . . ~~~, 
especially, certain methods ) 1\ y Increase the 
risks. 10 Although the increasingly common use and 
relative safety of the dilatation and evacuation method 
(D&E), see City of Akron, u.s., at __ , may make the 
need for particular equipment in and designs of a facility 11 
9Between 1972 and 1978, 79 women undergoing second-
trimester abortions in this country died as a result of 
the abortion procedure. See Centers for Disease Control, 
Abortion Surveillance, at 48 (1980). 
1°For example, the majority of second-trimester 
abortions after the sixteenth week of gestation are 
performed by means of intrauterine instillation of saline, 
see Grimes & Cates, The Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 
Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 30 (1980), even though the rate of 
death for abortions done by instillation procedures are 
greater than for D&E, see also ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 
37, Hypertonic Saline Amnio-Infusion 1 (1976) (mortality 
rate of 18 per 100,000 women); Cates, et al., The Risk of 
Dying from Legal Abortion in the United States, 1972-1975, 
15 Int'l J. Gynaeco1. Obstet. 172, 175 (1977). Less 
serious complications include hypertremia, fever, retained 
placenta, hemorrhage, premature rupture of the membranes, 
immediate labor, disseminated intravascular coagulation 
(DIC), cervicovaginal laceration, failed amniocentesis, 
failed labor, and sepsis. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 
37, supra, at 2-3. 
~ sf±M?:bl J'i!l& 
~·~ 
' 12. 
less compelling, they have not eliminated the need for 
~~ 
reasonable standards. D&E, despite its safety, may cause 
""' 
complications, 11 and States have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that meet d for m.-1{ s an ar s 
prevention, detection, and treatment of those 
complications. That interest is compelling throughout the 
second-trimester, and the State may, "from and after the 
end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing 
all facilities where abortions may be performed so long as 
1~ 
those standards are legitimately related to the objective 1~ 
the State seeks to accomplish." Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 
179, 194-195 (1973) (emphasis added). A 
'1{' Ac ute-care, general 
hospitalization do~ not enhance the safety of D&E 
abortions . ~~ major cause of complications--
infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the 
procedure has taken place, by which time the woman will 
have been discharged from either a hospital or a clinic. 
See Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part & aff'd in part, __ u.s. __ (1983). That fact, 
however, does not alleviate the need for standards • )0 
designed to prevent infection. Tfie otber~a~ng cause of 
death and complications in D&E abortion patients is 
a~-~ hemo'rrhage, which can be prevented, detected, and treated 
1 ~ OM during or soon after the procedure. See Cates & Grimes, 
9 ~,.j Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and .A·~~· · Evacuation: Causes 4 Preventiona Facilities, 58 Obstetrics rvv & Gynecology 401, 03 (1981) (-lso showing ane c;;Jeath ..from 
V ~· . .:;t-~.., L / 'f cCH:-di~ --c..oJd.apse £rem toM-ic reaetion to 
fVlAT....- ,y' . ) • Other potential complications 
f1' ft.P of this procedure are uterine perforation and cervical 
~ • tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to 
~~~ ~ other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical vr F~.¥1 Bulletion No. 56, at 78 (1979). 
9' ~ .ll.~'N 
~ ~ f" 9'( y~ ~ ~ ~!If 1//fo./ 






medical profession "'\ ~s notA~k an exemption 
from licensing requirements for facilities that provide 
abortion services. The standards of the American College ll 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) provide that 
"[a]mbulatory care facilities providing abortion services 
should meet the same standards of care as those 
recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the 
physician • s office and outpatient clinic or the free- 11 
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 
1982) (hereinafter Standards) . The profession olea.rly-
acknowledges the State's role in promulgating and policing 
those standards: "Free-standing or hospital-based 1~ 
ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to 
conform to requirements of state or federal legislation. 
Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, 
anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for 
hospitals." Id., at 54. The issue here is whether 
Virginia's licensing requirements ~e 
~ 
restra.iRts, further~ the state's compelling interest 
1\ 
~ ~t.f-l.rj dj ~ 
without unduly burdenin~ w~meR's • i~ht to an abortion. 
~~~~c ~·vu-~ ~, 
grouped for purposes of 
discussion into three main categories. 
~~~-------------/ 
The first grouping relates to organization, 
management, policies, procedures, and staffing. Some 
J. 
sections resemble the requirements for a ;:o~tion in 
I 
that they call for some governing authority, §§40.1, 40.3 20 
(governing body shall provide facilities, personnel, and 
resources "necessary to meet patient and program needs"), 
an administrative officer, §40.6, disclosure of ownership, 
§40.2, by-laws, §40.5, and a policy and procedures manual, 
licensed physician must supervise clinical 21 
~ 
' services and perform surgical procedures, §42.1 and a 
1-t:> 
registered nurse shait be on duty at all times while the 
facility is in use, §42.2. 
The second category of requirements outlines 
construction standards for new hospitals, and additions 
1 2The manual must describe emergency and elective 
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1; 
the anesthesia that may be used, §42.2.2; the criteria and 
procedure for admissions and discharge, §41. 2. 4; written 
informed consent, §41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping 
and infection control, §41.2.5. 
21 
' 15. 
and alterations to existing ones. 13 The Rules require the 
facility to provide a brief narrative of requirements and 
information relating to the fulfillment of the 
institution's objectives, §50.1.1, and provide that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the 
• minimum requirements have been fulfilled," §50.2.1. 
Guidance is given on parking, safety and fire codes, 
zoning, site, and location. 14 There are also construction 
requirements, which set forth standards for the public 
areas, 15 clinical areas, laboratory and radiology 
13section 50.7.1 permits conversion only of 
buildings that can be remodeled to meet the requirements 
of the State Uniform Building Code, but, when the 
licensing agency finds the special requirements of Part II 
would be impractical, it may waive the enforcement of 
those requirements, provided patient care and safety to 
life from fire is not adversely affected. 
14see Rules §50.6.1 (building must "conform to state 
and local codes, zoning and building ordinances, and the 
State Uniform Building Code requirements applicable to 
type of occupancy"): id., §50.8.1 ("The site shall meet 
local zoning regulations."): id., §50.8.4 (sanitation, 
water supply, sewage, and disposal facilities must comply 
with applicable state and local codes and ordinances): and 
id., §50.8.5 (adequate fire protection). 
15 See, e. g., Rules §52.1.2 (room may serve more 
than one function): id., §52.1.4 (lobby area must have 
space for one friend or family member per patient and must 
provide public toilets, a public telephone, a water 
fountain, and wheelchair storage): id., §52.1.6 (private 
space for counseling if program requires it): id., §52.1.7 




services, 16 and general building. 
-A.../4~~ 
- ~EJ.a-l:.ds for The most important group of our 
1 
purposes relate/ to patient care services. 'Fhe bulk - e.f 
~~ 
.e____l:>-b.~e.G~H!t"--e-:~·:-f:!1:Ht~~ the r equ i r erne n t s for v a r i o us 2 3 
1\ 
services that the facility may offer, such as 
anesthesia, 17 laboratory, 18 and pathology. 19 Some 
~ rLe> 
laundry, and the physical 
plant. See, e. g., Rules§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.12.6. There 
are also guidelines on medical records, §43.7, pre- 23 
16These services may be provided within the 
outpatient surgical hospital if the services comply with 
applicable requirements of the Department of Health's 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and 
Special Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement 
with nearby facilities. See Rules §52.3.1. 
17see, e. g., Rules §43.1.1 
directed by licensed physician); id., 
responsible for anesthesia must 
administration and recovery) . 
(service must be 
§43.1.2 {physician 
be present for 
18Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate 
routine" laboratory testing. See Rules §43.6.1. 
Outpatient surgical hospitals providing abortion services 
also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or 
hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb' s 
testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger 
and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infect ion, § 6 4 .1. 3, 
and where medically indicated, serologic testing for 
syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4. 
4 3 . 6 . 3 r eq u i r e s that a 11 t i s sue s h a 11 be 
a pathology examination, with pathology 









of §64.2.4 (must be submitted "for 
examination by a pathologist in all cases 
examination by the attending physician does 
presence of fetal parts") . See Ashcroft, 
' 17. 
t . d . . 20 opera 1ve a m1Ss1on, and post-operative 21 recovery. 
Finally, the Rules mandates some emergency services and 
t . 1 . 22 evacua 10n p ann1ng. 
~. I I I 
we "M, -!J!1i~~t~eguli!ft~ns &1'\dc r:e" 
/ 
20section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and 
physical examination before initiating any procedure. 
Sufficient time must be allowed between initial 
examination and intitiation of any procedure to permit 
review of laboratory tests. See id., §43.8.3. In an 
outpatient surgical hospital providing abortion services, 
the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. See id., §43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing 
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling 
and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth 
control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the 
means by which this counseling is performed. Under this 
requirement, it remains true that "it is for the woman, in 
conjunction with her physician, to decide what 
considerations are relevant to [her] decision." See City 
of Ashcroft, U.S., at 
21Each patient shall be observed for post-operative 
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of 
a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other 
emergency procedures. See Rules §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A 
licensed physician must be present on the premises until 
the patient is discharged on his written orders. See id., 
§§43.9.3, 43.9.4. ---
22see Rules §43.4.1 (written evacuation plan); id., 
§43.5.1 (shall maintain "adequate monitoring equipment, 
suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items necessary for 
resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other 
complications"); id., §43.5.2 (requiring a written 
agreement ensuring ambulance service to a licensed general 
hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
A written agreement shall be executed with a 
general hospital to ensure that any patient of 
the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive 
needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall 
be with a 1 icensed general hospital capable of 
providing full surgical anesthesia, clinical 
laboratory, and diagnostic radiology service on 
thirty (30) minutes notice and which has a 
physician in the hospital and available for 
emergency service at all times. 
? 1 
are reasonably related to 24 
of abortion ser 
first category of requirements need little 
discussion. 23 States have a legitimate interest in 
regulating organizations as organizations within their 
jurisdiction, and organizations primarily devoted to 24 
providing abortion services are no different. 24 Virginia 
requires little more or different than it does from other 
associations and groups holding out their services for a 
fee. 25 
~ G:,nstruction or renovation requirements can 25 
23The ACOG's standards discuss much of Virginia's 
concerns about proper management and policies under the 
appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See 
Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and 
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and 
efficient management of health care has been 
accomplished."). Like Virginia's narrative requirement, 
see supra, at __ , the ACOG's standards suggest that the 
"outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should 
assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy 
of diagnosis, appropriateness of use of laboratory and 
other services, and other outcome of care." Standards, 
supra, at 55-56. 
24The ACOG advises that each ambulatory body should 
have a "governing body" that has the final authority and 
responsibility for the appointment of the medical staff. 
Id., at 60. Cf. supra, at . It also states that 
"""TWJ ritten policies describingspecific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be 
reviewed and revised periodically." Id., at 60. 
25 See, e. g., Va. Const. art. IV, §14 (17) (power to 
create private corporations). 
[to be written] 
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discourage doctors from providing outpatient facilities, 
~ tbe¥ must be ~arefnlly sc:rutiRh:ed._ The requirements 
~ 
here, however, merely require the facility to follow some 
general design26 and provide basic equipment. 27 The 
safety standards for the most part merely refer to local 2! 
codes, 28 and many are not specific requirements, requiring 
only that the facility be adequate for the services 
26The ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices 
and clinics provide at least a patient reception room, 
consultation room, at least two examining rooms, a utility 
room, and storage. See Standards, supra, at 57-59. ~ J~ 
standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more 
detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, 
preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory 
testing, preparation of anesthesia, performance of 
surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of 
instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and 
fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and 
janitorial and utility support. See id., at 61. The ACOG 
_,A/ ~· details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and 
ff rY ~ areas. See id., at 57-58, 61. 
27The ACOG lists the equipment that a clinic's 
~ examining room should contain, including instruments for r/ vaginal and rectal examinations, obtaining cultures and 
~ smears, and diagnostic studies and operative procedures. 
See id., at 57. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic 
' ~r doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation 
~ :quipment, inlcuding postive pressure oxygen, intravenous 
Yv 
equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. See 
ibid. Ambulatory surgical centers should, in addition to 
oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for 
mergency lighting and intercommunications. See id., at 
~ -
28see n. 14, supra. The ACOG provides that both 
.J.AJ 7/1, clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet all state u and local building, safety, and fire codes. See 
[D Standards, supra, at 58, 61. Specific plans should be 
fJr developed to evacuate patients in case of an emergency. 
~ _J) \ See id. , at 59, 6 2. Procedures should also be made for q r (Y .;.;7 ~~~rgency transfers to a nearby hospital. See id. at 58, 
Y1pf; , ~ ~ ~ I 
JV' I . v>~~~~ / . 
~~~ 
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offered. Cf. Standards, at 51 ("Procedures should be 
limited to those that can be performed safely with 
available medications and equipment and for which the 26 
participating personnel are trained."). The medical 
profession seeks no immunity from local building laws, and 
Our ~~oncern is with the patient services 
requirement, for they most clearly 
relate to health, yet may be unreasonable when considered 
as conditions for · abortion procedures. The sani tation29 
and recordkeeping standards30 are typical and not 
unreasonable in detail. The laboratory services ~ 
29 rnfection can be a serious complication with any 
abortion procedure. See nn. 10 & 11, supra. Significant 
portions of the Virginia Regulations are designed to 
assure that outpatient surgical hospitals practice 
stringent infection control, including sterile processing, 
appropriate waste disposal and laundry practices, 
isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the 
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Reg. §§41.2.5, 
43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. The ACOG recommends that all 
facilities develop procedures for controlling and 
disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and 
contaminated waste supplies. See Standards, supra, at 58, 
62. 
30The Virginia record keeping requirements are v.ery { 
similar to those detailed by the ACOG, see Standards, 
supra, at 54-55, 59-60, and we have found such 
requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a 
legally insignifkant burden on the Roe right. See Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 
81 (1976). 
26 
-- - -..__ _______ - -
~~-~t!Yf~~ ~~ ,Lo -~14u. 
9ilO£ed ..J:.o the- pH>visio~ -Qf medical services., 31 a-RoEl ~ 2~ 
post-operative recovery standards follows~ical 
1\ 
practice. 32 The equipment requirements for emergency 
services are minima1 33 and are further prefaced with the 
word "adequate."34 
We are impressed by the means Virginia has ~ 2~ 
hs> ~~ ~ pHu..r ~ ~ UL/J:z;J!~)-. 
its requirements to en~ s that it seeks to meet. This is 
31The risks of hemorrhage, are reduced by requiring 
an outpatient surgical hospital to make hemoglobin or 
hematocrit determinations before initiating instillation. 
See Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data should 
include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis .•.. "}. 
32Anesthesia complications are allevieated by 
requiring a physician to be present for monitoring 
functions during the administration of anesthetics and in 
the recovery period. See Standards, supra, at 53. Less 
serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ibid. ("During the recovery period, 
the patient should be under continuous observation by a 
qualified member of the health care team."}. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection 
of these problems. See Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five 
Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. 
& Gynecol. 593 (1973}: Standards, supra, at 53: App. 37 
(defense witness concedes waiting period necessary}. 
33The arrangements for emergency transfer to an 
acute-care, general hospital are clearly reasonable. See 
Cates & Grimes, supra n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital 
facilities providing D&E, "arrangements for emergency care 
should be established with hospitals near the nonhospital 
facility~' 
- ~.~t1::'~ t:l1e fa~at 
~A A.J/.L~~petU..in;~ --w.e~~perating room contains 
f.V}Vr-"'--; ~ practically 4a~l of · d d m the 
emergency se v1c~ equipment required by the Commonwealth. 
--------- The record indicates that it has excellent lighting, wall 
outlets for oxygen, suction apparatus, resuscitation 
equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine, IV fluids, 
complete anesthesia equipment, and drugs , to be used in 
emergencies. See App. 21-22, 375-376. ~~
~~~  
 l J 
~ ~~~~ .. ~
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s 
especially so given that, in the regulation of abortion 
~' a particular 
--1\ 
"is not unconstitutional 
simply because it does not perfectly correspond to the 
asserted State interest." City of Akron, u.s., at 
We find the correspondence here reasonable to pass 
constitutional muster. 35 
We believe that the hospitalization requirement 
contained in §18.2-73 is nothing more than statutory 
2~ 
recognition of the medical fact that second-trimester 2f 
abortions may require certain technological support not 
necessary in the relatively safer first-trimester 
abortions. 36 The statute does not require that the 
35we indicated in City of Akron that the ACOG 
recommends that abortions performed in a physician's 
office or outpatient clinic be limited to fourteen-weeks 
gestation, but it indicates that abortions may be 
performed safely in a hospital-based or in a free-standing 
ambulatory facility until eighteen weeks gestations. See 
City of Akron, __ u.s. __ (citing Standards, supra, at 
52}. Virginia's Rules easily correspond to the ACOG 
requirements for a free-standing clinic and thus are 
reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in 
maternal health and safety for the period after fourteen 
weeks. But we are also impressed by the fact that, even 
though the Rules apply to two weeks in which abortions 
could be performed safely in a doctor's office or a 
clinic, they do not impose requirements that significantly 
deviate from those that ACOG would require of a well-
equipped office or clinic performing thirteenth and 
fourteenth week abortions. See nn. 23-30. We think that 
Virginia has done well to tailor its requirements to 
promote the ends that it seeks. 
36Petitioner argues that Part III of the Rules, 
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the 
abortion be performed in a full-scale general hospital. 2~ 
The Virginia hospitalization requirement, in conjunction 
with the Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Out-
Patient Hospitals in Virginia, accommodates medical 
advances and leaves the type and timing of the abortion 
precisely where it belongs--between the physician and his 2~ 
patient. Petitioner's failure to avail himself of the 
hospital licensure provisions does not make the 
Commonwealth's minimal hospitalization requirement 
unconstitutional.37 
same services and equipment as Part II. In fact, part 
Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Rules §63.l.l{b}, §63.3, 
§§64.2.5{a}-{m}. Petitioner argues that, given these 
extensive regulations for first-trimester abortion 
hospitals, the only way to require more technological 
support for second-trimester abortions would be to 
restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only 
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester 
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably 
related to the state's compelling interest in maternal 
health and safety. 
37Petitioner argues that, even if he could have} 
obtained an outpatient hospital license to provide second-
trimester abortions at his Falls Church office, he woul~ ~/ 
also be required to obtain a certificate of public need. / / 
See Va. Code §32.1-102.1. He contends that this arduous 
process consumes several months and requires that a public 
hearing be held. See id., §32.1-102.6.A. It is not at 
all clear that an outpatient surgical center would need a 
certificate. See id., §32.1-102.1.6{a} ~ §32.2-102.2.~ see 
Rules §§30.5. In any case, the statute itself does not 
indicate the process is particularly difficult, and in the 
absence of any record evidence, we are unwilling to assume 
that this licensing procedure will actually burden women s 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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III 3( 
Roe clearly permits States to impose some reasonable 
health requirements on second-trimester abortions to 
insure protection of a woman's physical health. Although 
there has been impressive advancements in medical science 
since 1973, eliminating in some circumstances the need for 3( 
caution that the medical community was then expressing, 
the same medical community does not advise that any or all 
second-trimester procedures are so safe that this Court 
should eradicate all health regulations guiding their 
effectuation. We ~~ at Virginia's requirement that 
A 
such abortions must be performed in properly equipped 
outpatient clines is reasonably related to the 
Commonwealth's compelling interest in maternal health and 
safety. 
IV 3) 
We hold that Virginia's second-trimester 
/ 
hospitalization requirement is constitutional. The 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia therefore is 
right to decide to have an abortion. 
' 25 0 
Affirmed. 
SUPR~f1f-E6VEq .. 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. 8·1-185PL'r i IC i:fU\r· , ~fl 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the ~qurt. 
. r, /. , I,.... 
c, .• · . '·') p ' ' 
The principal issue here is whether Virginia's mandatory 
hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is 
constitutional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. His practice in 
November, 1979 consisted of office practice in Woodbridge, Virginia, 
hospital practice at four local hospitals or surgery centers, and 
practice at his clinic in .Falls Church. The .Falls Church clinic has 
an operating room, operating-room lighting, and facilities for 
resuscitation and emergency treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. 
Replacement and stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant 
customarily performs first-trimester abortions at his clinic. 
During the time relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, 
nor had appellant sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a seventeen-year old, high school student when she 
went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmarried, 
and told appellant that she was approximately twenty-two weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her parents to 
know. Examination by appellant confirmed that P.M. was five months 
pregnant, well into the second trimester. Appellant testified that 
he encouraged her to confide with her parents and discussed with her 
the alternative of continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return 
home, but never advised her parents of her decision. 
, .. ~l;, ....... 
' 
2. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the fetus 
in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. Appellant 
gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a "Post-Injection 
Information" sheet that stated that she had undergone "a surgical 
procedure" and warned of a "wide range of normal reactions." App. 
199. The sheet also advised that she call the doctor if "heavy" 
bleeding began. Although P.M. does not recall being advised to go 
to a hospital when labor began, this was listed in the instruction 
sheet. Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline injection. She 
left the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket the motel. Her boy friend took her home. Police found 
the fetus later that day and began an investigation. 1 
Appellant was indicted2 for unlawfully performing an abortion 
1Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an 
abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and subject to 
mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.2-71, 54-316(3}, 54-
317(1}, 54.321.2 (1982}. The felony is punishable by a sentence 
of two to ten years in prison. Va. Code §18.2-lO(d}. 
2The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code §18.2-71, 
which provides: 
',. 
"Except as provided in other sections of this 
article, if any person administer to, or cause to be 
taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to 
produce abortion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy 
such child, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, he 
shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a licensed 
hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County 
sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed 
appellant's case and unanimously affirmed his conviction. 
Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981). 
This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction, ___ u.s. ___ , 
and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization 
requirements. 3 He contends that they sharply restrict the 
In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets forth 
exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal liability (i) if 
the abortion is performed within the first trimester, §18.2-72: 
(ii) if the abortion is performed in a licensed hospital in the 
second trimester, §18.2-73: (iii) if necessary to save the 
woman's life, §18.2-74.1: and (iv) during the third trimester 
under certain circumstances, §18.2-74.1. The indictment here 
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any 
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any first-
trimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not, 
however, rebut the other defenses. 
3Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's 
outpatient surgical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. 
Appellant also raises two issues on his appeal that do not 
require extended treatment. He first contends that Va. Code 
§18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of 
medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the 
indictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, nor mentioned by 
the trier of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders 
the indictment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State 
failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity in the 
indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62 
(1971): and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of 
persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977). 
The authoritative construction of §18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with regard to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not 
obligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reasonable 
doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a defense. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
availability of abortions after the first trimester by granting a 
monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-
4 0 
trimester abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him and 
the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, 
do not "measurably contribut[e] to the ..• purposes which the State 
advances as justification for the restriction." Carey v. Population 
Services International, 431 u.s. 678, 702 (1977) (WHITE, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding principles, 
for we have set them out at length today in City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. ___ . In Roe v. Wade, 
410 u.s. 113 (1973), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty was "broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," id., at 153. 
We rejected, however, the notion that a woman has an absolute right 
to an abortion. We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today 
See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance 
on Vuitch thus is misplaced. The Virginia statute, as construed 
by the state court, does not require that the State allege lack 
of medical necessity; the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, 
as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make th1s 
allegation. See 402 u.s., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the 
burden of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense 
is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, ___ U.S. ___ , 
and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-703, nn. 
28, 30,31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove 
that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of 
the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized above, this 
contention is frivolous. See 221 Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S.E.2d, 
at 200-201. 
5. 
that, "because a State has a legitimate concern with the health of 
women who undergo abortions, 'a State may properly assert important 
interests in safeguarding health [and] in maintaining medical 
standards.'" City of Akron, ante, at 10 (quoting Roe, 410 u.s., at 
154). This "important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother" becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end of the 
first trimester," Roe, 410 U.S., at 163, and is compelling 
throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. 
The State's interest in the health of the pregnant woman 
includes an interest in the safety of facilities that perform 
abortions. As the Court stated in Roe: 
"The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that 
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed 
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the 
patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the 
performing physician and his staff, to the facilities 
involved, to the availability of after-care, and to 
adequate provision for any complication or emergency that 
might arise." 410 u.s., at 150. 
To protect this compelling interest, the State may, "from and after 
the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all 
facilities where abortions may be performed so long as those 
standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks 
to accomplish." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-195 (1973) 
(emphasis added). Specifically, the State may regulate "as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether 
it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of 
less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and 
the like." Roe, 410 U.S., at 163. 
A 
6 . 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a general 
proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under Virginia 
law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, permit a physician licensed 
in the practice of medicine and surgery to perform an abortion 
during the second trimester of pregnancy unless "such procedure is 
performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." 
Va. Code §18.2-73 {1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not contain the definition of the term "hospital." This definition 
is found in Va. Code §32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to 
include "outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the 
Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia {1977) {"regulations") 5 defines 
4A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the 
hospital licensing statutes and regulations unless the office is 
used principally for performing surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124{5). 
Surgery is not defined. Appellant contends that whether his 
facility principally performs surgery is a question of fact that 
has not been resolved and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that, after he 
performed the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate of 
need, see also id., §32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office 
of the Attorney General that his "clinic-office cannot be 
licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this 
type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did 
not seek any license before he performed the abortion at issue 
here. Thus, without record evidence whether appellant's facility 
qualifies as a surgical outpatient clinic and that he was denied 
a hospital license, whether the Falls Chur~facility would 
qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our determination in 
this case. Seen. 7, infra {noting State's interpretation of the 
Virginia regulations). 
5The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. 
Acts, c. 15, §1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions •.• which 
primarily provide facilities for the performance of surgical 
procedures on outpatients"6 and provides that second-trimester 
abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7 Thus, under Virginia 
law, a second-trimester abortion may be performed in an outpatient 
surgical clinicS provided that clinic has been licensed as a 
"hospital" by the State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester 
not relevant to our determination here, we note that new but 
similar regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when 
appellant performed the abortion for which he has been 
prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for 
the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). 
6section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall 
establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any 
hospital ... unless such hospital •.. is licensed as provided in 
this article." See also Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30 .1 
(similar provision specifically governing outpatient surgical 
clinics). 
7Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for 
outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester 
abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by several sections 
in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 
43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. Moreover, the 
State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester 
abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
"Outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically to those 
facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the 
regulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. "These 
facilities limit the operative procedures to termination of 
pregnancy during the first trimester." Ibid. See id. , § 6 2 .1. 2 
("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
8we herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in 
Virginia that legally may perform second-trimester abortions as 
"outpatient surgical clinics." 
"r, . 
8. 
hospitalization requirement is significantly ·different from those at 
issue in City of Akron, ante, p. 13, and Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, p. 
In those cases, the regulations required "all second-trimester 
abortions [to] be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at We found that such a requirement, by 
preventing the use of the dilatation and evacuation method (D&E) of 
performing abortions in appropriate nonhospital settings, "imposed a 
heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively 
inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court held these laws invalid 
because they did not reasonably further the States' interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early weeks of 
the second trimester[,) D&E abortions may be performed as safely in 
an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital." Ante, at 19. 
In contrast, the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require 
that second-trimester abortions be performed exclusively in acute-
care, general hospitals. Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient 
surgical clinics may qualify for licensing as hospitals in which 
second trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious 
complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages. 
9 • 
risks. 10 Although the increasingly common use and relative safety 
of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at , may make the need 
for particular equipment in and designs of a facility less 
compelling, the need for reasonable regulations has not been 
eliminated. D&E, despite its relative safety early in the second 
trimester, still may cause complications. 11 
9Between 1972 and 1978, at least 67 women undergoing 
second-trimester abortions in this country died as a result of 
the abortion procedure. See Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: 
Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). See also Cadesky, Ravinsky & 
Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred Method of 
Midtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 331 
(1981) (6.9% complication rate for second-trimester D&E 
abortions; 55% complication rate for second-trimester 
prostaglandin instillation) • 
1°For example, the majority of second-trimester abortions 
after the sixteenth week of gestation are performed by means of 
intrauterine instillation of saline, see Grimes & Cates, The 
Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 3-0--
(1980), even though there is on the whole a greater death rate 
for instillation abortions than there is for D&E. See also 
Cates, et al., The Risk of Dying from Legal Abortion in the 
United States, 1972-1975, 15 Int'l J. Gynaecol. Obstet. 172, 175 
(1977). For identification of less serious complications, see 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 
Technical Bulletin No. 37, Hypertonic Saline Amnia-Infusion 1, 2-
3 (1976) (now replaced by ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods 
of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979)). 
11A leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients is hemorrhage, see Cates & Grimes, Deaths from 
Second Trimester Abortion by Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes, 
Prevention, Facilities, 58 Obstetrics & Gynecology 401, 401-402 
(1981), that can be prevented, detected, and treated during or 
soon after the procedure. Other potential complications of this 
procedure are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are 
significantly increased in comparison to other second-trimester 
procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, supra n. 10, at 
78. 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques--
infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the 
procedure has taken place, by which time the woman usually will 
have been discharged from any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), although 
recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and evacuation 
procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second 
trimester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the provision 
of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that 
meet the state standards required for certification." APHA, The 
Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). 
Those standards need not be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion 
services should meet the same standards of care as those recommended 
for other surgical procedures performed in the physician's office 
and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based 
ambulatory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 
54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards). See also id., at 52 
("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities 
should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal 
legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for 
outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities 
should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel 
standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid. 
Although the State's interest in licensing medical facilities 
687, 690 n. 6 (CAS 1981), rev'd in part & aff'd in part, ante, p. 
Thus the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not 
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection. 
' 11. 
is compelling, the State's discretion to regulate on this basis does 
not "permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound 
medical practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State 
requires licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of 
abortions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the State 
seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U.S., at 195." City of Akron, ante, 
at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's licensing requirements 
for outpatient surgical clinics performing second-trimester 
abortions are reasonable means of furthering the State's compelling 
interest in the woman's health. 
c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. Those regulations may be grouped for 
purposes of discussion into three main categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing--matters not particularly 
relevant. These require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet 
patient and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3~ 
see also §40.1. They also require a policy and procedures manual, 
§43.212, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed physician who 
12The manual must describe emergency and elective 
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1~ the 
anesthesia that may be used, §41.2.2~ the criteria and procedures 
for admissions and discharge, §41.2.4~ written informed consent, 
§41.2.4~ and procedures for housekeeping and infection control, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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must supervise clinical services and perform surgical procedures, 
§42.1, and a registered nurse to be on duty at all times while the 
facility is in use, §42.2. The second category of requirements 
outlines construction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but 
also provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed 
herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes of the 
minimum requirements have been fulfilled," §50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the public 
areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology services, 13 and 
general building.l4 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the 
requirements for various services that the facility may offer, such 
as anesthesia, 15 laboratory, 16 and pathology. 17 Some of the 
§41.2.5. 
l3These services may be provided within the outpatient 
surgical clinic if the services comply with applicable 
requirements of the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations 
for the Licensure of General and Special Hospitals or through a 
contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. Va. Regs. 
{Outpatient Hospitals} §52.3.1. 
14The regulations contain customary provisions with respect 
to meeting building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See 
Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals} §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 
50.8.4. 
15see, e. g., Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals} §43.1.1 
{service must be directed by licensed physician}; id., §43.1.2 
{physician responsible for anesthesia must be present for 
administration and recovery}. 
16Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine 
laboratory testing." See Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals} 
§43.6.1. Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. 
See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 
43.12.6. There are also guidelines on medical records, §43.7, pre-
operative admission, 18 and post-operative recovery. 19 Finally, the 
regulations mandate some emergency services and evacuation 
also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit 
determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb's testing where woman 
is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and albumin, culture for 
gonorrheal infection, §64.1.3, and where medically indicated, 
serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4. 
17section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be 
submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology services 
for abortion patients meeting the minimum requirements of §64.2.4 
(must be "submitted for histological examination by a pathologist 
in all cases where gross examination by the attending physician 
does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See Ashcroft, ante, 
at 
18section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and 
physical examination before initiating any procedure. Sufficient 
time to permit review of laboratory tests must be allowed between 
initial examination and initiation of any procedure. Id., 
§43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing abortion 
services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. Id., §43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing 
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and 
instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth control 
methods." (emphasis added) Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by 
which this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, it 
is, unlike in City of Akron, for the woman, in conjunction with 
her physician, to decide what considerations are relevant to her 
decision. See ante, at 27-28. 
l9Each patient shall be observed for post-operative 
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of a 
nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other emergency 
procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. 
A licensed physician must be present on the premises until the 
patient is discharged on his written orders. Id., §§43.9.3, 
43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 




Appellant does not attack expressly these regulations in his 
jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In those, he 
emphasizes that Virginia requires hospitalization for second-
trimester abortions without alluding to the fact that the statutory 
term "hospital" is defined to include outpatient surgical clinics 
that may perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not 
sought a license for his clinic, he appears to argue that the 
Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those we 
have considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations 
on various grounds. He argues that, even if he had applied for a 
license, it is uncertain whether it would have been granted: that 
Virginia courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing 
statutes and regulations": that Part II of the regulations does not 
20see Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.4.1 (written 
evacuation plan): id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, 
suction apparatus,-oxygen, and related items necessary for 
resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other 
complications"): id., §43.5.2 (ambulance service to a licensed 
general hospital)-.--Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general 
hospital to ensure that any patient of the outpatient 
surgical hospital shall receive needed emergency 
treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed 
general hospital capable of providing full surgical, 
anesthesia, clinical laboratory, and diagnostic 
radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and 
which has a physician in the hospital and available for 
emergency service at all times." 
cover an outpatient surgical facility where second trimester 
abortions are performed, but see n. 8, supra; and that medical 
evidence rebuts the view "that it is safer to perform second 
trimester abortions in hospitals." Reply Brief for Appellant 1. 
None of these contentions finds support in this Court's prior 
opinions, and the Virginia requirements are strikingly different 
15. 
from those we invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Indeed, it 
is evident that Virginia has adopted statutes and regulations 
compatible with our decisions. We are convinced that the Virginia 
provisions are reasonably related to and further the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman 
during the second trimester.21 
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of 
21No doubt there are costs incurred in complying with 
Virginia's requirements, but these are not burdens that 
necessarily invalidate the regulations. As an empirical matter, 
we have no reason to believe these costs will result in fewer 
appropriate facilities for performing second-trimester abortions. 
Ethical physicians are obligated to provide facilities consistent 
with the standards set by their profession. And appellant has 
not identified any significant differences between professional 
standards and the Virginia requirements. 
22ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns 
about proper management and policies under the appropriate 
heading of "Quality Assurance." See ACOG Standards, supra, at 55 
("Each physician's office and outpatient clinic should assess 
whether effective and efficient management of health care has 
been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's 
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of 
patient care should assess the completeness of medical records, 
the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriateness of use of laboratory 
and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG Standards, supra, 
at 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF 
Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and 
. . . ·' 
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regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance to 
policies in each area of care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus 
Curiae 29 n. 6. {supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital 
abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a 
"governing body" that has the final authority and responsibility 
for the appointment of the medical staff, ACOG Standards, supra, 
at 60; cf. Va. Regs. {Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3, and that 
"[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities of each 
member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and 
revised periodically," ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. NAF 
Standards, supra, at 12 {responsibilities of chief administrative 
officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., 
Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation 
of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 {hereinafter 
"Planned Parenthood Guidelines") {duties of administrator) . 
23This second category of Virginia regulations is 
consistent with those set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that 
even physicians' offices provide at least a patient reception 
room, consultation room, two examining rooms, a utility room, and 
storage. ACOG Standards, supra, at 56-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 1-3 {detailing extensive 
physical requirements for first-trimester abortion clinics). 
ACOG's standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more 
detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, administrative 
activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, 
physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of 
anesthesia, performance of surgical procedures, preparation and 
sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of 
drugs and fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and 
janitorial and utility support. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 
61. Cf. S. Neubardt & H. Schulman, Techniques of Abortion 110-
111 {2d ed. 1977) {similar list of facilities needed for model 
abortion care unit). 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms 
and areas. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA 
Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 652, 655 {1980) {hereinafter "APHA Guide") {any abortion 
facility should have "[a]n operating table, or conventional 
gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a room 
which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other 
environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. A doctor's examining room 
should contain instruments for vaginal examinations, supplies for 
obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment for diagnostic 
studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. When local 
anesthesia is used, the clinic or doctor's office should have 
emergency resuscitation equipment, including positive pressure 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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this case. They have not been challenged by appellant beyond his 
general condemnation of any requirement that second-trimester 
abortions--even those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy--be 
performed in hospitals, however defined and whether outpatient or 
not. In any event, as appears from the recommendations of ACOG and 
the American Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the 
margin, see nn. 22, 23 & 24, Virginia's requirements, although more 
detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and 
personnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are compatible with 
generally accepted medical standards and do not unreasonably burden 
the abortion decision. 
Our concern centers on the patient services requirements of the 
Virginia regulations and whether they further the State's interest 
in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We think they 
clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the standards used by 
oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac 
monitor. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation 
equipment, provide for emergency lighting and 
intercommunications. Id., at 61. Cf. APHA Guide, supra, at 655 
(requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial ventilation and 
resuscitation); NAF Standards, supra n. 22, at 9 (requiring all 
facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have 
resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator if general 
anesthesia is administered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, 
supra, at 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have 
parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
24ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities 
should meet all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. 
ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 61. Specific plans should be 
developed to evacuate patients in case of an emergency. Id., at 
59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards, supra n. 22, at 8, 11; Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 10. 
ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed with the scrupulousness with 
which Virginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its 
interest in protecting the pregnant woman's health. The 
sanitation25 and record-keeping standards 26 are typical and not 
25rnfection can be a serious complication with any abortion 
procedure. See nn. 11 & 12, supra. Significant portions of the 
Virginia regulations are designed to assure that outpatient 
surgical clinics take appropriate steps to control infection, 
including sterile processing, appropriate waste disposal and 
laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection 
of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. 
(Outpatient Hospitals) §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 
43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG 
recommends that all facilities develop procedures for controlling 
and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and 
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 62. 
APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655; NAF Standards~ supra n. 22, at 7 
("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit 
individual sterilization of the instruments used for each 
procedure .... ");Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 
2. 
18. 
26The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to 
those detailed by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards, 
supra, at 54-55, 59-60, which require at the initial visit a 
comprehensive data base including information on reason for 
visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current 
medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For 
ambulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the 
patient's record contain sufficient information to justify the 
preoperative diagnosis and the operative procedure, and should at 
least contain patient identification data, history and physical 
examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative 
consent, operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, 
medications record, and discharge summary and instructions. Id., 
at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On the day of surgery a 
preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval history, medical 
record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the 
record."). We have found such requirements, "if not abused or 
overdone," impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe 
right. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danrorth, 
428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think V1rginia's requirements 
are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655-656 
(recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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unreasonable in detail. The laboratory services27 support--and 
often are essential to--the direct medical services28 performed by 
the physician29 and nurse.30 The post-operative recovery 
Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 13 {record-keeping and reporting 
requirements) • 
27The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an 
outpatient surgical clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit 
determinations before initiating instillation. See ACOG 
Standards, supra, at 59 {"The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected 
patients, other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, 
and electrolytes."). See also APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 654 
{"Appropriate laboratory procedures must include determination of 
hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value of other 
laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served~ 
these may include sickle cell testing~ endocervical and anal 
culture for gonorrhea~ urinalysis~ serologic testing for 
syphilis~ and, when indicated cytologic screening for cancer.")~ 
NAF Standards, su~ra n. 22, at 7 {"Rh-immune globulin must be 
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients.")~ Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 8 {requiring lab 
facilities to be available on premises for pregnancy tests, urine 
protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin determination, and Rh 
typing) . 
28see ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 {"The appropriate 
records should be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to 
surgery.") {emphasis added). ACOG also recommends that "[t] he 
physician should strive to identify pre-existing or concurrent 
illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that may have a 
bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." Id., at 60 
{emphasis added). APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 654~ Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 8. 
29 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work 
before anesthesia is administered, and even then, it must be 
given only by or under the supervision of a doctor: "Any 
ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes general, epidural, or 
spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a 
qualified anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a 
certified nurse-anesthetist under the supervision of an 
anesthesiologist. When any form of anesthesia is used, trained 
personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
must be available." ACOG Standards, supra, at 53. Cf. APHA 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote{s) 30 will appear on following pages. 
standards31 also comport with accepted medical practice. 32 The 
Guide, supra n. 23, at 655: Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra 
n. 22, at 10. 
30The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for 
physicians' offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but 
note: "The efficient operation of an ambulatory surgical facility 
requires adequate staffing with administrative and professional 
personnel. The assignment of personnel should be based on the 
number of patients, patient profiles, type of procedures, and 
facility design." ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. id., at 56 
("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will 
vary considerably in each physician's office and outpatient 
clinic depending on the patient load, pattern of practice, and 
type of facility."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, 
at 7 (nurses): id., at 7-8 (head laboratory technician): id., at 
9 ("It is strongly recommended that three staff persons be-
present in the procedure room: the operating physician, the 
physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
31 1 See n. 9, supra. 
20. 
32complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by 
requiring a physician to be present during the recovery period. 
See ACOG Standards, supra, at 53 ("The supervising 
anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the 
ambulatory surgical facility until all surgical patients have 
been discharged. This physician should oversee the 
postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the surgeon 
responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to 
the back-up hospital."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 
22, at 11: see also APHA Guide, supra n. 23, at 655 ("[I]t will 
be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, pulse rate, 
blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal 
bleeding or injury."). Less serious complications can be 
monitored by the registered nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards, 
supra, at 53 ("During the recovery period, the patient should be 
under continuous observation by a qualified member of the health 
care team. This person should maintain a complete record of the 
patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, 
and occurrence of complications."): NAF Standards, supra n. 22, 
at 6 ("The recovery area must be supervised by a licensed nurse 
or physician who is immediately available to the recovery 
area."): Planned Parenthood Guidelines, su~ra, at 11. The 
required one-hour recovery period is inten ed to permit detection 
of these complications. See APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring 
post-operative observations "over a period of two or more hours, 
depending upon the type of anesthesia used"): Kerenyi, Mandelman 
Footnote continued on next page. 
21. 
equipment requirements for emergency services are minima1 33 and are 
further prefaced with the word "adequate."34 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State simply 
cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with the same degree 
of relevance; "a State necessarily must have some latitude in 
adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive 
area." City of Akron, ante at 16. Although a State's general 
licensing regulations must be drawn to further the State's interests 
in women's health for all reasonable periods of time within the 
second-trimester, a particular requirement "is not unconstitutional 
& Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. 
J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG Standards, supra, at 
53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable) • 
33The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, 
general hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide, supra 
n. 23, at 655; ACOG Standards, supra, at 52 ("There should be a 
written policy requiring the medical staff to provide for prompt 
emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an 
unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; Cates & Grimes, 
supra n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing 
D&E, "arrangements for emergency care should be established with 
hospitals near the nonhospital facility"); NAF Standards, supra 
n. 22, at 7; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra n. 22, at 10 
("Each facility must have a functioning arrangement for emergency 
transport to a local accredited hospital."). 
34Appellant's operating room contains practically all of 
the emergency services equipment required by the State. The 
record indicates that it has excellent lighting, wall outlets for 
oxygen, suction apparatus, resuscitation equipment, a 
defibrillator, an EKG machine, intravenous fluids, and complete 
anesthesia equipment. App. 21-22, 375-376. Although appellant 
sought a "certificate of need" from the Virginia Bureau of 
Resources Development, see n. 4, supra, he makes no contention 
that his office's facilities, personnel, or care conform fully to 
the requirements for an outpatient surgical clinic. 
22. 
simply because it does not correspond perfectly to the asserted 
state interest" every day of the trimester. Ante, at 20. 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in this 
case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-trimester 
abortions are reasonably related to and further the State's 
compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own health and 
safety." 35 Roe, 410 u.S . , at 15 0 . As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he 
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like 
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City 
of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the 
patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be 
performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements--the statutes and the regulations--accommodate 
accepted medical practice, and leave the method and timing of the 
abortion precisely where they belong--between the physician and the 
patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
35Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, 
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires the same 
services and equipment as Part II. In fact, part Part III has 
detailed regulations that do not appear in Part II. See, e. g., 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals} §§63.l.l(b}, §63.3, 64.2.5(a}-
(m}. Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require 
more technological support for second-trimester abortions would 
be to restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only 
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester 
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably related to 
the state's compelling interest. 
23. 
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clinics is 
constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
therefore is 
Affirmed. 
----- ~·"''-'l:'vu..Lvo v. VIrginia, No. 81-185 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The principal issue here is whether Virginia's 
mandatory hospitalization requirement for second-trimester 
----· 
abortions is constitutional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist 
certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. His practice in November, 1979 consisted of 
office practice in Woodbridge, Virginia, hospital practice 
at four local "hospitals or surgery centers, and practice 
at his clinic in Falls Church, known as the American 
Women's Clinic. The clinic has an operating room, 
operating-room lighting, and facilities for resuscitation 
and emergency treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. 
Replacement and stabilization 





at his clinic. During the time relevant to this case, the 
clinic was not nor had appellant 
2. 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a seventeen-year old, high school student 
when she went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. 
She was unmarried, and told appellant that she was about 
twenty-two weeks pregnant. She requested an abortion and 
did not want her parents to know. Examination by 
~~Hc.v~~ 
" appellant confirmed that P.M. was five months pregnant1 1\ 
Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confide with 
her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, 
but never advised her parents. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her 
II \\ 
boy friend. The abortion was performed by mea% e.f an 
injection of a saline solution. P.M. told appellant that 
she planned to deliver the fetus in a motel, and she 
~ 
understood that ~t agreed this was all right. 
1\ 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." The sheet also advised that 
she call the doctor if "heavy" bleeding began. Although 
3. 
P.M. does not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was specified in the instruction 
sheet. 
~ 
P.M.~ went to a motel and aborted her fetus 
1 
in 
the motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline 
injection. She left the fetus, follow-up 
instructions, and pain medication at the motel. Her 
boYjt- r iend took her home. Police found the fetus later 
that day and opened an investigation. 1 
Appellant was indicted2 for unlawfully performing an 
1Except as permitted by statute, persons performing 
an abortion are guilty of a felony under Virginia law and 
subject to mandatory license revocation. Va. Code §§18.2-
71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). See Simopoulos 
v. Virginia State Board of Medicine, 644 F.2d 321, 322-323 
(CA4 1981) • 
2The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code 
§18.2-71, which provides: 
Except as provided in other sections of 
this article, if 'Ciny person administer to, or 
cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other 
thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her 
unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or 
produce such abortion or miscarriage, he shall 
be guilty of a Class 4 felony. 
In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets 
forth exceptions to this statute: there is no criminal 
liability (i) if the abortion is performed within the 
first trimester, §18.2-72; (ii) if the abortion is 
performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§18.2-73; (iii) if necessary to save the woman's life, 
§18.2-74.1; and (iv) during the third trimester under 
certain circumstances, § 18. 2-7 4 .1. The indictment here 
alleged a violation of §18.2-71 and expressly negated any 
defenses of hospitalization under §18.2-73 and any first-
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancv outside 
of a 1 icensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The 
Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed appellant's case and, 
in a unanimous decision, affirmed his conviction. 
Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We now affirm. 
II 
11 ~~ h ...• ~.~1 Appe ant EW~eflU'b t~ V1rg1n1a s 1
.1\, 
S.L_/1<-~~~ 
requiremen~ ) sharply restricts the availability of 
abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-
trimester abort ions. 3 He also argues that the Virginia 
rimester defense under §18.2-72. The indictment did not, 
however, rebut the other defenses . 
.----ll_:__ ________ )Z ppellantf;'~ two issues on his appeal that do 
not require extended treatment. He first contends that 
Va. Code §18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, 
because lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not 
alleged in the indictment, addressed in the prosecution's 
case, nor mentioned by the trier of fact. Appellant 
contends that this failure creates two constitutional 
issues: (i) whether the State failed to meet its burden of 
alleging necessity in the indictment, as required by 
United States v. Vuitch, 402 u.s. 62 (1971) ~ and (ii) 
whether the prosecution failed to meet its burden of 
persuasion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 u.s. 
197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of §18.2-71 by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least 
with regard to the defense of medical necessity, the 
prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
$ 
requirement results in negative health consequences and, 
/' 
as applied to him and the abortions that he performs in 
his well-equipped non-licensed clinic, do~ not 
"measurably contr ibut [ e] to the purposes which the 
State advances as justification for the restriction." 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 
702 (1977) (WHITE, J., concurring in part an<l concurring 
in the result). 
We need not pause long here to consider the standard 
of review, for we have set it out at length today in City 




u.s. 113 ( 197 3) , I( the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of 
necessity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant 
invoked medical necessity as a defense. See 221 Va., at 
1069, 277 S.E.2d, at 200. Appellant's reliance on Vuitch 
thus is misplaced, because the Virginia statute, as 
construed by the state court, does not require that the 
State allege lack of medical necessity; the District of 
Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, 
did require the prosecution to so allege. See 403 u.s., 
at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of going 
forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is 
normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 
1567-1568 & n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 u.s. 
684, 701-703 nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed 
to prove that his acts in fact caused the demise of the 
fetus. In view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, 
summarized above, this contention is frivolous. See 221 
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S.E.2d, at 200-201. 
6 0 
~ 
personal liberty "broad enough to encompass a woman's 
'\ 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," id., 
;~J 
at 153~ We rejected the notion that a woman has an 
t1 
absolute right to an abortion without any interference 
from the State. We consistently have recogni~ and ~ 
reaffirm tod~ tha '). "since a State has a legitimate 
concern with the health of women who undergo abortions, 'a 
State may properly assert important interests in 
safeguarding health [and] in maintaining medical 
standards. '" City of Akron, U.S., at __ (quoting 
Roe, 410 u.s., at 154). As 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical 
procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient. This 
interest obviously extends at least to the 
performing physician and his staff, to the 
facilities involved, to the availability of 
after-care, and to adequate provision for any 
complication or emergency that might arise. 
410 u.s., at 150. The issue here is whether the Virginia 
1\ 
hospitalization requirement is reasonably related to 
promotion of the Commonwealth's compelling interest 
maternal health and safety. 4 





Before examining the medical bas is for Virginia's 
hospitalization requirement, it is helpful to understand 
the nature of that requirement. As a general proposition, 
physicians' offices are not regulated under Virginia law. 5 1 
Virginia law does not, however, permit a physician 
licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a 
hospital licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. 1 
Code §18.2-73 {1982}. The Virginia abortion statute 
4Appellant also argues that the State has no 
compelling interest in imposing criminal penalties on the 
performance of safe nonhospi tal abortions in the second 
trimester and that criminal penalties to enforce total:~ 
hospitalization is not a narrowly drawn requirement. 
Similar arguments in prior cases have not been persuasive. 
SA physician's off ice is explicitly excluded from 
the hospital licensing statutes and regulation~ss / 
the off ice is used principally for performing - surgery:-,' 
See Va. Code §32.1-124{5}. Surgery is not defined. 
Appellant contends that whether his facility principally 
performs surgery is a question of fact that has not been 
resolved and that it is uncertain whether his clinic may 
be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that, after he 
performed the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate 
of need, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney 
General that his "office-clinic cannot be licensed as a 
hospital" and that "if you wish to perform this type of 
procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant 
did not seek any license before he performed the abortion 
at issue here. Thus, whether his facility would qualify 
under Virginia law is irrelevant to our determination. 
8 0 
itself does not contain the definition of the term 
[..Nl- 1-k}-
"hospital." This is found §32.1-123.1, 
" 
w.R-i-erh defines 
"hospital" to include "outpatient ... hospitals." Section 
20.2.11 of the Department of Health's Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in 
(~~~'') 
(h~s) defines outpatient Virginia (1977) 
hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions •.. which 
primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and expressly 
includes "outpatient abortion clinics."7 Thus, under 
Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may be performed 
6section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person 
shall establish, conduct, maintain, or operate in this 
Commonwealth any hospital ... unless such hospital •.. is 
1 icensed as provided in this article." See also Rules 
§30.1 (similar provision specifically for outpatient 
surgical clinics). 
7 "0utpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part 
III of the Rules, see Rules, at i, §62.1.2 of which 
provides that "[a] ny procedure performed to terminate a 
pregnancy shall be performed prior to the end of the first 
trimester (12th week amenorrhea)." Appellant argues from 
this that outpatient surgical clinics that provide 
abortion services cannot A previae second-trimester 
abortions. A more plausible reading, however, is that 
Part III sets m1n1mum standards for first-trimester 
abortion clinics, with part II setting minimum standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics that may perform second-
trimester abortions. This interpretation is confirmed by 
several sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to 
abortion services. Moreover, the Commonwealth's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed 
pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester 




in an outpatient surgical clinic8 provided that clinic has 
been licensed as a "hospital" by the Commonwealth. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second- 1 
trimester hospitalization requirement is significantly 
different from those that we invalidated today in City of 
Akron and Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, ~~ 
0~ ~k~f- . .1 -- u.s. In those cases, the laws at issue "require[d] 
~vr·. ~ all second-trimester abortions to be performed in general, 
~~ acute-care facilities." Id., at We found that such . 
~~ kU UJL UA-4- ot--~/--6-~~ ~~14d_. 
~Y.: a requirement, by preventing 1\ tl>& pe~:~e <1f { D&E) 
·~ Ja~propriate nonhospital settings, "im::ed a 
S ~ ~ / heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women • s access to a 
. J/~·~ relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe 
y..r- & . 
D-~ 
abortion procedure." City of Akron, u.s. , at 
The Court therefore held invalid the laws there as not 




One of the most important factors in our analysis in 1 
8we herein usually refer to the outpatient 
"hospitals" in Virginia that legally may perform second-
trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical clinics." 
10. 
City of Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during 
the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions 
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a 
full-service hospital." u.s., at In contrast, 
the Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that 1 
second-trimester abortions be performed exclusively in 
acute-care, general hospitals. Under Virginia's 
regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 1 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
a.-~~~1 
Our desi~n~ ~¥9 9Stablisnea tn-t the State's 
1\ 
interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling 
at approximately the beginning of the second-trimester. 1 
See City of Akron, u.s., at ___ ; Roe, 410 u.s., at 
163. Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious 
complications, 9 and certain procedures significantly 
9Between 1972 and 1978, 79 women undergoing second-
trimester abortions in this country died as a result of 
the abortion procedure. See Centers for Disease Control, 





~ t j~ 
lj 1 JJ 
11. 
increase the risks. 10 Although the increasingly common 
~~E 
use and relative safety of the -6 :H:atation-and evae ua e-ion 1 
A 
method ~, see City of Akron, u.s., at ___ , may 
make the need for particular equipment in and designs of a 
'~ u.,~t: 41•, JI,..,.,J:  
facility less compelling, they l:lav~)\ not eliminated the 
')1-L~~ 
need for reasonablef~ standards. D&E, despite its 
~~ ~~~z~~.) 
compa~e safet~, may cause complications . 11 ~ States 
1°For example, the majority of 
abortions after the 
Technical Bulletin No. 37, supra, at 2-3. 
J1A...-.:f 
11A leading cause of death a r\d ~omplications in D&E 
abortion patients is hemorrhage, ~h can be prevented, 
detected, and treated during or soon after the procedure. 
See Cates & Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion 
b Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes Prevention 
ac1 1t1es, stetr1cs & yneco ogy , 
Other potential complications of this procedure are 
uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are 
significantly increased in comparison to other second-
trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bullet ion No. 
56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion, at 78 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion 
techniques--infection--does not arise until 24 to 72 hours 
after the procedure has taken place, by which time the 
woman will have been discharged from any facility, see 
Ashcro t, 664 F.2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in part 
& aff' in part, u.s. (1983) 6 "thus the safety of v 
the &E procedure- does not alleviat e the/ need for 






interest in ensuring that facilities 
used for second-trimester abortions meet appropriate 
standards for prevention, detection, and treatment of 
those complications. That interest is compelling 
throughout the second-trimester, and the State may, 11 from 1 
and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards 
for licensing all facilities where abortions may be 
performed so long as those standards 
[~] 
are legitimately 
related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish ... 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179, 194-195 (1973) (emphasis 1 
added). Specifically, the State may regulate 11 as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that 
is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the 
licensing of the facility; and the like ... Roe, 410 U.S., 1 
at 163. 
The medical profession has not sought an exemption 
from 1 icens ing requirements for facilities that provide 
abortion services. The standards of the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) provide that 1 
11 [a]mbulatory care facilities providing abortion services 
13. 
should meet the same standards of care as those 
recommended for other surgical procedures performed in the 
physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." ACOG, 1 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 
1982) (hereinafter Standards). The profession clearly 
acknowledges the State's role in promulgating and policing 
those standards: "Free-standing or hospital-based 
c 
ambulatory surgical facilities should be licensed to 2 
conform to requirements of state or federal legislation. 
Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, 
anesthetic, and personnel standards as recommended for 
hospitals." Id., at 54. The issue here is whether 
Virginia's licensing requirements reasonably further the 2 
1./v&-~~Uu . 
$ tate's compelling interest w..itaout U+lGYl.y eurEieRiRog the -
r ~ht of .a ,JWliia.D to an abort-4.oR. 
c 
applicable to outpatient surgical 




exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all 
outpatient surgical clinics in Virginia. Those 
14. 
regulations may be grouped for purposes of discussion into 
three main categories. 
The first grouping relates . t. 12 to organ1za 1on, 
management, policies, procedures, and staffing--matters 
not presently relevant. These do require personnel and 
facilities "necessary to meet patient and program needs." 
Rules §§40.1, 40.3. They also require a policy and 
2 
procedures manual, § 4 3. 213 , an admini str at ive officer, 2 
§40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical 
services and perform surgical procedures, § 4 2 .1, and a 
registered nurse to be on duty at all times while the 
facility is in use, §42.2. The second category of 
requirements outlines construction standards for 
outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the 
owners ~ eeeiae . 
corporation, 
See Rules 
13The manual must describe emergency and elective 
procedures that may be performed at the facility, §41.2.1; 
the anesthesia that may be used, §42.2.2; the criteria and 
procedures for admissions and discharge, §41.2.4; written 
informed consent, §41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping 
and infection control, §41.2.5. 
2 
15. 
minimum requirements have been fulfilled," §50.2.1. There 
are also construction requirements that set forth 2 
standards for the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory 
and radiology services, 14 and general building. 15 
The most important group of regulations for our 
purposes relates to patient care services. Most of these 
set the requirements for various services that the 2 
facility may offer, such as anesthesia, 16 laboratory, 17 
and pathology. 18 Some of the requirements relate to 
14These services may be provided 
outpatient surgical clinic if the services 
applicable requirements of the Department 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Special Hospitals or through a contractual 






15The regulations ~ contain customary provisions 
with respect to meeting building codes, zoning ordinances, 
and the like. See Rules §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
16see, e. g., Rules §43.1.1 
directed by licensed physician)~ id., 
res~onsible for anesthesia must 
administration and recovery). 
{service must be 
§43.1.2 (physician 
be present for 
17Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate 
routine" laboratory testing. See Rules §43.6.1. 
Outpatient surgical clinics providing abortion services 
also must conduct pregnancy testing, hemoglobin or 
hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, Coomb' s 
testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger 
and albumin, culture for gonorrheal infect ion, § 6 4 .1. 3, 
and where medically indicated, serologic testing for 
syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, §64.1.4. 
18section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be 
submitted for a pathology examination, with pathology 
services for abortion patients meeting the m1n1mum 
requirements of §64.2.4 {must be submitted "for 
histological examination by a pathologist in all cases 
where gross examination by the attending physician does 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. See, e. g., 
Rules §§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines 
d . 1 d 4 3 7 t. d . . 19 d on me 1ca recor s, § • , pre-opera 1ve a m1ss1on, an 
post-operative recovery. 20 Finally, the Rules mandates 
. d . 1 . 21 some emergency serv1ces an evacuat1on p ann1ng. 
not confirm presence of fetal parts") • See Ashcroft, 
u.s., at • 
19section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and 
physical examination before initiating any procedure. 
Sufficient time must be allowed between initial 
examination and initiation of any procedure to permit 
review of laboratory tests. See id., §43.8.3. In an 
outpatient surgical clinic providi~abortion services, 
the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performin9 physician. See id., §43.8.4. 
Sect1on 43.8.5 provideS:that the facility performing 
abortions "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling 
and instruction in the abortion procedure and in birth 
control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the 
means by which this counseling is performed. Under this 
requirement, it remains true that "it is for the woman, in 
conjunction with her physician, to decide what 
considerations are relevant to [her] decision." See City 
of Ashcroft, U.S., at 
20Each patient shall be observed for post-operative 
complications for one hour under the direct supervision of 
a nurse trained in resuscitation techniques and other 
emergency procedures. See Rules §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A 
licensed physician must be present on the premises until 
the patient is discharged on his written orders. See id., 
§§43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
21see Rules §43.4.1 (written evacuation plan): id., 
§4 3. 5 .1 (shall maintain "adequate monitoring equipment, 
suction apparatus, oxygen, and related items necessary for 
resuscitation and control of hemorrhage and other 
complications"): id., §43.5.2 (requiring a written 
agreement ensuring ambulance service to a licensed general 
hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
A written agreement shall be executed with a 
general hospital to ensure that any patient of 
the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive 
needed emergency treatment. The agreement shall 
be with a licensed general hospital capable of 
providing full surgical anesthesia, clinical 




Appellant does not attack these regulations as such 
either in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal 2 
brief. In those, he emphasizes that Virginia requires 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions without 
alluding to the fact that the statutory term "hospital" is 
defined to include outpatient surgical clinics that may 
perform second-trimester abortions. As appellant had not 2 
sought a license for his clinic, ~er'Aa~ he ,~ 
I\ 
1-,r; ~dry~ h v· · · · · · th A neg.ess-a:ry- roa =to eqtiate t e 1rg 1n1a prmn s1ons -w,_ 
~~-1-c~ 
(:, the hospitalization requirements A we have cons ide red in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia 2 
regulations on various grounds. He argues that, even if 
he had applied for a license, it is uncertain whether it 
would have been granted; that Virginia courts have had no 
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
~7~ 
regulations"; that Part I I of the Rules do not cover an 2 
laboratory, and diagnostic radiology service on 
thirty (30) minutes notice and which has a 
physician in the hospital and available for 
emergency service at all times. 
18. 
outpatient surgical facility where second trimester 
abortions are performed, but see n. 7, supra; and that 
medical evidence rebuts the view that it is "safer to 
perform trimester abortions in hospitals." Reply Brief 
for Appellant 9-13. None of these contentions finds 2 
support in this Court's prior opinions, and the Virginia 
requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Indeed, it is 
evident that Virginia has made a thoughtful effort to 
adopt statutes and regulations compatible with our 2 
decisions. We are convinced that the Virginia provisions 
are reasonably related to and further the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the health of the 
pregnant woman during the second trimester, and that they 
~




trimester abortions than without the regulations . . Bec eeP s 
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the 
standards set by their nrofession. ~~~ee~~~~~~~UQ€ 





The requirements of the first 23 and second 
categories24 of regulations discussed in Part II-C above 
23The ACOG' s standards discuss much of Virginia's 
concerns about proper management and policies under the 
appropriate heading of "Quality Assurance." See 
Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and 
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and 
efficient management of health care has been 
accomplished."). Like Virginia's narrative requirement, 
see Rules §§50.1.1, 50.2.1, the ACOG's standards suggest 
that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care 
should assess the completeness of medical records, the 
accuracy of diagnosis, appropriateness of use of 
laboratory and other services, and other outcome of care." 
Standards, supra, at 55-56. See National Abortion 
Federation, Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF 
Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures 
and policies in each area of care). 
The ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body 
should have a "governing body" that has the final 
authority and responsibility for the appointment of the 
medical staff, id., at 60; cf. Rules §40.3, and that 
"[w] ritten polic""I'eS describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be 
reviewed and revised periodically." Id., at 60. Cf. NAF 
Standards, supra, at 12 (detailing responsibilities of 
chief administrative officer). 
24The ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices 
provide at least a patient reception room, consultation 
room, two examining rooms, a utility room, and storage. 
See Standards, supra, at 57-59. Its standards for an 
ambulatory surgical facility are more detailed, providing 
space for reception, waiting, administrative activities, 
patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evaluation, 
physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of 
anesthesia, performance of surgical procedures, 
preparation and sterilization of instruments, storage of 
equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility 
support. See id., at 61. 
The ACOGdetails the equipment to be found in the 
various rooms and areas. See id., at 57-58, 61. A 
doctor's examining room should contain instruments for 
vaginal and rectal examinations, obtaining cultures and 
smears, and diagnostic studies and operative procedures. 
See id., at 57. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic 
or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation 
equipment, including positive pressure oxygen, intravenous 
equipment and fluids, suction, and a cardiac monitor. See 
ibid. Ambulatory surgical centers should, in addition to 
oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equipment, provide for 
emergency lighting and intercommunications. See id., at 
61. Cf. NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 9 (requiring all 
facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have 
Footnote continued on next page. 
20. 
have little relevancy in this case. They have not been 
challenged by appellant beyond his general condemnation of 
any requirement that second-trimester abortions--even 2 
those during the twenty-second week of pregnancy--be 
performed in hospitals, however defined and whether 
outpatient or not. In any event, as appears from the 
recommendations of the ACOG and National Abortion 
Federation (NAF} 25 set forth in the margin below, see nn. 2 
23, 24 & 26, Virginia's requirements with respect to the 
facilities, 26 equipment, and personnel are compatible with 
generally accepted medical standards, and further the 
State's legitimate interest. 
Appellant's argument centers essentially on the 2 
patient services requirements of the Virginia regulations. 
resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator if general 
anesthesia is administered}. 
25see n.23, supra. See Brief of the American Public 
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81-
185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the NAF Standards for 
nonhospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum 
standards"}. 
26The ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory 
facilities should meet all state and local building, 
safety, and fire codes. See Standards, supra, at 58, 61. 
Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in 
case of an emergency. See id., at 59, 62. See also NAF 
Standards, supra n. 23, at 8~1. 
21. 
He contends that they do not further the State's interest 
~ 
in the helth of the pregnant woman. We think they clearly 
'\. 
do. The sani tation27 and record-keeping standards 28 are 
typical and not unreasonable in detail. The laboratory 2 
services support--and often are essential to--the direct 
medical services performed by the physician and nurse. 29 
The post-operative recovery standards also comport with 
accepted medical practice. 30 The equipment requirements 
27 Infection can be a serious complication with any 
abortion procedure. See nn. 10 & 11, supra. Significant 
portions of the Virginia Rules are designed to assure th~t 
outpatient surgical clinics practice -ire£ i.-Agent infect ion 
control, including sterile processing, appropriate waste 
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable 
water, and protection of the integrity of the operating 
suite. See Rules §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 
43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. 
The ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures 
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, 
knife blades, and contaminated waste supplies. See 
Standards, supra, at 58, 62. See also NAF Standards, 
supra n. 23, at 7. 
28The Virginia record-keeping requirements are ~ 
similar to those detailed by the ACOG, see Standards, 
supra, at 54-55, 59-60, and we have found such 
requirements, "if not abused or overdone," impose a 
legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri ~Danforth, 428 
u.s. 52, 81 (1976}. 
29The risks of hemorrhage are reduced by requiring 
an outpatient surgical clinic to make hemoglobin or 
hematocrit determinations before initiating instillation. 
See Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data should 
include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis •..• "}. See 
also NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 7 ("Rh-immune globulin 
must be explained and administered to Rh-negative 
patients."}. 
30Anesthesia complications are allevieated by 
requiring a physician to be present for monitoring 
functions during the administration of anesthetics and in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
22. 
for emergency services are minima1 31 and are further 3 
prefaced with the word "adequate. .. 32 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia 
requirements are necessary for every second-trimester 
abortion. A State simply cannot adopt regulations that 
serve every case with the same degree of relevance. 3 
Following, as we must, Roe and subsequent precedents, we 
adhere to the trimester periods as providing general 
the recovery period. See Standards, supra, at 53. Less 
serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ibid. ("During the recovery period, 
the patient should be under continuous observation by a 
qualified member of the health care team."): NAF 
Standards, supra n. 23, at 6 ("The recovery area must be 
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is 
immediately available to the recovery area."). The 
required one-hour recovery period is intended to permit 
detection of these problems. See Kerenyi, Mandelman & 
Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 
Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593 (1973): Standards, supra, at 
53: App. 37 (defense witness concedes waiting period 
necessary) • 
31The arrangements for emergency transfer to an 
acute-care, general hospital are clearly reasonable. See 
ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 62: Cates & Grimes, supra n. 
11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing D&E, 
"arrangements for emergency care should be established 
with hospitals near the nonhospital facility"): NAF 
Standards, supra n. 23, at 7. 
3 2 .5 .faX.- . 
Appel nt's operating room contains practically 
d .. ,all of the mergency services equipment required by the 
Y~~"" CommeR~ieal:-t The record indicates that it has excellent 
lighting, w 11 outlets for oxygen, suction apparatus, 
resuscitation equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine, 
IV fluids, complete anesthesia equipment, and drugs to be 
used in emergencies. See App. 21-22, 375-376. Appellant 
makes no contention, however, that his office's 
facilities, personnel, or care conform to the other 
requirements for an outpatient surgical clinic. 
23. 
guidance as to the validity of state abortion regulations 
in accord with medical knowledge and generally accepted 
standards. Although a State's general licensing 3 
regulations must be drawn to further the State's interests 
7 in women's health and safety for all reasonable periods of 
time within the second-trimester, a particular requirement 
"is not unconstitutional simply because it does not 
perfectly correspond to the asserted state interest" every 3 
day of the trimester. 33 City of Akron, __ u.s., at __ . 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before 
us in this case, that Virginia's regulations of second-
trimester abortions are reasonably related to and further 
~~ 33we i~die~ A in City of Akron that the ACOG 
recommends that abortions performed in a physician's . ,.. r office or outpatient clinic be limited to fourteen-weeks 
~ gestation, but it indicates that abortions may be 
~ performed safely in a hospital-based or in a free-standing 
'"' :.Av ~ ambulatory facility until eighteen-weeks gestation. See 
y~; _ City of Akron, __ U.S. __ (citing Standards, supra, at 
~~ ,.J-' 52}. Virginia's Rules s,aei 1¥ correspond to the ACOG 
requirements for a free-standing clinic and thus are 
~ f9 · ~~~ reasonably related to the State's compelling interest in 
~:~f vrr maternal health and safety for the period after fourteen 
~~~ t ~ weeks. But we are also impressed by the fact that, even 
1 
q. 4  though the Rules apply to two weeks in which abortions 
~~could be performed safely in a doctor's office or a 
~.~ clinic, they do not impose requirements that significantly 
~1M 1 deviate from those that ACOG would require of a well-
. L. equipped off ice or clinic performing thirteenth and 
~ !L\. t.PO fourteenth week abortions. See nn. 23-24, 26-31. See 
~~2 also NAF Standards, supra n. 23, at 5-7. We think that 
~~,~~ ~Virginia has done well to draw its requirements to promote 
~~~~~ the ends that it seeks. 
~r- ~ ~ 7 
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the State's ~nterest in the health and safety 3 
of pregnant women. 34 We emphasize again that Virginia 
does not require the patient to be hospitalized as an 
inpatient or that the abortion be performed in a full-
S~'J 
service general hospital. Rather, the Vir~-i-nia 
requirements--the statutes and the regulations--
accommodate medical requirements, and leave the method and 
timing of the abortion precisely where they belong--
between the physician and his patient. 
health requirements on abortions 
insure protection 
impressive advancements in 
34Appellant argues that Part III of the Rules, 
covering first-trimester abortion clinics requires, the 
same services and equipment as Part II. In fact, part 
Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Rules §63.l.l(b), §63.3, 
§§64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these 
extensive regulations for first-trimester abortion 
clinics, the only way to require more technological 
support for second-trimester abortions would be to 
restrict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only 
regulations before us, however, relate to second-trimester 
abortions, and we find those requirements reasonably 






hat ny or econd-trimester procedures are so safe 
this Court 
he1r hold that Virginia's 
~ be performed in 3 
properly equipped outpatient clines is 
w-e- <\&i !fttitt:l lin-g -4 R~QB~ == ill matcrr5tl 
ha%1;~;.. 
3 
r sq.ui.J::.eme n t i ~ eens t: ~ t ·Hm a 1. The judgment of the 












From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The principal issue here is whether Virginia's mandatory 
hospitalization requirement for second-trimester abortions is 
constitutional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. His 
practice in November, 1979 consisted of office practice in 
Woodbridge, Virginia, hospital practice at four local hospitals 
or surgery centers, and practice at his clinic in Falls Church. 
The Falls Church clinic has an operating room, operating-
room lighting, and facilities for resuscitation and emergency 
treatment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and 
stabilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily per-
forms first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time 
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had ap-
pellant sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a seventeen-year old, high school student when 
she went to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was 
unmarried, and told appellant that she was approximately 
twenty-two weeks pregnant. She requested an abortion but 
did not want her parents to know. Examination by appel-
lant confirmed that P.M. was five months pregnant, well into 
the second trimester. Appellant testified that he encour-
aged her to confide with her parents and discussed with her 
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the alternative of continuing the pregnancy to term. She did 
return home, but never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the doctw- if "heavy" bleeding began. Al-
though P.M. does not r~all being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was lie-ted in the instruction sheet. 
/\ !d., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom forty-eight hours after the saline injection. 
She left the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication 
in the wastebasket the motel. Her boy friend took her 
home. Police found the fetus later that day and began an 
investigation. 1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory license revo-
cation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 (1982). The 
felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in prison. Va. Code 
§ 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
In the four following sections the Virginia Code sets forth exceptions to 
this statute: there is no criminal liability (i) if the abortion is performed 
within the first trimester, § 18.2-72; (ii) if the abortion is performed in a 
81-185-0PINION 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia reviewed appellant's case and unanimously af-
firmed his conviction. Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 
Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 (1981). This appeal followed. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 3 He contends that they sharply restrict the 
licensed hospital in the second trimester, § 18.2-73; (iii) if necessary to save 
the woman's life,§ 18.2-74.1; and (iv) during the third trimester under cer-
tain circumstances,§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of 
§ 18.2-71 and expressly negated any defenses of hospitalization under 
§ 18.2-73 and any first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment 
did not, however, rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions Taised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant also raises two 
issues on his appeal that do not require extended treatment. He first con-
tends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, be-
cause lack of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the in-
dictment, addressed in the prosecution's case, nor mentioned by the trier 
of fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indictment uncon-
stitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging 
necessity in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 
U. S. 62 (1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persua-
sion, as required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with~ to the defense of medical ne-
cessity, the prosecution was not oblig~ted to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced. The Virginia statute, as construed by 
the state court, does not require that the State allege lack of medical neces-
sity; the District of Columbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, 
required the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. 
Placing upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence on 
an affirmative defense is normally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, U. S. 
--,and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 
... 
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availability of abortions after the first trimester by granting 
a monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-
trimester abortions. He also argues that the Virginia re-
quirements result in negative health consequences and, as 
applied to him and the abortions he performs in his well-
equipped non-licensed clinic, do not "measurably contribut[e] 
to the ... purposes which the State advances as justification 
for the restriction." Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S. 678, 702 (1977) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result). 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. 
--. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy," id., at 153. We re-
jected, however, the notion that a woman has an absolute 
right to an abortion. We consistently have recognized and 
reaffirm today that, "because a State has a legitimate con-
cern with the health of women who undergo abortions, 'a 
State may properly assert important interests in safeguard-
ing health [and] in maintaining medical standards.'" City of 
Akron, ante, at 10 (quoting Roe, 410 U. S., at 154). This 
"important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother" becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the end 
of the first trimester," Roe, 410 U.S., at 163, and is compel-
ling throughout the remainder of the pregnancy. 
The State's interest in the health of the pregnant woman 
includes an interest in the sa;Wty 6f facilitiesp at ~9ri0rm 1 
a~. As the Court stated in Roe: -
30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is frivolous. See 221 
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"The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that 
abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed 
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the 
patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the 
performing physician and his staff, to the facilities in-
volved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate 
provision for any complication or emergency that might 
arise." 410 U. S., at 150. 
To protect this compelling interest, the State may, "from and 
after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for li-
censing all facilities where abortions may be performed so 
long as those standards are legitimately related to the objec-
tive the State seeks to accomplish." Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U. S. 179, 194-195 (1973) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
the State may regulate "as to the facility in which the proce-
dure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital 
or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital 
status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like." Roe, 
410 U. S., at 163. 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that, after he performed 
the abortion on P.M., he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek any 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without 
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not contain the definition of the term "hospital." This defini-
tion is found in Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospi-
tal" to include "outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of 
the Department of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Li-
censure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regula-
tions") 5 defines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]n-
stitutions . . . which primarily provide facilities for the 
performance of surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and pro-
vides that second-trimester abortions may be performed in 
these clinics. 7 Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester 
record evidence whether appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpa-
tient clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, whether the Falls 
Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to .our deter-
mination in this case. See n. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of the 
Virginia regulations). 
5 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, 
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our 
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now super-
sede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for 
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). 
6 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
7 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. 
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
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abortion may be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 
provided that clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the 
State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, p. 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, p. --. In those cases, the regulations required "all 
second-trimester abortions [to] be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at --. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate nonhospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on wol!len's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court held these laws 
invalid because they did not reasonably further the States' in-
terest in maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in acute-care, general hospitals. 
Under Virginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may 
"Outpatient abortion clinics" refers specifically to those facilities meeting 
the minimum standards of Part III of the regulations. See Va. Regs. 
(Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. "These facilities limit the operative proce-
dures to termination of pregnancy during the first trimester." Ibid. See 
id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure performed to terminate a pregnancy shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
8 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
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qualify for licensing as hospitals in which second trimester 
abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. 10 Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at --, 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less compelling, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its relative safety 
early in the second trimester, still may cause complications. 11 
9 Between 1972 and 1978, at least 67 women undergoing second-trimes-
ter abortions in this country died as a result of the abortion procedure. 
See Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Con-
trol, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). See also 
Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Preferred · 
Method of Midtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 331 
(1981) (6.9% complication rate for second-trimester D&E abortions; 55% 
complication rate for second-trimester prostaglandin instillation). 
1° For example, the majority of second-trimester abortions after the six-
teenth week of gestation are performed by means of intrauterine instilla-
tion of saline, see Grimes & Cates, The Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 
Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29, 30 (1980), even though there is on the whole a 
greater death rate for instillation abortions than there is for D&E. See 
also Cates, et al., The Risk of Dying from Legal Abortion in the United 
States, 1972-1975, 15 Int'l J. Gynaecol. Obstet. 172, 175 (1977). For iden-
tification of less serious complications, see American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Technical Bulletin No. 37, Hypertonic 
Saline Amnia-Infusion 1, 2-3 (1976) (now replaced by ACOG Technical Bul-
letin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979)). 
11 A leading cause of death and complications in D&E abortion patients is 
hemorrhage, see Cates & Grimes, Deaths from Second Trimester Abortion 
by Dilatation and Evacuation: Causes, Prevention, Facilities, 58 Obstet-
rics & Gynecology 401, 401-402 (1981), that can be prevented, detected, 
and treated during or soon after the procedure. Other potential complica-
tions of this procedure are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are 
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second 
Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). Those 
standards need not be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) 
(hereinafter ACOG Standards). See also id., at 52 ("Free-
standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities 
should be licensed to conform to requirements of state or fed-
eral legislation."). Indeed, the medical profession's stand-
ards for outpatient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such fa-
cilities should maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and 
personnel standards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid. 
t ough the State's interest in licensing medical facilitie 
s com ellin the St te's dis r tion tore late n this bas· 
does not "permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart 
from sound medical practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. 
significantly increased in comparison to other second-trimester proce-
dures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, supra, n. 10, at 78. 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
~ does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by 
_ which time the woman usually will have been discharged from any facility. 
-- See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690 n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in part & aff'd in 
part, ante, p. -. Thus the relative safety of the D&E procedure does 
not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection. 
11 y/k ~ 8-fi4 ~~ ~ 
s~ - ~
~~~~~~ 
~a f:ts"LZ~ ~ ~~~Pvi:L<. 
~~~~~ 
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"If a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate the 
performance of abortions during [the second trimester], the 
health standards adopted must be 'legitimately related to the 
objective the State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 
195." City of Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether 
Virginia's licensing requirements for outpatient surgical clin-
ics performing second-trimester abortions are reasonable 
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in the 
woman's health. 
c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. Those regulations may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, artd staffing matt-ers Hat -partietllarly 
~· These require personnel and facilities "necessary 
to meet patient and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals) § 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy 
and procedures manual, § 43.212, an administrative officer, 
§40.6, a licensed physician who must supervise clinical serv-
ices and perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered 
nurse to be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, 
§ 42.2. The second category of requirements outlines con-
struction standards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also 
provides that "deviations from the requirements prescribed 
herein may be approved if it is determined that the purposes 
of the minimum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. 
12 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
- ~ 11 
'• 
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There are also construction requirements that set forth 
standards for the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and 
radiology services, 13 and general building. 14 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia/5 laboratory, 16 and pathologyY Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 18 and post-
13 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 52.3.1. 
14 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
15 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1. 2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
'
6 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection,§ 64.1.3, and where medically indi-
cated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
17 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue shall be submitted for a pathol-
ogy examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at --. 
18 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., §43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
12 
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operative recovery. 19 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 20 
III 
Appellant does not attack § resgx these regulations) in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. ''rn 
those, he emphasizes that Virginia requires hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." (emphasis added) Virginia does not 
require that the doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the 
means by which this counseling is performed. Under this requirement,~ 
~ unlike in City of Akron, for the woman, in conjunction with her physi- ,_f ~ 
cian, to decide what conside'rations are relevant to her decision. See ante, 
at 27-28. 
19 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d. , 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, seen. 32, infra. 
20 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
-hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
81-185-0PINION 
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tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic, he 
appears to argue that the Virginia hospitalization require-
ments are comparable to those we have considered in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that, even if he had ap-
plied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where second trimester abortions are performed, but see n. 
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is 
safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals." 
eply Brief for Appellant 1. None of these contentions finds 
support in this Court's prior opinions, and the Virginia re-
quirements are strikingly different from those we invalidated ~ _ ~ ~ 
in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Ulldeed, it is evident that 2 1;._ ~ ~· b/A--
Virginia has ado ted statutes and regulations compatible J ~~ 
with our decisions:f We are convmce that the Virginia pro- ~..,.a 
visions are reasonably related to and further the State's com-  ~ _ 
pelling interest in protecting the health of the pregnant 
woman during the second trimester. 21 ~r-~ 
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of ~ ... ~11 ~ 
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance '~, f :J 
21 No doubt there are costs incurred in complying with Virginia's re-
quirements, but these are not burdens that necessarily invalidate the regu-
lations. As an empirical matter, we have no reason to believe these costs 
will result in fewer appropriate facilities for performing second-trimester 
abortions. Ethical physicians are obligated to provide facilities consistent 
with the standards set by their profession. And appellant has not identi-
fied any significant differences between professional standards and the Vir-
ginia requirements. 
22 A COG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See ACOG Standards, supra, at 55 ("Each physician's office and 
[Footnote 23 appears on p. 14] 
~~ 
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
yond his ~l condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of AGOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22, 23 and 24, Virginia's requirements, although more 
detailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and 
outpatient clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management 
of health care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" re-
quirement, Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's 
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care 
should assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diag-
noses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and out-
come of care." ACOG Standards, supra, at 55--56. See National Abor-
tion Federation (NAF), National Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) 
(hereinafter N AF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures 
and policies in each area of care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Cu-
riae 29 n. 6. (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facil-
ities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards, supra, at 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals) § 40.3, and that "[ w ]ritten policies describing specific respon-
sibilities of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed 
and revised periodically," ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. NAF 
Standards, supra, at 12 (responsibilities of chief administrative officer); 
Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guide-
lines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpa-
tient Abortion Facilities 1 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") 
(duties of administrator). 
23 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards, supra, at 56-58. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 1--3 (detailing exten-
sive physical requirements for first-trimester abortion clinics). AGOG's 
[Footnote 24 appears on p. 15] 
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personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are compat-
ible with generally accepted medical standards and do not un-
reasonably burden the abortion decision. 
standards for an ambulatory surgical facility are more detailed, providing 
space for reception, waiting, administrative activities, patient dressing, 
lockers, preoperative evaluation, physical examination, laboratory testing, 
preparation of anesthesia, performance of surgical procedures, preparation 
and sterilization of instruments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs 
and fluids, postanesthetic recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and util-
ity support. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 61. Cf. S. Neubardt & H. 
Schulman, Techniques of Abortion 110-111 (2d ed. 1977) (similar list of fa-
cilities needed for model abortion care unit). 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards, supra, at 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Pro-
gram Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) 
(hereinafter "APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n op-
erating table, or conventional gynecologic examining table with acces-
sories, located in a room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and 
meets all other environmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2. A doctor's examining room should 
contain instruments for vaginal examinations, supplies for obtaining cul-
tures and smears, and equipment for diagnostic studies and operative pro-
cedures. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Cf. Planned Parenthood 
Guidelines, supra, at 2. When local anesthesia is used, the clinic or doc-
tor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, including posi-
tive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suction, and a car-
diac monitor. ACOG Standards, supra, at 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for 
artificial ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 9 
(requiring all facilities performing second-trimester abortions to have 
resuscitation bag, oxygen, and defibrillator if general anesthesia is admin-
istered); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 2 (even first-trimester 
abortion clinics should have parenteral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and 
oxygen). 
24 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards, 
supra, at 58, 61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients 
in case of an emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards, supra, n. 
16 
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Our concern centers on the patient services requirements 
of the Virginia regulations and whether they further the 
State's interest in the health and safety of the pregnant 
woman. We think they clearly do. Again, we have com-
pared them to the standards used by ACOG and APHA, and 
we are impressed with the scrupulousness with which Vir-
ginia has drawn regulations reasonably related to its interest 
in protecting the pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25 
and record-keeping standards 26 are typical and not unreason-
22, at 8, 11; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10. 
25 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations 
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate 
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste 
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protec-
tion of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals)§§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop 
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife 
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards, supra, at 58, 
62. APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7 
("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number to permit individual 
sterilization of the instruments used for each procedure .. . . "); Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 2. 
26 The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards, supra, at 54-55, 
59-60, which require at the initial visit a comprehensive data base includ-
ing information on reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, 
gynecologic history, sexual history, past medical and surgical history, cur-
rent medications, allergies, social history, and family history. For am-
bulatory surgical facilities, ACOG recommends that the patient's record 
contain sufficient information to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the 
operative procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, 
history and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and 
therapeutic orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative 
consent, operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications 
record, and discharge summary and instructions. !d., at 59. See also id., 
at 60 ("On the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an inter-
val history, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination 
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able in detail. The laboratory services 27 support-and often 
are essential to-the direct medical services 28 performed by 
the physician 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery 
standards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice. 32 
should be performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the 
record."). We have found such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," 
impose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Par-
enthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). We do 
not think Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide, supra, 
n. 23, at 655-656 (recommended reporting requirements); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 13 (record-keeping and reporting 
requirements). 
27 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 ("The laboratory data 
should include hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain se-
lected patients, other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and 
electrolytes."). See also APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 654 ("Appropriate 
laboratory procedures must include determination of hematocrit and Rh 
factor in every case. The value of other laboratory procedures will depend 
upon the population served; these may include sickle cell testing; 
endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; urinalysis; serologic testing 
for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic screening for cancer."); NAF 
Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be explained and 
administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, 
supra, n. 22, at 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
28 See ACOG Standards, supra, at 59 ("The appropriate records should 
be completed and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis 
added). ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to 
identify pre-existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug 
reactions that may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthe-
sia. All records should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." 
Id., at 60 (emphasis added). APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 654; Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 8. 
29 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
[Footnotes 30, 31, and 32 appear on p. 18] 
81-18~0PINION 
18 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
The equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal 33 and are further prefaced with the word 
"adequate." 34 
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards, supra, at 53. 
Cf. APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, 
supra, n. 22, at 10. 
30 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards, supra, at 60. Cf. id. , at 56 
("Administrative and professional personnel requirements will Vary consid-
erably in each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the pa-
tient load, pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood 
Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 7 (nurses); id., at 7-8 (head laboratory techni-
cian); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended that three staff persons be 
present in the procedure room: the operating physician, the physician's as-
sistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
31 See n. 19, supra. 
32 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Stand-
ards, supra, at 53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician 
qualified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the am-
bulatory surgical facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. 
This physician should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should 
share with the surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transfer-
ring them to the back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, 
supra, n. 22, at 11; see also APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655 ("[I]t will be 
necessary to periodically observe the temperature, pulse rate, blood pres-
sure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the abdomen should be ex-
amined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or injury."). Less serious 
complications can be monitored by the registered nurse on duty. See 
ACOG Standards, supra, at 53 ("During the recovery period, the patient 
[Footnote$ 33 and 34 appear on p. 19] 
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We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
the same degree of relevance; "a State necessarily must have 
some latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability 
in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16. Al-
though a State's general licensing regulations must be drawn 
to further the State's interests in women's health for all rea-
sonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a par-
ticular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply because it 
does not co~espond perfectly to the asserted state interest" 
every day of the trimester. Ante, at 20. 
should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of the 
health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of the 
patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occurrence 
of complications."); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 6 ("The recovery area 
must be supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately 
available to the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, at 
11. The required one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection 
of these complications. See APHA Guide, supra, at 655 (requiring post-
operative observations "over a period of two or more hours, depending 
upon the type of anesthesia used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five 
Thousand Consecutive Saline Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol. 
593, 597 (1973); ACOG Standards, supra, at 53; App. 37 (defense expert 
witness concedes waiting period desirable). 
33 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide, supra, n. 23, at 655; 
ACOG Standards, supra, at 52 ("There should be a written policy requiring 
the medical staff to provide for prompt emergency treatment or hospital-
ization in the event of an unanticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; Cates 
& Grimes, supra, n. 11, at 407 (even for nonhospital facilities providing 
D&E, "arrangements for emergency care should be established with hospi-
tals near the nonhospital facility"); NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7; 
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must 
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accred-
ited hospital."). 
34 Appellant's operating room contains practically all of the emergency 
services equipment required by the State. The record indicates that it has 
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We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.35 As we empha-
sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clin-
excellent lighting, wall outlets for oxygen, suction apparatus, resuscitation 
equipment, a defibrillator, an EKG machine, intravenous fluids , and com-
plete anesthesia equipment. App. 21-22, 375--376. Although appellant 
sought a "certificate of need" from the Virginia Bureau of Resources 
Development, see n. 4, supra, he makes no contention that his office's facil-
ities, personnel, or care conform fully to the requirements for an outpatient 
surgical clinic. 
30 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri-
mester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the state's compelling interest. 
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ics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia therefore is 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante , p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. · 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room, and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-tri-
mester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
' 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). The Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years 
in prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
'• 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is 
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defenses of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two addi-
tional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends 
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack 
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Ap-
pellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional 
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity 
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical 
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in 
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this 
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden 
81-185-0PINION 
4 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester 
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him 
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li-
censed clinic, do not further the State's interests. 
pari aHel eoneu1"f'ing iH tae l"esultj. 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. 
ForAetW purposes fte!oe , the critical point is that we 
consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a State 
has an "important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approximately the 
end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 
(1973), and is compelling throughout the remainder of the 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
mEmt for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
of going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally per-
missible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221 
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include 
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that sec-
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without 
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient 
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the 
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our 
determination in this case. Seen. 7, irifra (noting State's interpretation of 
the Virginia regulations). 
5 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, 
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our 
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now super-
sede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for 
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). 
6 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
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ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 5. In those cases, the regulations required that "all 
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that 
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation 
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in ap-
propriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
~because they did not reasonably further the States' in-
terest in maternal health. 
7 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i . e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. 
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "[O]utpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regula-
tions. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancyfin an outpatient abortion clini~shall be 
performed prior to the end of th e first trimester (12th week amenor-
rhea)."). 
8 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
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One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at --, 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in 
the second trimester, still may cause complications.'0 
9 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981) Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
10 Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other 
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. --. Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent 
infection. 
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The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
' ~bortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
oprofessio~ has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's li-
censing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
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ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of fur-
thering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health. 
c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia.K"' These regulations may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categor-
Ies. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 12 and general building. 13 
11 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
12 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
q · , [Footnote 13 is on p. 10} 
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 14 laboratory, 15 and pathology. 16 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and post-
operative recovery: 18 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
13 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
14 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
15 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
16 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at --. 
17 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11} 
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emergency services and evacuation planning. 19 
III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. As appeliant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that even if he had ap-
plied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28. 
18 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, see n. 32, infra. 
19 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxyg-en, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
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granted; that Virgin· courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing sta utes and regulations;" that Part II of 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where second trimester ai:J rtions are performed, but see n. 
8, supra; and that medical evt ence rebuts the view "that it is 
safer to perform second tri ster abortions in hospitals." 
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. ~GII~~~~~tet.tmi~.,l 
20 AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See AGOG Standards,.a~1oe , at 55 ("Each physician's office and cr outpat1ent clmic should assess whether effective and efficient management 
of health care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" re-
quirement, Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's 
standards suggest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care 
should assess the completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diag-
noses, appropriateness of use of laboratory and other services, and out-
come of care." AGOG Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federa-
tion (NAF), National Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter 
NAF Standards) (requiring written descriptions of procedures and policies 
in each area of care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. 
(supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as con-
stituting "minimum standards"). 
.1 • 
[Footnote 21 is on p. 1J} 
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although 
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment, 
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) § 40.3, and that "[w)ritten policies describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and re-
vised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (respon-
sibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropoli-
tan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance 
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (herein-
after "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator). 
21 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for 
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory 
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-
tion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia, 
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instru-
ments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG 
Standards 61. 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for 
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter 
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or 
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a 
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other envi-
ronmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-
[ Footnote 22 is on p. 14} 
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and personnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are 
compatible with generally accepted medical standar~ 
Our concern centers on whether the patient services re-
quirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's in-
terest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We 
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the 
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed 
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regu-
lations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the 
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keep-
lines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal 
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment 
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the 
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, in-
cluding positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suc-
tion, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial 
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities 
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen, 
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have paren-
teral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
22 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58, 
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an 
emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10. 
23 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations 
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate 
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protec-
tion of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals) §§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 
52.2.6, 52.2.7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop 
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife 
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ing standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential 
to-the direct medical services 26 performed by the physi-
cian 27 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery stand-
ards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the 
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. 
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be suffi-
cient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used 
for each procedure .... "). 
2
' The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which re-
quire at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on 
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, al-
lergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facili-
ties, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient in-
formation to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative 
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history 
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent, 
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and 
discharge summary and instructions. !d., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On 
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval his-
tory, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record."). 
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," im-
pose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parent-
hood ofCentml Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think 
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655--656 (recom-
mended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13 
(record-keeping and reporting requirements). 
25 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, 
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes."). 
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must in-
clude determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value 
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served; 
these may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gon-
[Footnotes 26 through JO are on pp. 16 and 17} 
- -- ------:--
f' ~ ... 
•' 
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equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal. 31 o~ 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
orrhea; urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cyto-
logic screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must 
be explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
26 See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be com-
pleted and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added). 
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify pre-
existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that 
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." I d., at 60 (emphasis 
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8. 
~For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse:.anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA 
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra., n. 22, at 10. 
28 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Admin-
istrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in 
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, 
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended 
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating 
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
29 See n. 19, supra. 
[Footnotes JO and Jl m·e on pp. 17} 
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must 
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applica-
bility in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16. 
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be 
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for 
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
serted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20. 
30 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards 
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical 
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician 
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the 
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the 
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA 
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or 
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the 
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of 
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of 
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occur-
rence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be 
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to 
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complica-
tions. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over 
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia 
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Sa-
line Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG 
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable). 
3
' The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards 
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide 
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
81-185-0PINION 
18 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.32 As we empha-
sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient 
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7; o~ 
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must 
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accred-
ited hospital."). l C:~ 
32 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri-
mester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.l.l(b), §63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the state's compelling interest. 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room 
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indict-
ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of § 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) 
is performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
Appellant argues that Virginia's statutory hospital re-
quirement prohibits all non-hospital second-trimester abor-
tions and that such a requirement imposes an unconstitu-
tional burden on the right of privacy and has negative health 
consequences. Appellant contends that this prohibition 
sharply restricts the availability of abortions after the first 
trimester by granting a monopoly to the few licensed hospi-
tals that will permit the post 12-week abortions. Appellant 
contends that the hospital monopoly is an unreasonable re-
straint on a woman's right to an abortion and that the State 
has not shown that the requirement furthers any compelling 
interest. 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that· becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest, of course, embraces the 
facilities and circumstances in which abortions are per-
formed. See id., at 150. The State here argues that its hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from the 
hospitalization requirements considered in City of Akron and 
Ashcroft and that it reasonably promotes the State's inter-
ests. It thus becomes necessary to determine whether Vir-
. ' 
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ginia's hospitalization requirement is different from those 
considered earlier, or whether we should consider our deci-
sion in City of Akron controlling. 
A 
It is in furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted a hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, per-
mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." · This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include 
8 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See 
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
.. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). . 
The first draft of the regulations was considerably different from the 
regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, 
Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in 
Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the 
requirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
tient clinics in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the tri-
mester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimes-
ter abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
regulation. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, 
presided, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." ld., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics aclmowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." ld., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 9 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
cally ''propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical clinics in the State, agreed that the Board 
should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics in order to include outpatient abortion clinics within the same set 
of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, the Board added 
Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester 
abortions. It therefore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for 
discrete and different sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board 
gave its final approval to the regulations before us on May 11, 1977. 
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months after the effective date of the regulations. 
In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977, attended as noted above 
by representatives of various organizations specifically concerned with 
abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant does not argue-that he 
was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that 
his clinic be licensed. 
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar 
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant per-
formed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of 
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, 
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va. 
Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital .. . unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
[Footnote 9 is on page 9] 
... 
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ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per- . ~ ~ - J ~ 
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-~ tf ~ ~. -_ . 
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and / ~ l4.-
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be LA-~~ ~ 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir- ~ ~-7-- ~ 
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for ,4, 
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions JJ~~ )-~ 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of . 7G 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. v ~ ....,.... • 'f 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, infra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] 
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
9 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
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B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 10 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19, 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in 
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 11 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [ w ]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[ u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
10 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
11 Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to 
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 
56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and affd in part, ante, p. --. Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
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same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter AGOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is the validity of Virgin-
ia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in a licensed "hospital" given that the term "hospital" 
is defined to include "outpatient hospitals." 
c 
It is necessary to describe briefly the Virginia regulations 
applicable to outpatient surgical clinics performing second-
trimester abortions in order to understand appellant's con-
stitutional challenge and determine the validity of Virginia's 
hospitalization requirement. Those Virginia regulations ap-
plicable to outpatient surgical clinics performing second-tri-
mester abortions are, with few exceptions, the same regula-
tions applicable to all outpatient surgical clinics in Virginia, 
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and may be grouped for purposes of discussion into three 
main categories. 
The first grouping re.lates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 12 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40. 6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices,'3 and general building. 14 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 15 laboratory, 16 and pathology. 17 Some of 
12 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
13 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
" The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
16 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.1.1 (service must be 
[Footnotes 15 and 16 are on page 13] 
,· 
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 18 and post-
operative recovery. 19 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 20 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
16 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
17 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
' 8 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d., § 43. 8. 3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27. 
19 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
20 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
·" 
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IV 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics tW ma)' perfQwn econd- rimes era or-
IOn As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
• the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that the record is silent 
on the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that 
the record does not show whether any outpatient surgical 
clinics exist in Virginia or whether, if they exist, they allow 
second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the 
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity 
to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient clinic license, it 
would have been granted; that obtaining a license is an ardu-
ous process; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to 
construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that 
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgi-
plan); id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
r , I( 
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cal clinic where second-trimester abo ons are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply , see n. 8, supra, 
and others are irrelevant, see n. 3, s ra. And certainly ap-
pellant cannot argue that the State has no right to require ap-
pellant to meet some facility and equipment standards merely 
because they impose some costs and burdens. Compliance 
with the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can 
be said of most regulations adopted by governments to pro-
tect the health and safety of people. 
What is perhaps most important about appellant's constitu-
tional challenges is what they do not challenge: Appellant has 
not argued that individual regulations are unreasonable. 
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his 
trial, 21 appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitaliza-
tion requirement as no different from those we reviewed in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft. Any silence of the record on 
the reasonableness of the regulations must be attributed to 
his failure to show their invalidity, for he has not produced 
any medical evidence, as the plaintiffs in City of Akron and 
Ashcroft~au~ Q8fl.e, to show that certain equipment or serv-
ices required by the State are unreasonable requirements to 
impose on women seeking second-trimester abortions. In a 
word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not 
further the State's compelling interest in the health and 
safety of the pregnant woman. 
It is therefore unnecessary for this Court to review those 
regulations individually to determine whether alone or as a 
group they impose unreasonable conditions ·on outpatient 
hospital licensing in Virginia. Our task is much simpler, and 
that is to assure ourselves that the Virginia hospitalization 
requirement is not of the same nature as those invalidated in 
21 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient clinic regulations; stating that he was seeking a 
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City of Akron and Ashcroft. As we noted earlier, they are 
not. Nor do they appear to impose different, but also unrea-
sonable requirements for second-trimester abortions. We 
have looked to the recommendations of ACOG and the Amer-
ican Public Health Association (APHA), 22 and although Vir-
ginia's requirements may be more detailed with respect to 
specific facilities, equipment, and personnel, we believe that 
they are generally compatible with the medical standards set 
forth there for outpatient facilities performing second-trimes-
ter abortions. Certainly appellant has given us no reason to 
assume that they are unreasonable health and safety 
requirements. 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that appellant has not shown the Virginia regula-
tions concerning second-trimester abortions to be an unrea-
sonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150.23 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron 
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not 
22 See APHA Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 
Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federa-
tion, National Abortion Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the 
APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-
hospital abortion facilities as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
zs Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear 
in Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), 
§ 63.3, 64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive 
regulations for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require 
more technological support for second-trimester abortions would be to re-
strict them to acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before 
us, however, relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those re-
quirements reasonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that 
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospi-
tal. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the 
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical prac-
tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion pre-
cisely where they belong-between the physician and the 
patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's require-
ment for second-trimester abortions is constitutional. The 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
' . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA . 
[April - , 1983] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room 
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
ld., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indict-
ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of § 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
lumbia · statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
. ' 
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities 
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See 
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's stat-
utory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital 
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In 
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argu-
ment persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to 
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement is significantly different from the hospitalization 
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1,4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See 
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
4 The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the re-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-tri-
mester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
regulation. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Me\lical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics 
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, 
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do-
ing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 9, 28, irifra. It therefore is clear 
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of 
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the 
regulations before us on May 11, 1977. 
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on 
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various 
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and 
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regula-
tions and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] 
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manuaV §43.2, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regalations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
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such as anesthesia,l2 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1. 2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative , urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
14 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d. ; § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortio~ services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d. , 
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
81-185---0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 11 
B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
c 
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virgin-
ia's regulations. Second-trimester abortions may give rise 
to serious complications, 18 and certain procedures signifi-
cantly increase the risks. Although the increasingly com-
mon use and relative safety of the D&E method, see City of 
Akron, ante, at 17-19, may make the need for particular 
equipment in and designs of a facility less imperative, the 
need for reasonable regulations has not been eliminated. 
D&E, despite its safety in most cases early in the second tri-
mester, still may cause complications. 19 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [ w ]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
18 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
19 Medical evidence indicates that hemorrhaging is a leading cause of 
death and complications in D&E abortion patients. Other potential com-
plications are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are significantly 
increased in comparison to 
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion (1979). 
The Court of Appeals in Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), 
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, ante, p. --that major potential complica-
tion for all abortion techniques-infection-normally does not arise until 24 
to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by which time the woman 
usually will have been discharged from any facility. Thus, the medical evi-
dence makes clear that the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not 
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection. 
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dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., at 52 ("Free-stand-
ing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be 
licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legis-
lation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for out-
patient surgical facilities are stringent; "Such facilities should 
maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel stand-
ards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. On their face, these Virginia regulations 
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical 
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. 20 
20 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Stardards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J . Pub. Health 652, 
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion 
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We need not decide whether certain individual regulations 
are unreasonable on their face or invalid as applied to him. 
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his 
trial, 21 appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitaliza-
tion requirement as no different from those we reviewed in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent the record is si-
lent, the lack of evidence on the reasonableness of the regula-
tions must be attributed to his failure to produce any medical 
evidence, as the plaintiffs in City of Akron and Ashcroft did 
at great length, to show that certain equipment or services 
required by the State are unreasonable requirements to im-
pose on women seeking second-trimester abortions. 22 In a 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
21 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seek-
ing a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abor-
tion was performed). 
22 Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on this hospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations instead mak-
ing only facial challenges in the broadest language and in conclusory terms: 
but not individually or on specific grounds the record is silent on the ap-
plicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show 
whether any outpatient surgical clinics exist in Virginia or whether, if they 
exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the 
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend 
against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had ap-
plied for an outpatient clinic license, it would have been granted; that ob-
taining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no 
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that 
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical clinic where 
... 
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word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not 
further the State's compelling interest in the health and 
safety of the pregnant woman. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations con-
cerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable 
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "pro-
tecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150.23 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron 
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not 
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that 
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospi-
tal. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the 
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical prac-
second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are 
simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see n. 3, 
supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no right to 
require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards 
merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron 
makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in 
the pregnant woman's health, it may adapt reasonable regulations. Com-
pliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but this 
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. 
23 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest . 
.) 
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tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion pre-
cisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital-
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is con-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo. , Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room 
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.' 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indict-
ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosec.ution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
.. 
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069--
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities 
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See 
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's stat-
utory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital 
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In 
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argu-
ment persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to 
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement is significantly different from the hospitalization 
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
81-185-0PINION 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." V a. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1,4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See 
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-tri-
mester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
regulation. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortipn clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics 
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, 
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do-
ing first-trimester abortions. See nn. !., ?j,, infra. It therefore is clear 
A A 
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on page 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of 
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the 
regulations before us on May 11, 1977. 
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on I 
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various 
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and 
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regula-
tions and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations t 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code§§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i . e. , §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] 
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual,9 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. n 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. /d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortio~ services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physicia~ /d., § 43.8.-h ai1d. a 
O' geetiOH 48.8.8 ~pr,pfiQ~S ~the fa'cility J'eifOtllliRg aaef'ti~ "shall Offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods~' i.9, . 1 • ~ 41 . S5 
16 Each patient shall be observed' for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written ·orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
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B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
c 
The remaining uestion is the constitutionality of Virgin-
ia's re at10ns. Secon -trimester abortions may gwe rise 
to serious complications, 18 and certain procedures signifi-
cantly increase the risks. Although the increasingly com-
mon use and relative safety of the D&E method, see City of 
Akron, ante, at 17-19, may make the need for particular 
equipment in and designs of a facility less imperative, the 
need for reasonable regulations has not been eliminated. 
D&E, despite its safety in most cases earl in the second tri-
mester, still may cause complications. 19 
The American Public ea ssociation (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en- _/-
I' 18 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre- ~ 
ferred Method of Mid trimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
19 Medical evidence indicates that hemorrhaging is a leading cause of 
death and complications in D&E abortion patients. Other potential com-
plications are uterine perforation and cervical tears, which are significantly 
increased in comparison to 
other second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion (1979). 
The Court of Appeals in Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), 
rev'd in part and affd in part, ante, p. -- that major potential complica-
tion for all abortion techniques-infection-normally does not arise until 24 
to 72 hours after the procedure has taken place, by which time the woman 
usually will have been discharged from any facility. Thus, the medical evi-
dence makes clear that the relative safety of the D&E procedure does not 
alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent infection. J 
J 
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dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., at 52 ("Free-stand-
ing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical facilities should be 
licensed to conform to requirements of state or federal legis-
lation."). Indeed, the medical profession's standards for out-
patient surgical facilities are stringent: "Such facilities should 
maintain the same surgical, anesthetic, and personnel stand-
ards as recommended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. On their face, the~ Virginia regulations 
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical 
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions.~ 
I~ Jd'See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Staf dards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 
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are unreasonable on t e ace or invalid as applied to~~~~~..) 
Despite full knowledge of the regulations at the time of his 
';. trial,~ appellant has elected to treat the Virginia hospitaliza-
tion requirement as no different from those we reviewed in 
City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent the record is si-
lent, the lack of evidence on the reasonableness of the regula-
tions must be attributed to his failure to produce any medical 
Y evidence, as ~plaintiffs in City of Akron and Ashcroft did 
at great length, to show that certain equipment or services 
required by the State are unreasonable requirements to im-
1. 2-1 pose on women seeking second-trimester abortions.~ In a 
20 
A 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
! See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seek-
ing a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abor-
tion was performed). 
I Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on thilhospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not atGck these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulation~nstead mak-
ing only facial challenges in the broadest language and in conclusory terms: 
~imlivia~ally or on speei;ig ~6ttHS... the record is silent on the ap-
plicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show 
whether any outpatient surgica~~ exist in Virginia or whether, if they 
exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent on the 
reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to defend 
against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had ap-
plied for an outpatient ~ license, it would have been granted; that ob-
taining a license is an ar3'-uous process; that Virginia courts have had no 
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that 
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word, he has not shown why the Virginia regulations do not 
further the State's compelling interest in the health and 
safety of the pregnant woman. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations con-
cerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable 
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "pro-
tecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
~ U. S., at 150.~ As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron 
in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not 
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that 
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospi-
tal. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the 
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical prac-
.2.1 
" 
second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these arguments are 
simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see n. 3, 
supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no right to 
require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment standards 
merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Akron 
makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest in 
the pregnant woman's health, it may adt pt reasonable regulations. Com-
pliance with the State's requirements ~rtainly will entail costs, but this 
can be said of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people . 
~Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
0 ,.. 
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tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion pre-
cisely where they belong-with the physician and the I 
patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital- ~ 
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is con-
stitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
is 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room 
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion,-- U.S.--, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders the indict-
ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
,, ,J., \-. 
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities 
and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See 
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia's stat-
utory hospitalization requirement prohibits all non-hospital 
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In 
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we today have found this argu-
ment persuasive when made in constitutional challenges to 
the acute-care, general hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement is significantly different from the hospitalization 
requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See 
n. 8, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physl.cians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-tri-
mester abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
regulation. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." I d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regillations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these outpatient abortion clinics 
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, 
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
ing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It therefore is clear 
that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different sets of 
regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval to the 
regulations before us on May 11, 1977. 
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. In view of the public hearing on 
January 26, 1977, attended as noted above by representatives of various 
organizations specifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and 
indeed appellant does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regula-
tions and the statutory requirement that his clinic be licensed. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital . . . unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., §62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] 
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manuai,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 
· The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
• The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
'
0 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
14 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43. 8.4, and 
the facility "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instruc-
tion in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods, id., § 43.85." 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hem or-
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
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The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virgin-
ia's regulations. The American Public Health Association 
(APHA), although recognizing "that greater use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform 
the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or 
prior to the 16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still 
"[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester 
abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state 
standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to 
Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). 
The medical profession has not thought tJ:ieA_standards need 
be relaxed merely because the facility per-forms abortions: 
"Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services 
should meet the same standards of care as those recom-
mended for other surgical procedures performed in the physi-
cian's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and 
hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Ob-
stetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., 
at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical 
facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of 
state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profes-
sion's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are strin-
gent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anes-
thetic, and personnel standards as recommended for 
hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
1 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
' practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes ·to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
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State seeks to acco.~plish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." {f;ity of 
Akron, ante, at 12J On their face, the Virginia regulations 
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical 
standards governing outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18 
e need not decide, however, whether certain individual 
regulations are unreasonable on their face or invalid as ap-
lied to appellant. Despite full knowledge of the regulations 
at he time of his trial, 19 appellant has elected to treat the Vir-
gmia hospitalization requiremen( as no different from those 
we reviewed in City of Akron and Ashcroft. To the extent 
the record is silent, the lack of evidence on the reasonable-
ness of the regulations must be attributed to his failure to 
produce any medical evidence, as plaintiffs in City of Akron 
and Ashcroft did at great length, to show that certain equip-
ment or services required by the State are unreasonable re-
quirements to impose on women seeking second-trimester 
ortions. 20 In a word, he has not shown why the Virginia 
18 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
19 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital regulations; stating that he was seek-
ing a license; but denying that he knew of the regulations when the abor-
tion was performed). 
20 Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not indi-
vidually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the 
broadest language and in conclusory terms: but the record is silent on the 
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
14 
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regulations do not further the State's compelling interest in 
the health and safety of the pregnant woman. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia regulations con-
cerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable 
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "pro-
tecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150.21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing te-itAhat abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that 
the State has no right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and 
equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. 
As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's com-
pelling interest in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable 
regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will en-
tail costs, but this can be said of most regulations adopted by governments 
to protect the health and safety of people. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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in City of Akron or Missouri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not 
require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that 
the abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospi-
tal. Rather, the State's requirements-the statutes and the 
regulations-seem to accommodate accepted medical prac-
tice, and leave the method and timing of the abortion pre-
cisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
v 
We hold .that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital-
ization requiremen~ for second-trimester abortions is con-
stitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
is 
Affirmed. 
liAR 3 1963 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
?J..?.,.. 
Circulated: 3 1883 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[March-, 1983] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-tri-
mester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.' 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is 
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two addi-
tional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends 
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack 
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Ap-
pellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional 
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity 
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical 
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in 
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this 
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden 
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester 
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him 
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li-
censed clinic, do not further the State's interests. 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at 
9-12, 14--16. For present purposes here, the critical point is 
that we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that 
a State has an "important and legitimate interest in the 
health of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at ap-
proximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the re-
mainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, em-
braces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are 
performed. I d., at 150. 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law.4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally per-
missible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221 
Va., at 106~1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include 
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "(i]nstitutions 
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7 
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without 
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient 
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the 
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our 
determination in this case. Seen. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of 
the Virginia regulations). 
5 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, 
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our 
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now super-
sede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for 
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). 
6 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
7 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
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Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 45. In those cases, the regulations required that "all 
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that 
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation 
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in ap-
propriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
invalid because they did not reasonably further the state in-
terest in maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. 
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regula-
tions. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenor-
rhea)."). 
8 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical 
clinics." 
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formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in 
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 10 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
9 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981), Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
10 Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other 
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. --. Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent 
infection. 
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majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195.'' City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's li-
censing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of fur-
thering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health. 
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c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categor-
ies. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 12 and general building. 13 
11 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
12 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 52.3.1. 
13 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
'I 
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 14 laboratory, 15 and pathology. 16 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and post-
operative recovery. 18 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 19 
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
"See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
15 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
16 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confinn presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at --. 
17 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d., § 43. 8. 3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28. 
18 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11} 
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III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that even if he had ap-
plied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where second trimester abortions are performed, but see n. 
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, see n. 32, infra. 
19 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
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safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals." 
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these argu-
ments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regula-
tions, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his 
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the 
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with 
the state's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said 
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians 
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the stand-
ards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified 
any significant differences between professional standards 
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least 
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are rea-
sonably related to and further the State's compelling interest 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the 
second trimester. 
The requirements of the first 20 and second categories 21 of 
regulations discussed in Part 11-C above have little relevance 
to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
20 AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See AGOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient 
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health 
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's standards sug-
gest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the 
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriate-
ness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." AGOG 
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (re-
quiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of 
care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the 
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). 
AGOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
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yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although 
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment, 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and re-
vised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (respon-
sibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropoli-
tan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance 
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (herein-
after "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator). 
21 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 5&-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, 1--3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for 
first-trimester abortion clinics). AGOG's standards for an ambulatory 
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-
tion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia, 
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instru-
ments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG 
Standards 61. 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for 
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter 
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or 
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a 
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other envi-
ronmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-
lines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal 
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment 
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the 
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and personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are 
compatible with generally accepted medical standard. 
Our concern centers on whether the patient services re-
quirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's in-
terest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We 
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the 
standards used by AGOG and APHA, and we are impressed 
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regu-
lations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the 
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keep-
ing standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, in-
cluding positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suc-
tion, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial 
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities 
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen, 
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have paren-
teral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
22 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58, 
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an 
emergency. Id., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10. 
23 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations 
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate 
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protec-
tion of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals) §§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 
52.2.6, 52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop 
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife 
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. 
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be suffi-
cient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used 
for each procedure .... "). 
24 The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
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The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential 
to-the direct medical services 26 performed by the physi-
cian 2:1 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery stand-
ards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which re-
quire at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on 
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, al-
lergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facili-
ties, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient in-
formation to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative 
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history 
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent, 
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and 
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On 
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval his-
tory, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record."). 
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," im-
pose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think 
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recom-
mended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13 
(record-keeping and reporting requirements). 
25 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, 
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes."). 
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must in-
clude determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value 
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served; 
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; 
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic 
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be 
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests,' urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
25 See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be com-
pleted and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added). 
[Footnotes 27 throngh J1 a1·e on pp. 16 and 17] 
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equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal. 31 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify pre-
existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that 
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis 
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8. 
27 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA 
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10. 
28 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Admin-
istrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in 
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, 
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended 
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating 
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
29 See n. 19, supra. 
30 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards 
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical 
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician 
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the 
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the 
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must 
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applica-
bility in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16. 
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be 
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for 
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
serted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20. 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA 
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or 
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the 
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of 
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of 
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occur-
rence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be 
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to 
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complica-
tions. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over 
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia 
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Sa-
line Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG 
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable). 
31 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards 
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide 
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7; 
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must 
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accred-
ited hospital."). 
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State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.32 As we empha-
sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient 
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
32 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri-
mester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the state's compelling interest. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --, present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
7 
~ . 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188. 04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
• Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 69~701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that , if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development , maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41 
( 
' 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. - U. S. - (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689--690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. ld., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 38&-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a sec-
ond-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can 
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F . Supp., at 694; 655 F . 2d, at 865. Ac-
cordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the require-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be 
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to pre-
serve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to 
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature in-
fant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view 
the issue as a close one. 
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's .eei'\SitiaR, and not to protecting the ac-
tual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. 
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or simi-
lar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to 
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical rea-
sons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (ex-
perts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We 
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compel-
ling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth 
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester 
abortion. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H .L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
',9 
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because 
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement furthers the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, 
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding 
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abor-
tion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant im-
pact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an 
abortion may be permissible where justified by important 
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, ~ (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one sur-
vival out of 38 live births).) 
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 
52, 80--81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 uncon-
stitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold 
that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and 
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid 
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right dur-
ing the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue 
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is 
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards 
and maternal health, '0 "further[s] important health-related 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards 
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termina-
tion of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identi-
fied, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted 
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose mem-
bers include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tis-
sue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a 
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In 
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, ob-
tained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this 
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfer-
ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of 
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
lard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abor-
tion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495, 
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with 
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications.U Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 
81. 
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suit-
able pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." N AF, National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance 
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Ami-
cus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the 
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, 
D. C. , Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of 
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination 
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be 
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does 
not confirm a normal gestation."). 
11 Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
12 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. 
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid. 
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a preg-
nant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court 
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as 
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its 
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to deci-
sions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., 
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as 
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on 
this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
13 Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the patholo-
gist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, 
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fe-
tal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic 
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981). 
14 The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue 
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 17 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part, 
provides: 
15 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
16 Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F . Supp. , at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
17 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
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"(4) In the decree, the court sha)l for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
18 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
19 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 2{) 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
20 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 14&-147 
(1976) (Bellotti D. Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I , supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
o I 
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is 
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of 
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, - U.S.- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[March - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitatioh and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-tri-
mester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga~ 
tion. 1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a Violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 8 He contends that they restrict the availability 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is perfonned within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is perfonned in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is 
perfonned during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two addi-
tional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends 
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack 
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Ap-
pellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional 
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity 
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical 
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in 
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this 
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden 
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will perniit mid-trimester 
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him 
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li-
censed clinic, do not further the State's interests. 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at 
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes, the critical point is that 
we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the re-
mainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, em-
braces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are 
performed. ld., at 150. 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law.4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
of going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally per-
missible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221 
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
• A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." V a. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1,5 that defines "hospital" to include 
"outpatient ... hospitals." 6 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See n. 
9, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
6 The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently tban itia itt'serpritee in title 32.1, and specifically 
in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 6, infra. ) 
6 
Section 32.1-123.1 provides: (.~ ~ ~~·.,e.,..-;~LL ~~ 
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ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 7 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
.. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and ma-
ternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or sur-
geons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
7 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
y ~ classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
~ service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
V the patients. '' 
Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) (similar 
rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 and 
7 32.1-127 (1979))1/ The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval--=- -1'1 
December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 26, 1977. At 
this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided, and 
staff present from the Department included two doctors and the Director 
of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facili~s Services. Witnesses in-
cluded the Associate Executive Director of tlie Virginia Hospital Associa-
tion; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the State; repre-
sentatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest Clinic, 
abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School repre-
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surgical procedures on outpatients" 8 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 9 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 10 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
senting Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tidewater 
OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical Center 
of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial Hospi-
tal; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a repre-
sentative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Commonwealth 
of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed Rules 
and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (Jan-
uary 26, 1977). The primary topic discussed at the hearing was the effect 
the new regulations would have on abortion clinics in the State. The 
Board apparently made changes in the regulations before giving its final 
approval on May 11, 1977~ The regulations became effective on June 30, 
1977. The abortion for which ~titiMlet: was prosecuted was performed on 
November 10, 1979, some two years and five months after the effective 
date of the regulations. In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977, 
attended as noted above by representatives of various organizations spe-
cifically concerned with abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant 
does not argue-that he was not fully aware of the regulations and the stat-
utory requirement that his clinic be licensed. 
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar 
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant per-
formed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of 
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, 
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va. 
Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
8 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics) . . 
9 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. 
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
[Footnote 10 is on p. 8] 
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 4--5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regula-
tions. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenor-
rhea)."). 
10 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical 
clinics." 
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licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 11 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety ofthe D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19, 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in 
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 12 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
11 See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrirnester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
12 Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other 
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. -. Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
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mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's li-
censing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of fur-
thering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health. 
c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be 
81-185--0PINION 
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grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categor-
Ies. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 13 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, §42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 14 and general building. 15 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
13 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
14 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with appliaable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
15 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
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such as anesthesia, 16 laboratory, 17 and pathology. 18 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43.7, pre-operative admission, 19 and post-
operative recovery. 20 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 21 
16 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
17 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
18 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
19 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. I d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this <;ounseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27. 
00 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
[Footnote 21 is on p. 13] 
• f 
81-185-0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 13 
III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that even if he had ap-
plied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing statutes and regulations"; that Part II of 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where secon<k.trimester abortions are performed, but see n. 
9, supra; and' that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is 
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. Id., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, seen. 30, infra. 
21 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
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safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals." 
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these argu-
ments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regula-
tions, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his 
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the 
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with 
the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said 
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians 
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the stand-
ards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified 
any significant differences between professional standards 
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least 
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are rea-
sonably related to and further the State's compelling interest 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the 
second trimester. 
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of 
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance 
22 AGOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See AGOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient 
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health 
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, AGOG's standards sug-
gest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the 
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriate-
ness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." AGOG 
Standards 55--56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (re-
quiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of 
care). Gf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the 
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). 
AGOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
[Footnote 23 is on p. 15] 
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22-24, Virginia's requirements, although more de-
tailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and per-
body'' that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and re-
vised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (respon-
sibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropoli-
tan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance 
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (herein-
after Planned Parenthood Guidelines) (duties of administrator). · 
23 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 5&-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for 
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory 
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-
tion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia, 
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instru-
ments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG 
Standards 61. 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for 
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter 
APHA Guide) (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or 
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a 
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other envi-
ronmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-
[Footnote 24 is on p. 16] 
81-185---0PINION 
16 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
sonnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, are compatible 
with generally accepted medical standards. 
Our concern centers on whether the patient services re-
quirements of the Virginia regulations further t,Pe State's in-
terest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We 
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the 
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed 
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regu-
lations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the 
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25 and recordkeep-
lines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal 
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment 
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the 
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, in-
cluding positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suc-
tion, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial 
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities 
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen, 
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have paren-
teral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
24 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58, 
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an 
emergency. ld., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10. 
26 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See n. 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations are de-
signed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate steps to 
control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-disposal 
and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the 
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 
52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures 
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and 
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ing standards 26 are typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
The laboratory services '1:1 support-and often are essential 
to-the direct medical services 28 performed by the physi-
cian 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery stand-
ards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice, 32 and the 
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. APHA Guide 
655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number 
to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used for each proce-
dure .... "). 
26 The Virginia recordkeeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59-60, which re-
quire at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on 
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, al-
lergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facili-
ties, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient in-
formation to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative 
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history 
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent, 
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and 
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On 
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval his-
tory, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record."). 
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," im-
pose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think 
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recom-
mended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13 
(recordkeeping and reporting requirements). 
27 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical I 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standru;ds 59 ("The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, 
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes."). 
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must in-
clude determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value 
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served; 
[Footnotes 28, 29, and 30 are on p. 18] 
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equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal.33 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; 
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic 
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be 
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
28 See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be com-
pleted and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added). 
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify pre-
existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that 
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is peiformed." !d., at 60 (emphasis 
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8. 
29 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA 
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10. 
30 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Admin-
istrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in 
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, 
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 
7--8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended 
[Footnotes 31, 32 and 33 are on p. 19] 
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must 
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applica-
bility in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 15--16. 
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be 
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for 
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
serted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20. 
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating 
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
81 See n. 20, supra. 
32 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards 
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical 
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician 
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the 
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the 
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA 
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or 
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the 
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of 
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of 
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occur-
rence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be 
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to 
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complica-
tions. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over 
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia 
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Sa-
line Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG 
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable). 
88 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards 
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We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.34 As we empha-
sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clin-
ics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide 
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards 7; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10 ("Each facility must have a functioning arrangement for 
emergency transport to a local accredited hospital."). 
34 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri-
mester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.1.1(b), §63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, ·given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-tri-
mester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. . 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up iJ!structions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga~ 
tion. 1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d) .. 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is 
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under § 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two addi-
tional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends 
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack 
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Ap-
pellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional 
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity 
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical 
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in 
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this 
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden 
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester 
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him 
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li-
. censed clinic, do not further the State's interests. 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at 
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes, the critical point is that 
we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the re-
mainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, em-
braces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are 
performed. ld., at 150. 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
of going forward with evidence on an affinnative defense is normally per-
missible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus. In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221 
Va., at 1069-1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
• A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." V a. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code §32.1-123.1,5 that defines "hospital" to include 
"outpatient ... hospitals." 6 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. See n. 
9, infra (noting State's interpretation of the Virginia regulations). 
6 The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 6, infra. 
6 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
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ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 7 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
. . . which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and ma-
ternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or sur-
geons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
7 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
witll, the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations ~"considerably 8iffep~ from the 
regulations that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, 
Draft I, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in 
Virginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that the 
requirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
tient ~in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the tri-
mester. Thus, no distinction was made between first- and second-trimes-
ter abortions with respect to the appropriateness of and need for state 
regulation. 
81-185-0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 7 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 8 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 9 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 10 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. At this hearing, Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, 
presided, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical' and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of the Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 
Clinic, abortion clinics; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions dur-
ing the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical clinics in the State, agreed that the Board 
should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics in order to include outpatient abortion clinics within the same set 
of regulations. See id., at 30. Following the hearing, the Board added 
Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics doing first-trimester 
abortions. It therefore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for 
1scre e and different sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board 
[Footnotes 8 and 9 are on p. 8] 
·~ 
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 4-5. In those cases, the regulations required that 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen-
eral, acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found 
that such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilata-
tion and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in 
appropriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
because they did not reasonably further the state interest in 
maternal health. 
gave its final approval to the regulations before us on May 11, 1977. 
The regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months after the effective date of the regulations. 
In view of the public hearing on January 26, 1977, attended as noted above 
by representatives of various organizations specifically concerned with 
abortions, it cannot be said-and indeed appellant does not argue-that he 
was not fully aware of the regulations and the statutory requirement that 
his clinic be licensed. 
Although of no direct relevance to this case, we note that new but similar 
regulations now supersede the regulations in effect when appellant per-
formed the abortion for which he was prosecuted. See Department of 
Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, 
pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were promulgated pursuant to Va. 
Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
8 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in t~is Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
9 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
[Footnote 10 is on p. 9] 
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One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 11 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19, 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 7, infra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regula-
tions. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenor-
rhea)."). 
10 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical 
clinics." 
11 See Cadesky, Ravinsky &' Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
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a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable re lations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety arly in 
the second trimester, still may cause complic1tions. 1 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur-
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter ACOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
12 Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other 
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. -.· Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent 
infection. 
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medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's li-
censing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of fur-
thering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health. 
c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categor-
ies. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 13 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
13 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may.be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
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physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, §42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 14 and general building. 15 
The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 16 laboratory, 17 and pathology. 18 Some of 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
14 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
" The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
16 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
17 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for SY.Philis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
18 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 19 and post-
operative recovery. 20 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 21 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confinn presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
19 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. !d., §43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27. 
20 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, see n. 30, infra. 
21 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
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III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
IOns · grounds. He argues that even if he had ap-
plied or a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing statutes and regulations"; that Part II of I 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where second-trimester abortions are performed, but see n. 
9, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is 
safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals." 
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these argu-
ments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regula-
tions, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his 
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the 
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with 
the State's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said I 
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians 
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the stand-
ards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified 
any significant differences between professional standards 
times." 
• > ... 
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and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least 
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are rea-
sonably related to and further the State's compelling interest 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the 
second trimester. 
The requirements of the first 22 and second categories 23 of 
regulations discussed in Part II-C above have little relevance 
22 ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See ACOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient 
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health 
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's standards sug-
gest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the 
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriate-
ness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG 
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (re-
quiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of 
care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the 
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). 
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and re-
vised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (respon-
sibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropoli-
tan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance 
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (herein-
after Planned Parenthood Guidelines) (duties of administrator). 
23 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for 
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory 
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-
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to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of ACOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22-24, Virginia's requirements, although more de-
tailed with respect to specific facilities, 24 equipment, and per-
tion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia, 
perfonnance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instru-
ments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG 
Standards 61. 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for 
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter 
APHA Guide) (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or 
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a 
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other envi-
ronmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-
lines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal 
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment 
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the 
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, in-
cluding positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suc-
tion, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial 
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities 
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen, 
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have paren-
teral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
24 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58, 
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an 
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sonnel than the ACOG and APHA standards, ~ble 
with generally accepted medical standards. I 
Our concern centers on whether the patient services re-
quirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's in-
terest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We 
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the 
standards used by ACOG and APHA, and we are impressed 
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regu-
lations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the 
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 25 and recordkeep-
ing standards 26 are typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
emergency. /d., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10. 
25 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See n. 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations are de-
signed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate steps to 
control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-disposal 
and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protection of the 
integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§ 41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 52.2.6, 
52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop procedures 
for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife blades, and 
contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. APHA Guide 
655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be sufficient in number 
to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used for each proce-
dure .... "). 
26 The Virginia recordkeeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59--60, which re-
quire at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on 
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, al-
lergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facili-
ties, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient in-
formation to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative 
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history 
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent, 
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and 
discharge summary and instructions. Id., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On 
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The laboratory services '1:1 support-and often are essential 
to--the direct medical services 28 performed by the physi-
cian 29 and nurse. 30 The post-operative recovery stand-
ards 31 also comport with accepted medical practice, 32 and the 
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval his-
tory, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record."). 
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," im-
pose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think 
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655--656 (recom-
mended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13 
(recordkeeping and reporting requirements). 
'n The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, 
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes."). 
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must in-
clude determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value 
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served; 
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; 
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic 
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be 
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests, urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
28 See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be com-
pleted and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added). 
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify pre-
existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that 
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis 
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8. 
29 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
[Footnotes 30, 31, and 32 are on p. 19] 
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equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal. 33 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA 
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 10. 
30 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Admin-
istrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in 
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, 
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended 
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating 
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
31 See n. 20, supra. 
32 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards 
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical 
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician 
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the 
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the 
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA 
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or 
injury."). Less serious compli,cations can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the 
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of 
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of 
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occur-
rence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be 
[Footnote 33 is on p. 20] 
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must 
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applica-
bility in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 15-16. 
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be 
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for 
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
serted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20. 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.34 As we empha-
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to 
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complica-
tions. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over 
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia 
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Sa-
line Inductions, 116 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG 
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable). 
83 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards 
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide 
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards 7; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10 ("Each facility must have a functioni!}g arrangement for 
emergency transport to a local accredited hospital."). 
S4 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri- I 
mester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in properly equipped outpatient clin-
ics is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood As5. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
.November, 19791.\he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, ~ 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 1 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room 
and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as pennitted by statute, persons perfonning an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the convicti~ Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probaofe jurisdic-
tion,-- U.S.--, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders~e~ict9 
0 ment unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069--
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
~u. ~o£' ~ , U. S. 113, 163 (1973). This interest embraces the facilities 
_, ~ \o ~ and circumstances in which abortions are performed. See 
id., at 150. Appellant argues, however, that Virginia\;. stat g. 
)- utory hospitalisation requiFeffieHt- prohibits all non-hospital 
second-trimester abortions and that such a requirement im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In 
City of Akron and Ashcroft, we t.eea~' have found this ar~ 
_ ):AI""' f""'""~ ''§iii) made ia constitutional challen etTa" 1 ..,.IJ.l ~...0.. ...,) ·y the acute-car ge~lleli hospital reqmrements at issue there. ~ · 
)- The State of Virgmia argues here that its hospitalization re-
l d..~.{fus) quirementQO§\significantly diff8ri~from the hospitalization 
" requirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
... 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code §32.1-123.1, 4~-defines "hospital" to include 
~ 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). ~Surgeti:is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. -see-e.. 
.. 
.a. 8, i1t1~ 01 (aatiRg State's interpretatiGR af U1:e Vh ginia t egula1:iefls). e._ 
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 I 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
. different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
.. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de- 1 
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "(i]nstitutions 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code§§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
81-185-0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 7 
. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the I 
:~~~~t:h·afi!!:~~=!:: ;::::;:a::!Z!~;:::~::~;!~ 
~e~atioH. · 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
-tux:, ~\-~~ t...\;,.,~t." State; representatives of he Richmond Medical Center and the Hillcrest 'l' 
L~~~~~~===~!!·~;:a~Ft*~ii*i~\; :_3a~~professor from Eastern Virginia Medical School 
representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the Tide-
water OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memorial 
Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and a 
representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these out atient abortion clinics 
within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following t e earmg, 
the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only to clinics do-
[ Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
lf~-~J 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
ing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It therefore is clear ~ » ~ 
"ssl--=~!!!e;N.._6_....,_~ __ ~·~StEh~at~1~~t~0gt~~sm~·:O~rh~:~~~e~r:~~~~gn~e~~~~0~dd~!~~e;n~e~e~d~~;o;r~d~i~sc~r:e~t~~a~nd~d~ifi~er;e~n~t~s~e:ts:o:fll \ \ -~ ~\ 
• ~ egulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
'----"w..,_...Ic....-appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
_.---t---11~-- some two years and five months later. lfl view ef tl:!.e pYalie hell:f'iflg alP J 
.Jaflttttey 2e, 1~77, atte~dQc,l aii IJ.oted aBQ'W hJ' representati"Qii of variawo 
--ePgttnillstioHB Sfleeifiettlly eafleemefi with abortion!!, it ettflflat B9 illiid and:> 
iiJ.deQd appella~t dees flat ttPgtte tJotst he ~a!! not ftdl) ft n ftPe afthe reg:altt'<. 
~iOil.ii aiJ.d the catatntory re'!lol.ire~Heflt t!otat his clinic be lieeFtseP 
1 We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
' Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i . e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., §62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] 
shall be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three · main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
1
. ices, 10 and general building. 11 cl~ f~ <::\. 
,.-,~~-m~7-H· ~QI:l&af:!iigroup o regulations -ieF QUr pnrpoiH~.iY 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities . 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
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such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
14 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43. 8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, andY 
C::: the facility "shall offer each patient appropriate counseling and instruc-
tion in the abortion procedure and in birth control methods,~d. , § 43.85." 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§43.9.1 , 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id. , §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
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B 
tis readily apparent t a Irg:tma's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement ~significantly "tiiffepe~ from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante at 4-5. In those cases ~he regulationst required that lct~t · \.owwel'\ ) 
"all second-trimester abortions must be performed in gen- ~' ' 
eral acute-care facilities." A ante at 5. 
' tieR aHa O¥aeyatioH IlUiltHOQ (D&E) ofperformiRg abortiORS iR .IZ.. 
app~;:op~;:iate HOB fios~ital settiHgs, "imposea a :Heavy, aHa YR .s:z 
Heeessary, bYPtkR oR womeH's aeeess to a l'elatively iHexp9R o 
...sive, ot:Rervlise aeeessible, aRd :~afe abortioR p~;:oeeauPe .'l< 
-Gity efAk' tm, d1tttl, a:t 20. Tee Co1:1rt iRvaliaatea tfie!5e la:ws ~ 
b'i!Gause they did not reasonably further the state iRterest iH e 
matemal :Realt:kc. 
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 




The remainin question is the constitutionality of Virgin- , 
· 's re lations. V trhe American Public Health Association CII'YIIM-Iat'-
(APHA), although recognizing "that greater use oft e ilata-
tion and evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform 
the vast majority of second trimester abortions during or 
prior to the 16th [w]eek after the last menstrual period," still 
"[u]rges endorsement of the provision of second trimester 
abortion in free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state 
standards required for certification." APHA, The Right to 
Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 (1979~~ffiJ3H~~i~ aelelee+Jl. 
The medical profession has not thought ~standards need L"'-cd:,. ~'=r.J 
be relaxed merely because the facility performs abortions: " 
"Ambulatory care facilities providing abortion services 
should meet the same standards of care as those recom-
mended for other surgical procedures performed in the physi-
cian's office and outpatient clinic or the free-standing and 
hospital-based ambulatory setting." American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Ob-
stetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). See also id., I 
at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambulatory surgical 
facilities should be licensed to conform to requirements of 
state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the medical profes-
sion's standards for outpatient surgical facilities are strin-
gent: "Such facilities should maintain the same surgical, anes-
thetic, and personnel standards as recommended for 
hos itals." Ibid. ·-'P~ .\b ~ 
In view of its mteres , the State necessarily has consider- ~ . ~: \ 
able discretion in determining standards for the licensin of lN\oC) 
medical facilitie~ its discretion does not· ermit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from ~,..medical ( ~-!) 
~:=~~i~i:r:!fel::~:~r=a=:t~7J:!::C:r::f ~ ·~~:_ 'u\· ~ ~ -
tiofts eltuing [the second trimester], the he~ltfi st~nel~td~ ~~ ~-
aEleflteel an1st be 'le~tiffiately Felated to t:Re ebj eetive t:Re o ' ~ 
~r~ 
~~~ 
~ ~ ~.DOPIAGI\AI 
81-185--0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 13 
.gtate seeks to aeeomplish.' DfJe, 410 U. 8., at 1Q5," City o.fc;:> 
~ A~rfJn, ante, at 1~ n their face, the Virginia regu atwns 
appear to be generally compatible with accepted medical 
standards · out atient second-trimester abortions. 18 
.....,_..,---r-r~..--....,--L ~ ~ ~ J 
18 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
19 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital_,(egYleth~~; stating that he was seek-
ing a license; but denying that he knew of the :~=egYlatieRs when the abor-
tion was performed). "' 
20 Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement ~ompara e to t ose 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not indi-
vidually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the 
broadest language and in conclusory terms: ~he record is silent on the 
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
I 
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Pegulatic;n:~s do uot further the gtate's egmpellillg interest ~ 
"d the health aad safety of the pregnant vv omas.. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia :regalatieH~ con-
cerning second-trimester abortions to be an unreasonable 
means of furthering the State's compelling interest in "pro-
tecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150.21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike -AlrPo~ 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are· performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that 
the State has no right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and 
equipment standards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. 
As City of Akron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's com-
pelling interest in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable 
regulations. Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will en-
tail costs, but this can be said of ~,regulations adopted by governments 
to protect the health and safety of people. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
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~ City of Akro~ · Ashcroft, Virginia{ do~ not l ~ Ol'<l ~ J 
require that the patie be hospitalized as an inpatient or that 's ~. 
the abortion be peri edina full-service, acute-care hospi-
L~~;jf~~~~~f,:;it~ali.tl!fiR~a~t;h;er~t~h~e~SJfct~e~'s :reqliiFemeats tiM! statYtes a:Rd theO.. 
~egt~lations 2. @I IH to ~HUR:QQ~~acceptea medical prac- I 
tice..,. and leave tne method and timmg of the abortion pre-
cisely where they belong-with the physician and the I 
patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital-
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is con-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-185 
CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
c:h~;-
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic. and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-lO(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, · which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. 
' The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions ,could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." ld., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester ''the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infectio~ control, § 41.2.5. 
tQThese services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
humin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
"Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d.,§ 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient 
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in 
birth control methods," M., § 43.85. 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
times." 
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B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester 
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City 
of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those 
cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during 
the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions 
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-
service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The require-
ments at issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimes-
ter abortions must be performed in general, acute-care 
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia 
statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester 
abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. 
Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient sur-
gical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in 
which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be per-
formed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft 
are not controlling here. 
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virgin-
ia's regulations. In view of its interest in protecting the 
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable 
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medi-
cal facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical 
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating sec-
ond-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for 
facilities in which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18 The American Pub-
18 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52-54 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion 
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [ w ]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for· other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider each of the regulations separately. 
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the 
time of his trial, 19 appellant introduced no medical evidence 
questioning the reasonableness of any of them. This is to be 
contrasted with the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
19 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 5&-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a 
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
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where the plaintiffs sought at great length to show that par-
ticular requirements as to equipment and services were un-
reasonable restraints on women seeking second-trimester 
abortions. Appellant persisted in arguing broadly that Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in sub-
stance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and 
Ashcroft cases. 20 Indeed, not until his reply brief in this 
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart from Vir-
ginia's statutory hospitalization requirement. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia hospitalization re-
20 Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement is comparable to those we 
have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. Ap-
pellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individ-
ually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the 
broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the ap-
plicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show 
whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or whether, if 
they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent 
on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to de-
fend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had 
applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have been granted; that 
obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no 
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that 
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital 
where second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these argu-
ments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see 
n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no 
right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment stand-
ards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Ak-
ron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest 
in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable regulations. 
Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but 
this can be said of all regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. 
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quirement concerning second-trimester abortions to be an 
unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling in-
terest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." 
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he 
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, 
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circum-
stances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. 
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, 
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the pa-
tient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be 
performed in a full-service, acute-care hos~tal. Rather, the 
State's hospitalization requirement appearol\comport with ac-
cepted medical practice and leav{ the method and timing of 
the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician 
and the patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital-
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is con-
stitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
lS 
Affirmed. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the' same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
I I -
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2--71, 54--316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2--10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2--71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S~E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, .410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, bwld a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us · · whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with th-en-1. 
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
/ 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery). " 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion ana by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. whlch primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." !d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." !d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there-
[Foot?Wtes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main 
categories. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virgirua, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i.e., §§43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II le-
gally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 9 §43.2, an administrative officer, §40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices,'0 and general building.11 The final group of regulations 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia,'2 laboratory, 13 and pathology.'4 Some of 
'The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures t 
may performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may sed, 
§ 41.2.2; e criteria and procedures for admissions and dischar , § 41.2.4; 
'Written info ed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for ho ekeeping and · 
infectio~ contr § 41.2.5. 
10 These service ay be provided within the out 1ent surgical hospital 
if the services comp with applicable require ts of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Re lations for the Li sure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a c tractual gement with nearby facilities . 
Va. Regs . (Outpatient Hospi s) §- . . 1. 
11 The regulations contain cust ary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordin ces, d the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1 . 7.1, 50.8. 50.8.4. 
12 See, e. g., Va. Re . (Outpatient Ho "tals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licens physician); id., § 43.1.2 sician responsible for an-
esthesia must present for administration and very). 
13 Each p ent admitted must receive "appropriate utine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43. 6.1. atient sur-
gical ospitals providing abortion services also must conduct p ancy 
te mg, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh t · 
oomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and a 
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically i 
·cated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1 fi. 
ection 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a path ogy 
exa · ation, with pathology services for abortion patients meet" g the 
m1mmu requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for hi ological 
examinati by a pathologist in all cases where gross examin on by the 
attending p sician does not confirm presence of fetal rts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43.8. provides for a medical history and phY, Jcal examination 
before initiating a procedure. Sufficient time to p it review of lab-
oratory tests must b allowed between initial exam· tion and initiation of 
any procedure. !d.,§ 3.8.3. In an outpatients gical hospital providing 
abortion services, the · gnosis of pregnancy i the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., 43.8.4, and the fa · ity "shall offer each patient 
appropriate counseling an ·nstruction in e abortion procedure and in 
birth control methods," id., § .85. 
16 Each patient shall be observ for ost-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency pro d es. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2~ A lie 1sed p sician must be present on the 
premises until the patient · discharge on his written orders. !d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Ou atient Hospitals) § 3.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("a equate monitoring equip ent, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related· ems necessary for resuscitati and control of hemor-
rhage and other mplications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambu ce service to a li-
censed general spital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written a eement shall be executed with a general ho "tal to ensure 
that any p ient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall rec ·ve needed 
emergen treatment. The agreement shall be with a license eneral 
hospit capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical !abo ory, 
and agnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and w · h 
ha a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at a 
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It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester 
hospitaliztion requirement differs from those at issue in City 
of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4--5. In those 
cases, we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during 
the early weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions 
may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-
service hospital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The require-
ments at issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimes-
ter abortions must be performed in general, acute-care 
facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia 
statutes and regulations do not require that second-trimester 
abortions be performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. 
Under Virginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient sur-
gical hospitals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in 
which second-trimester abortions lawfully may be per-
formed. Thus, our decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft 
are not controlling here. 
. ;l~e ; :i:~ ques~ion is ~he ~onstituti.onalit;y of _Yir gin/ 
1a' ~ . In view of Its mterest m protectmg the 
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable 
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medi-
cal facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical 
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating sec-
ond-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for 
facilities in which such abortions are performed. 
(fl.f}j\) en their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener .,_ 
'}lA> .:.. J- F f/ ally eompatible ,,vith accepted medical standards governing> 
<mtpatient second trimester abortions.# The American Pub-
--
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [ w ]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
--,~~~d for hospitals." Ibid. 
e need not conside~ of the regulation~:fifim~~::' 
trJ~E-R..,. Despite personal knowledge of the r lations a east by the 
A- 1me o 1s tria /"" appellant introduced no medical evidence4-
(o..:tkM) EjtieStioning the r€lasonableness o 
)r - /H~~e~:,~~:~:~,:~::~d~:~li~th~t~h~s~s~'~'isd;e~n~ee~in~c~~~·ty~'~o~f~A.~k~ro~n~a~n~d~2~4~s~h~cr~o5fi~, g. ..-- 29, n. 6 (supporti an ar .,..,..,->Ln,,n 
''• 
as 1 uting "minimum standards"). 
19 ee nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55--56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a 
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
Insert A (p. 12) 
"appellant has not attacked them as being insufficient!¥ related 
to the State's interest in protecting maternal health. His 
challenge throughout this litigation has been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
I ndeed, appellant has taken the position, both before the lower 
courts and before this Court, that a state licensing requirement 
for outpatient abortion facilities would be constitutional. See 
9 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 
(Va.S.Ct.), p.35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 
43, n. 75, 46. In essence, appellant has argue~ 
Insert B (p. 13) 
"Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see notes , supra, we see no -~ 
reason to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon ~ 
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license 
permitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. Jj 
ppellant has thus challenged a statutory scheme that does not 
exist in Virginia: a requirement that second-trimester abortion ~ 
be performed in full-service hospitals. Since appellant has __ 
declined to challenge the constitutionality of the Virginia 
egulations, we have no occasion to pass on them." 
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( #ta:J- J 
quirement~"'-ISecond-trimester abortions.J6 be an 
unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling m-
terest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." 
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he 
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, 
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circum-
stances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. 
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, 
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the pa-
tient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be 
performed in a full-service, acute-care hos ital. Rather, the 
State's~~ requirement appea:g omp W1 
cepted medical practice and leavest e method and timing of 
the abortion precisely w~ere they belong-with the physician 
and the patient. 
v 
~aj ~GJ~­
*~~ 5 f.v- ahor ~'ch5 
let_ p-u4i;~ ,'" 
l,'~o;,ul r.L'/\/c_;, 
We hold-tR~ecurd-before us, Vii ginia's hospital->- I . __ . ·'.:A .. A ~k 
· · rimest-€r abo~ is coiY--' ~1:...:.::..:..~ u 
Bt~ The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
is 
Affirmed. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be restrict them to 
~care, general hospitals. The only~gulations before us, however, 
\:::/ re1aL,"'{ to second-trimester abortio~:: ~ :;:ose rEJqYirements l'ea.R 
S'6Hably related to tl:i€l St:JtQ'S com h;o.g mtel'e,st. ,._ 
'' 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clihic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
, .. 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia Jaw and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden ofalleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
81-185---0PINION 
4 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069--
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." V a. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
the issue before us is the validity of those requirements, not whether ap-
pellant's clinic and his procedures would have complied with them. 
•The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
81-185---0PINION 
6 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
"outpatient. hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
' The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representa:tive of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first grouping relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, seen. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meet-
ing these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure 
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall 
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and proce-
dures manual,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a li-
censed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
inay be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals) §§50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient 
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in 
birth control methods," id., § 43.8.5. 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
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B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kan-
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, 
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at 
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling 
here. 
The remaining question is the constitutionality of Virgin-
ia's regulations. In view of its interest in protecting the 
health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable 
discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medi-
cal facilities. Although its discretion does not permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical 
practice, it does have a legitimate interest in regulating sec-
ond-trimester abortions and setting forth the standards for 
facilities in which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. 18 The American Pub-
times." 
18 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 51-62 (5th ed. 1982); APHA Recom-
mended Program Guide for Abortion Services, 70 Am. J . Pub. Health 652, 
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lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [ w ]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider each of the regulations separately. 
Despite personal knowledge of the regulations at least by the 
time of his trial, 19 appellant introduced no medical evidence 
questioning the reasonableness of any of them. This is to be 
contrasted with the evidence in City of Akron and Ashcroft, 
655 (1980). See also National Abortion Federation, National Abortion 
Federation Standards (1981). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 
29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities 
as consitituting "minimum standards"). 
19 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a 
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
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where the plaintiffs sought at great length to show that par-
ticular requirements as to equipment and services were un-
reasonable restraints on women seeking second-trimester 
abortions. Appellant persisted in arguing broadly that Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirements are no different in sub-
stance from those we reviewed in the City of Akron and 
Ashcroft cases. 20 Indeed, not until his reply brief in this 
Court did appellant criticize the regulations apart from Vir-
ginia's statutory hospitalization requirement. 
We therefore conclude, on the record before us in this case, 
that appellant has not shown the Virginia hospitalization re-
quirement concerning second-trimester abortions to be an 
20 Appellant has presented no evidence challenging the validity of the 
regulations as distinguished from his attack on the hospitalization require-
ment in§ 18.2-73. Indeed, appellant does not attack these regulations ex-
pressly in his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief, instead argu-
ing that the Virginia hospitalization requirement is comparable to those we 
have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus also invalid. Ap-
pellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not individ-
ually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in the 
broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the ap-
plicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not show 
whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or whether, if 
they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the record is silent 
on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no opportunity to de-
fend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain whether, if he had 
applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have been granted; that 
obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia courts have had no 
opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and regulations"; and that 
Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical hospital 
where second-trimester abortions are performed. Some of these argu-
ments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others are irrelevant, see 
n. 3, supra. And certainly appellant cannot argue that the State has no 
right to require appellant to meet reasonable facility and equipment stand-
ards merely because they impose some costs and burdens. As City of Ak-
ron makes clear, see ante, at 12, in view of the State's compelling interest 
in the pregnant woman's health, it may adopt reasonable regulations. 
Compliance with the State's requirements certainly will entail costs, but 
this can be said of all regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. 
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unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling in-
terest in "protecting the woman's own health and safety." 
Roe, 410 U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he 
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, 
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circum-
stances that insure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. 
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, 
Virginia's statute and regulations do not require that the pa-
tient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be 
performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's hospitalization requirement appears to comport with 
accepted medical practice and leave the method and timing of 
the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician 
and the patient. 
v 
We hold that, on the record before us, Virginia's hospital-
ization requirement for second-trimester abortions is con-
stitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
is 
Affirmed. 
2' Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno• 
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
sonably related to the State's compelling interest. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
, .. . , 
81-185--0PINION 
2 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the · alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1/ that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his pro-
cedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations. 
4 The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards andre-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants , and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code § § 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." Id., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 23, infra. It there-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
• -r.., 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first grouping relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital .. . unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II , i . e. , §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meet-
ing these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure 
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall 
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea).") . 
·" < • 
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and proce-
dures manuaV § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a li-
censed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
• The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures fo!'admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
11 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1 , 50.7.1 , 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
13 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
esting." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
esting, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
81-185-0PINION 
10 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43.7, pre-operative admission, 15 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
6oomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
15 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. I d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient 
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in 
birth control methods," id., § 43.8.5. 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43.9.3, 43.9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
I • 
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B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kan-
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, 
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at 
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling 
here. lo~ 
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. 
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion~ 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it 
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimes-
ter abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in 
which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-1 / _____.-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing ~ 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Pub- I 0~ 
lie Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
times. " 
'~ "If· ... 
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mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [ w ]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are 
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowl-
edge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant 
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the 
State's interest in protecting health. 18 His challenge 
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are no different in substance from those 
18 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a 
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
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reviewed in the City of Akrpn and Ashcroft cases. 19 At the 
same time, however, appellant took the position-bot~ be-
fore the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing 
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be con-
stitutional. 20 We can only assume that by continuing to chal-
lenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner ei-
ther views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way 
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization require-
ment that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations 
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hos-
pitalization requirement. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no rea-
son to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon 
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license per-
mitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. 
We conclude that Virginia's reguirement that second-trimes-
ter abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unrea-
sonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
19 Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not 
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in 
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the 
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below. 
20 See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S. 
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"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the 
provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's 
statute and regt1lation.s do not require that the patienrlJe 
hospitaliZed as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed 
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's re-
quirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in 
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical 
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion 
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care , general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates 
to second-trimester abortions. 
lJ 
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CHRIS SIMOPOULOS, APPELLANT v. VIRGINIA 
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for R epToductive Health, Inc., ante, p. - -, 
and Planned Pa1·enthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-
trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
!d., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
' The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
' . 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the f1rst trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (il) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
fust-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975) . 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus . In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E . 2d, at 200-201. 
II I 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
.. . 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code §32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his pro-
cedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations. 
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in § 18.2--73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32. 1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204 . 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. See n. 5, infra. 
• Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity \vith provisions of this chapter, 
\vith the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of th.e Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
· Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." Id., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions . See nn. 8, 23, infra . It there-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8] 
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be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first grouping relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
7 Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital ... is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
'Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43.7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meet-
ing these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure 
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outp~tient abortion clinic] shall 
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and proce-
dures manuai,S § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a li-
censed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 10 and general building. 11 The final group of regulations 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia, 12 laboratory, 13 and pathology. 14 Some of 
9 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures fol" admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
10 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical hospital 
if the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities . 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
"The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
building codes, zoning ordinances, and the like. See Va. Regs. (Outpa-
tient Hospitals)§§ 50.6.1, 50.7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
12 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
"Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43. 6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical hospitals providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy 
testing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
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the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§ 43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission/5 and post-
operative recovery. 16 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 17 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for sugar and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
"Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at 8-11. 
"Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical hospital providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician, id., § 43.8.4, and the facility "shall offer each patient 
appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion procedure and in 
birth control methods," id ., § 43.8.5. 
16 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43.9.1, 43.9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. !d., 
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. 
17 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., § 43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
has a physician in the hospital and available for emergency service at all 
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B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kan-
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, 
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at 
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling 
here. 
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. 
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it 
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimes-
ter abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in 
which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Pub-
lic Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
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mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG), Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are 
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowl-
edge· of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant 
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the 
State's interest in protecting health. 18 His challenge 
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are no different in substance from those 
'
8 See nn. 3, 6, supra; Record Vol. 5, pp. 55-56 (appellant acknowledging 
existence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a 
license; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
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reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 19 At the 
same time, however, appeliant ·took the position-both be-
fore the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing 
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be con-
stitutional. 20 We can only assume that by continuing to chal-
lenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner ei-
ther views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way 
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization require-
ment that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations 
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hos-
pitalization requirement. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no rea-
son to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon 
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license per-
mitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. 
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimes-
ter abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unrea-
sonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
19 Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not 
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in 
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: the record is silent on the 
applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below. 
20 See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S. 
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46. 
,; 
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"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150. 21 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the 
provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's 
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be 
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed 
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's re-
quirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in 
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical 
practice, and leaves the method and tinung of the abortion 
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
21 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church, Virginia. The Falls Church clinic has an operating 
room and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treat-
ment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and sta-
bilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily per-
forms first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time 
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had ap-
pellant sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
Id., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
'. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
· prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus . In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, 4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code § 32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his pro-
cedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations. 
'The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in §32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
' Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
" 'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
'The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
.. 
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
· School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." Id., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." I d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 12, infra. It there-
[Footnotes 7 and 8 are on p. 8} 
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be perfonned in an outpatient surgical hospital provided that 
facility has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the perfonnance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first groupipg relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
'Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical hospitals). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meet-
ing these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure 
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall 
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and proce-
dures manual, § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a li-
censed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, §§ 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, and general building, §§ 50.6.1, 
50.7.1, 50.8.1, 52.4. The final group of regulations relates to 
patient care services. Most of these set the requirements 
for various services that the facility may offer, such as an-
esthesia, §43.1, laboratory, §§43.6.1, 64.1.3, 64.1.4, and pa-
thology, §§ 43.6.3, 64.2.4. Some of the requirements relate 
to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. §§ 43.2, 43.10, 
43.11, 43.12. 6. There are also guidelines on medical records, 
§ 43. 7, pre-operative admission, § 43.8, and post-operative re-
covery, § 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emer-
gency services and evacuation planning. §§ 43.4.1, 43.5. 
B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kan-
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, 
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at 
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
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tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling 
here. 
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. 
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it 
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimes-
ter abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in 
which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Pub-
lic Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "(u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
I O'!'r~ 
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ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are 
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowl-
edge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant 
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the 
State's interest in protecting health. 9 His challenge 
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are no different in substance from those 
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 10 At the 
9 See nn. 3, 6, supra; 5 Record 5i>-56 (appellant acknowledging exist-
ence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a li-
cense; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 1. ~---
w Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not 
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in 
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: that the record is silent on 
the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
81-185-0PINION 
12 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
same time, however, appellant took the position-both be-
fore the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing 
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be con-
stitutional. 11 We can only assume that by continuing to chal-
lenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner ei-
ther views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way 
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization require-
ment that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations 
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hos-
pitalization requirement. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no rea-
son to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon 
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license per-
mitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. 
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimes-
ter abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unrea-
sonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U. S., at 150. 12 As w~ emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below. 
11 See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S. 
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46. 
12 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.l.l(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates 
to second-trimester abortions. 
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provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's 
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be 
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed 
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's re-
quirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in 
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical 
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion 
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
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SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
No. 81-185. Argued November 30, 1982-Decided June--, 1983 
Appellant, an obstetrician-gynecologist, was convicted after a Virginia 
state-court trial for violating Virginia statutory provisions make it un-
lawful to perform an abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy 
outside of a licensed hospital. "Hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient hospitals, and State Department of Health regulations define "out-
patient hospital" as including institutions that primarily furnish facilities 
for the performance of surgical procedures on outpatients. The regula-
tions also provide that second-trimester abortions may be performed in 
an outpatient surgical clinic licensed as a "hospital" by the State. The 
evidence at appellant's trial established, inter alia, that he performed a 
second-trimester abortion on an unmarried minor by an injection of sa-
line solution at his unlicensed clinic; that the minor understood appellant 
to agree to her plan to deliver the fetus in a motel and did not recall 
being advised to go to a hospital when labor began, although such advice 
was included in an instruction sheet provided her by appellant; and that 
the minor, alone in a motel, aborted her fetus 48 hours after the saline 
injection. The \Giog4Ria Supreme Co affirmed appellant's conviction. 
Held: 'I;~ j_,; ~' 
1. The Virginia abortion statute was not unconstitutionally applied to 
appellant on the asserted ground that the State failed to allege in the in-
dictment and to prove lack of medical necessity for the abortion. Under 
the authoritative construction of the statute by the V:iPg:iJ:~itl Supreme 
~I· . . A 1 Cow1( the prosecution was no~· a ted to prove lack of medical neces-l ~ '''\'"'~ --sitylj'~yond a reasonable doub unti appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. Placing upon the efendant the burden of going forward 
with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally permissible. And 
appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts in 
fact caused the fetus' death is meritless, in view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial. Pp. 3--4. 
--
.. 
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2. Virginia's requirement that second-trimester abortions be per-
formed in licensed outpatient clinics is not an unreasonable means of fur-
thering the State's important and legitimate interest in protecting the 
woman's health, which interest becomes "compelling" at approximately 
the end of the first trimester. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., ante, p. --,and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kan-
sas City v. Ashcroft, ante, p. --, constitutional challenges were upheld 
with regard to requirements mandating that all second-trimester abor-
tions be performed in "general, acute-care facilities." In contrast, the 
Virginia statutes and regulations do not require that such abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals, but permit their perform-
ance at licensed outpatient clinics. Thus, the decisions in Akron and 
Ashcroft, are not controlling here. Although a State's discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities does not per-
mit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical 
practice, the Virginia regulations on their face are compatible with ac-
cepted medical standards governing outpatient second-trimester abor-
tions. Pp. 4-13. 
221 Va. 1059, 227 S. E. 2d 194, affirmed . 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo ., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979, he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church, Virginia. The Falls Church clinic has an operating 
room and facilities for resuscitation and emergency treat-
ment of cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and sta-
bilization fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily per-
forms first-trimester abortions at his clinic. During the time 
relevant to this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had ap-
pellant sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
81-185---0PINION 
2 SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 
P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
ld., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
1 Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54--317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic- l 
tion, 456 U. S. 988, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant raises two issues that do not require extended 
treatment. He first contends that Va. Code § 18.2-71 was 
applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack of medical ne-
cessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of 
fact. Appellant contends that this failure renders his convic-
tion unconstitutional for two reasons: (i) the State failed to 
meet its burden of alleging necessity in the indictment, as re-
quired by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 (1971); and 
(ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to 
the defense of medical necessity, the prosecution was not ob-
ligated to prove lack of medical necessity beyond a reason-
able doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity as a 
defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appel-
lant's reliance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Co-
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is performed during the third trimester under certain cir-
cumstances, § 18.2-74; and (iv) is necessary to save the woman's life, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
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lumbia statute in Vuitch, as construed by _this Court, re-
quired the prosecution to make this allegation. See 402 
U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is nor-
mally permissible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 
120-121, and n. 20 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 
701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to 
prove that his acts in fact caused the death of the fetus. In 
view of the undisputed facts proved at trial, summarized 
above, this contention is meritless. See 221 Va., at 1069-
1070, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
III 
We consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that a 
State has an "important and legitimate interest in the health 
of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' . . . at approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester." Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973). See City of Akron, ante, at 10. This 
interest embraces the facilities and circumstances in which 
abortions are performed. See id., at 150. Appellant ar-
gues, however, that Virginia prohibits all non-hospital sec-
ond-trimester abortions and that such a requirement imposes 
an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy. In City 
of Akron and Ashcroft, we upheld such a constitutional chal-
lenge to the acute-care hospital requirements at issue there. 
The State of Virginia argues here that its hospitalization re-
quirement differs significantly from the hospitalization re-
quirements considered in City of Akron and Ashcroft and 
that it reasonably promotes the State's interests. 
A 
In furtherance of its compelling interest in maternal 
health, Virginia has enacted a hospitalization requirement for 
abortions performed during the second trimester. As a gen-
eral proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated under 
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Virginia law. 3 Virginia law does not, however, permit a 
physician licensed in the practice of medicine and surgery to 
perform an abortion during the second trimester of preg-
nancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital li-
censed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1,4 that defines "hospital" to include 
3 A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). "Surgery" is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here, nor does he now 
argue that his clinic would meet the requirements of the Virginia statute 
and regulations. Rather, he broadly attacks the validity of the state hos-
pitalization requirements as applied to second-trimester abortions. Thus, 
it is irrelevant to the issue before us whether appellant's clinic and his pro-
cedures would have complied with the Virginia regulations. 
4 The Supreme Court of Virginia views the word "hospital" in§ 18.2-73 
as referring to the definition of that term in § 32.1-123.1. This is made 
clear by the court's general reference in its opinion to title 32.1 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the title of the Code that contains many of Virginia's health 
laws: 
"The state is empowered to license and regulate hospitals, clinics, home 
health agencies, and other medical care facilities, see generally, Title 32.1 
of the Code, and to fix and enforce different standards of medical care for 
different facilities. The General Assembly has decided that medical proce-
dures employed in second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospi-
tals. Based upon the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that 
the hospital requirement is reasonably related to the State's compelling in-
terest in preserving and protecting maternal health." 221 Va., at 1075, 
277 S. E. 2d, at 204. 
~ ' I. 
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"outpatient . hospitals." 5 Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 6 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
There is no basis for assuming that the court interpreted "hospital" in 
§ 18.2-73 any differently from its interpretation in title 32.1, and specifi-
cally in § 32.1-123.1. Seen. 5, infra. 
5 Section 32.1-123.1 provides: 
"'Hospital' means any facility in which the primary function is the provi-
sion of diagnosis, of treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgi-
cal or nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospi-
tals known by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, 
sanitariums and general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and 
maternity hospitals." 
The definition of hospital in effect in 1975 when § 18.2-73 was enacted is 
similar. See Va. Code § 32.298(2) (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711). 
It specifically included at that time "out-patient surgical hospitals (which 
term shall not include the office or offices of one or more physicians or 
surgeons unless such office or offices are used principally for performing 
surgery)." 
6 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to the State Board of 
Health's general authority to adopt rules and regulations prescribing mini-
mum standards for hospitals. This authority permits it to 
"classify hospitals in accordance with the character of treatment, care, or 
service rendered or offered, and prescribe the minimum standards and re-
quirements for each class in conformity with provisions of this chapter, 
with the guiding principles expressed or implied herein, and with due re-
gard to and in reasonable conformity to the standards of health, hygiene, 
sanitation, and safety as established and recognized by the medical profes-
sion and by specialists in matters of public health and safety, having due 
regard to the availability of physicians, surgeons, nurses and other assis-
tants, and the cost and expense to the hospital and the resulting costs to 
the patients." Va. Code § 32-301 (1973) (repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711) 
(similar rulemaking authority currently is granted in Va. Code §§ 32.1-12 
and 32.1-127 (1979)). 
The first draft of the regulations differed considerably from the regula-
tions that the Board finally approved. See Department of Health, Draft I, 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (October 27, 1976). The most important difference was that there-
quirements now in Part II of the regulations were applicable to all outpa-
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. which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 7 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 8 
Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
tient facilities in which abortions could be performed, regardless of the 
trimester. 
The State Board of Health gave preliminary approval to the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 1976, and a public hearing was held January 
26, 1977. Dr. William R. Hill, a member of the Board, presided at this 
hearing, and staff present from the Department included two doctors and 
the Director of the Bureau of Medical and Nursing Facilities Services. 
Witnesses included the Associate Executive Director of the Virginia Hos-
pital Association; a representative of five outpatient abortion clinics in the 
State; representatives of two abortion clinics, the Richmond Medical Cen-
ter and the Hillcrest Clinic; a professor from Eastern Virginia Medical 
School representing Planned Parenthood of Southside Tidewater and the 
Tidewater OBGYN Society; the Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgi-
cal Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital; the Administrator of Leigh Memo-
rial Hospital; a representative of the Virginia Society for Human Life; and 
a representative of the Northern Virginia Medical Center. See Common-
wealth of Virginia Department of Health, Public Hearing In Re: Proposed 
Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Vir-
ginia (January 26, 1977). The Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital 
Association stated that "[i]n general, they are a good set of standards and 
have our support." !d., at 4. The abortion clinics were concerned, how-
ever, about the imposition of the regulations on outpatient abortion clinics 
then performing first-trimester abortions. The clinics acknowledged that 
during the second trimester "the State may regulate the [abortion] proce-
dure in the interest of maternal health." !d., at 7. But the clinics specifi-
cally "propose[d] that clinics or other facilities that perform abortions 
during the first trimester be specifically excluded from the Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia." I d., at 
26. See also id., at 28. The Medical Director of the Ambulatory Surgical 
Center of Leigh Memorial Hospital, concerned about the need to set high 
standards for outpatient surgical hospitals in the State, agreed that the 
Board should not "compromise" the strict standards needed for outpatient 
surgical hospitals in order to include these first-trimester outpatient abor-
tion clinics within the same set of regulations. See id., at 30. Following 
the hearing, the Board added Part III, the regulations of which apply only 
to clinics doing first-trimester abortions. See nn. 8, 12, infra. It there-
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be performed in an outpatient surgical hospital provided that 
facility has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
The Virginia regulations applicable to the performance of 
second-trimester abortions in outpatient surgical hospitals 
are, with few exceptions, the same regulations applicable to 
all outpatient surgical hospitals in Virginia, and may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main catego-
ries. The first grouping relates to organization, manage-
ment, policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations 
fore is clear that Virginia has recognized the need for discrete and different 
sets of regulations for the two periods. The Board gave its final approval, 
and the regulations became effective on June 30, 1977. The abortion for 
which appellant was prosecuted was performed on November 10, 1979, 
some two years and five months later. 
We note that new but similar regulations now supersede the regulations 
in effect when appellant performed the abortion for which he was prose-
cuted. See Department of Health, Rules and Regulations for the Licen-
sure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). These new regulations were 
promulgated pursuant to Va. Code §§ 32.1-12, 32.1-127, enacted in 1979. 
'Section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical hospitals). 
8 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
cal hospitals that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpre-
tation is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services, and 
by the history of Part III, see n. 6, supra. Moreover, the State's counsel 
at oral argument represented that facilities licensed pursuant to Part II 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the reg-
ulations. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meet-
ing these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure 
performed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall 
be performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week 
amenorrhea)."). 
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require personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient 
and program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§ 40.3; see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and proce-
dures manual, § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a li-
censed physician who must supervise clinical services and 
perform surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to 
be on duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The 
second category of requirements outlines construction stand-
ards for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that 
"deviations from the requirements prescribed herein may be 
approved if it is determined that the purposes of the mini-
mum requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are 
also construction requirements that set forth standards for 
the public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, §§ 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, and general building, §§ 50.6.1, 
50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 52.4. The final group of regulations relates to 
patient care services. Most of these set the requirements 
for various services that the facility may offer, such as an-
esthesia, §43.1, laboratory, §§43.6.1, 64.1.3, 64.1.4, and pa-
thology, §§ 43.6.3, 64.2.4. Some of the requirements relate 
to sanitation, laundry, and the physical plant. §§43.2, 43.10, 
43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on medical records, 
§ 43. 7, pre-operative admission, § 43.8, and post-operative re-
covery, § 43.9. Finally, the regulations mandate some emer-
gency services and evacuation planning. §§ 43.4.1, 43.5. 
B 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement differs from those at issue in City of 
Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kan-
sas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, ante, at 4-5. In those cases, 
we recognized the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." City of Akron, ante, at 19. The requirements at 
issue, however, mandated that "all second-trimester abor-
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tions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities." 
Ashcroft, ante, at 5. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's hospitalization requirement, outpatient surgical hospi-
tals may qualify for licensing as "hospitals" in which second-
trimester abortions lawfully may be performed. Thus, our 
decisions in City of Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling 
here. 
In view of its interest in protecting the health of its citi-
zens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in 
determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities. 
Although its discretion does not permit it to adopt abortion 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice, it 
does have a legitimate interest in regulating second-trimes-
ter abortions and setting forth the standards for facilities in 
which such abortions are performed. 
On their face, the Virginia regulations appear to be gener-
ally compatible with accepted medical standards governing 
outpatient second-trimester abortions. The American Pub-
lic Health Association (APHA), although recognizing "that 
greater use of the dilatation and evacuation procedure 
make[s] it possible to perform the vast majority of second tri-
mester abortions during or prior to the 16th [w]eek after the 
last menstrual period," still "[u]rges endorsement of the pro-
vision of second trimester abortion in free-standing qualified 
clinics that meet the state standards required for certifica-
tion." APHA, The Right to Second Trimester Abortion 1, 2 
(1979). The medical profession has not thought that a 
State's standards need be relaxed merely because the facility 
performs abortions: "Ambulatory care facilities providing 
abortion services should meet the same standards of care as 
those recommended for other surgical procedures performed 
in the physician's office and outpatient clinic or the free-
standing and hospital-based ambulatory setting." American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Stand-
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ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th ed. 1982). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
We need not consider whether Virginia's regulations are 
constitutional in every particular. Despite personal knowl-
edge of the regulations at least by the time of trial, appellant 
has not attacked them as being insufficiently related to the 
State's interest in protecting health. 9 His challenge 
throughout this litigation appears to have been limited to an 
assertion that the State cannot require all second-trimester 
abortions to be performed in full-service general hospitals. 
In essence, appellant has argued that Virginia's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are no different in substance from those 
reviewed in the City of Akron and Ashcroft cases. 10 At the 
9 See nn. 3, 6, supra; 5 Record 55-56 (appellant acknowledging exist-
ence of the outpatient hospital license; stating that he was seeking a li-
cense; but denying that he knew of the licensing program when the abor-
tion was performed). 
10 Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regulations, but not 
individually or on specific grounds, instead making only facial challenges in 
the broadest language and in conclusory terms: that the record is silent on 
the applicability of those regulations to his facility; that the record does not 
show whether any outpatient surgical hospitals exist in Virginia or 
whether, if they exist, they allow second-trimester abortions; that the 
record is silent on the reasonableness of the regulations; that he had no 
opportunity to defend against the regulations at trial; that it is uncertain 
whether, if he had applied for an outpatient hospital license, it would have 
been granted; that obtaining a license is an arduous process; that Virginia 
courts have had no opportunity to construe the "licensing statutes and 
regulations"; and that Part II of the regulations does not cover an outpa-
tient surgical hospital where second-trimester abortions are performed. 
Some of these arguments are simply meritless, see n. 8, supra, and others 
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same time, however, appellant took the position-both be-
fore the Virginia courts and this Court-that a state licensing 
requirement for outpatient abortion facilities would be con-
stitutional. 11 We can only assume that by continuing to chal-
lenge the Virginia hospitalization requirement petitioner ei-
ther views the Virginia regulations in some unspecified way 
as unconstitutional or challenges a hospitalization require-
ment that does not exist in Virginia. Yet, not until his reply 
brief in this Court did he elect to criticize the regulations 
apart from his broadside attack on the entire Virginia hos-
pitalization requirement. 
Given the plain language of the Virginia regulations and 
the history of their adoption, see n. 6, supra, we see no rea-
son to doubt that an adequately equipped clinic could, upon 
proper application, obtain an outpatient hospital license per-
mitting the performance of second-trimester abortions. 
We conclude that Virginia's requirement that second-trimes-
ter abortions be performed in licensed clinics is not an unrea-
sonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 
"protecting the woman's own health and safety." Roe, 410 
U.S., at 150. 12 As we emphasized in Roe, "[t]he State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other 
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that in-
sure maximum safety for the patient." Ibid. Unlike the 
are irrelevant, see n. 3, supra, and none has been raised below. 
n See 8 Record 196a, 214a; Brief for Appellant in No. 801107 (Va. S. 
Ct.), p. 35; Juris. Statement 16; Brief for Appellant 32, 43 n. 75, 46. 
12 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-
trimester abortion clinics, requires the same services and equipment as 
Part II. In fact, Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§63.1.1(b), §63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only issue before us, however, relates 
to second-trimester abortions. 
0. 
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provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's 
statute and regulations do not require that the patient be 
hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be performed 
in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's re-
quirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in 
licensed clinics appears to comport with accepted medical 
practice, and leaves the method and timing of the abortion 
precisely where they belong-with the physician and the 
patient. 
IV 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
